Richard A. Fancher is seeking the office of Granite City superintendent of streets. On January 13, 2003, he filed his nomination papers, including a statement of candidacy,nomination petitions, a receipt for economic interest statement, and a loyalty oath. Shortlyafter these papers were filed, Roger A. Knobeloch, Jr. (petitioner), filed an objection. Anelection is to be held on April 1, 2003.

Petitioner claimed that Fancher's statement of candidacy and most of his nominationpetitions did not comply with the statutory requirements set forth in sections 10-4 and 10-5of the Illinois Election Code (Code) (10 ILCS 5/10-4, 10-5 (West 2000)). Specifically,petitioner claims that certain papers were not signed and sworn to before an appropriateofficer authorized to take acknowledgments of deeds in Illinois or authorized to administeroaths in Illinois. Petitioner contends that those papers that were signed and sworn to beforeKathlyn Moore, a notary public commissioned by the State of Missouri, were invalid. Moore is not a notary commissioned by the State of Illinois, the state where the papers weresigned and the oath was sworn. Petitioner sought the removal of Fancher's name from theballot.

After a hearing before the Electoral Board for the City of Granite City, Illinois(Board), the Board denied petitioner's objections. The Board found that Fancher had agood-faith belief that at the time of the signing and oaths he was doing so before a personauthorized to take such oaths. Therefore, the Board concluded that the intent of the Codehad been fulfilled and that, absent an allegation of fraud or an intent to deceive, Fanchershould be allowed to remain on the ballot. Petitioner sought the review of this decisionbefore the circuit court of Madison County. The circuit court refused to disturb the decisionof the Board. We now have petitioner's expedited appeal before us.

The facts in this case, as stipulated to by the parties, are as follows. Fancher'snomination papers include 27 nominating petitions containing a total of approximately 500signatures. These petitions were completed between November 21, 2002, and January 12,2003. At the bottom of each petition is a statement of certification. Twenty-six of thepetitions are notarized by Moore. Fancher's statement of candidacy is also notarized byMoore.

Moore is a notary public commissioned by the State of Missouri. This is evident onthe seal stamped on each notarization. In October 2002, Moore contacted the Illinois StateBoard of Elections to ascertain whether she, a Missouri notary, had the authority to notarizeIllinois election documents. She was told that she could. At the time of the notarizations,both Fancher and Moore believed that Moore's notarization was authorized under Illinoislaw. However, Fancher and Moore now understand that Moore did not have authority tonotarize these papers in Illinois. There is no allegation of fraud, corruption, or dishonestypertaining to the notarial act. We now turn to the relevant statutes.

Section 10-4 of the Code provides that the statement of certification "shall be swornto before some officer authorized to administer oaths in this State." 10 ILCS 5/10-4 (West2000). Section 10-5 of the Code provides that the statement of candidacy "shall besubscribed and sworn to by such candidate before some officer authorized to takeacknowledgments of deeds in this State." 10 ILCS 5/10-5 (West 2000). Fancher does notdispute that Moore did not have the authority to administer oaths in Illinois or that she didnot have the authority to take acknowledgments of deeds in Illinois. However, Fanchercontends that the unknowing use of a defective notary is not fatal; that because he signedand took the oaths before a person whom he believed to be an authorized notary, theprovisions were substantially complied with; and finally, that the integrity of the politicalprocess was not jeopardized by Fancher's actions and so his name should remain on theballot.

The provisions of the Code are designed to protect the integrity of the electoralprocess. Welch v. Johnson, 147 Ill. 2d 40, 56 (1992). There is no dispute that the provisionsin sections 10-4 and 10-5 are mandatory. See Hagen v. Stone, 277 Ill. App. 3d 388, 391(1995) (holding that the section 10-4 requirement that a circulator's affidavit include astatement of when the sheet was circulated is a mandatory provision); Serwinski v. Boardof Election Commissioners of the City of Chicago, 156 Ill. App. 3d 257, 260 (1987) (thesubscription-and-oath provision of section 10-5 is mandatory). A mandatory provision isone that will describe the consequences of failing to follow its provisions (Johnson v. Theis,282 Ill. App. 3d 966, 972 (1996)), and the conduct is prescribed in order to safeguard aperson's rights, which may be injuriously affected by a failure to act in the manner specified. Shipley v. Stephenson County Electoral Board, 130 Ill. App. 3d 900, 903 (1985). Thefailure to follow a mandatory provision renders the proceeding to which it relates illegal andvoid. Serwinski, 156 Ill. App. 3d at 259.

Essentially, Fancher's argument on appeal is that even though these are mandatoryprovisions, he substantially complied with these provisions and, therefore, the 26 petitionsand the statement of candidacy should not be considered defective. Fancher cites severalcases that have accepted the theory of substantial compliance with mandatory provisions,including a recent appellate court decision in Brennan v. Kolman, 335 Ill. App. 3d 716, 720(2002) (stating that "substantial compliance can satisfy even a mandatory provision of theCode" and then holding that although affidavits failed to state that those who signed thepetition were registered voters, the opening line in the petitions made that statement and thusthe petitions substantially complied with section 28-3 of the Code (10 ILCS 5/28-3 (West2000))). See also Sakonyi v. Lindsey, 261 Ill. App. 3d 821, 826 (1994) (despite the failureto include a circulator's address on three of the four petitions verified by the circulator,where the address was present on one petition and thus available for use in locating her,there was substantial compliance with the mandatory provision of section 28-3 of the Code);Schumann v. Kumarich, 102 Ill. App. 3d 454, 459 (1981) (although an address was notincluded in the circulator's affidavit at the bottom of each sheet, because the address wasgiven at the top of each page of his own petition wherein he was named to be a candidate,there was substantial compliance with the requirements of section 10-4 on this point);Shipley, 130 Ill. App. 3d at 907 (a notarization was invalid, but section 28-3 wassubstantially complied with where the circulators believed they could be subjected to perjuryprosecutions if the statements they made proved to be false, where there was no evidenceof fraud or corruption, where none of the parties knew that the notarization was invalid, andwhere the integrity of the political process was not in jeopardy).

However, as we recently stated in Powell v. East St. Louis Electoral Board, No. 5-03-0071 (February 19, 2003), we believe that the Illinois Supreme Court's decision in DeFabiov. Gummersheimer, 192 Ill. 2d 63, 66 (2000), is controlling. In Gummersheimer, thesupreme court rejected the use of the substantial-compliance theory for mandatoryprovisions in the Code. In Powell, we stated, "Gummersheimer held that a mandatoryprovision of the Election Code must be enforced even where parties agree there is noknowledge or evidence of fraud or corruption." Powell, slip op. at 5. We adhere to thisinterpretation of Gummersheimer that substantial compliance is no longer sufficient. Although we are sympathetic to Fancher's situation, we cannot overlook petitioner'sstatement that an opposing view "effectively permits a candidate's ignorance of Illinois lawto insulate himself or herself from the consequences of any and all violations of mandatorylegal requirements." Here, even though the parties agree that there is no knowledge orevidence of fraud or corruption and that Fancher, at the time of his signing and oath, fullybelieved that he was certifying said papers before an authorized notary and thereforesubjecting himself to the laws of perjury, we believe that we are bound by the supremecourt's decision in Gummersheimer. Accordingly, because the statement of candidacy andnearly all of the petitions do not comply with the mandatory provisions in sections 10-4 and10-5 of the Code because they were not sworn to before an appropriate officer⁽¹⁾, they mustbe ruled invalid. Wherefore, we reverse the decision of the circuit court, and pursuant to ourauthority under Supreme Court Rule 366(a)(5) (155 Ill. 2d R. 366(a)(5)), we direct thatFancher's name be removed from the ballot.

We further direct that the mandate issue instanter.

Reversed; judgment entered; mandate to issue instanter.

HOPKINS, P.J., and KUEHN, J., concur.

1. Cf. Roth v. Illinois Farmers Insurance Co., 202 Ill. 2d 490, 494 (2002) (stating "[litigant] did not file an 'affidavit' *** because the document filed *** does not consist ofa statement sworn to before a person who has authority under the law to administer oaths").