Rule 23 order filed
May 10, 2004
Motion to publish granted
June 22, 2004.

JUSTICE KUEHN delivered the opinion of the court:

The Illinois Department of Corrections (the Department) sued the defendant, WayneEdwards, an inmate who was then incarcerated at Big Muddy Correctional Center, to recovercosts incurred during the inmate's incarceration. The defendant appeals the circuit court'sdecision allowing the Department to attach $4,000 of a bank account in his name. We affirm.

The defendant, who organized and supervised the wholesale and street-level retaildistribution of heroin for the Chicago Black Souls street gang, was convicted of criminal drugconspiracy, and on January 9, 1998, he was sentenced to serve 30 years in prison and fined$150,000. See People v. Edwards, 337 Ill. App. 3d 912, 788 N.E.2d 35 (2002). Although thedefendant filed multiple pleadings in the instant case, only those pleadings or responses ofeither party that are essential to this appeal will be discussed.

On December 20, 2001, the Department filed a complaint to recover costs it hadincurred during the defendant's incarceration, pursuant to section 3-7-6 of the Unified Codeof Corrections (Unified Code) (730 ILCS 5/3-7-6 (West 2000)). The Department calculatedthe total cost of the defendant's incarceration at $61,844.31. The Department attached astatement to the complaint documenting the cost of incarcerating the defendant from January23, 1998, through November 13, 2001. It also attached the verification of Jack Huffman, thesupervisor of the accounting section of the Department, his letter of certification, and anaffidavit certifying that the cause of action sought money damages in excess of $50,000.

On January 7, 2002, the Department moved for an order of attachment, asserting thatthe defendant had attachable property in two accounts-his inmate trust account with theDepartment and a bank account with the Du Quoin State Bank (the Bank) in Du Quoin,Illinois-and that under section 4-107 of the Code of Civil Procedure (the Code) (735 ILCS5/4-107 (West 2002)), no plaintiff's bond was necessary because the Department, a Stateagency, was the plaintiff. The affidavit of Jack Huffman, filed pursuant to section 4-104 of theCode (735 ILCS 5/4-104 (West 2002)), in which he verified the amount owed by the defendantfor the costs of his incarceration, was appended to the pleading.

On January 7, 2002, the trial court entered the order for attachment, returnable on orbefore January 31, 2002, and the order issued on the same date, as did notice andinterrogatories to the garnishees, the Department and the Bank. The garnishees were notifiedthat they were to "hold any property, effects, choses in action[,] or credits in their possessionor power belonging to the defendant" and not to pay them over to the defendant because of theplaintiff's pending lien. Nonwage garnishment summonses were served on the Bank on January9, 2002, and on the Department and the defendant on January 10, 2002. On January 14, 2002,the Bank informed the court that the defendant's account had a balance of $6,041.90. TheDepartment filed its interrogatory answers on January 31, 2002, indicating that the defendant'strust fund balance was $98.01, the defendant having "spent down" his trust account from a totalof $1,171.65 to less than $100 between November 27, 2001, less than a month before theDepartment filed its complaint, and January 29, 2002. On January 31, 2002, the trial courtordered the Bank to freeze the defendant's savings account.

The defendant was served on February 1, 2002, with, inter alia, the garnishmentsummons, interrogatories, the answers to the interrogatories of the Bank and the Department,and the January 31, 2002, garnishment order. On February 11, 2002, the defendant filed a"response to the order of attachment" and a motion to dismiss the action against him. Hecontended, inter alia, that the complaint was defective because it was signed by an assistantAttorney General, rather than by the Attorney General of the State of Illinois, as required bysection 3-7-6(d) of the Unified Code (730 ILCS 5/3-7-6(d) (West 2000)) governingreimbursement for the expenses of incarceration. He filed a second motion to dismiss theaction on February 11, 2002, in which he asserted as one ground for dismissal that the orderof attachment should be dismissed because it failed to identify the specific property to beattached.

On April 9, 2002, the parties appeared in court and oral argument was heard on the firstand second motions to dismiss. The State also filed a written response to the defendant's firstmotion to dismiss. It argued that under the holding in Saxby v. Sonnemann, 318 Ill. 600, 607,149 N.E. 526, 529 (1925), assistant Attorneys General were empowered to file and prosecutecivil actions through their appointment by the Attorney General. No written response to thesecond motion to dismiss appears in the record on appeal. However, the docket sheet notes,which are a part of the common law record and are presumed to be correct (see People v. Lilly,291 Ill. App. 3d 662, 665, 687 N.E.2d 1070, 1073 (1997) (citing People v. Brooks, 158 Ill.2d 260, 274, 633 N.E.2d 692, 698 (1994))), indicate that arguments were heard on both of thedefendant's February 11, 2002, motions to dismiss and his amendments to them. Thedefendant contended, inter alia, that the circuit court lacked jurisdiction over the complaintbecause the Bank "sent the Notice for Order of Attachment and Garnishment Summons [to thedefendant]." The defendant's motions to dismiss, as amended, were denied. Two separateorders prepared by the Attorney General, in which the arguments of the State in opposition tothe defendant's first and second motions to dismiss were set forth in brief form, are a part ofthe record and were signed by the trial court on April 9, 2002. The State did not oppose thedefendant's oral motion to assert his right to exempt $2,000 from attachment.

The State moved for a summary judgment on June 10, 2002. It argued that neither thefact of the defendant's incarceration nor the cost of that incarceration was contested. Thedefendant's responsive motion was filed on June 17, 2002, and on June 24, 2002, the trialcourt granted a summary judgment for the State. It granted the defendant an exemption for$2,000 of the defendant's account and directed the Bank to surrender $4,000 of the defendant'ssavings account to the State to apply against the defendant's debt of $61,844.31. The defendantfiled no further pleadings in the circuit court and proceeded with the instant appeal.

The defendant claims that the grant of a summary judgment for the State was erroneous. He contends that (1) the circuit court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the actionbecause the proceedings did not comport strictly with statutory requirements, (2) he wasentitled to the grant of his first motion to dismiss because only the Attorney General isempowered to file actions for the reimbursement of expenses pursuant to section 3-7-6 of theUnified Code, (3) he was entitled to the grant of his second motion to dismiss because theState did not file a written response to his assertion that the order for attachment failed tospecify the property to be attached, and (4) the State denied him due process by failing tocomply with the postjudgment garnishment statute, section 12-705 of the Code (735 ILCS5/12-705 (West 2002)), when it did not mail him a copy of the garnishment notice andsummons within two days of their service on the Bank and the Department. He seeks thereversal of the trial court's denial of his motions to dismiss and its grant of the State's motionfor a summary judgment, and he also seeks a remand of the case to the circuit court for a trial.

Each of the issues raised by the defendant involves a pure question of law, making thede novo standard of review applicable. Williams v. Staples, 208 Ill. 2d 480, 487, 804 N.E.2d489, 492 (2004).

The defendant contends that no subject matter jurisdiction existed in the trial courtbecause the State did not file affidavits as required by sections 12-701 and 4-104 of the Code(735 ILCS 5/12-701, 4-104 (West 2002)) "at the commencement of the suit." He cites, interalia, Ford v. Transocean Airlines, Inc., 28 Ill. App. 2d 234, 171 N.E.2d 225 (1960), insupport of his position. Ford held that because attachment was unknown at common law, thestatutory nature of the proceeding mandated that the affidavit required by the statute in questionhad to meet " 'all the essential requirements of the statute' " in order to confer subject matterjurisdiction on the court. Ford, 28 Ill. App. 2d at 238, 171 N.E.2d at 227 (quoting Martin v.Schillo, 389 Ill. 607, 610, 60 N.E.2d 392, 393 (1945)).

His position is incorrect. "Subject matter jurisdiction" refers to the power of the courtto hear and determine cases of the general class to which the action belongs, and "[w]ith theexception of the circuit court's power to review administrative action, which is conferred bystatute, a circuit court's subject matter jurisdiction is conferred entirely by our stateconstitution." (Emphasis added.) Belleville Toyota, Inc. v. Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc.,199 Ill. 2d 325, 334, 770 N.E.2d 177, 184 (2002). The trial court thus had jurisdiction overthe controversy before it.

Moreover, the State did not file the action in question pursuant to the postjudgmentgarnishment statute, thus obviating any need to comply with the affidavit requirement ofsection 12-701 of the Code (735 ILCS 5/12-701 (West 2002)). It did, however, file theaffidavit required by section 4-104 of the prejudgment attachment statute-section 4-104 ofthe Code (735 ILCS 5/4-104 (West 2002))-under which the order for attachment was sought. The affidavit, filed January 7, 2002, was filed at the time the motion for an order of attachmentwas filed, in compliance with the statute.

Contrary to the defendant's contention, he was not entitled to the grant of his firstmotion to dismiss. Section 3-7-6(d) of the Unified Code provides that the director of theDepartment "or the [d]irector's designee" may authorize the Attorney General to seekreimbursement from inmates for the cost of their incarceration. 730 ILCS 5/3-7-6(d) (West2000). In turn, the Attorney General has the implied power to delegate the tasks of filing andprosecuting actions to assistant Attorneys General. See Saxby v. Sonnemann, 318 Ill. 600,607, 149 N.E. 526, 529 (1925) ("It is, of course, easily seen that in a great State such as thisthe multiplicity of duties of the Attorney General forbid [sic] personal attention to all of them. He must, and does, have power to appoint the necessary deputies or assistants to aid in carryingout those duties."). In Scott v. Association for Childbirth at Home, International, 85 Ill. App.3d 311, 407 N.E.2d 71 (1980), the defendants asserted that in the absence of specificlegislative authority for the Attorney General to delegate authority, the legislature's intentionwas that the Attorney General must personally issue writs, thereby lessening the possibilitythat the broad investigative powers granted to the Attorney General would be exercisedoppressively. The reviewing court drew a parallel between assistant Attorneys General andassistant State's Attorneys and found as follows:

"Although we share defendants' concern with the scope of investigative powergiven by the Act, we do not agree that the legislature intended that the writs in questionmust be signed by the Attorney General personally. In People v. Nahas (1973), 9 Ill.App. 3d 570, 292 N.E.2d 466, the court examined legislation prohibiting eavesdroppingunless done with permission of a party to the conversation and at the request of 'aState's Attorney' (emphasis added) (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1969, ch. 38, par. 14-2(a)). The courtconcluded that an Assistant State's Attorney was intended to have the full powers of aState's Attorney when the State's Attorney was absent, sick[,] or otherwise occupied. Even more reasons exist to imply that an Assistant Attorney General has implied powerto act on behalf of the Attorney General." Scott, 85 Ill. App. 3d at 315, 407 N.E.2d at74.

The filing of the complaint by an assistant Attorney General in the instant case was notrendered invalid because the Attorney General did not personally sign the document.

The defendant contends that he was entitled to the grant of his second motion to dismissbecause the State filed no written response to his motion, in which he asserted, inter alia, thatthe order for attachment was invalid because it failed to specify the property to be attached. The absence of a written response is of no import, given that the docket sheet notes of April9, 2002, indicate that arguments had been heard from both parties on the defendant's February11, 2002, second motion and the defendant's amendments to that motion to dismiss prior toits denial. The docket sheet notes, which are laudably precise, complete, and legible, do notindicate that the defendant objected to arguing the merits of his amended second motion todismiss in the absence of a written response to that motion. The defendant does not contendon appeal that he did so. The record contains neither a transcript of the April 9, 2002, hearingnor a transcript substitute as provided for by Supreme Court Rule 323 (166 Ill. 2d R. 323). The defendant, as appellant, is responsible for providing a complete record on appeal, and anydoubts arising from an incomplete record will be resolved against him. Djikas v. Grafft, 344Ill. App. 3d 1, 14, 799 N.E.2d 887, 898 (2003). In the absence of a transcript or a substitutetherefor, we will assume that the trial court's legal decision to deny the motions to dismiss wascorrect and predicated on its consideration of the arguments presented.

Section 4-110 of the Code governing prejudgment attachment provides in pertinentpart:

"The order for attachment required in the preceding section shall be directed tothe sheriff (and, for purpose only of service of summons, to any person authorized toserve summons) ***. *** [B]ut in case any specific property of the defendant, foundin the county, shall be described in the order, then the officer shall attach the describedproperty only, and no other property." (Emphasis added.) 735 ILCS 5/4-110 (West2002).

We need look no further than the plain language of the statute to parse out its meaning. Curtisv. Chicago Transit Authority, 341 Ill. App. 3d 573, 579, 793 N.E.2d 83, 88 (2003). A plainreading of the statute reveals that the language upon which the defendant relies merely requiresthat in those instances where only certain property is described in the attachment order, thesheriff is precluded from attaching any property other than that which is named. Where theattachment order is not expressly limited to specific property, the sheriff may logically attachany of the defendant's property that might be found. The statute does not mandate that theproperty to be attached must be specifically itemized in the order of attachment in order tohave it be efficacious. Because the question raised in the defendant's second amended motionto dismiss was one of law that the court decided after affording both parties the opportunityto argue the second amended motion to dismiss in open court, the lack of a written responsivemotion from the State did not require the court to rule in the defendant's favor.

The defendant argues for the first time on appeal that he was denied due process becausethe State failed to mail a copy of the garnishment notice and summons to him within two daysof the date on which the garnishees were served, as required by section 12-705(b) of the Code(735 ILCS 5/12-705(b) (West 2002)), governing postjudgment garnishment summonses. Hisfailure to raise the issue in the trial court resulted in the procedural waiver of the question onappeal. Official Reports Advance Sheet No. 21 (October 17, 2001), R. 341(e)(7), eff. October1, 2001; Collins v. Lake Forest Hospital, 343 Ill. App. 3d 353, 360, 798 N.E.2d 143, 148(2003).

Even had he not forfeited the issue, he would not have prevailed below or on appealbecause the State sought garnishment under the prejudgment attachment statute, section 4-126of the Code (735 ILCS 5/4-126 (West 2002)), which lacks the two-day mailing requirementof the postjudgment garnishment statute. Furthermore, the record substantiates that the Statecomplied with the service and notice requirements of section 4-114 of the Code (735 ILCS5/4-114 (West 2002)). The court entered the order for attachment on January 7, 2002, andthe defendant was served with the complaint, the order for attachment, and a summons toanswer the complaint with a hearing date of January 31, 2002, on January 10, 2002, therebycomplying with section 4-114, which requires service no later than five days after the entry ofthe order for attachment. Following the January 31, 2002, entry of the garnishment order, thedefendant was served on February 1, 2002, with the garnishment summons, interrogatories, theanswers to interrogatories filed by the Bank and the Department, and the garnishment order. The defendant's contentions in regard to service, even had they not been procedurally defaulted,are thus without merit.

The defendant's contentions on appeal, all of which raise purely questions of law, aremeritless. The trial court's decision granting a summary judgment for the State is thereforeaffirmed.

HOPKINS and MAAG, JJ., concur.