JUSTICE CHAPMAN delivered the opinion of the court:

In 1986 a petition alleging that Jamel Beck was a delinquent minor (14 years of age)was filed in the circuit court of St. Clair County. The petition alleged that Beck hadcommitted six counts of attempted murder, six counts of aggravated battery, and one countof home invasion. The prosecution of the case was later transferred from juvenile court toadult criminal court pursuant to former section 2-7(3)(a) of the Juvenile Court Act (Ill. Rev.Stat. 1985, ch. 37, par. 702-7(3)(a)). Beck later pled guilty and was sentenced to sixconsecutive 20-year terms of imprisonment. In 2000, Beck filed a petition for habeas corpusalleging that the consecutive sentences imposed by the court violated the United StatesSupreme Court's decision in Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 147 L. Ed. 2d 435, 120S. Ct. 2348 (2000). The circuit court found that Beck's sentencing was entitled toreconsideration under the Post-Conviction Hearing Act (725 ILCS 5/122-1 et seq. (West2000)), in light of the holding in Apprendi. Beck's petition, however, was ultimately denied. Beck then filed a motion to reconsider, alleging that section 2-7 of the Juvenile Court Act(Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 37, par. 702-7) was unconstitutional under Apprendi. The circuitcourt denied the motion, finding that Apprendi did not apply to the juvenile transferproceedings. Beck brought this appeal. The sole issue for review is whether section 2-7, asit existed at the time Beck was transferred to adult criminal court, is unconstitutional. Weaffirm.

On November 25, 1986, a petition was filed pursuant to the Juvenile Court Act (Ill.Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 37, par. 704-1 et seq.). The petition alleged that Beck had committedsix counts of attempted murder and one count of aggravated battery. The petition allegedthat Beck was delinquent, and it sought to have him declared a ward of the court. The sameday, the State also filed a motion pursuant to former section 2-7(3)(a) of the Juvenile CourtAct (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 37, par. 702-7(3)(a)), seeking to have Beck, 14 years of age,prosecuted under Illinois criminal law. After an evidentiary hearing, the court granted theState's motion to transfer Beck from juvenile court to adult criminal court. A grand jury laterreturned an indictment charging Beck with six counts of armed violence, six counts ofattempted murder, six counts of aggravated battery, and one count of home invasion. Beckentered into a negotiated plea agreement in which he pled guilty to the six armed violencecounts and the six aggravated battery counts. The court entered a judgment of conviction onBeck's plea of guilty and sentenced him to six consecutive 20-year terms of imprisonment.

Beck filed a timely motion to withdraw his guilty plea, which the court denied. Beckappealed. In People v. Beck, 190 Ill. App. 3d 748, 546 N.E.2d 1127 (1989), we vacatedBeck's convictions for aggravated battery and affirmed his transfer under the Juvenile CourtAct, as well as the court's imposition of consecutive sentences. In October 2000, Beck fileda petition for habeas corpus alleging that the court's imposition of consecutive sentences wasunconstitutional under Apprendi. The circuit court found that the petition did not entitle himto a discharge, but the court found that he might be entitled to a reconsideration of hissentencing under the Post-Conviction Hearing Act (725 ILCS 5/122-1 et seq. (West 2000)),in light of the holding in Apprendi. However, the court later denied the petition, finding (1)that Apprendi did not apply to the consecutive sentencing, (2) that Beck had waived anyperceived Apprendi violations when he entered the negotiated guilty plea, and (3) that anApprendi claim could not be brought under the Habeas Corpus Act (735 ILCS 5/10-101 etseq. (West 2000)). Beck filed a motion to reconsider, arguing that section 2-7(3)(a) of theJuvenile Court Act was unconstitutional under Apprendi. The court found that Apprendi didnot apply to juvenile transfer proceedings, and the court denied the motion. Beck filed thistimely appeal.

On appeal, Beck argues that section 2-7(3)(a) of the Juvenile Court Act (as it existedat the time he was transferred to adult criminal court for prosecution) is unconstitutionalbecause it can result in increased punishment due to facts not submitted to a jury and provedbeyond a reasonable doubt, in violation of the United States Supreme Court's holding inApprendi.

At the time Beck was transferred, section 2-7 provided in pertinent part as follows:

"Criminal prosecutions limited. (1) Except as provided in this Section, nominor who was under 17 years of age at the time of the alleged offense may beprosecuted under the criminal laws of this State or for violation of an ordinance of anypolitical subdivision thereof.

(3) If a petition alleges commission by a minor 13 years of age or over of anact which constitutes a crime under the laws of this State, and, on motion of the State'sAttorney, a Juvenile Judge, *** after investigation and hearing but beforecommencement of the adjudicatory hearing, finds that it is not in the best interests ofthe minor or of the public to proceed under this Act, the court may enter an orderpermitting prosecution under the criminal laws.

(a) In making its determination on a motion to permit prosecution under thecriminal laws, the court shall consider among other matters: (1) whether there issufficient evidence upon which a grand jury may be expected to return an indictment;(2) whether there is evidence that the alleged offense was committed in an aggressiveand premeditated manner; (3) the age of the minor; (4) the previous history of theminor; (5) whether there are facilities particularly available to the Juvenile Court forthe treatment and rehabilitation of the minor; and (6) whether the best interest of theminor and the security of the public may require that the minor continue in custodyor under supervision for a period extending beyond his minority. *** (b) If criminalproceedings are instituted, the petition shall be dismissed insofar as the act or actsinvolved in the criminal proceedings are concerned. Taking of evidence in anadjudicatory hearing in any such case is a bar to criminal proceedings based upon theconduct alleged in the petition." Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 37, par. 702-7(3)(a).

Beck notes that if he had been adjudicated in juvenile court, he would have faced amaximum punishment of commitment to the juvenile division of the Department ofCorrections until his twenty-first birthday. Beck notes further that as the language of section2-7(3)(a) demonstrates above, the judge considering the State's motion to transfer is requiredto engage in findings of fact. Beck contends that the trial court judge's determination that itwas not in his or the public's "best interest" to proceed with his case under the Juvenile CourtAct subjected him to increased punishment. Beck contends that the required findings of factmade by a judge, instead of a jury, and the resulting increased punishment that could resultfrom such findings render section 2-7(3)(a) unconstitutional under Apprendi. Beck contendsthat, despite the fact that section 2-7 is not a sentencing law and does not, itself, impose aparticular sentence, it nevertheless operates to change the entire sentencing scheme underwhich certain minors are sentenced and therefore subjects them to increased punishment.

In Apprendi, the Supreme Court held unconstitutional a New Jersey "hate crime"statute that permitted the trial court to impose a prison sentence of up to 20 years where itfound, by a preponderance of the evidence, that a defendant's purpose in acting was tointimidate a victim due to the victim's race. The Apprendi Court held that because thefindings the trial court was permitted to make involved an element of the crime, thedefendant was denied his due process right to a determination of guilt beyond a reasonabledoubt by a jury on each element of the crime charged. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 477, 147 L. Ed.2d at 447, 120 S. Ct. at 2356. It is on this basis that the Apprendi Court held as follows:"Other than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crimebeyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury[] and proved beyonda reasonable doubt." Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 490, 147 L. Ed. 2d at 455, 120 S. Ct. at 2362-63. However, section 2-7, at issue here, does not involve the same concerns.

Beck's argument is not the first to make an Apprendi-based challenge to the provisionsof the statute governing juvenile court proceedings that allow a minor to be exposed to thecriminal law. In People v. Beltran, 327 Ill. App. 3d 685, 765 N.E.2d 1071 (2002), a 15-year-old defendant similarly argued that section 5-805 of the Juvenile Court Act of 1987 (705ILCS 405/5-805 (West 1998)) was unconstitutional in light of the holding in Apprendi. Inthat case, under section 5-805(2)(a) of the Juvenile Court Act of 1987 (705 ILCS 405/5-805(2)(a) (West 1998)), the State obtained a presumptive transfer of the defendant fromjuvenile court to adult criminal court to pursue sanctions available under the criminal law. Under section 5-805(2)(a) the State was required to allege that the minor defendant hadcommitted a Class X felony or aggravated discharge of a firearm and that the minor was atleast 15 years old. When the juvenile court finds that there is probable cause to believe thatthe State's allegations are true, a rebuttable presumption that the case should be transferredis created. See 705 ILCS 405/5-805 (West 2000). In Beltran, like the case sub judice, thedefendant minor noted that when the State initially petitioned to adjudicate him delinquent,he faced a maximum sanction no greater than commitment in the juvenile division of theDepartment of Corrections until his twenty-first birthday. The Beltran defendant argued thatafter the juvenile court judge found the necessary elements for transfer, he faced a muchgreater sanction.

The Beltran court held that a hearing under section 5-805 is a juvenile proceeding andnot a criminal prosecution, as was the case in Apprendi. The court determined that whetherthe defendant was denied due process depends upon the standards applicable to the juvenileproceeding that resulted in the transfer, not the standards of due process applicable tocriminal prosecutions. The court noted that due process does not require a jury in juvenileproceedings. The court found that a hearing pursuant to section 5-805 is dispositional innature. While due process requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt during the adjudicatorystage, at which a minor's guilt or innocence is determined, due process does not require sucha standard of proof for a dispositional hearing. The Beltran court concluded that Apprendibears only upon the process due in criminal court proceedings and does not apply todispositional proceedings under section 5-805(2). The court reasoned that, though thejuvenile court makes findings that expose minors to greater sanctions under section 5-805(2),the minors do not have a due process right to have a jury make those findings beyond areasonable doubt.

Furthermore, another recent decision, In re Matthew M., 335 Ill. App. 3d 276, 780N.E.2d 723 (2002), similarly found that Apprendi did not apply to a provision of the JuvenileCourt Act of 1987 which allowed a minor to be held in juvenile court and exposed to bothcriminal law and adult sentencing (705 ILCS 405/5-810 (West 2000)). In In re Matthew M.,a petition was filed in juvenile court to adjudicate a minor delinquent. Pursuant to section5-810 of the Juvenile Court Act of 1987 (705 ILCS 405/5-810 (West 2000)), the State movedto designate the proceedings as an extended jurisdiction juvenile (EJJ) prosecution. Whenthe State moves to designate proceedings against a minor as an EJJ prosecution and the courtdesignates the proceedings as such, the trial court is allowed to impose one or more of thepenalties provided for in section 5-710 of the Juvenile Court Act of 1987 (705 ILCS 405/5-710 (West 2000)) and a conditional adult criminal sentence. In seeking an EJJ prosecution,the State must allege that the minor is 13 years of age or older when he committed an offensethat would be a felony if committed by an adult and that there is probable cause to believethat the allegations in the delinquency petition and the motion for EJJ prosecution are true.705 ILCS 405/5-810(1) (West 2000). If the trial court finds that there is probable cause tobelieve that the allegations are true, the court must then designate the proceeding as an EJJprosecution unless the court finds, by clear and convincing evidence, that adult sentencingwould not be appropriate for the minor based on the seriousness of the offense alleged, theminor's history of delinquency, the minor's age, the minor's culpability, whether the offensewas committed in an aggressive or premeditated manner, and whether the minor used orpossessed a deadly weapon when committing the offense alleged. 705 ILCS 405/5-810(1)(b)(West 2000).

The minor in In re Matthew M. argued that section 5-810 violated Apprendi becauseit permitted the trial court to increase the maximum sanction that could be imposed basedupon the trial court's determination of the existence of certain factors that were not submittedto a jury or proved beyond a reasonable doubt. Relying on Beltran, the court in In reMatthew M. concluded that because the trial court's determination to designate a proceedingas an EJJ prosecution does not adjudicate the minor's guilt, due process does not require ajury to make the findings involved in the procedural determination. In re Matthew M., 335Ill. App. 3d at 288-89, 780 N.E.2d at 734. Consequently, the In re Matthew M. court heldthat Apprendi does not apply to EJJ prosecutions.

In sum, we find that section 2-7 simply provides for a procedure by which a case canbe removed from the juvenile division of the circuit court to the criminal division. SeePeople v. P.H., 145 Ill. 2d 209, 222, 582 N.E.2d 700, 706 (1991). For the reasons stated inboth Beltran and In re Matthew M., we conclude that a section 2-7 hearing is dispositionalin nature rather than adjudicatory and therefore does not implicate the constitutional concernsraised in Apprendi. Accordingly, the circuit court did not error in denying Beck's petition.

We note that a portion of each party's brief is devoted to argument concerning thenature of Beck's petition, i.e., whether his petition was one for habeas corpus or one seekingrelief under the Post-Conviction Hearing Act (725 ILCS 5/122-1 et seq. (West 2000)). Inlight of our holding that section 2-7 of the Juvenile Court Act does not violate Apprendi, wedo not reach this issue beyond our determination that the circuit court did not err in denyingBeck's petition in either event.

For the reasons stated, the judgment of the circuit court is affirmed.

Affirmed.

MAAG and GOLDENHERSH, JJ., concur.

Opinion Filed: May 14, 2003

Justices: Honorable Melissa A. Chapman, J.

Honorable Gordon E. Maag, J., and

Honorable Richard P. Goldenhersh, J.,

Concur

Attorneys Daniel M. Kirwan, Deputy Defender, Rita K. Peterson, Assistant Defender, Office

for of the State Appellate Defender, Fifth Judicial District, 730 E. Illinois Highway 15,

Appellant P.O. Box 2430, Mt. Vernon, IL 62864-0047

Attorneys James E. Ryan, Attorney General, State of Illinois, Joel D.Bertocchi, Solicitor

for General, State of Illinois, William L. Browers, Colleen M. Griffin, Assistant

Appellee Attorneys General, 100 W. Randolph Street, 12th Floor, Chicago, IL 60601