Rule 23 order filed
January 14, 2004;
Motion to publish granted
February 20, 2004.

JUSTICE KUEHN delivered the opinion of the court:

The plaintiff Ricky Nesby appeals from the circuit court's dismissal of his complaintfor equitable relief against the defendant Country Mutual Insurance Company (CountryMutual). We affirm.

The plaintiff held an automobile insurance policy with Country Mutual (the policy). The policy provided medical-payments coverage for the payment of medical bills incurredas a result of injuries sustained while a passenger in the covered automobile. The terms ofthe policy issued by Country Mutual contained a "right to recover payment" provision thatallowed Country Mutual to obtain the insured's right to recover against a third party afterCountry Mutual paid the plaintiff's medical bills. In addition, the provision gave CountryMutual the right of reimbursement if the insured directly recovered damages. The provisionprovided in pertinent part as follows:

"9. OUR RIGHT TO RECOVER PAYMENT (SUBROGATION)

a. If we make payment under this policy, other than Death Benefit,Coverage C-1, and the person to or from whom payment was made hasa right to recover damages, we will be subrogated to that right (have theright transferred to us). That person must do whatever is necessary toenable us to exercise our rights and must do nothing after the loss toprejudice our rights.

b. If we make a payment under this policy, other than Death Benefit,Coverage C-1, and the person to or for whom payment was maderecovers damages from another, that person must hold the proceeds ofthe recovery in trust for us and must reimburse us to the extent of ourpayment."

The plaintiff was involved in an automobile accident in 2000. In connection with theaccident, Country Mutual paid $4,793 in medical expenses incurred by the plaintiff, inaccordance with the medical-payments coverage under the policy. Thereafter, the plaintiffdirectly pursued the responsible party for his injuries. Country Mutual asserted an interestin the proceeds recovered by the plaintiff. Pursuant to the claimed interest, on December 11,2000, the plaintiff paid the defendant $4,793 (less his attorney fees for collecting saidamount under the common-fund doctrine), for a net reimbursement to the defendant of$3,195.33.

On August 21, 2002, the plaintiff filed a complaint alleging that Country Mutual wasunjustly enriched by the plaintiff's reimbursement of the medical payments made by CountryMutual on his behalf. On October 9, 2002, Country Mutual filed a motion to dismiss theplaintiff's complaint. On November 14, 2002, the trial court dismissed the plaintiff'scomplaint without prejudice and granted the plaintiff 28 days to amend his complaint. Noamended complaint was filed. On March 21, 2003, the trial court dismissed the plaintiff'scomplaint with prejudice. The plaintiff appeals.

On appeal, the plaintiff contends that Country Mutual had no reimbursement right torecover payments for medical expenses because the policy language is ambiguous. Basedon the alleged ambiguity, the plaintiff contends that his complaint sufficiently states a causeof action for unjust enrichment.

A motion to dismiss filed pursuant to section 2-615 of the Code of Civil Procedure(735 ILCS 5/2-615 (West 2002)), which attacks only the legal sufficiency of a complaint,admits all well-pleaded facts but does not admit unsupported legal or factual conclusions. Benge v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., 297 Ill. App. 3d 1062, 1066, 697N.E.2d 914, 917 (1998). The court must interpret the factual allegations in the light mostfavorable to the plaintiff. Benge, 297 Ill. App. 3d at 1066, 697 N.E.2d at 917. A complaintshould be dismissed pursuant to section 2-615 only if no set of facts could be proven thatwould entitle the plaintiff to the relief he seeks. People ex rel. Peters v. Murphy-Knight, 248Ill. App. 3d 382, 386, 618 N.E.2d 459, 463 (1993). We review the trial court's ruling on amotion to dismiss de novo, and we can affirm on any basis present in the record. Toombsv. City of Champaign, 245 Ill. App. 3d 580, 583, 615 N.E.2d 50, 51 (1993).

The theory of unjust enrichment is an equitable remedy based upon a contract impliedin law. People ex rel. Hartigan v. E & E Hauling, Inc., 153 Ill. 2d 473, 497, 607 N.E.2d165, 177 (1992). The basis for the unjust-enrichment doctrine is that no one ought to enrichhimself unjustly at the expense of another. Village of Bloomingdale v. CDG Enterprises,Inc., 196 Ill. 2d 484, 500, 752 N.E.2d 1090, 1102 (2001).

Because it is an equitable remedy, unjust enrichment is only available when there isno adequate remedy at law. Season Comfort Corp. v. Ben A. Borenstein Co., 281 Ill. App.3d 648, 656, 655 N.E.2d 1065, 1071 (1995). Where there is a specific contract that governsthe relationship of the parties, the doctrine of unjust enrichment has no application. Hartigan, 153 Ill. 2d at 497, 607 N.E.2d at 177.

In the instant case, an automobile insurance policy governed the relationship of theparties. The language in the plaintiff's policy clearly states that if the plaintiff recovers fromanother, Country Mutual obtains the right to be reimbursed to the extent of its payment. Itis the unambiguous contract language that controls, not equitable considerations. Becausethe plaintiff had a contractual obligation to reimburse Country Mutual for the medicalpayments made on his behalf, the plaintiff cannot allege any facts upon which relief may begranted. The trial court properly dismissed the complaint.

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court of WilliamsonCounty.

Affirmed.

HOPKINS and DONOVAN, JJ., concur.