On February 25, 2001, Earl Barwig (defendant) was cited for driving whileunder the influence of alcohol (625 ILCS 5/11-501(a)(2) (West 2000)), drivingwhile having a blood-alcohol concentration in excess of .08 (625 ILCS5/11-501(a)(1) (West 2000)), speeding (625 ILCS 5/11-601(b) (West 2000)), andimproper lane usage (625 ILCS 5/11-709 (West 2000)). Defendant filed a petitionto rescind his statutory summary suspension, and a hearing was held. The circuitcourt entered an order denying defendant's petition to rescind. Additionally,defendant challenged section 7-4-8 of the Illinois Municipal Code (MunicipalCode) (65 ILCS 5/7-4-8 (West 2000)) on constitutional grounds. The circuit courtdeclined to find a constitutional violation. Defendant filed a timely notice ofappeal.

The relevant facts are as follows. Steve Mumbower, the arresting officer, had writtena sworn report on the same date as the offense. The report stated as follows: "I saw a truckswerving from one side of the road to the other and speeding[.] [T]he driver then refusedall field sobriety test [sic] and said he had 10 or 12 beers[.] [A]lso[,] he was unable to keephis balance while standing." The sworn report also shows a breath test result of .183.

On March 9, 2001, defendant filed a petition to rescind his statutory summarysuspension. Defendant claimed that he was not properly placed under arrest for drivingunder the influence of alcohol, that the arresting officer did not have reasonable grounds tobelieve that defendant was driving or in actual physical control of a motor vehicle whileunder the influence of alcohol, and that defendant was not properly warned by the arrestingofficer as provided in section 11-501.1 of the Illinois Vehicle Code (Vehicle Code) (625ILCS 5/11-501.1 (West 2000)). Defendant supplemented the petition to rescind on April3, 2001. The supplement stated as follows: "Defendant submitted to the requested test ortests, but the test sample of Defendant's blood[-]alcohol concentration did not indicate ablood[-]alcohol concentration of 0.08 or more[,] and the arresting officer did not follow te[sic] standards prescribed by Illinois law in administering the test." On that same date,defendant also filed a motion in limine seeking to prohibit the State from using his breathtest results. Among defendant's complaints was that the logbook failed to disclose the entryof any record that defendant was tested on February 25, 2001. We note that the breath-analysis-instrument log shows that the breath test instrument was certified accurate by ClydeMatthews on February 13, 2001.

On April 4, 2001, a hearing was held on the petition to rescind. Mumbower, a patrolofficer with the West City police department, testified that the majority of his work over thepreceding two years had been with driving-under-the-influence arrests. He stated that WestCity adjoins Benton. He agreed that if he were in Benton while on patrol, he would use hisradar, although he would not stop someone in Benton for speeding. Mumbower stated thathe had made driving-under-the-influence stops in Benton in the past.

Mumbower stated that on the evening in question he went to Benton looking for asuspect in an unrelated incident. While Mumbower was in Benton, he saw defendant's truckgoing from one side of the road, outside his lane of traffic, to the other side. Mumboweractivated his radar and clocked defendant going 36 miles per hour. Mumbower activatedhis siren and lights and eventually stopped defendant at his home.

Although defendant was asked to perform field sobriety tests, he refused. Defendantthen became argumentative. Mumbower testified that three Benton police officers andanother West City police officer were present after defendant was stopped. Defendant wastransported to the Franklin County jail, where he was given the warning to motorist and washanded a written copy of the warning so that he could review the form. Mumbower agreedthat a logbook goes with the machine, but he stated that there were no blank sheets for thisinstrument at the Franklin County sheriff's department. Mumbower claimed that to the bestof his recollection, defendant blew a sufficient sample the first time. Although he stated thatdefendant may have blown twice into the instrument, he would have had a receipt showingthat defendant had given an insufficient sample, and he did not have such a receipt. Mumbower also stated that he never saw defendant burp or regurgitate during the 20-minuteobservation period. Mumbower agreed that he had left defendant for a few seconds, but hestated that he was able to watch him while doing so.

Melvin Dixon, Benton's police chief, testified that the merit system looks at everypolice officer to be hired by the city and recommends to the city council whether a particularindividual should be hired. Dixon was unaware of any intergovernmental agreementsbetween Benton and West City regarding the joint use of police forces. He was alsounaware of West City police officers patrolling in Benton. Dixon claimed that he had nopower to discipline a West City police officer.

The State moved for a "directed finding" at the conclusion of the hearing. Defendantresponded, in relevant part, by claiming that the defense had shown a problem with thebreath test. Defendant claimed that there was a risk of contamination, because Mumbowerhad not entered the breath test results in the logbook. The circuit court took underadvisement defendant's argument that his arrest was constitutionally invalid, but it found infavor of the State on other grounds. Attached to defendant's trial brief is a copy of a Bentoncity ordinance that states that the mayor has the duty to appoint members of the board ofpolice and fire commissioners and that the police chief is to be appointed by the mayor withthe advice and consent of the city council.

The circuit court issued an order on May 24, 2001, denying the remainder ofdefendant's petition to rescind. The court determined that defendant's arrest in Benton bya West City police officer was permitted pursuant to sections 7-4-7 and 7-4-8 of theMunicipal Code (65 ILCS 5/7-4-7, 7-4-8 (West 2000)), because section 7-4-7 created"police districts" and section 7-4-8 gave the police within the district "full authority andpower as peace officers." The court stated that this enabled the police officers within thepolice district to go into any part of the police district to exercise that authority and power. Although defendant challenged section 7-4-8 on constitutional grounds, the circuit courtdeclined to find a constitutional violation. Defendant filed a timely notice of appeal.

Initially, defendant contends that the circuit court erred in denying his petition torescind his statutory summary suspension on the ground that his breath test result wasunreliable. More specifically, defendant claims that because Mumbower failed to log the"purported test or tests" in the official records of the Franklin County sheriff's department,the tests are inadmissible hearsay. We disagree.

Mumbower testified that he personally conducted a breath test on defendant. Theresults of that test were not admitted into evidence; therefore, no hearsay evidence wasadmitted regarding defendant's breath alcohol content.

Defendant also claims that Mumbower's testimony established that he failed to followthe guidelines and operational standards established by the Illinois Department of PublicHealth. The gist of defendant's argument is that a record of defendant's breath-alcohol-content test must be maintained in a logbook. Defendant claims that if a record of the testis not kept in the logbook, then the evidence is "unrebutted" and the "suspension of thedefendant's driving privileges must be rescinded." We disagree.

In People v. Orth, 124 Ill. 2d 326, 337-38, 530 N.E.2d 210, 215 (1988), the IllinoisSupreme Court stated that because a statutory summary suspension hearing is a civil action,not a criminal action, a defendant who requests the judicial rescission of a suspension bearsthe burden of providing, inter alia, prima facie evidence of an alcohol test's unreliability. In meeting the initial burden of proof of showing a test result's unreliability, the defendant'sevidence "may consist of any circumstance which tends to cast doubt on the test's accuracy,including, but not limited to, credible testimony by the motorist that he was not in fact underthe influence of alcohol." Orth, 124 Ill. 2d at 341, 530 N.E.2d at 217. A circuit court'sfinding regarding a prima facie case will not be reversed unless it is against the manifestweight of the evidence. Orth, 124 Ill. 2d at 341, 530 N.E.2d at 217. For a decision to beagainst the manifest weight of the evidence, it must appear that a conclusion opposite to thatreached by the trier of fact is clearly evident. Rolando v. Pence, 331 Ill. App. 3d 40, 46, 769N.E.2d 1108, 1112 (2002).

Although defendant cites Orth's five foundational requirements for the admission ofbreath test results, defendant fails to acknowledge that these requirements come into effectonly if a defendant has made out a prima facie case for a rescission. See Orth, 124 Ill. 2dat 340, 530 N.E.2d at 216. Hence, the real issue in this case is whether defendant did so.

Defendant focuses on four factors to support his contention that he made out a primafacie case for a rescission. They are as follows: (1) that the officer did not enter into alogbook defendant's breath test results, (2) that the officer did not continuously observedefendant for 20 minutes prior to the administration of the breath test, (3) that defendant wasgiven more than one breath test, and (4) that the West City police officer's arrest ofdefendant in Benton was unlawful.

Prima facie evidence has been characterized as being equivalent to the quantum ofevidence required to meet the preponderance-of-the-evidence standard. People v. Vinson,184 Ill. App. 3d 33, 36, 540 N.E.2d 8, 10 (1989). Whether defendant has met this burdenof proof is a question of fact for the circuit judge, and this determination cannot beoverturned on review unless it is against the manifest weight of the evidence. People v.Easterly, 264 Ill. App. 3d 233, 234, 636 N.E.2d 1182, 1183 (1994). In Easterly, 264 Ill.App. 3d at 235, 636 N.E.2d at 1183, this court described what was necessary for a primafacie case attacking the accuracy of breath test results: (1) proof that the test was notproperly administered by the breathalyzer operator, (2) proof that the result was not accurateand trustworthy, or (3) proof that the Department of Public Health rules were violated. Absent proof of any of these facts, defendant fails to establish a prima facie case for therescission of the summary suspension. Easterly, 264 Ill. App. 3d at 235, 636 N.E.2d at1183. Defendant focuses on Mumbower's failure to make an entry in the logbook,and defendant claims that it is a violation of the Department of Public Health rules that hefailed to do so. Defendant cites sections 510.20, 510.60, and 510.100 of Title 77 of theIllinois Administrative Code (Administrative Code) (77 Ill. Adm. Code