Rule 23 order filed
August 27, 2004;
Motion to publish granted
September 24, 2004.

JUSTICE DONOVAN delivered the opinion of the court:

This is an appeal from the Madison County circuit court's refusal to compel plaintiffArmettia Peach to arbitrate her claims against defendant CIM Insurance Corp. (CIM). Onappeal, CIM seeks the reversal of the circuit court's arbitration ruling. This interlocutoryappeal followed; we have jurisdiction pursuant to Illinois Supreme Court Rule 307(a)(1) (188Ill. 2d R. 307(a)(1)). We affirm.

Armettia Peach filed a class action complaint against CIM for violations of the IllinoisConsumer Fraud and Deceptive Business Practices Act (815 ILCS 505/2 (West 2000)),common law fraud by misrepresentation, conspiracy to commit consumer fraud, and breachof contract.

CIM sells "Extended Protection Plans" (EPPs) to consumers who purchaseautomobiles. Peach's complaint alleged that CIM, through Enterprise Car Sales (Enterprise),a car dealership located in Glen Carbon, Illinois, misrepresented to consumers that the fullamount paid by the consumers for the EPPs would be passed through to CIM when, in fact, andunknown to the consumers, the dealerships retained a portion of the proceeds. This allegedfraud was accomplished through the "Vehicle Buyer's Order" (VBO), which listed the EPPunder the heading "Other Charges," grouped together with other pass-through charges, such as"License Fee" and "Documentary Fee." The accompanying CIM EPP form contract likewiserepresented that the amount paid for the EPP was passed through to CIM. However, only aportion of the amount listed on these form contracts was "passed through" to CIM for theextended warranties, and the remainder was retained by the dealer.

After the suit was filed, CIM filed a motion to compel arbitration and to stay thelitigation of Peach's first amended complaint. CIM premised its entitlement to compelarbitration on the presence of an arbitration provision in the contract between Peach andEnterprise. Pointing to Peach's allegation in her complaint that Enterprise acted as CIM'sagent in accomplishing the claimed fraud, CIM argued that, as the alleged principal behind thealleged fraud, CIM should be entitled to enforce the arbitration provision even though CIM wasnot a signatory to the contract. Peach opposed CIM's motion.

The trial court entered an order denying CIM's motion. According to the order: (i) CIMcannot enforce the arbitration provision in the contract between Peach and Enterprise, (ii) thearbitration provision is unconscionable because it precludes class action relief, (iii) thearbitration provision lacks mutuality of obligations, (iv) the costs of arbitration areprohibitively high, and (v) the arbitration provision is a part of a fraudulent scheme. CIM thenfiled a notice of interlocutory appeal. We will limit our analysis to whether CIM, as anonsignatory to the contract between Peach and Enterprise, can enforce the arbitrationprovision in that contract, because it is dispositive of this case.

An order to compel arbitration is injunctive in nature and is appealable under SupremeCourt Rule 307(a)(1) (188 Ill. 2d R. 307(a)(1)). Salsitz v. Kreiss, 198 Ill. 2d 1, 11, 761N.E.2d 724, 730 (2001). Generally, the standard employed in reviewing an interlocutory ordergranting or denying a motion to compel arbitration is whether the circuit court abused itsdiscretion. Bishop v. We Care Hair Development Corp., 316 Ill. App. 3d 1182, 1189, 738N.E.2d 610, 616 (2000). However, a review of a trial court's construction of the arbitrationagreement states a question of law that is subject to a de novo standard. Caligiuri v. FirstColony Life Insurance Co., 318 Ill. App. 3d 793, 800, 742 N.E.2d 750, 756 (2000). Inreviewing whether CIM must either stipulate to a principal-agency relationship with Enterpriseor demonstrate facts proving such a relationship to invoke the arbitration provision in thecontract between Peach and Enterprise, we apply a de novo standard of review. In decidingwhether there was a sufficient showing in the record to infer a finding of agency, we apply anabuse-of-discretion standard. We will also apply a de novo standard of review in decidingwhether CIM should be allowed to compel arbitration based on equitable estoppel.

Initially, we acknowledge that Congress enacted the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) (9U.S.C.