JUSTICE MAAG delivered the opinion of the court:

The plaintiffs, Sonya R. Moore, as the guardian for Eva R. Moore, and Eva D. Moore,filed a suit against the defendants, Johnson County Farm Bureau (Farm Bureau) and CountryMutual Insurance Company (Country Mutual), in the circuit court of Saline County. Thecourt entered an order dismissing all the counts of the amended complaint against CountryMutual with prejudice and expressly finding no just reason to delay an appeal, pursuant toIllinois Supreme Court Rule 304(a) (155 Ill. 2d R. 304(a)). On appeal, the plaintiffs contendthat the circuit court (1) improperly drew a distinction between a broker and a captive agentand (2) erred in dismissing all the counts of the amended complaint against Country Mutualfor the failure to state a cause of action.

On July 21, 1999, the plaintiffs suffered injuries from an automobile accidentinvolving a vehicle driven by Mark Harper. Harper was driving a 1991 Tiltmaster tractorowned by his father, Harold Harper. Harold Harper had entered into an insurance contracton the vehicle with Country Mutual.

The plaintiffs filed a suit against the Harpers in the United States District Court forthe Southern District of Illinois. Sonya R. Moore, as Guardian of Eva R. Moore, and EvaD. Moore v. Harold Harper d/b/a Harper's Red Barn Fruit Market, a Proprietorship, and BradPavelonis, as Administrator of the Estate of Mark T. Harper, No. 99-4240-JLF. Otherpersons not named in the suit were believed to have been injured in the accident, andtherefore, Country Mutual filed an interpleader action and deposited with the clerk of thatcourt its policy limits of $50,000 per person and $100,000 per occurrence. Country MutualInsurance Company v. Sonya R. Moore, Individually, and as Guardian for Eva R. Moore etal., No. 00-4001-JLF. The district court found that the actual damages exceeded the deposit,and the court ordered a distribution of the funds.

On July 19, 2001, the plaintiffs filed a complaint against the defendants in the circuitcourt of Saline County. The plaintiffs alleged that Harold Harper and Brad Pavelonis, as theadministrator of the estate of Mark T. Harper, had assigned them their rights against thedefendants. The complaint contained 12 counts. Counts I through VI were directed againstthe Farm Bureau. Counts VII through XII were directed against Country Mutual.

In their complaint, the plaintiffs alleged that Mark Harper had been driving theTiltmaster on behalf of Harper's Red Barn Fruit Market. The Tiltmaster was allegedly usedto transport produce between Saline County, Illinois, and St. Louis, Missouri. This trip wasmore than 140 miles one way and involved travel on interstate highways. The plaintiffsalleged that upon his purchase of the Tiltmaster, Harold Harper approached the Farm Bureauabout providing coverage for the Tiltmaster. Harold Harper "described the vehicle and thenature of its use" to the Farm Bureau and relied upon the Farm Bureau to get him "the propertype and amount of insurance coverage for the Tiltmaster and the type of business he wasdoing." Each of the first six counts allegs that the Farm Bureau "failed to procure proper andadequate insurance coverage for a vehicle that carried cargo in interstate traffic in acommercial enterprise." Each of the last six counts made this allegation regarding CountryMutual.

The plaintiffs allege that an insurance policy was issued by the defendants. Theinsurance policy described the Tiltmaster as a "FARM TRUCK NOT-FOR-HIRE OVER 1TON, LIGHT, 0-50 MILE RADIUS HIGH." The bodily injury coverage was $50,000 perperson and $100,000 per occurrence. The policy was reissued every six months. Theplaintiffs allege that their damages exceed these policy limits.

The defendants each filed a motion to dismiss (735 ILCS 5/2-615 (West 2000)),which the court granted. The court dismissed counts I through VI against the Farm Bureauwithout prejudice: "Plaintiffs have failed to allege that said Defendant was acting as the agentor broker of *** (Plaintiffs' assignor) ***." The court dismissed counts VII through XIIagainst Country Mutual with prejudice: "[S]aid [c]ounts fail[] to state a cause of actionbecause Illinois does not recognize a claim by an insured against an insurance carrier forfailure to provide adequate insurance coverage ***."

The court granted leave to file an amended complaint. The plaintiffs filed an amendedcomplaint. They also sought leave to refile their claims against Country Mutual (counts VIIthrough XII) to avoid waiving their objections to the trial court's prior ruling. That requestwas granted. The plaintiffs amended counts I through VI to include an allegation that theFarm Bureau "was an agent and/or insurance broker for Harold Harper and/or Mark T.Harper." Each defendant filed a motion to dismiss the amended complaint. On June 6, 2002,the court entered an order finding that, for the same reasons stated in the order of February4, 2002, counts VII through XII were dismissed with prejudice. The court found no justreason for delaying an appeal. The plaintiffs appeal.

The issue presented by a motion to dismiss is whether, when all well-pleaded factsare taken as true and are considered in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, the plaintiffhas alleged sufficient facts that, if proved, would entitle the plaintiff to relief. Jackson v.Michael Reese Hospital & Medical Center, 294 Ill. App. 3d 1, 9-10, 689 N.E.2d 205, 211(1997). A motion to dismiss on the pleadings should not be granted unless it clearly appearsthat no set of facts can be proved that will entitle the plaintiff to recover. First Bank ofRoscoe v. Rinaldi, 262 Ill. App. 3d 179, 182-83, 634 N.E.2d 1204, 1207 (1994). Review isde novo. Wood v. Wabash County, 309 Ill. App. 3d 725, 727, 722 N.E.2d 1176, 1179(1999).

The plaintiffs argue that the trial court erred in finding that an insured cannot have aclaim against an insurance carrier's captive agents for the failure to provide adequateinsurance coverage. They contend that agents should be held to the same standard as brokersand that there is no rational basis to hold agents to a lesser duty than that owed by brokers. In support of this contention they cite Sobotor v. Prudential Property & Casualty InsuranceCo., 491 A.2d 737, 739 (N.J. Super. A.D. 1984); M. Schlag, The Case for ExpandedInsurance Producer Duties, 16 N. Ill. U. L. Rev. 433 (1996); and D. Sakall, Can the PublicReally Count on Insurance Agents to Advise Them? A Critique of the "SpecialCircumstances" Test, 42 Ariz. L. Rev. 991 (2000).

Country Mutual counters that under Illinois law an agent has no duty to obtain"adequate" insurance, and it cites a number of cases which establish that an insurer has noobligation to provide coverage for the full amount of any possible damages. See Nielsen v.United Services Automobile Ass'n, 244 Ill. App. 3d 658, 662, 612 N.E.2d 526, 529 (1993)(a fire policy did not address the full amount of damages); Connelly v. Robert J. Riordan &Co., 246 Ill. App. 3d 898, 901, 617 N.E.2d 76, 78 (1993) (the homeowners wereunderinsured for the destruction of their house by a fire); Shults v. Griffin-Rahn InsuranceAgency, Inc., 193 Ill. App. 3d 453, 457, 550 N.E.2d 232, 235 (1990) (holding that anagreement calling for a "reasonable amount" of coverage was unenforceable); Friederich v.Board of Education of Community Unit School District No. 304, 59 Ill. App. 3d 79, 84, 375N.E.2d 141, 146 (1978) (the school district failed to provide insurance for physical injuriessuffered by a student athlete).

Illinois law recognizes a distinction between brokers and captive agents. UnderIllinois law, a broker has a duty to procure adequate insurance. Economy Fire & CasualtyCo. v. Bassett, 170 Ill. App. 3d 765, 771, 525 N.E.2d 539, 543 (1988). This duty arisesbecause brokers are the agents of and owe allegiance to the insured. Economy Fire &Casualty Co., 170 Ill. App. 3d at 771, 525 N.E.2d at 543. On the other hand, captive agentsdo not have the same fiduciary duty to provide an adequate type and amount of coverage. Economy Fire & Casualty Co., 170 Ill. App. 3d at 771, 525 N.E.2d at 543; Nielsen v. UnitedServices Automobile Insurance Ass'n, 244 Ill. App. 3d 658, 666, 612 N.E.2d 526, 531(1993).

Section 2-2201 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Code) (735 ILCS 5/2-2201 (West2000)) limits any civil liability arising out of a fiduciary relationship between an insured andan insurance agent. Section 2-2201(b) of the Code states as follows:

"(b) No cause of action brought by any person or entity against any insuranceproducer, registered firm, or limited insurance representative concerning the sale,placement, procurement, renewal, binding, cancellation of, or failure to procure anypolicy of insurance shall subject the insurance producer, registered firm, or limitedinsurance representative to civil liability under standards governing the conduct of afiduciary or a fiduciary relationship except when the conduct upon which the causeof action is based involves *** wrongful retention or misappropriation ***." 735ILCS 5/2-2201(b) (West 2000).

Although an insurer has an implied duty of good faith and fair dealing with respectto an insured, that duty does not include the burden of reviewing the adequacy of an insured'spolicy when the policy is renewed. Nielsen, 244 Ill. App. 3d at 663, 612 N.E.2d at 529;Connelly, 246 Ill. App. 3d at 901, 617 N.E.2d at 78; Cleary v. Country Mutual InsuranceCo., 63 Ill. App. 3d 637, 638, 380 N.E.2d 525, 526 (1978). Illinois courts have discussedthe policy reasons for not placing a duty on the insurer to provide an adequate amount ofcoverage. See Shults, 193 Ill. App. 3d at 457, 550 N.E.2d at 236; Nielsen, 244 Ill. App. 3dat 667, 612 N.E.2d at 532. One of the difficulties with requiring insurers to provide anadequate amount of coverage was discussed in Shults. In that case, an insurer allegedlyagreed to provide a "reasonable amount" of coverage. Shults, 193 Ill. App. 3d at 458, 550N.E.2d at 236. The court found that the agreement constituted an unenforceable contractbecause the term "reasonable amount" was an ambiguous phrase not subject to any definiteor certain interpretation. Shults, 193 Ill. App. 3d at 458, 550 N.E.2d at 236. Furthermore,mandating that an adequate amount of insurance coverage be provided could provedetrimental to the insured. The Nielsen court explained:

"We believe it is the insured, not the insurer, who best knows his insurance needs andthe premium he can afford. If full coverage was always required, a potential insuredcould be faced with a choice of having to purchase more insurance than he couldafford or no insurance at all. If an insured is to be faced with such a choice, it is upto the legislature to mandate that choice." Nielsen, 244 Ill. App. 3d at 667, 612N.E.2d at 532.

Under Illinois law, Country Mutual owed no duty to the insured to determine whatwould constitute "adequate" insurance coverage and to provide coverage in that amount. This is true whether or not the insured made such a request. Nielsen, 244 Ill. App. 3d at 666,612 N.E.2d at 531. In this case, the circuit court properly dismissed counts VII through XIIof the amended complaint because Country Mutual owed no duty to the plaintiffs under thepleadings and because it is apparent that no set of facts could be proved under the pleadingsthat would entitle the plaintiffs to relief.

Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court dismissing all the counts against CountryMutual is affirmed.

Affirmed.

KUEHN, J., concurs.

I respectfully dissent. Although an insurer does not have a duty to provide anadequate amount of insurance, an insurance producer still has a duty to exercise ordinarycare in providing insurance that is requested by an insured. Section 2-2201(a) of the Codeof Civil Procedure provides:

"(a) An insurance producer, registered firm, and limited insurancerepresentative shall exercise ordinary care and skill in renewing, procuring, binding,or placing the coverage requested by the insured or proposed insured." 735 ILCS 5/2-2201(a) (West 2000).

The majority states that under Illinois law Country Mutual owed no duty to theinsured to determine what would constitute "adequate" insurance and to provide coveragein that amount. The cases relied upon by Country Mutual and cited by the majority hold thatan insurance agent has no duty to an insured to procure adequate coverage. A review ofthose cases reveals that the amount of coverage was at issue. See Nielsen v. United ServicesAutomobile Ass'n, 244 Ill. App. 3d 658, 662, 612 N.E.2d 526, 529 (1993) (the fire policy wasnot for the " 'full, fair insurable value' " of the plaintiff's residence); Connelly v. Robert J.Riordan & Co., 246 Ill. App. 3d 898, 899, 617 N.E.2d 76, 78 (1993) (the insureds requestedand received an amount of coverage comparable to their previous policy); Shults v. Griffin-Rahn Insurance Agency, Inc., 193 Ill. App. 3d 453, 457, 550 N.E.2d 232, 235 (1990)(holding that an agreement calling for a "reasonable amount" of coverage wasunenforceable); cf. Friederich v. Board of Education of Community Unit School District No.304, 59 Ill. App. 3d 79, 84, 375 N.E.2d 141, 146 (1978) (dealt with the duty of the schoolboard, not the insurer).

As the majority's review of Shults and Nielsen reveals, the policy reasons for notplacing a duty on an insurance agent to determine an adequate amount of insurance aretwofold. The holding in Shults was due to the vagaries involved in predicting whatconstitutes a "reasonable amount" and an unwillingness to place a burden on an insurer inlight of those vagaries. Shults, 193 Ill. App. 3d at 457, 550 N.E.2d at 235. Neilsen, on theother hand, reveals a reluctance to remove the choice of an amount of coverage from aninsured by statutorily requiring full coverage. Neilsen, 244 Ill. App. 3d at 667, 612 N.E.2dat 532.

This does not preclude a claim that the insurer failed to provide "adequate" insuranceby not providing insurance as requested by the insured. Neither of these policy concernsarises if the question of "adequate" insurance is not a matter of the amount of coverage but,rather, a matter of whether the insurer provided the type of insurance as requested by theinsured. Requiring insurance to be provided as requested by an insured does not invite thevagaries of mandating an "adequate" amount, nor does it limit an insured's choice. Thepolicy reasons for not placing a duty on an insurance producer or an insurer to provide an"adequate" amount of insurance are not disturbed by placing a duty to provide the requestedinsurance. See Lewis v. Royal Globe Insurance Co., 170 Ill. App. 3d 516, 521, 524 N.E.2d1126, 1130 (1988) (discussing how an insurer may be liable for the action of its agent).

If the notion of adequacy refers to what the insured requested, in contrast to a vagueconcept of an "adequate" amount, the plaintiff states a cause of action. An insurance agentor an insurer does not have a duty to provide an adequate amount to cover what an insuredmight need. An insurance agent, however, does have a duty to provide insurance thatrepresents what the insured requested.

The plaintiffs' complaint can be read as stating a claim for the failure to providerequested insurance. To determine whether a cause of action has been stated, the wholecomplaint must be considered, rather than taking a view of a disconnected part. Board ofEducation of City of Chicago v. A, C & S, Inc., 131 Ill. 2d 428, 438, 546 N.E.2d 580, 585(1989). The complaint describes the Tiltmaster and states that it was used to transport fruitand vegetable produce from St. Louis, Missouri, to Stonefort, Illinois, using Interstate 64-atrip in excess of 140 miles. According to the complaint, Harold Harper described theTiltmaster and "the nature of its use" to the agents of Country Mutual and "relied" on them"to get [him] the proper type and amount of insurance coverage for the Tiltmaster and thetype of business he was doing." The Tiltmaster was then involved in an accident onInterstate 64 while Mark Harper was driving it to St. Louis to get produce for the business.

The breach was described as:

"a) failed to procure proper and adequate insurance coverage for a vehicle thatcarried cargo in interstate traffic in a commercial enterprise."

Counts IX and X, for negligence, described the duty as one to provide the requestedinsurance:

"[P]ursuant to the description of the Tiltmaster and its uses by Mr. Harold Harperand/or Mark T. Harper, and his request for proper and adequate coverage and hisreliance upon Country Mutual Insurance Company's agents and/or employees to selectand determine proper and adequate coverage and periodic reviews of the coverage andconversations with Mr. Harper about the nature of his business, [Country Mutual]voluntarily assumed a duty to act with due care, competence[,] and skill in theprocurement of the insurance policy on the Tiltmaster."

In counts XI and XII, for breach of contract, the complaint alleges that as a result of theinteractions between Country Mutual and the Harpers, they entered into a contract "whichrequired the Defendant to procure a policy of vehicular insurance on the Tiltmaster." In thecontext of the facts alleged by the plaintiffs, the complaint is a claim that Country Mutual,through its agents, failed to provide requested insurance.

The trial court dismissed the counts against Country Mutual on the ground that Illinoisdoes not recognize a claim by an insured against an insurer for a failure to provide adequateinsurance. In the sense that the insurer has no duty to provide the best available insuranceto meet an insured's need, the trial court was correct. See Nielsen, 244 Ill. App. 3d at 662,612 N.E.2d at 529; Connelly, 246 Ill. App. 3d at 899, 617 N.E.2d at 78; Shults, 193 Ill. App.3d at 457, 550 N.E.2d at 235. The plaintiffs' complaint, however, can be read as allegingthat the defendants were negligent and breached a contract by not providing the insurancerequested by the insured. This supports a viable cause of action. Thus, the dismissal waspremature.

A complaint should be dismissed for the failure to state a claim only when it clearlyappears that no set of facts could be proved under the pleadings that would entitle theplaintiff to relief. Michael Nicholas, Inc. v. Royal Insurance Co. of America, 321 Ill. App.3d 909, 913, 748 N.E.2d 786, 789 (2001). The cause should not be dismissed unless itclearly appears that no set of facts can be proved that would entitle the plaintiff to relief. Allen v. Berger, 336 Ill. App. 3d 675, 677, 784 N.E.2d 367, 369 (2002). Only one factuallysufficient allegation supporting a cause of action is necessary for a count to withstand amotion to dismiss; any other allegations contained in the same count which do not supportthat cause of action are surplusage which may be stricken on motion, but they do not providea basis for the dismissal of a pleading. Straub v. City of Mt. Olive, 240 Ill. App. 3d 967, 978,607 N.E.2d 672, 679 (1993); Johnson v. Town of the City of Evanston, 39 Ill. App. 3d 419,423, 350 N.E.2d 70, 73 (1976).

Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.