JUSTICE CHAPMAN delivered the opinion of the court:

In January 1996, Antonio Ray died after being struck by at least one vehicle onHighway 367 in St. Charles County, Missouri. His death was initially treated as a trafficfatality, possibly occurring as a result of intoxication. Late in 1999, police in Alton, Illinois,became aware that Ray's death may have been a homicide. In January 2000, the defendant,Eddie L. Alexander, was indicted on three counts of first-degree murder and one count ofaggravated battery in the crime. The indictment charged that the defendant had beaten Rayand then left him on the Missouri highway to be struck by vehicles. A jury convicted thedefendant in April 2001. The defendant appeals, arguing that (1) he was not subject toprosecution in Illinois for murder because the murder occurred in Missouri, (2) he receivedineffective assistance of counsel, (3) the statute of limitations (720 ILCS 5/3-5(b) (West2002)) barred his prosecution for aggravated battery, (4) his aggravated battery convictionmust be vacated because it was a lesser-included offense of murder, and (5) his aggravatedbattery sentence exceeded the permissible sentencing range for that crime. We affirm thedefendant's conviction for murder, but we vacate his conviction and sentence for aggravatedbattery.

On December 10, 1999, the State filed an information charging the defendant,Michael Tate, Brendon Wallace, and Ramando Alexander (who is the defendant's nephew)with one count each of murder (720 ILCS 5/9-1(a)(2) (West 1994)) in the January 1996death of Antonio Ray. On January 13, 2000, a grand jury returned an indictment (whichsuperceded the information) charging the defendant with three counts of first-degree murder(720 ILCS 5/9-1(a)(1), (a)(2), (a)(3) (West 1994)) and one count of aggravated battery (720ILCS 5/12-4 (West 1994)). The indictment alleged that on or about January 19 or 20, 1996,the defendant committed the offense of first-degree murder in Madison County in that hebeat Antonio Ray with the intent to do great bodily harm to him and then left Ray on ahighway in St. Charles County, Missouri, where he would be struck by vehicles. Tate andWallace each pled guilty to second-degree murder regarding Ray's death. RamandoAlexander pled guilty to unlawful restraint and was sentenced to 18 months in prison.

The defendant was tried before a jury in April 2001. The testimony adduced at thetrial established that Antonio Ray had been severely beaten at the Alton, Illinois, home ofthe defendant and his former wife, Robin Alexander, on the evening of January 19, 1996. Several guests were present in the Alexanders' home that night, including Michael Tate,Brendon Wallace, Jeffrey Ewing, and Antonio Ray. The Alexanders and most of their guestswere members of a gang called the Gangster Disciples. Ewing was the "governor" of theGangster Disciples, and the defendant was the assistant governor. Ramando Alexander, whowas a member of a different gang, was residing with the defendant and Robin Alexander atthe time.

The violence began when Ray tried to steal money that Ewing was counting. Therewas some conflict in the testimony regarding exactly how many people participated in thebeating, where in the house the beating occurred, and whether the participants in the beatingwere armed with baseball bats and pistols or used only their hands. One witness testifiedthat the beating occurred in the dining room, while the others testified that it took place inthe kitchen. All of the witnesses who saw the beating testified that the defendant, Wallace,Tate, and Ewing beat Ray. According to Robin Alexander and Brendon Wallace, the othermen who were present in the house took part in the beating as well. According to RamandoAlexander, Sherri Goree (who was Ewing's girlfriend at the time) joined Wallace, Tate,Ewing, and the defendant in beating Ray. Most of the witnesses testified that Ewing hit Rayin the head with his pistol. Some of the witnesses testified that the others used guns orbaseball bats to hit Ray, while other witnesses testified that they saw only Ewing use anobject to hit Ray. Robin Alexander testified that she did not know if anyone used anythingother than their fists and feet to hit Ray. Gregory Taylor, who is the defendant's cousin andnot a Gangster Disciples member, also testified that he saw no weapons being used.

All of the witnesses testified that Ray was beaten severely in the Alexanders' kitchen. One witness, Shanieka Mitchell, testified that he was covered in blood and "looked like hewas dead already"and that he was lying on the floor unable to fight back while they beat him. Ramando Alexander, Robin Alexander, and Gregory Taylor all testified that Ray was on theground unable to defend himself during the beating. Sherri Goree testified that Ray wasknocked to the floor, but she stated that he tried to fight back. Only Michael Tate claimedthat Ray was not knocked to the floor during the beating, but even he admitted that Ray "kindof staggered" and was not able to defend himself because he was badly outnumbered.

The testimony further showed that Ray was taken to the back yard of the Alexanders'home, where he was beaten again and shut in the trunk of Wallace's car. Again, there wereconflicts in the testimony. Most of the witnesses testified that Tate and Wallace dragged Rayfrom the kitchen to the yard. Wallace testified that he carried Ray to the yard. Only Tatetestified that Ray walked out the door. He stated that Ray recoiled from the group of menhitting him and that this "forced him out the back door." The testimony was uncontrovertedthat by the time the beating in the back yard was over, Ray was lying on the ground. Mostof the witnesses stated that he was not moving, although Taylor testified that Ray was"squirming a little." Taylor and Ramando Alexander both testified that Tate and Wallacelifted Ray up and put him in the trunk of Wallace's car, although Ramando first testified thathe could not remember whether it was Wallace or another man who helped Tate put Ray inthe trunk. Wallace testified, "[Tate and I] just opened the trunk, and we-we helped him in."

After the beating, it was decided that Tate and Wallace were to take Ray to Missourito kill him, although the testimony regarding exactly who said what is also in conflict. According to Wallace, Ewing ordered him and Tate to take Ray to Fourth Street and kill himthere, but then the defendant told them to take him to Missouri instead. According to Tate,Ewing and the defendant told him and Wallace to take Ray to Fourth Street to kill him there,but they decided on their own to take him to Missouri instead because they were afraid theywould be seen on Fourth Street. Taylor testified that he suggested taking Ray to the homeof someone named Shalinda, who was Ray's girlfriend and Wallace's cousin, but thatWallace objected to that idea. Robin Alexander testified that the defendant told Wallace to"drop [Ray] off" across the bridge in Missouri. She later said that she heard the defendantsay to "dump-and drop him off across." She further stated that the defendant referred to Rayas "the body." On cross-examination, she admitted that in her December 1999 statement tothe police she stated that the defendant had told Wallace to put Ray in the car trunk and "takecare of business across the river." On redirect, she clarified that he had said this in responseto Tate asking if he could kill Ray. Although Ramando Alexander testified that thedefendant did not order Wallace and Tate to kill Ray, he stated that the defendant orderedthem to take "the body" out of his house.

Wallace and Tate both testified that they drove to Missouri with Ray in the trunk ofWallace's car. Both testified that they did not think that Ray's attempt to steal from Ewingwarranted killing him and that they decided that they would disobey Ewing and thedefendant's orders to kill him. They drove across the Clark Bridge and parked next to theside of Route 367. Wallace testified that he and Tate "let [Ray] out of the trunk" and then"just left him in the road" instead of killing him. He admitted, however, that Ray was notup and walking at that time and that when they left him in the road, they thought that hemight be hit by a car. The prosecutor asked, "And that would solve the problem of you beingordered to kill him?" Wallace replied, "Yes."

Tate's account of what took place in Missouri was somewhat different from Wallace'saccount. According to Tate, he and Wallace "helped" Ray out of the trunk. Tate stated[:]"He was real woozy. He said a couple of words. He said, [']Mike, Brendon, please don't killme.['] " Then, according to Tate, they let Ray go and he "walked a few steps" before fallingdown next to the shoulder of the road. Tate testified that the area was very dark and that Rayfell maybe five feet away from the highway "at the most." He further testified that he didnot believe that Ray would be hit by a car but that when he returned to the defendant's homein Alton, he told the defendant and Ewing that he and Wallace had taken care of their"business."

On April 6, 2001, the jury returned verdicts of guilty of first-degree murder andaggravated battery. On October 30, 2001, the court sentenced the defendant to 40 years inprison on each charge, to be served concurrently. On November 28, 2001, the defendantfiled a motion to reduce his sentence, arguing that his 40-year sentence would cause unduehardship to his family and was disproportionately harsh compared with the sentencesreceived by codefendants Wallace and Tate. The court denied the motion on December 18,2001. The defendant filed his notice of appeal on January 3, 2002.

On October 23, 2003, the defendant filed a motion in this court to supplement therecord on appeal, which we ordered taken with the case on November 13, 2003. We nowgrant the defendant's motion.

The defendant raises several issues with respect to his aggravated battery conviction. The State concedes that the aggravated battery conviction must be vacated because it was alesser-included offense of first-degree murder. We agree. See People v. Smith, 183 Ill. 2d425, 431-32, 701 N.E.2d 1097, 1100 (1998); People v. King, 66 Ill. 2d 551, 566, 363 N.E.2d838, 844 (1977). Because we vacate the defendant's conviction and sentence for aggravatedbattery, we need not address the other issues raised with respect to this conviction.

The defendant first contends that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to convict him. This argument has three components. First, the defendant contends, the indictment wasfatally defective in that it failed to allege that the murder occurred even partly within theState of Illinois. Second, he contends that the State failed to prove beyond a reasonabledoubt that a part of the crime occurred in Illinois. Third, he argues that his conviction mustbe reversed because the jury was not instructed that in order to convict the defendant, it hadto find that at least a part of the crime occurred in Illinois. We reject all three contentions. The indictment charges, in relevant part, as follows:

on or about January 19-20, 1996, at and in the County of Madison, in the State ofIllinois, committed the offense of:

COUNT I: FIRST[-]DEGREE MURDER in that said defendant, without lawfuljustification, and with the intent to do great bodily harm to Antonio Ray, beat AntonioRay[] and then left Antonio Ray upon Highway 367, St. Charles County, Missouri,where he would be struck by vehicles, thereby causing the death of Antonio Ray, inviolation of 720 ILCS 5/9-1(a)(1) [(West 1994)]." (Emphases added.)

On its face, the indictment alleges that the acts constituting the murder-with the exceptionof leaving Ray on the Missouri highway-occurred in Madison County, Illinois. Theindictment charges that the defendant committed the offense of first-degree murder inMadison County and does not mention any other location until after the words "and then." Giving the indictment its most logical reading, then, it charges that all the actions constitutingthe offense of murder took place in Illinois-except for the final act of leaving Ray on thehighway in Missouri. While it might have been better to have stated in the body of count Iitself that the beating had taken place in Madison County, we think it would be irrational tointerpret the charge to mean that the defendant committed the murder in Madison County,Illinois, by beating Ray at some undisclosed location and then leaving him on a highway inSt. Charles County, Missouri. The indictment, on its face, raises no genuine jurisdictionalissue.

The defendant further contends that the State failed to prove beyond a reasonabledoubt that the acts perpetrated in Illinois caused Ray's death. See People v. Holt, 91 Ill. 2d480, 492, 440 N.E.2d 102, 108 (1982) (stating that jurisdiction must be proven beyond areasonable doubt). There is no dispute that the ultimate cause of Ray's death was the severecranial injuries he suffered when he was hit by at least one vehicle on the Missouri highway. We note that there was some evidence to support a finding that Ray died directly as a resultof the beating before he was taken to Missouri. Ramando Alexander testified that thedefendant told Tate and Wallace to "get the body" out of his house and that it was Ramando'sunderstanding that Ray was to be "dumped" somewhere. Robin Alexander also testified thatshe did not know whether Ray was dead or alive when he was put in the trunk of Wallace'scar, and she stated that the defendant referred to him as "the body" when the defendantordered Wallace and Tate to take him across the bridge. However, most of the evidencesuggested that Ray was alive when he was taken to Missouri, and the State merely takes theposition that the murder occurred partly in the State of Illinois.

A defendant is subject to prosecution in Illinois for a criminal offense if it is"committed either wholly or partly within the [s]tate" (720 ILCS 5/1-5(a)(1) (West 2002))or if conduct within this state "constitutes an attempt, solicitation[,] or conspiracy" to commitan offense in another state that is a criminal offense in both states (720 ILCS 5/1-5(a)(4)(West 2002)). An offense is committed partly in Illinois if either the conduct or a result thatconstitutes an element of the offense occurs within Illinois. 720 ILCS 5/1-5(b) (West 2002). In this case, Ray's death, which was a result constituting an element of the offense of first-degree murder (see 720 ILCS 5/9-1(a)(1) (West 1994)), occurred in Missouri. The issue,then, is whether the beating, which occurred in Illinois, constituted an element of the offenseas well. To sustain a conviction for first-degree murder, the State must show (1) that adefendant performed acts which caused the death of the victim and (2) that the defendantintended to cause death or great bodily harm or knew that his or her actions would causedeath or created a strong probability of death or great bodily harm. 720 ILCS 5/9-1(a)(1),(a)(2) (West 1994). At issue here is whether the defendant's actions in Illinois causedAntonio Ray's death.

The defendant acknowledges, as he must, that in order for the State to provejurisdiction, the State need not establish that Ray's death was caused entirely by actionsoccurring in Illinois. See 720 ILCS 5/1-5(a)(1) (West 2002) (Illinois has jurisdiction overa crime that occurred "wholly or partly within the [s]tate"); Holt, 91 Ill. 2d at 485, 440N.E.2d at 104 (noting that "[j]urisdiction would be proper even if less than all the criminalactivity took place in Illinois, provided enough did to constitute a criminal attempt"(emphasis added) (citing People v. Werblow, 241 N.Y. 55, 148 N.E. 786 (1925))). Heargues, however, that the beating inflicted in Illinois did not constitute a part of the crimebecause the State did not prove that it caused Ray's death. We reject this contention.

Even if we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the defendant, it is clearthat the beating was a contributing cause of Ray's death. The defendant contends that someof the evidence showed that Ray was "walking and talking" in Missouri. This statement,which refers to Tate's testimony, mischaracterizes the evidence. Tate specifically testifiedthat Ray "was real woozy" when they arrived in Missouri and that he "walked a few steps"and then fell down next to the roadway. While the testimony varied considerably regardingthe exact progression of the events at the defendant's home, no testimony refuted the fact thatRay was savagely beaten and taken away in the trunk of Wallace's car, nor did any testimonyrefute the fact that the defendant participated in that beating. Further, a passenger in the carthat struck Ray testified that she did not see him until after the car hit him, and there was astipulation that, if called, another motorist would testify that he swerved to avoid hitting aman he saw lying in the center of the road, where Ray's body was later found. To concludethat Ray lay down in the center of the highway in the path of oncoming traffic of his ownaccord-or that he remained lying on the highway for any reason other than that he was tooweak to get up as a result of the beating-would be ludicrous.

Even assuming that the jury accepted Tate's testimony that Ray fell down next to theroad, rather than Wallace's testimony that they deliberately left Ray in the roadway itself,does not eliminate the causal connection between the beating and Ray's death. Tate testifiedthat Ray fell down no more than five feet from the side of the highway in a darkened areain a "woozy" condition. The danger inherent in this situation is obvious. If Wallace andTate did not place the badly injured Ray in the middle of the highway, where his body wasfound, he could only have gotten there by falling onto the highway attempting to flag downa passing motorist for aid, a situation just as causally connected to the "woozy" conditioncaused by the beating in Illinois as the more likely explanation that he had been left in themiddle of the highway and was unable even to crawl off.

The defendant contends that, under the Illinois Supreme Court's decision in Holt,these facts are insufficient to establish Illinois jurisdiction. We find Holt distinguishable. There, the defendant was tried in Illinois for aggravated kidnaping and felony murder (Ill.Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 38, par. 9-1(a)(3)). The State originally charged him with intentionalmurder as well as felony murder, but the trial court dismissed the intentional murder chargebecause the evidence showed that the victim had been strangled to death only in Wisconsin. Holt, 91 Ill. 2d at 483, 440 N.E.2d at 103. In holding that Illinois lacked jurisdiction overthe felony murder charge, the supreme court explained that the predicate felony underlyinga felony murder charge acts as a substitute for the actual intent required for intentionalmurder. Holt, 91 Ill. 2d at 485, 440 N.E.2d at 104. If a defendant formed an actual intentto kill in Illinois but did nothing in furtherance of this intent before leaving the state, Illinoiswould not have jurisdiction. Likewise, forming the constructive intent to kill in Illinois bycommitting the predicate felony here does not confer jurisdiction on Illinois courts. Holt,91 Ill. 2d at 486, 440 N.E.2d at 104.

The court further explained that the kidnaping, although it was a related crime, couldnot support Illinois jurisdiction because "it is not enough that some part of a course ofcriminal conduct, some related crime, be committed in Illinois; the particular crime chargedmust be committed partly within this [s]tate." (Emphases added.) Holt, 91 Ill. 2d at 484, 440N.E.2d at 104. The beating that occurred in the case at bar was not merely a part of a relatedseries of actions which constituted separate crimes. Rather, it was an integral part of theoffense charged. Had Ray not been debilitated to the point where he was unable to get outof the roadway under his own strength due to the beating in Illinois, Wallace and Tate couldnot have killed him without doing more than they did in Missouri. There was no evidencethat Ray had been pushed in front of an oncoming car or that he had been restrained in anymanner other than by the condition in which the beating left him. This stands in starkcontrast to the situation in Holt where the defendant engaged in actions that caused hisvictim's death by strangulation entirely in Wisconsin. Had Holt strangled his victim whenhe first encountered her at a Kenosha, Wisconsin, bar (see Holt, 91 Ill. 2d at 482, 440 N.E.2dat 103), he could have caused her death without first kidnaping her from her parents' homein Illinois by doing no more than he actually did in Wisconsin. By contrast, had Tate andWallace transported Antonio Ray to Missouri without first, along with the defendant andEwing, beating him in Illinois, they would have had to do something more than they did inMissouri to cause his death; otherwise, he could have avoided being run over by simplywalking away.

The Holt court recognized this distinction, going out of its way to point out that afelony might support jurisdiction over a felony murder charge "if there were some intrinsicrelation between it and the death *** so that one could say realistically that the felony causedthe death." Holt, 91 Ill. 2d at 486, 440 N.E.2d at 104-05. For the reasons we have stated,we can realistically say that the beating Ray suffered in Illinois caused his death even thoughit was most likely not the only or even most direct cause of his death.

Further, as noted, the Holt court pointed out that conduct within Illinois must at leastamount to an attempt to commit the felony in order to support Illinois jurisdiction. See Holt,91 Ill. 2d at 485, 440 N.E.2d at 104. Given the severity of the beating and the undisputedfact that Ray was outnumbered 4 to 1, we find that if Ray had not been struck by vehiclesand had recovered from his injuries, the beating alone would support a prosecution forattempted murder. See 720 ILCS 5/8-4(a) (West 1994) (defining attempt as taking anysubstantial step toward the commission of an offense with the intent to commit that offense).

Moreover, as the State correctly points out, Illinois jurisdiction over a crime thatoccurred wholly in Missouri could also be established by the evidence that the defendantordered Wallace and Tate to kill Ray in Illinois. See 720 ILCS 5/1-5(a)(4) (West 1994)(providing that Illinois has jurisdiction where conduct within this state constitutes solicitationto commit an offense in another state). In order for the jury to find the defendant guilty ofRay's murder, it had to find either that he had solicited the murder or that the beatingconstituted a part of the murder-or both. There were no allegations in the indictment andno evidence presented at the trial to show that the defendant had done anything infurtherance of this crime anywhere other than Illinois. Thus, we find that the State providedsufficient evidence to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Illinois had jurisdiction over thiscrime under at least one-if not both-of those subsections.

As the defendant correctly contends, however, whether the crime occurred partly inIllinois is a question of fact. He argues that this question should have been submitted to thejury and that counsel was ineffective for failing to request a jury instruction informing thejury that it must find beyond a reasonable doubt that at least a part of the murder occurredin Illinois. In order to succeed on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, the defendantmust show both that counsel's performance fell below an objective standard of professionalreasonableness and that but for counsel's professional errors, the outcome of the defendant'strial might have been different. People v. Ortiz, 224 Ill. App. 3d 1065, 1070, 586 N.E.2d1384, 1387 (1992). As we have explained, in order to convict the defendant, the jury neededto find that he solicited the murder in Illinois or that the act of beating Ray in Illinois formeda part of the murder. Because the jury necessarily found beyond a reasonable doubt at leastone of the facts required to support Illinois jurisdiction, the result would have been nodifferent had the instruction been given.

C. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

The defendant next contends that his murder conviction must be reversed because hereceived ineffective assistance of counsel. He argues that defense counsel was ineffectivebecause (1) he failed to challenge Illinois's jurisdiction over the murder charge, (2) he failedto raise the statute of limitations as an affirmative defense to the charge of aggravatedbattery, (3) he did not object to a police officer's testimony that the murder occurred inMadison County, (4) he did not adequately confront Tate and Wallace with the full extentof the benefits they received pursuant to plea agreements, and (5) he failed to object to twohearsay statements that were admitted.

We evaluate claims of ineffective assistance of counsel under the standardannunciated by the United States Supreme Court in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668,80 L. Ed. 2d 674, 104 S. Ct. 2052 (1984), and adopted by the Illinois Supreme Court inPeople v. Albanese, 104 Ill. 2d 504, 473 N.E.2d 1246 (1984). People v. Moore, 279 Ill. App.3d 152, 156-57, 663 N.E.2d 490, 494-95 (1996). The Strickland test has two components. First, a defendant contending that he received ineffective assistance of counsel mustdemonstrate that counsel's performance was deficient. Moore, 279 Ill. App. 3d at 157, 663N.E.2d at 495. To do so, the defendant must show that "counsel made errors so serious thatcounsel was not functioning as the 'counsel' guaranteed the defendant by the SixthAmendment." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687, 80 L. Ed. 2d at 693, 104 S. Ct. at 2064. Although counsel's conduct is afforded a strong presumption that it constitutes sound trialstrategy (Moore, 279 Ill. App. 3d at 157, 663 N.E.2d at 495), this presumption may beovercome where no reasonably effective criminal defense attorney, confronting thecircumstances of the defendant's trial, would engage in similar conduct (People v. Fletcher,335 Ill. App. 3d 447, 453, 780 N.E.2d 365, 370 (2002)).

To prevail on an ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim, a defendant must alsodemonstrate that, but for counsel's deficient performance, there is a reasonable probabilitythat the result of the trial would have been different. Moore, 279 Ill. App. 3d at 159, 663N.E.2d at 496 (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 695, 80 L. Ed. 2d at 698, 104 S. Ct. at 2068-69). In other words, the defendant must demonstrate that he was actually prejudiced by theineffective representation he received. Moore, 279 Ill. App. 3d at 157, 663 N.E.2d at 495. To make this showing, the defendant need not show that the evidence that is not attributableto defense counsel's errors would have been insufficient to sustain the conviction. Moore,279 Ill. App. 3d at 160, 663 N.E.2d at 497. Rather, the defendant need only show that it isplausible that the result of the trial would have been different absent counsel's unprofessionalerrors. Fletcher, 335 Ill. App. 3d at 455, 780 N.E.2d at 371. If it is easier to demonstratethat the claimed errors could not have prejudiced the defendant, a reviewing court may affirmthe defendant's conviction on that basis alone. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697, 80 L. Ed. 2d at699, 104 S. Ct. at 2069.

We may dismiss the first three claimed errors at the outset. Because we haveconcluded that Illinois had jurisdiction over the murder charge, counsel was not ineffectivefor failing to challenge the indictment on this ground. See People v. Singleton, 217 Ill. App.3d 675, 689, 577 N.E.2d 838, 847 (1991) (noting that trial counsel is not ineffective forfailing to make a useless objection). Because we have vacated the defendant's aggravatedbattery conviction, his contention that counsel was ineffective for failing to raise the statuteof limitations is moot. The defendant's complaint regarding the police officer's testimonythat the murder occurred in Madison County is that this "bare opinion testimony" helped toestablish Illinois jurisdiction. Because Illinois jurisdiction was proper, the defendant cannotclaim he suffered any prejudice from this admittedly conclusory testimony.

The defendant's next contention of error concerns counsel's alleged failure to confrontWallace and Tate with the full extent of the deals they made pursuant to their negotiated pleaagreements. He argues that plea agreements they had entered into, both in unrelated priorconvictions and in their convictions for Ray's murder, resulted in void sentencing orderswhich the State could seek to revoke at any time, thereby exposing Wallace and Tate to thepossibility of receiving harsher sentences. See People v. Wade, 116 Ill. 2d 1, 4-5, 506N.E.2d 954, 955 (1987) (an order sentencing a defendant to probation after a negotiatedguilty plea was vacated when a probation officer informed the court that the defendant hada prior conviction, making him ineligible for probation). According to the defendant, thissituation created an incentive for Wallace and Tate to implicate the defendant that is farstronger than the incentive a codefendant who has pled guilty ordinarily has to testify for theState. Because a void sentencing order may be challenged at any time, the defendant argues,the State could pressure Wallace and Tate into falsely implicating the defendant bythreatening to challenge their sentences if they do not cooperate. See People v. Muschio, 278Ill. App. 3d 525, 528-29, 663 N.E.2d 93, 95 (1996) (where the State engaged in such atactic).

A comparison of Muschio, cited by the defendant, to the case at bar demonstrates theflaws inherent in the defendant's argument. There, one codefendant pled guilty and receiveda seven-year sentence for an offense carrying a mandatory minimum sentence of nine years. Muschio, 278 Ill. App. 3d at 528, 663 N.E.2d at 95. During the course of the secondcodefendant's trial, the prosecutor stated that he had learned that the defense intended to callthe first codefendant as a witness. If that was true, the prosecutor said, the State " 'would bemaking an oral motion to reconsider' " the sentence given to the first codefendant pursuantto his plea agreement because it was illegally low. Muschio, 278 Ill. App. 3d at 528, 663N.E.2d at 95. The codefendant stated on the record that he did not testify because he did notwant to serve two additional years in prison. Muschio, 278 Ill. App. 3d at 529, 663 N.E.2dat 95. The appellate court found that this tactic amounted to witness intimidation. Muschio,278 Ill. App. 3d at 530, 663 N.E.2d at 96.

Here, by contrast, there is no evidence of any such tactics on the part of the State;there is only a complex legal argument that such pressure could, theoretically, be placed onWallace and Tate. That argument is as follows. Wallace pled guilty to a charge that hecommitted the offense of armed violence (720 ILCS 5/33A-2 (West 1994)) when, whilearmed with a dangerous weapon, he was accountable for a first-degree murder committedby another. Because first-degree murder cannot serve as the predicate felony for armedviolence (see People v. Hobbs, 249 Ill. App. 3d 679, 683, 619 N.E.2d 258, 261 (1993)), thedefendant argues that the court had no authority to accept Wallace's guilty plea and that theState could seek to vacate it at any time. Tate pled guilty to second-degree murder in aprevious case in which he had been originally indicted on charges of first-degree murder forshooting a man in the head. The indictment was subsequently amended by interlineation tocharge Tate with second-degree murder and include allegations that he believed at the timeof the killing that circumstances existed that would have justified or exonerated the killinghad they been true. The defendant contends that because an indictment may not besubstantively amended except by a grand jury (see People v. Kelly, 299 Ill. App. 3d 222, 227,701 N.E.2d 114, 117 (1998)), the second-degree-murder conviction entered on Tate's guiltyplea was void and subject to challenge by the State at any time. In Ray's murder, both Tateand Wallace pled guilty to second-degree murder after similar amendments were made totheir indictments. The defendant contends that no factual basis existed for finding that theycould have had an imperfect defense to first-degree murder that would entitle them to asecond-degree-murder instruction had they been tried by juries rather than plead guilty andthat, as a result, their sentences for second-degree murder in Ray's death were also subjectto attack at any time.

We need not determine whether the defendant is correct in his assertion that the State,even theoretically, could use any of these plea bargains to threaten Wallace and Tate toimplicate the defendant. Any cross-examination of these witnesses on the complexities oftheir plea bargains would have been far less effective than the cross-examination defensecounsel actually conducted. Defense counsel got Wallace to admit on cross-examination thathe had received two concurrent murder sentences (although the previous sentence wasactually for armed violence). Wallace further admitted that he could have been sentencedto natural life in prison for the murder of Antonio Ray, the second of the two murders, absenthis plea agreements but was instead sentenced to only 35 years. He further admitted that hissentence for Ray's murder extended the time he was already sentenced to spend in prison byonly 10 years. Defense counsel emphasized how beneficial Wallace's plea in the instant casewas. Moreover, Wallace denied making a plea agreement that included his testimony againstthe defendant, even after he admitted he had received such favorable treatment, a lie defensecounsel was able to use to further impeach his credibility. Although defense counsel neverasked Tate whether he could have been sentenced to natural life absent his guilty pleas, Tateadmitted on cross-examination that his concurrent sentence for Ray's murder would notextend the time he was to serve in prison on the previous murder charge at all. Defensecounsel told the jury: "[The State has] cut a deal with Mr. Tate for his testimony. They cuta deal so sweet for him, he's not going to serve any more time than he [was] already goingto serve. He got a free pass."

Telling the jury that Tate essentially got away with murder and that Wallace wasavoiding a life sentence has far more impact than explaining the nuanced details of how theState theoretically could have exerted pressure over these two witnesses by threatening tochallenge plea agreements it had previously negotiated with them. Moreover, the latterstrategy, the one the defendant argues on appeal trial counsel should have engaged in, mightwell have backfired. In the absence of any evidence that the State was using their sentencesin unrelated prior cases to threaten Wallace and Tate to testify against the defendant, theinherently confusing argument that the State had the power to do so might well haveappeared to the jury to be nothing more than a far-fetched conspiracy theory. Counsel wasnot ineffective for cross-examining Wallace and Tate in the manner he did.

Finally, the defendant contends that defense counsel was ineffective for failing toobject to two alleged hearsay statements. One of these statements was admitted withoutobjection when Shanieka Mitchell testified that she heard the defendant tell Wallace and Tateto put Ray in the trunk of Wallace's car. On cross-examination, she admitted that RobinAlexander's 13-year-old cousin had overheard the defendant tell the men to put him in thetrunk and relayed this to Mitchell. Although Mitchell's testimony, if believed, would notestablish the fact that the defendant ordered Wallace and Tate to kill Ray, it did add somecredibility to the testimony that the defendant gave the order. However, considering thetotality of the circumstances, we do not find that it prejudiced the defendant. Severalwitnesses testified that the defendant either ordered Wallace and Tate to kill Ray or orderedthem to do the killing in Missouri rather than in Alton after Ewing had given the initial orderto kill. The only witness who gave any truly exculpatory testimony in this regard wasGregory Taylor, the defendant's cousin. The defendant's former wife and his nephew bothtestified that the defendant ordered "the body" to be "dumped" or "dropped off" in Missouri. Further, the testimony that the defendant was the assistant governor of the Gangster Discipleswith the authority to issue such an order was uncontroverted. Moreover, defense counseleffectively used the fact that Mitchell lied about hearing the order personally to challengethe credibility of her far more damaging testimony. Specifically, Mitchell testified that shehad seen the defendant, along with Ewing, Tate, and Wallace, beating Ray, that the menwere using guns and baseball bats to beat him, and that Ray "looked like he was dead" beforeTate and Wallace even dragged him into the back yard.

The other statement of which the defendant complains was contained in a stipulationthat was read into evidence. The stipulation stated that, if called to testify, Dr. Mary Case,the medical examiner who performed an autopsy on Ray in 1996, would testify, in relevantpart, as follows:

"Antonio Ray died of crania-cerebral trauma.

Also present were abrasions of the left elbow, left hand, knees, shoulders, leftside back[,] and right chest. Ray had a rib fracture on the right 10th rib.

The cause of death is stated as blunt trauma at the hands of another and thenstruck by a motor vehicle." (Emphasis added.)

The jury requested both the original autopsy report and the stipulation regarding what Dr.Case would testify to; however, the autopsy report itself was never entered into evidence,and defense counsel objected to sending the stipulation to the jury room on the grounds thatthe stipulation was the equivalent of Dr. Case's testimony. The court sustained the objection. We first note that the meaning of this stipulation that the cause of death "is stated as"blunt trauma followed by being hit by a motor vehicle is not at all clear. It could mean "Dr.Case states that"-in which case, since the stipulation is the equivalent of her testimony, it isnot hearsay but simply a poorly worded description of what she would testify to if called. It could mean "Dr. Case would testify that 'it is stated' in the autopsy report"-which wouldbe admissible under an exception to the hearsay rule for coroners' reports. See 725 ILCS5/115-5.1 (West 2002). In all likelihood, the original autopsy report did not contain any suchstatement because the Missouri police who investigated Ray's death in 1996 considered it atraffic accident. The statement is at best confusing and at worst potentially misleading. Defense counsel should have objected. We find that it resulted in no prejudice to thedefendant, however. The stipulation was not sent back to the jury room, although all therequested exhibits were. It is highly unlikely that an isolated statement read into evidencenear the beginning of a three-day trial was more persuasive to the jurors than theoverwhelming evidence that Ray was severely beaten by at least four men and left badlyinjured in the middle of a highway where it was too dark for motorists to see him. Weconclude that the claimed errors did not amount to ineffective assistance of counsel.

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the defendant's conviction for first-degreemurder, but we vacate his conviction and sentence for aggravated battery.

Motion granted; judgment affirmed in part and vacated in part.

WELCH and GOLDENHERSH, JJ., concur.