Industrial Commission Division
Filed: April 28, 2004

No. 1-03-0797WC

IN THE
APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS
FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION DIVISION

JUSTICE HOFFMAN delivered the opinion of the court:

Max Shepard, Inc., (Shepard) appeals from an order of thecircuit court confirming a decision of the Industrial Commission(Commission), awarding the claimant, Sam Creinin, benefits underthe Workers' Compensation Act (Act) (820 ILCS 305/1 et seq. (West1998)). For the reasons which follow, we affirm as hereinaftermodified.

The claimant filed an application for adjustment of claim,seeking benefits under the Act for injuries he allegedly receivedout of and in the course of his employment on October 2, 1999. Inthat application, the claimant listed his employers as: Jerome S.Alport and Myra K. Alport, individually and doing business as MaxShepard, Inc.; Mel-Park Village Mart; Mel-Park Drugs; Mel-Park Deliand Liquor; and Village Currency Exchange. The following factswere established by the testimony and exhibits presented at thearbitration hearings.

On October 2, 1999, the 83-year-old claimant was employed byShepard as a delicatessen manager. His duties included preparingtrays of food, slicing meat, and overall running the delicatessen. On the morning of October 2, 1999, the claimant arrived at work anddeactivated the security alarm at 6:13 a.m., as evidenced by therecords of Certified Security, Shepard's alarm company. Accordingto the claimant, after he spoke to a representative of CertifiedSecurity at 6:14 a.m., he brought newspapers and several food itemsinto the store from a shed in the alley, and began filling boxeswhich he obtained from a cooler with food. The claimant testifiedthat, as he was filling the last box, he tripped on a box and fellagainst an ice cream cooler. Unable to walk and in pain, theclaimant crawled to the phone located in the front of the store andcalled Jerome Alport, Shepard's president, and told him that he hadbroken his leg. When Alport arrived about 15 minutes later, theclaimant was sitting on a chair in the store. Because the claimantcould not stand and put weight on his left foot, Alport called"911".

Paramedics arrived at the scene and transported the claimantto Gottlieb Hospital where Dr. Prinz, a board certified orthopedicsurgeon, diagnosed the claimant as suffering from a comminutedfracture of the left tibia and fibula. Dr. Prinz applied anexternal fixator to the claimant's left tibial shaft fracture andperformed an open reduction and internal fixation of the leftdistal fibular fracture.

The witnesses testified to conflicting accounts as to how theclaimant came to be injured. As indicated earlier, the claimanttestified that he tripped over a box while working and fell againstan ice cream cooler. Alport testified that, when he arrived at thedelicatessen, the claimant told him that he had fallen outside ofthe store. Alport also stated that he heard the claimant tell theparamedics that he had fallen outside of the store while gettingout of his car.

A report dictated by Dr. Prinz on October 3, 1999, states,under the heading of "HISTORY OF PRESENT ILLNESS", that theclaimant "sustained an injury on his way to work ***." However, ina progress note dated March 7, 2000, Dr. Prinz wrote that, althoughhis records suggest that the claimant sustained an injury on hisway to work, the claimant subsequently told him that he wasactually injured at work when he fell over a box as he was fillingorders.

Diego Palacios, one of the Melrose Park paramedics whotransported the claimant to Gottlieb Hospital, testified that heand his partner picked up the claimant on October 2, 1999, at 7:57a.m. According to Palacios, when he arrived, the claimant waslying on the floor, just inside of the door. Palacios acknowledgedthat he wrote a report of the incident which indicates that theclaimant stated that he tripped on the sidewalk. However, Palaciostestified that he did not know whether it was the claimant or someother individual at the scene who gave him that information. Histestimony in this regard is consistent with a letter that he wroteon March 31, 2000, at the request of the claimant. The claimantdenied telling Palacios that he tripped on the sidewalk, and Alportdenied ever telling either the paramedics or the personnel atGottlieb Hospital that the claimant had fallen in the parking lot.

Alport testified that he visited the claimant four or fivetimes while he was hospitalized. According to Alport, the claimanttold him that he had tripped over a box as he was getting out ofhis car and fell in the parking lot.

Anthony Aiadro, one of the claimant's friends, testified that,when he arrived at the delicatessen on October 2, 1999, Alport toldhim that the claimant fell on some boxes, broke his leg, and wastaken to the hospital.

Paul Nicoski, Shepard's delicatessen manager until May 1999,testified that he visited the claimant in the hospital on October4, 1999. According to Nicoski, the claimant told him that hetripped over a box as he was preparing lunches.

Subsequent to his admission to Gottlieb Hospital, the claimantcontinued under the care of Dr. Prinz. On January 5, 2000, Dr.Prinz operated to remove the claimant's external fixator andapplied a short leg cast. Thereafter, Dr. Prinz prescribedphysical therapy for the claimant and ordered a bone stimulator tohelp his bone heal. He ordered the claimant to remain off workuntil further notice. As early as March 7, 2000, Dr. Prinz notedthat the claimant would be unable to return to his old job as itwas unlikely that he would be able to stand for eight hours a dayor walk without a walker.

According to Dr. Prinz, the claimant had not reached maximummedical improvement (MMI) as of April 1, 2000. On May 15, 2000,Dr. Prinz noted that the claimant needed to wear a walker boot, wasrequired to use a walker, and was still in significant pain. Dr.Prinz's notes of June 19, 2000, state that the claimant was makingslow progress, needed a walker, and could not return to work.

At the request of Shepard, the claimant was examined by Dr.Thomas G. Colmey on June 20, 2000. In a report dated that sameday, Dr. Colmey noted that the claimant gave a history of havinginjured his ankle when he fell over a box at work. After examiningthe claimant and reviewing an x-ray of his left lower leg andankle, Dr. Colmey recorded a clinical impression of "residuals offracture left tibia and ankle" and commented that the claimantappeared to be doing relatively well with regard to ambulation,although he was still maintained in a brace and had to use a walkerto alleviate discomfort and provide stability.

When deposed on June 29, 2000, Dr. Prinz stated that theclaimant had not yet reached MMI and he did not believe that theclaimant would reach MMI before October 2000. Dr. Prinz opinedthat the claimant was permanently disabled and would never be ableto return to his job. He testified that the claimant might be ableto do some sedentary work in the future, but could not fix a datewhen the claimant might be able to return to work. Dr. Prinzstated that transportation to and from work might present aproblem, as the claimant was at risk of injury even traveling toscheduled medical visits. Dr. Prinz thought it would be unusual toprovide vocational rehabilitation for someone of the claimant'sage. Finally, Dr. Prinz testified as to the reasonableness of thecharges for medical services rendered to the claimant by himselfand several other medical providers.

In a letter dated September 20, 2000, Dr. Prinz wrote that theclaimant had some permanent loss of function, that he would not beable to return to delicatessen work, and that he was not surewhether the claimant was an appropriate candidate for vocationalrehabilitation.

At the arbitration hearing held on April 25, 2001, theclaimant admitted that the payroll checks he received while workingcame from Shepard as did the W-2 forms that he received at the endof each year.

After the conclusion of the arbitration hearings, thearbitrator issued a decision on June 15, 2001, in which hedismissed all of the respondents except for Shepard. In thatdecision, the arbitrator found that the claimant sustainedaccidental injuries arising out of and in the scope of hisemployment with Shepard and awarded the claimant temporary totaldisability (TTD) benefits for a period of 35 2/7 weeks, andpermanent partial disability (PPD) benefits for a period of 120weeks by reason of the claimant having suffered a 60% loss of useof his left leg. In addition, the arbitrator ordered Shepard topay $12,457.93 for medical expenses incurred by the claimant.

Both the claimant and Shepard sought a review of thearbitrator's decision before the Commission. On June 28, 2002, theCommission issued a decision, concurred in by Commissioners Madiganand Kinnaman, with a dissenting opinion filed by CommissionerGilgas. However, on September 27, 2002, that decision was recalledby the Commission pursuant to section 19(f) of the Act (820 ILCS305/19(f)(West 1998)), and a "Corrected Decision" was filed in itsplace. The Corrected Decision was authored by CommissionerKinnaman, with a special concurring opinion filed by CommissionerRink. Commissioner Gilgis again filed a dissenting opinion.

In its Corrected Decision, the Commission modified thearbitrator's award, finding that the claimant was entitled to TTDbenefits for a period of 60 5/7 weeks, that he had established thathe was permanently and totally disabled, and that he was,therefore, entitled to an award of $233.33 per week for lifebeginning on November 30, 2000. After determining the credits towhich "the respondent" was entitled and ordering it to hold theclaimant harmless and defend him from any claims for the payment ofmedical expenses he might incur as a result of his work-relatedinjuries, the Commission affirmed and adopted the arbitrator'sfindings as to all other issues.

Shepard sought judicial review of the Commission's CorrectedDecision in the circuit court of Cook County. On February 26,2003, the circuit court entered an order confirming that decisionand, thereafter, Shepard filed this appeal.

For its first issue on appeal, Shepard argues that theCommission's Corrected Decision is void because the appointment ofPaul Rink as a commissioner was invalid. In support of itsargument in this regard, Shepard submitted certain documentaryevidence to the circuit court establishing the following.

Robert Madigan was appointed as a Commissioner of the IllinoisIndustrial Commission for a term commencing on the third Monday inJanuary 2001 and ending on January 17, 2005. When Madiganresigned, then Governor George Ryan sent a letter to the IllinoisSecretary of State dated July 3, 2002, stating that, effective July8, 2002, he made a temporary appointment of Paul Rink to theposition formerly held by Commissioner Madigan "until a permanentappointment can be made." The letter also stated that Rink'sappointment would expire on December 31, 2002. On that same day,Governor Ryan issued another letter to the Secretary of Stateappointing Diane Ford as a commissioner, effective January 17,2003, to the position held by Rink. Both appointments weretransmitted to the Senate on November 21, 2002, and approved onDecember 4, 2002.

Shepard argues that the appointment of Rink as a commissionerfor a term less than the unexpired term of Commissioner Madigan wasin derogation of section 13(b) of the Act (820 ILCS 305/13(b) (West2000)) and, as a consequence, void. Although we agree thatGovernor Ryan had no statutory authority to limit Rink's term ofoffice to less than Commissioner Madigan's unexpired term, we donot agree that Rink's temporary appointment was void.

Section 13 of the Act provides in relevant part, as follows:

"The Industrial Commission shall administer thisAct.

The members shall be appointed by the Governor, withthe advice and consent of the Senate, as follows:

***

(b) Members shall *** be appointed to hold officefor terms of 4 years from the third Monday in January ofthe year of their appointment, and until their successorsare appointed and qualified.

***

In case of a vacancy in the office of a Commissionerduring the recess of the Senate, the Governor shall makea temporary appointment until the next meeting of theSenate, when he shall nominate some person to fill suchoffice. Any person so nominated who is confirmed by theSenate shall hold office during the remainder of the termand until his successor is appointed and qualified." 820ILCS 305/13 (West 2000).

Shepard makes no argument that the Senate was not in recess onJuly 3, 2002, when Governor Ryan made the temporary appointment ofRink as a commissioner, nor does it, or could it, argue that anynomination to fill Commissioner Madigan's position was transmittedto the Senate and approved prior to September 27, 2002, the dateupon which Rink concurred in the Corrected Decision entered in thiscase. Rather, Shepard's attack on the validity of Rink'sappointment as a commissioner appears to focus on his nominationand confirmation for a term less than the unexpired term ofCommissioner Madigan. We need not address the argument (but seeFord v. Blagojevich, 260 F. Supp. 2d 700 (C.D.Ill. 2003)), as ithas little relevance to the question of the validity of Rink'stemporary appointment.

When Rink concurred in the Corrected Decision in this case, hewas discharging the duties of a commissioner under a temporaryappointment. With the resignation of Commissioner Madigan,Governor Ryan exercised his statutory authority to temporarilyappoint Rink to the vacant position. See 820 ILCS 305/13(b) (West2000). Although the July 3, 2002, letter reflecting the temporaryappointment of Rink which was transmitted to the Secretary of Statereflects an expiration date of December 31, 2002, it clearly statesthat it was a temporary appointment "until a permanent appointmentcan be made." In the context of a temporary appointment, anyreference to a specific expiration date is pure surplus verbiage asthe Act specifies that the Governor may make the appointment untilthe next meeting of the Senate, when he is required to nominatesomeone to fill the office. See 820 ILCS 305/13(b) (West 2000).

We believe that Rink's temporary appointment as a commissionerwas in compliance with the provisions of section 13(b) of the Actand in all respects valid. Consequently, we reject Shepard'sattack on the validity of the Commission's Corrected Decision.

Next, Shepard argues that the Commission's finding that theclaimant sustained accidental injuries arising out of and in thecourse of his employment is against the manifest weight of theevidence. Distilled to its finest, however, this argument islittle more than an attack on the credibility of the claimant andhis witnesses.

It is the function of the Commission to decide questions offact, judge the credibility of witnesses, and resolve conflictingevidence. O'Dette v. Industrial Comm'n, 79 Ill. 2d 249, 253, 403N.E.2d 221 (1980). The Commission's determination on a question offact will not be disturbed on review unless it is against themanifest weight of the evidence. Orsini v. Industrial Comm'n, 117Ill. 2d 38, 44, 509 N.E.2d 1005 (1987). For a finding of fact tobe contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence, an oppositeconclusion must be clearly apparent. Caterpillar, Inc. v.Industrial Comm'n, 228 Ill. App. 3d 288, 291, 591 N.E.2d 894(1992).

In this case, the Commission found the claimant credible whenhe testified that he suffered accidental injuries as a consequenceof having tripped over a box while working. Additionally, theCommission found Alport's testimony concerning the manner in whichthe claimant was injured to be inconsistent and unsupported by anyother witness' testimony. Whether this or any other court mighthave reached the same conclusion is not the test of whether theCommission's determination on the issue is against the manifestweight of the evidence. Rather, the appropriate test is whetherthere is sufficient evidence in the record to support theCommission's determination. Benson v. Industrial Comm'n, 91 Ill.2d 445, 450, 440 N.E.2d 90 (1982). We cannot say that no rationaltrier of fact could have found the claimant credible or that anopposite conclusion is clearly apparent from the evidence in therecord. Relying on the testimony of the claimant as to the mannerin which he broke his leg, the Commission's finding that theclaimant sustained accidental injuries arising out of and in thecourse of his employment by Shepard is not against the manifestweight of the evidence.

For its next argument, Shepard asserts that the Commission'sfinding that the claimant is permanently and totally disabled isagainst the manifest weight of the evidence and contrary to law. According to Shepard, the claimant failed to prove that hiscondition was in fact permanent.

A person is totally disabled when he cannot perform anyservices except those for which no reasonably stable labor marketexists. A.M.T.C. of Illinois, Inc. v. Industrial Comm'n, 77 Ill.2d 482, 487, 397 N.E.2d 804 (1979). The claimant need not,however, show that he has been reduced to total physical incapacitybefore being entitled to a permanent and total disability award. Interlake, Inc. v. Industrial Comm'n, 86 Ill. 2d 168, 176, 427N.E.2d 103 (1981). In determining whether a claimant is totallyand permanently disabled, the Commission considers his age,experience, training, and education. E.R. Moore Co. v. IndustrialComm'n, 71 Ill. 2d 353, 362, 376 N.E.2d 206 (1978). The questionof whether a claimant is totally and permanently disabled is one offact for the Commission to resolve, and its determination on thismatter will not be disturbed on appeal unless contrary to themanifest weight of the evidence. Ceco Corp. v. Industrial Comm'n,95 Ill. 2d 278, 288-89, 447 N.E.2d 842 (1983).

At the time of the arbitration hearing, the claimant was 85years old. He has a high school education and has worked indelicatessens from 1947 until the time of his injury. The claimanttestified that he can only stand for 5 to 10 minutes without theuse of a walker and from 15 to 20 minutes while using a walker. His treating physician, Dr. Prinz, opined that the claimant waspermanently disabled and would never be able to return to his oldjob. Although Dr. Prinz testified that the claimant might be ableto do sedentary work at some time in the future, he qualified hisremark by stating that transporting the claimant to and from workmight present a problem and that he did not believe that theclaimant was a good candidate for vocational rehabilitation.

Taking into account the claimant's injury, his age, education,work history, and the opinions of his treating physician, webelieve that there is sufficient evidence in the record to supporta conclusion that the claimant is incapable of performing anyservices for which a stable labor market exists. Further, Shepardfailed to introduce any evidence to show that the claimant wascapable of engaging in some type of regular and continuousemployment. Consequently, the Commission's finding that theclaimant is totally and permanently disabled is not against themanifest weight of the evidence, despite the fact that the claimantfailed to introduce evidence that work was not available to him. See E.R. Moore Co., 71 Ill. 2d at 362-63.

Shepard also contends that the claimant failed to lay a properfoundation for the admission into evidence of bills for medicalservices and failed to introduce evidence establishing thenecessity for the services rendered. As a consequence, Shepardargues that the Commission's award of benefits under section 8(a)of the Act (820 ILCS 305/8(a) (West 2000)) is against the manifestweight of the evidence.

Resolution of this issue has been made somewhat difficult byreason of Shepard's failure to include in the appendix to its briefa table of contents, with page references, of the record on appealas required by Supreme Court Rule 342(a) (155 Ill. 2d R. 342(a)),a record which consists of 8 volumes containing in excess of 1900pages; and the claimant's failure to meaningfully address the issuein his brief.

The claimant introduced into evidence, over Shepard'sobjection, exhibits in support of the following medical expenses: $44,422.08 to Gottlieb Hospital; $6,761.00 to Dr. Prinz; $3,950.00to E.B.I Bone Healing System; $2,282.00 to Dr. Farhi; $494.00 toMedical Imaging Professionals; and $160.00 to Special Care HomeOrthopedics. Dr. Prinz testified to the reasonableness andnecessity of the charges and services rendered by himself, E.B.IBone Healing System, Dr. Farhi, Medical Imaging Professionals, andSpecial Care Home Orthopedics. The bill from Gottlieb Hospital isclearly for medical services rendered in connection with theclaimant's hospitalization and treatment immediately following hisinjury.

The arbitrator and the Commission ordered Shepard to pay$12,457.93 for necessary medical care and services provided to theclaimant by Dr. Prinz, E.B.I Bone Healing System, Medical ImagingProfessionals, Special Care Home Orthopedics, and the balance ofDr. Farhi's bill which had not been paid by Medicare. In addition,the Commission ordered Shepard to hold the claimant harmless anddefend him against any claims for reimbursement for medicalexpenses paid on his behalf by reason of the injuries he sustainedon October 2, 1999. These potential claims include the payment ofGottlieb Hospital's bill and a portion of Dr. Farhi's bill.

Under section 8(a) of the Act, an employer is required toprovide or pay for "all the necessary first aid, medical andsurgical services, and all necessary medical, surgical and hospitalservices thereafter incurred, limited, however, to that which isreasonably required to cure or relieve from the effects of theaccidental injury" of an employee. 820 ILCS 305/8(a) (West 2000). As is the case with any element of a workers' compensation claim,the claimant bears the burden of proving, by a preponderance of theevidence, his entitlement to an award of medical expenses undersection 8(a). Jewel Cos., Inc. v. Industrial Comm'n, 125 Ill. App.3d 92, 94, 465 N.E.2d 935 (1984). Questions as to thereasonableness of medical charges or their causal relationship toa work-related injury are questions of fact to be resolved by theCommission and its resolution of such matters will not be disturbedon review unless against the manifest weight of the evidence. Ingalls Memorial Hospital v. Industrial Comm'n, 241 Ill. App. 3d710, 717, 609 N.E.2d 775 (1993).

In light of Dr. Prinz's testimony, we are unable to find thatthe Commission's order that Shepard pay $12,457.93 for necessarymedical care and services provided to the claimant by Dr. Prinz,E.B.I Bone Healing System, Medical Imaging Professionals, SpecialCare Home Orthopedics, and the balance of Dr. Farhi's bill isagainst the manifest weight of the evidence. This is especiallytrue in light of the fact that Shepard failed to introduce anyevidence to suggest that the services rendered by any of theseproviders was not necessary or that their charges were notreasonable and customary. See Ingalls Memorial Hospital, 241 Ill.App. 3d at 718.

Additionally, we find no error in that portion of theCommission's Corrected Decision which ordered Shepard to hold theclaimant harmless and defend him against any claims forreimbursement for medical expenses paid on his behalf by reason ofthe injuries he sustained on October 2, 1999. It is clear from thetestimony of the claimant, Alport, Palacios, Nicoski and Dr. Prinzthat the claimant was taken to Gottlieb Hospital on the day of hisinjury, received medical attention there and was hospitalized, andthat the medical services the claimant received at GottliebHospital were causally related to his accident on October 2, 1999. It is true, as Shepard contends, that the claimant totally failedto lay a proper foundation for the admission of the GottliebHospital bill into evidence. The claimant never testifiedconcerning that bill, and Dr. Prinz, although asked, declined torender an opinion as to whether the charges set forth therein wereusual and customary. However, the Commission did not order Shepardto pay the Gottlieb Hospital bill; it only ordered Shepard todefend and hold the claimant harmless against any claim forreimbursement for medical bills paid on his behalf by reason of hiswork-related injuries. Clearly, the payment of any such bills isShepard's obligation under section 8(a) of the Act. If a claim ismade against the claimant for reimbursement for sums paid toGottlieb Hospital or any other entity for medical services incurredby reason of his work-related injury, Shepard, in its defense ofthe claimant, would be provided a forum to contest the necessityfor any services rendered and the reasonableness of the charges. In this case, the Commission has ordered no more than section 8(a)of the Act requires.

As its final request for relief, Shepard moves this court tomodify the judgment of the circuit court to reflect that it is theonly party plaintiff in this cause and the only party ordered bythe Commission to pay benefits to the claimant. Shepard assertsthat the arbitrator dismissed all of the other original respondentsnamed in the claimant's application for adjustment of claim andthat the Commission affirmed and adopted that portion of thearbitrator's decision. As a consequence, Shepard contends that thecircuit court's reference to Alport as the party bringing theaction for judicial review is in error as is the reference in itsjudgment order to the claimant having been injured during thecourse of his employment by Alport.

The claimant asserts that Alport never purchased workers'compensation insurance naming himself or any of "his corporations"as insured employers, nor did he or Shepard apply with theCommission for approval to operate as a self-insured employer asprovided in section 4(a) of the Act ((820 ILCS 305/4(a) (West2000)). The claimant alleges that the Commission issued an orderrequiring that "Mel Park Village Mart" purchase an insurancepolicy, and contends that, "[t]o secure payment of the award by theuninsured employer, Jerome S. Alport (sole officer and director ofhis uninsured corporations), the Commission rejected theappellants' petition to limit liability for payment of the award tothe defunct corporations, Max Shepard, Inc., d/b/a Mel Park VillageMart."

A resolution of this issue requires a brief statement of factsgleaned from the record. As noted earlier, the claimant admittedin his testimony at the arbitration hearing that the payroll checkshe received while working came from Shepard as did the W-2 forms hereceived at the end of each year. Contrary to the claimant'sassertions, the Commission ordered Shepard to obtain workers'compensation insurance, not Alport. The Insurance ComplianceSettlement Agreement resolving the matter states that it wasentered into between the Commission and "the EMPLOYER, MAX SHEPARD,INC[.], d/b/a MEL-PARK VILLAGE MART." Further, Sherpard isabsolutely correct when it states that the arbitrator granted amotion to dismiss all of the respondents named in the claimant'sapplication for adjustment of claim except for Shepard, and thatthe Commission in its Corrected Decision neither modified oroverruled the arbitrator's decision in this regard, but adopted andaffirmed it. It is true that the Commission's Corrected Decisionspeaks only in terms of the arbitrator having found that theclaimant suffered accidental injuries arising out of and in thecourse of his employment with the "Respondent" and, thereafter,refers only to the "Respondent" being liable for certain specifiedbenefits without ever identifying the respondent by name. However,the arbitrator's decision specifically states that "[t]he motion todismiss all Respondents except Max Shepard, Inc. is granted" and,as a consequence and in the absence of any action by the Commissionto reverse, vacate, or modify the arbitrator's ruling in thisregard, Shepard was the only remaining party respondent at the timethat the Commission issued its Corrected Decision and theCommission specifically found that the claimant "worked for MaxShepard, Inc." Based upon the procedural history in this case, thefindings of the Commission, and the fact that the only evidenceintroduced at the arbitration hearing established that the claimantwas an employee of Shepard, we conclude that the party against whomthe Commission entered its award is Shepard. Our conclusion isalso supported by well-settled law of which the Commission ispresumptively aware; namely, that the Act does not provide forindividual liability against corporate officers and directors, andthe Commission lacks the power to pierce the corporate veil even incircumstances where a corporate employer does not, or cannot, payan award. JMH Properties, Inc. v. Industrial Comm'n, 332 Ill. App.3d 831, 832-33, 773 N.E.2d 736 (2002). Additionally, the recordreflects that Shepard is the sole plaintiff on whose behalf thepetition for judicial review was filed in the circuit court of CookCounty.

Based upon our review of the record, we find that the circuitcourt incorrectly referred to Alport as: the party who filed an"appeal" (action for judicial review) from the Commission'sdecision; the party employing the claimant at the time of hisinjury; and the party making various arguments attacking theCommission's decision. Shepard is the plaintiff in the underlyingaction, Shepard was the claimant's employer on the date that hesuffered the accidental injuries for which benefits under the Actwere sought, and Shepard is the only party ordered by theCommission in its Corrected Decision to pay benefits to theclaimant. Consequently, the circuit court's judgment is herebymodified to so reflect.

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of thecircuit court, as modified, confirming the Commission's CorrectedDecision.

Affirmed as modified.

McCULLOUGH, P.J., and CALLUM, HOLDRIDGE, and GOLDENHERSH, JJ.,concur.