Rule 23 Order filed
March 25, 2004;
Motion to publish granted
April 22, 2004.

JUSTICE HOPKINS delivered the opinion of the court:

The plaintiff, Larry Morietta, appeals from the trial court's order granting a summaryjudgment in favor of the defendant, Reese Construction Company. On appeal, the plaintiffcontends that the trial court erred in determining (1) that the statute-of-limitations provisionof section 13-214(a) of the Code of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS 5/13-214(a) (West 2002))was inapplicable and (2) that the discovery rule was inapplicable. We affirm.

On June 3, 1998, the plaintiff was driving southbound on Illinois Route 4. At about 0.4mile south of mile marker No. 6, the plaintiff's vehicle hydroplaned on standing water on theroad, which caused him to lose control, leave the road, enter a ditch, and flip his car over ontothe driver's side. The plaintiff suffered a back injury as a result of the accident.

On June 4, 2001, three years after the accident, the plaintiff filed his negligencecomplaint against the defendant. The plaintiff alleged that the defendant had done negligentwork on Illinois Route 4 in that the defendant "failed to properly design," "failed to properlyspecify the manner and method of construction," "failed to supervise the repaving," "failed toproperly compact the new surface," and "failed to build a proper crown" during the constructionof the road so that water did not drain from the surface during a rain. The plaintiff also allegedthat he did not learn until May 2001 that the accident was the result of negligence. Thedefendant's answer included several affirmative defenses, inter alia, that the plaintiff's causeof action was barred either by the statute of limitations, because he filed his complaint morethan two years after his cause of action had accrued, or by the contractor-specificationdefense.

According to the pleadings, attachments, and memorandums of law, the defendantsuccessfully bid on a road project let by the Illinois Department of Transportation (IDOT) in1994, which consisted of "9.3 miles of pavement patching, bituminous surface removal and 26ft. and variable width bituminous concrete resurfacing on Illinois Route 4 from south of FAIRoute 70 to Randle Street in Lebanon." The project encompassed the area where the plaintiff'saccident occurred. The road work was done in accordance with the plans and specificationsprovided by IDOT. Further, resident engineers from IDOT were present daily during the workproject to ensure that the defendant followed IDOT's plans and specifications. The workproject did not involve the construction of a new road or the widening of the existing road butonly encompassed the removal and repavement of the existing road. On January 3, 1995, IDOTsent the defendant a letter of final acceptance indicating that a final inspection had been doneand that the work on the project was complete and in compliance with the applicable plans andspecifications.

The defendant filed a motion for a summary judgment, claiming that the plaintiff'scomplaint was barred by the two-year statute of limitations of section 13-202 of the Code ofCivil Procedure (735 ILCS 5/13-202 (West 2002)) and that the complaint was also barred bythe contractor-specification defense, i.e., the defendant cannot be liable because the work onIllinois Route 4 had been done in accordance with IDOT's plans and specifications. Inresponse, the plaintiff argued that his action was not time-barred because it had been filedwithin the four-year statute of limitations of section 13-214(a) and, alternatively, that the timefor bringing the plaintiff's cause of action did not commence until he discovered that his injuryhad been caused by negligence (the discovery rule). The plaintiff also asked the court tocontinue any decision concerning the contractor-specification defense until he received all thediscovery materials from IDOT.

On March 10, 2002, the court granted the defendant's motion for a summary judgment,finding that section 13-214 does not apply to the plaintiff's cause of action because thedefendant's work was not an improvement to real property and that the "discovery rule" did notapply because the plaintiff "knew at the time of the accident on June 3, 1998[,] that his accidentwas caused by accumulated water and was therefore on notice to investigate whether theaccumulation was caused by negligence." The plaintiff filed his timely notice of appeal.

A summary judgment is a drastic means of disposing of litigation and is only to begranted when pleadings, depositions, admissions on file, and affidavits, if any, establish thatthere is no genuine issue of any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgmentas a matter of law. Outboard Marine Corp. v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co., 154 Ill. 2d 90(1992); Jinkins v. Lee, 337 Ill. App. 3d 403 (2003), aff'd, No. 95876 (March 18, 2004). Thereview of the grant of a summary judgment is de novo. Outboard Marine Corp., 154 Ill. 2dat 102. In reviewing a summary judgment, a court construes evidentiary material strictlyagainst the moving party and in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Jinkins, 337Ill. App. 3d at 409. A genuine issue of material fact exists where there is a dispute on amaterial fact or where the facts are undisputed but reasonable minds might differ in drawinginferences from the facts. Jinkins, 337 Ill. App. 3d at 409. If facts are not disputed and theissue is one of statutory interpretation, the issue is reviewed as a matter of law. Jacobson v.General Finance Corp., 227 Ill. App. 3d 1089 (1992).

The plaintiff argues that the trial court erred in determining that the construction statuteof limitations of section 13-214(a) was inapplicable and that the general statute of limitationsof section 13-202 applied (735 ILCS 5/13-214(a), 13-202 (West 2002)). The plaintiff claimsthat the four-year statute of limitations applies because the defendant's removal and repavingof Illinois Route 4 under the IDOT contract meets all the criteria for an improvement to realestate.

Section 13-214(a) applies to any actions "based upon tort, contract[,] or otherwiseagainst any person for an act or omission of such person in the design, planning, supervision,observation[,] or management of construction, or construction of an improvement to realproperty." 735 ILCS 5/13-214(a) (West 2002). Section 13-214 applies to all parties engagedin construction activities. Wright v. Board of Education of the City of Chicago, 335 Ill. App.3d 948 (2002). If the special statute of limitations of section 13-214(a) does not apply to theplaintiff's case, then the general statute of limitations of section 13-202 of the Code of CivilProcedure applies. 735 ILCS 5/13-202 (West 2002); Hernon v. E.W. Corrigan ConstructionCo., 149 Ill. 2d 190 (1992).

In considering the application of section 13-214(a), "[t]he first step is to determinewhether the item at issue is an improvement to real property." Wright, 335 Ill. App. 3d at 955. Cases defining an improvement to real property have generally concerned section 13-214(b)of the Code of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS 5/13-214(b) (West 2002)); however, because ofthe identical language in sections 13-214(a) and 13-214(b), the cases concerning section 13-214(b) are pertinent to this issue. Hernon, 149 Ill. 2d at 196-97. Whether an item is animprovement to real property is a question of law. St. Louis v. Rockwell Graphic Systems,Inc., 153 Ill. 2d 1 (1992). The relevant criteria for determining whether an item is animprovement to real property is "whether the addition was meant to be permanent ortemporary, whether it became an integral component of the overall system, whether the valueof the property was increased, and whether the use of the property was enhanced. [Citations.]" St. Louis, 153 Ill. 2d at 4-5. However, an improvement is more than mere repair orreplacement. Adcock v. Montgomery Elevator Co., 274 Ill. App. 3d 519 (1995).

Here, the defendant's work on the road was not an improvement to real property asdefined by the supreme court. The evidence presented in the motion for a summary judgmentestablished that the defendant removed and replaced an existing road. It did not build a newroad or even widen the existing road. Both of the IDOT resident engineers testified thatrepaving the road involved using the same depth of material as the existing road and followingthe slope of the existing road. The project also involved patching the pavement. This workneither improved the value of the property nor enhanced the use of the property. Thus, becausethe defendant's work on the road was merely repair and replacement and not an improvementto real property, the specific statute of limitations of section 13-214(a) does not apply.

Because section 13-214(a) is not applicable to the plaintiff's case, the general statuteof limitations of section 13-202 applies. See Hernon, 149 Ill. 2d 190. Section 13-202requires that a cause of action concerning injury to a person be brought within two years of thetime the injury occurred. 735 ILCS 5/13-202 (West 2002). The plaintiff's accident occurredon June 3, 1998. The plaintiff did not file his complaint until June 4, 2001, three years afterthe accident. Because the statute of limitations for filing his claim ran on June 3, 2000, theplaintiff's cause of action was time-barred.

The plaintiff also claims that his cause of action was timely filed under the discoveryrule because his complaint was filed within two years of when he discovered that his accidenthad been due to negligence. The plaintiff alleged in his complaint that he did not discover thatthere was a defect in the construction of the road until May 12, 2001, when he read in thenewspaper about others filing suit because of their accidents in the area where his accidentoccurred.

Generally, a personal injury cause of action accrues when the plaintiff suffers an injury. Golla v. General Motors Corp., 167 Ill. 2d 353 (1995). A limitations period is not tolledsimply because a plaintiff is unaware of the existence of an injury; however, a statute oflimitations is not to be applied mechanically, thereby barring a plaintiff from bringing suitbefore the plaintiff is aware that he was injured. Golla, 167 Ill. 2d at 360. The judiciarycreated the discovery rule to alleviate the harshness of the literal application of the limitationsperiod. Golla, 167 Ill. 2d at 360. The discovery rule postpones the commencement of thestatute of limitations until the injured plaintiff knows or reasonably should know that he hasbeen injured and that his injury was wrongfully caused. Golla, 167 Ill. 2d at 360-61. Wherea plaintiff's injuries are caused by a sudden, traumatic event, such as an automobile accident,the plaintiff's cause of action accrues, and the statute of limitations commences on the datethe injury occurred. Golla, 167 Ill. 2d at 362; Lowe v. Ford Motor Co., 313 Ill. App. 3d 418(2000). The nature and circumstances surrounding a traumatic event puts an injured party onnotice that actionable conduct might be involved. Golla, 167 Ill. 2d at 363; Lowe, 313 Ill. App.3d at 421. An injury is wrongfully caused when a plaintiff attains sufficient informationconcerning his injury to put a reasonable person on inquiry to determine whether actionableconduct is involved. Hutson v. Hartke, 292 Ill. App. 3d 411 (1997).

Here, the plaintiff knew of his injuries at the time of the accident. The accident was atraumatic event that should have put him on notice that there may be actionable conduct. Theplaintiff claims that the pooling of surface water on the road was due to a latent defect.However, the fact that the water was not draining from the road warranted investigation. Theplaintiff had an obligation to investigate the possibility that his injuries resulted fromnegligence. We see no reason to deviate from the "sudden, traumatic event" rule. Because theplaintiff's injuries were caused by a sudden, traumatic event, the two-year statute of limitationsbegan to run on the date of the accident, and the discovery rule does not apply.

The plaintiff should have filed his complaint within two years of the date of theaccident. Because he filed his complaint three years after the accident, his claim is time-barred, and the defendant was entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.

For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the circuit court of Madison County isaffirmed.

Affirmed.

CHAPMAN, P.J., and WELCH, J., concur.