INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION DIVISION

I. INTRODUCTION

Claimant, Janice Mores-Harvey, filed an application for adjustment of claim under theWorkers' Compensation Act (Act) (820 ILCS 305/1 et seq. (West 2002)) for injuries she sustainedwhen she slipped and fell on employer's, Bob Evans Restaurant's, parking lot. Following a hearingon claimant's section 19(b) petition (820 ILCS 305/19(b) (West 2002)), the arbitrator awardedclaimant 15 4/7 weeks' temporary total disability benefits and $18,230.82 in medical expenses. Employer appealed, and the Industrial Commission (Commission) reversed, finding that claimantfailed to prove that she suffered accidental injuries arising out of and in the course of her employmentwith employer. Claimant appealed, and the circuit court reversed and reinstated the arbitrator'sdecision. Employer now appeals.

II. BACKGROUND

Claimant worked as a waitress for employer. On December 17, 1997, at about 6 or 7 a.m.,claimant drove to work to begin her 6 a.m. to 2 p.m. shift. She parked her car behind employer'srestaurant in the parking lot that surrounds the building. As she exited her car, claimant put one footdown and slipped and fell on ice, hit her head on the car door, and landed on her back. She testifiedthat it had snowed and was very cold outside, and employer's parking lot had not been shoveled.

Claimant walked into the restaurant and informed her manager that she had an accident in theparking lot. The manager, Jennifer Kuder, told claimant that she had been unsuccessful in her attempts to contact a snow removal service. Claimant worked her entire shift that day.

Employer's restaurant is located on the corner of McDonough and Larkin roads in Joliet. Claimant testified that the restaurant is surrounded by a parking lot. There is no parking onMcDonough Street, which runs adjacent to the restaurant's entrance. Claimant routinely parked hercar in employer's lot behind the restaurant. Employees were directed to park on either the side orback of the parking lot so that customers could park in the front. The lot is not lit. Although no oneat employer told claimant that she had to use the restaurant's lot, claimant testified that there was noother place to park. Claimant understood that employer maintained the lot.

The arbitrator awarded claimant 15 4/7 weeks' temporary total disability benefits and $18, 230in medical expenses. Employer appealed, arguing that claimant failed to prove that she sustainedinjuries arising out of and in the course of her employment with employer. On review, theCommission reversed the arbitrator's decision. Relying on Caterpillar Tractor Co. v. IndustrialComm'n, 129 Ill. 2d 52 (1989), the Commission found that claimant's fall resulted from the naturalaccumulation of snow and ice on a lot intended for the use of employees and customers alike. Therecord did not support a finding that there was a defect in the parking lot surface. Because theaccumulation was a natural hazard to which the general public was equally exposed in all parkingareas of employer's restaurant, claimant's claim for compensation was denied.

One Commissioner dissented, arguing that claimant was at an increased risk when she slippedand fell because the snow and ice constituted a defect on employer's lot. Employer's failure to removethe defect on the lot increased the risk of injury faced by claimant because she was required to usethe lot to get to work. Furthermore, the dissenting Commissioner indicated that claimant faced anincreased risk because she arrived at work at 6 a.m. while it was still dark, and the lot was unlit andunplowed. Unlike the general public, claimant could not choose a parking spot closest to therestaurant door.

Claimant appealed, and the circuit court reversed the Commission's decision and reinstatedthe arbitrator's award. The court found that the Commission based its ruling in part on its finding thatthe ice accumulation was a natural accumulation. The court reasoned that such a finding was anegligence law concept that had no bearing in workers' compensation matters. Characterizing theissue as whether the claimant was placed at a greater risk than the general public because of heremployment, the court found that she was and that the Commission applied the wrong legal standard. Additionally, the court found that the Commission's finding was against the manifest weight of theevidence. Employer timely appealed.

III. ANALYSIS

Employer argues that the Commission's decision was not against the manifest weight of theevidence, as claimant's injuries did not arise out of her employment. The determination of whethera claimant's injury arose out of or in the course of the claimant's employment is a question of fact forthe Commission to resolve, and its determination will not be disturbed on appeal unless it is againstthe manifest weight of the evidence. Homerding v. Industrial Comm'n, 327 Ill. App. 3d 1050, 1054(2002).

To obtain compensation under the Act, a claimant must show, by a preponderance of theevidence, that he or she suffered a disabling injury that arose out of and in the course of the claimant'semployment. 820 ILCS 305/2 (West 2002); Baggett v. Industrial Comm'n, 201 Ill. 2d 187, 194(2002). An injury "arises out of" one's employment if it originates from a risk connected with, orincidental to, the employment and involves a causal connection between the employment and theaccidental injury. Baggett, 201 Ill. 2d at 194. A risk is incidental to the employment where it belongsto or is connected with what an employee has to do in fulfilling his or her duties. Caterpillar Tractor,129 Ill. 2d at 58.

An injury occurs "in the course of" employment when it occurs during employment and at aplace where the claimant may reasonably perform employment duties, and while a claimant fulfillsthose duties or engages in some incidental employment duties. Baggett, 201 Ill. 2d at 194. Accidental injuries sustained on an employer's premises within a reasonable time before and afterwork are generally deemed to arise in the course of the employment. Caterpillar Tractor, 129 Ill. 2dat 57; Doyle v. Industrial Comm'n, 95 Ill. 2d 103, 106 (1983). However, when an employee slips andfalls at a point off of the employer's premises while traveling to or from work, the resulting injuriesdo not arise out of and in the course of the claimant's employment and are not compensable underthe Act. Joiner v. Industrial Comm'n, 337 Ill. App. 3d 812, 815 (2003); Illinois Bell Telephone Co.v. Industrial Comm'n, 131 Ill. 2d 478, 483-84 (1989). While the distinction between on- and off-premises injuries has been described as arbitrary, it has also been noted that its advantages includethat it is logical and easily administered. Doyle, 95 Ill. 2d at 107.

There have developed two exceptions to this "general premises rule." Illinois Bell TelephoneCo., 131 Ill. 2d at 484. First, recovery has been permitted where the employee has sustained injuriesin a parking lot "provided by and under the control of" an employer. Illinois Bell Telephone Co., 131Ill. 2d at 484. Second, recovery has been permitted for off-premises injuries when "the employee'spresence at the place where the accident occurred was required in the performance of his duties andthe employee is exposed to a risk common to the general public to a greater degree than otherpersons." Illinois Bell Telephone Co., 131 Ill. 2d at 484.

Turning to the parking lot exception, slips or falls on an employer-provided lot whenhazardous conditions are present are generally compensable. See Archer Daniels Midland Co. v.Industrial Comm'n, 91 Ill. 2d 210, 217 (1982) (injury arose out of and in the course of employmentwhere employee slipped on ice while walking from employer's parking lot through gate to plantgrounds because injury resulted from a risk incident to employment); Hiram Walker & Sons v.Industrial Comm'n, 41 Ill. 2d 429, 431 (1968) (injury arose out of and in the course of employmentwhere the claimant injured his hand after he slipped and fell in snowy and icy company parking lotafter he had parked his car in the lot because "his presence in the lot was due entirely to hisemployment"); De Hoyos v. Industrial Comm'n, 26 Ill. 2d 110, 114 (1962) (snow and ice; "anemployee who falls on a parking lot provided by his employer while proceeding to work, we believe,is subjected to hazards to which the general public is not exposed"). The rationale for awardingcompensation is that the employer-provided parking lot is considered part of the employer's premises. See 1 L. Larson, Larson's Workers' Compensation Law