Rule 23 order filed
November 17, 2003;
Motion to publish granted
December 26, 2003.

JUSTICE MAAG delivered the opinion of the court:

The plaintiffs, The People ex rel. Brenda Ropac, Patrick T. Bennett, and Gene D.Allsup, filed a complaint in quo warranto in the circuit court of Madison County questioningthe validity of the annexations of certain properties by the City of Edwardsville (the City). After a hearing, the circuit court found that the contested annexations did not constitute stripannexations and that the annexed parcels were contiguous to the City, and the court deniedthe quo warranto complaint. On appeal, Ropac contends that the trial court erred in denyingthe quo warranto complaint because the City failed to prove that the annexed parcels werecontiguous to the City.

Having obtained leave of court, the plaintiffs filed a quo warranto complaint onAugust 21, 1998, challenging annexation ordinances adopted by the City in 1997 and 1998. In the complaint, the plaintiffs alleged that the City did not have lawful authority to exercisepower over seven parcels of real estate because the annexations of those parcels wereimproper and invalid. The City filed an answer denying the allegations in the complaint andasserted several affirmative defenses, including laches. The City also filed a justification tothe complaint, claiming that all the challenged annexations had been performed, executed,and adopted pursuant to the terms of the Illinois Municipal Code (65 ILCS 5/7-1-1 et seq.(West 1992)) and the Edwardsville City Code, that the annexations were valid, and that theannexed parcels are a part of and subject to its jurisdiction. Documents regarding eachannexation were filed in support of the City's pleadings.

The plaintiffs filed several objections in response to the justification. We will onlyrecount the two objections that are pertinent to the issues on appeal. The objections arebased on claims that the seven parcels lacked physical contiguity and legal contiguity withthe municipal boundaries. In regard to the lack of physical contiguity, the plaintiffs allegedthat the City had annexed all the parcels by means of an improper strip annexation. In regardto the lack of legal contiguity, the plaintiffs claimed that the connections of all the parcelsto the City are based solely on a prior annexation that is ineffective and that an ineffectiveannexation cannot be the predicate for a subsequent annexation. In response, the City fileda memorandum and additional documents challenging the plaintiffs' objections andallegations. The City also claimed that the plaintiffs' legal contiguity contention constitutedan improper collateral attack on a prior annexation proceeding and that the contention wasbarred by the statute of limitations and the doctrine of laches.

Following a hearing, the trial court denied the complaint in quo warranto. The courtfound that the annexed parcels were contiguous to the City and that the annexations did notconstitute strip annexations. On appeal, Ropac contends that the challenged annexations lackthe fundamental statutory requirement of contiguity and are therefore invalid.

The proper remedy for questioning an annexation that has been accomplished is quowarranto. Edgewood Park No. 2 Homeowners Ass'n v. Countryside Sanitary District, 42 Ill.2d 241, 245, 246 N.E.2d 294, 296 (1969). A quo warranto proceeding is an actionchallenging a defendant's right to exercise jurisdiction over territory or to hold public office. People ex rel. City of Leland Grove v. City of Springfield, 166 Ill. App. 3d 943, 520 N.E.2d1205 (1988). In a quo warranto action, the burden is on the defendant city to prove that allthe elements of its annexation were proper and in accord with the annexation statute. Schallau v. City of Northlake, 82 Ill. App. 3d 456, 465, 403 N.E.2d 266, 272 (1979).

Under the Illinois Municipal Code, the corporate authorities of a municipality mayenact an ordinance expressing a desire to annex a territory that is contiguous to it and thatis not within the corporate limits of any municipality. 65 ILCS 5/7-1-1, 7-1-2 (West 1992). To be contiguous, the tracts of land in the territory must touch or adjoin the municipalboundary in a reasonably substantial physical sense. Western National Bank of Cicero v.Village of Kildeer, 19 Ill. 2d 342, 352, 167 N.E.2d 169, 175 (1960). "The purpose of thecontiguity requirement is to permit the natural and gradual extension of municipal boundariesto areas which 'adjoin one another in a reasonably substantial physical sense.' " People exrel. County of St. Clair v. City of Belleville, 84 Ill. 2d 1, 12, 417 N.E.2d 125, 130 (1981)(quoting Village of Kildeer, 19 Ill. 2d at 352, 167 N.E.2d at 175). The requirement of asubstantial common boundary ensures that the delivery of police and fire services, sewerlines, and other provisions is convenient for the city and its residents. City of Belleville, 84Ill. 2d at 12, 417 N.E.2d at 130. A line of demarcation between the reasonableness orunreasonableness of the contiguity cannot be precisely determined and must be based on thefacts of each case. Village of Kildeer, 19 Ill. 2d at 352, 167 N.E.2d at 175. Generally,annexations have been rejected for a lack of contiguity in cases where the evidenceestablishes that the municipality has engaged in strip annexations or impermissible cornering. See In re Petition to Annex Certain Territory to Village of North Barrington, 144 Ill. 2d 353,367-68, 579 N.E.2d 880, 887 (1991). In those types of cases, the courts have concluded thatthe subject territory lacked a substantial common boundary with the annexing municipality. The trial court's finding that contiguity has or has not been established by the evidence willnot be disturbed unless it is clearly against the manifest weight of the evidence. In reProposed Incorporation of Village of Volo, 229 Ill. App. 3d 321, 327, 592 N.E.2d 628, 633(1992); People ex rel. Tudor v. Vance, 374 Ill. 415, 419, 29 N.E.2d 673, 675 (1940).

On appeal, Ropac contends that the challenged annexations are invalid because thephysical connections between the City and the subject parcels are based on an improper stripannexation of a property identified as the Rapp tract. According to the record, the Rapp tractis a single tract of 750 acres with an irregular shape. Maps depicting the various annexationsindicate that the Rapp tract and the City share a boundary of approximately 250 feet. Themaps show that the Rapp tract touches and connects with the municipal boundary in areasonably substantial physical sense. The record clearly shows that the annexation involveda sizeable piece of real estate as opposed to a narrow corridor. After examining the record,we conclude that the boundary shared by the City and the Rapp tract is sufficient to meet thestatutory requirement for contiguity and that the annexation of that tract resulted in a gradualand natural extension of the City's boundaries. The trial court's finding of contiguity isreasonable and is not against the manifest weight of the evidence.

Ropac also contends that the challenged annexations are invalid because theconnections between the City and the subject parcels are based on Ordinance No. 1748-9-78,a prior annexation ordinance that is ineffective. Ropac claims that Ordinance No. 1748-9-78is ineffective because notice was not served on the individual trustees of the Mitchell FireProtection District, as required under section 7-1-1 of the Illinois Municipal Code (65 ILCS5/7-1-1 (West 1992)). Ordinance No. 1748-9-78 pertains to the annexation of real estatecomposing a portion of the Southern Illinois University (SIU) campus in Madison County,Illinois. The annexation was completed in 1978. The parcels annexed under the challengedordinances are contiguous to the SIU property. Ropac contends that an ineffectiveannexation cannot be the predicate for subsequent annexations. In arguments before the trialcourt and before this court, Ropac has insisted that she is not seeking to overturn theannexation under Ordinance No. 1748-9-78.

Her position seems incongruous. She cannot successfully attack the challengedordinances based on a lack of legal contiguity without contesting, directly or indirectly, the1978 annexation of the SIU property. See, e.g., Langendorf v. City of Urbana, 197 Ill. 2d100, 105, 754 N.E.2d 320, 324 (2001); Ogle v. City of Belleville, 238 Ill. 389, 87 N.E. 353(1909). An attack on the 1978 annexation based on a lack of proper notice is untimely. Section 7-1-46 of the Illinois Municipal Code (65 ILCS 5/7-1-46 (West 1992)) provides thatan action to contest, either directly or indirectly, the annexation of any territory to amunicipality must be initiated within one year after the date that the annexation becomesfinal. There is a statutory exception to the one-year statute of limitations. The exceptionapplies in cases where the territory was not contiguous at the time of the annexation and isnot contiguous at the time an action is brought to contest the annexation. In this case, theannexation of the SIU property was concluded in 1978. The plaintiffs have not attacked thatannexation on grounds of lack of contiguity but, rather, on the lack of notice to individualtrustees. The one-year statute of limitations applies, and the plaintiffs' challenge to the 1978ordinance is barred.

The circuit court's finding that the challenged parcels are contiguous with the City'sboundaries is supported by the evidence in the record. Accordingly, the judgment of thecircuit court is affirmed.

Affirmed.

CHAPMAN, P.J., and GOLDENHERSH, J., concur.