IN THE

JUSTICE KUEHN delivered the opinion of the court:

George and Michael Whittier, Kevin Barbic, Michael Chrisman, and David Hawkinsfound friendship back in their glory days at Bloomington Community High School in themid-nineties. They traveled life's journeys together until sometime prior to September of2000, when the State of Illinois removed David Hawkins from his home in Bloomington andplaced him in a prison cell. We do not know precisely when or why. We do know that aftera prison stint of unknown duration, Hawkins was scheduled for release from ShawneeCorrectional Center (Shawnee) on the morning of September 20, 2000.

Barbic, Chrisman, and the two Whittier brothers were not fine-feathered friends. Assoon as September 20, 2000, arrived, the foursome hopped into Barbic's minivan and drovethe several hundred miles south, from Bloomington to Shawnee. They drove throughout thenight and into the dawn for a welcomed reunion with their fallen comrade. They wanted tocelebrate the moment, share in his rendevous with freedom, and take him back home toBloomington. However, there would be no celebration that day. When the sun set onSeptember 20, 2000, David Hawkins was the only one not confined to a jail cell.

The van arrived at Shawnee a few hours prior to Hawkins' scheduled release. Havingbeen told that there would be a considerable wait before the release, the foursome drove toa nearby McDonald's restaurant and ate some breakfast. When they returned to the prison,George Whittier drove the minivan onto the prison grounds and parked it in the visitors'parking lot. A prison official told them to close all of the van's windows and to lock thevan's doors. They complied with the request to secure their vehicle and walked to thegatehouse door in an attempt to be in the visitors' center when Hawkins was freed.

Chrisman had partied at the Lizzard Lounge in Bloomington until shortly before he,Barbic, and the Whittier brothers journeyed south to pick up Hawkins. On the way toShawnee he slept off the effects of some rather heavy drinking. However, he still smelledof alcohol when he walked into the visitors' center. Someone reported the smell to prisonofficials. They summoned Johnson County deputies to search Barbic's minivan. Barbicrepeatedly refused their requests for a consent to search, until he was shown a sign at theprison entrance that warned everyone that they and their cars were subject to being searched. After the authorities explained that he had no privacy right to assert when on prison grounds,Barbic opened the van and agreed to the search. The search uncovered a small bag ofmarijuana under the driver's seat and a half-empty bottle of cheap rum in a cooler in the backof the van. The Whittier brothers, Barbic, and Chrisman were immediately placed underarrest.

The State bypassed a prosecution for unlawful possession of cannabis andtransporting open liquor in a motor vehicle, opting to charge all four travelers with thecommission of two felony offenses. A two-count information was filed, charging theWhittier brothers, Barbic, and Chrisman with bringing contraband into a penal institution.The first count was predicated upon the small bag of marijuana; the second count dealt withthe bottle of rum. The charges were brought under section 31A-1.1(a)(3) of the CriminalCode of 1961 (720 ILCS 5/31A- 1.1(a)(3) (West 1998)), a section that covers situationswhere contraband is not brought into a penal institution but, rather, is placed near enoughto the facility that prisoners could get their hands on it. Both counts alleged that thedefendants knowingly placed contraband in such proximity to a penal institution as to giveinmates access to the contraband.

George Whittier pled guilty. During the trial of Barbic and Chrisman, he was calledby the defense and claimed sole ownership of the marijuana. He testified that the 11 gramsseized by prison officials were all that remained from a $90-ounce purchase that he alonehad made four days prior to the trip. He told the jury that no marijuana had been consumedin the van during the night's journey en route to the prison. Whittier apparently did not wantto have marijuana in his pocket when he went into the prison. He testified that he decidedto slip the small bag under the driver's seat of Barbic's van while Barbic, Chrisman, and hisbrother slept.

Barbic testified in his own defense that he did not know that the marijuana was in thevan. He also claimed that he had forgotten about the presence of the rum, which had beenin the van for several days.

Chrisman also testified. He disavowed any knowledge of the marijuana or the rum. In a statement made to the authorities shortly after his arrest, he admitted knowledge of therum. Chrisman tried to explain the earlier admission. He testified that Barbic told him aboutits presence only shortly before deputies were about to search the van. He insisted that hedid not know it was there when he entered the prison or left the van to meet with Hawkins. Barbic corroborated this claim, stating that he disclosed the existence of the rum to Chrismanonly moments before its discovery.

The State presented evidence that, as a matter of general prison routine, inmate workcrews have access to the parking lot. The State did not present evidence that a specific workdetail was assigned work on the parking lot on September 20, 2000. In fact, there was neverany inmate on the parking lot the day in question.

The jury found Barbic guilty on both counts of the information. It acquittedChrisman of knowingly providing inmate access to marijuana but found him guilty of givinginmates access to rum. Barbic and Chrisman were placed on probation and fined. Theyappeal their convictions.

There is but one challenge on appeal. Both appellants question whether the Stateestablished, beyond a reasonable doubt, that they provided inmates access to prisoncontraband.

There is no dispute over the fact that marijuana and rum constitute items of prisoncontraband. Nor is there any question that the contraband was inside the van while it restedon the prison parking lot. While their knowledge of the contraband's presence inside the vanwas contested at the trial, neither Barbic nor Chrisman raises a challenge to a finding ofknowledge, implicit in the jury's verdicts.

The sole question that we are asked to decide is whether the State proved, beyond areasonable doubt, that either Barbic or Chrisman knowingly placed marijuana or rum in suchproximity to prison confines as to give prisoners access to the marijuana or the rum. Inweighing the legal sufficiency of the State's evidence, we always view that evidence in alight most favorable to the State and ask whether any rational trier of fact could reach afinding of guilt based upon it. People v. Ortiz, 196 Ill. 2d 236, 259, 752 N.E.2d 410, 425(2001). Here, the answer depends upon whether the prohibition against "knowingly ***plac[ing] an item of contraband in such proximity to a penal institution as to give an inmateaccess to the contraband" (720 ILCS 5/31A-1.1(a)(3) (West 1998)) is broad enough toencompass a securely locked van parked on a designated prison visitors' parking lot.

The appellants' argument is essentially this: George Whittier parked in an areadesignated for all visitor vehicles. Logically, people would believe that prison officialswould make such an area secure and safe for unattended vehicles, free from any criminalelement that abounds within the neighboring facilities. Anyone who parked where prisonofficials wanted them to park would think that the vehicles themselves, as well as theircontents, would be off-limits to prisoners. Whittier did not park where he did in order toallow prisoners to access contraband.

No one arrived with an intention of smuggling contraband to inmates or with anyknowledge that parking in a designated visitors' parking lot would provide an inmate accessto the van. It was undisputed that the sole purpose of the trip was to take a released friendhome.

More importantly, since everyone complied with the request to secure the van afterparking in the designated area, whatever limited access inmates in a work detail may havehad to the van or other visitors' vehicles, access to the van's contents was completely cut off. The marijuana and rum became inaccessible to inmates when those items were securelylocked inside the vehicle. The only way an inmate could gain access to the marijuana or therum would be to forcibly break into and burglarize the vehicle, an event too remote and toounforeseeable for an attribution of criminal liability. The legislature did not contemplatesuch a broad reading of the statutory provision making it a crime to give prison inmatesaccess to contraband.

No one parking on a designated parking lot would contemplate the limited inmateaccess that prison officials allowed. Even if they did, the evidence demonstrated thatinmates are either under direct supervision or under constant surveillance when working inthe vicinity of motor cars. The State failed to establish that any prisoner would be permittedto go near a vehicle, much less engage in an effort to board it.

Based upon this position, the appellants tender the following conclusion. Becausethe designated visitors' parking lot is a considerable distance from the walls and fences thatconfine prisoners, because parked vehicles are off-limits to working inmates, because thevan in question was secured against entry by anyone, and because no inmate was everanywhere in the vicinity of the van, no rational juror could find, beyond a reasonable doubt,that the defendants knowingly parked where they did so as to give inmates access tomarijuana or rum.

The State's view differs. It maintains that the prohibition against placing contrabandin such a position as to provide accessibility to inmates necessitates only the proof of acommon practice that provides inmates access to the area where vehicles are parked. Sincethe prison allows inmates to work on the parking lot, any visitor who parks his or her car onthat lot with an item of prison contraband inside places that contraband in such proximityto a penal institution as to give access to an inmate.

Because the evidence established that Shawnee Correctional Center authoritiesroutinely allow prison work details access to the parking lot, the State argues that anycontraband locked inside a vehicle on that lot is accessible to inmates for purposes of thelaw's prohibition. The fact that inmates would not be permitted to get near any of thevehicles by guards supervising their work, or guards watching their activities from towers,is not germane to the inquiry. It is irrelevant that inmates would have to break into thelocked vehicle in the presence of officials who would immediately put a stop to suchactivity. Nor does it matter that Barbic and Chrisman were completely ignorant of the factthat inmates frequented the parking lot and could, therefore, get within reach of the van orthat the contraband was irrefutably beyond the reach of any prisoner and totally secure onthe day in question. All that matters is that contraband was left where it could, conceivably,under the right circumstance and breach of security, find its way into the hands of a rogueprisoner.

For the following reasons, we reverse.

The statutory provision under which Barbic and Chrisman were prosecuted reads asfollows:

"A person commits the offense of bringing contraband into a penal institutionwhen he knowingly and without authority of any person designated or authorized togrant such authority (1) brings an item of contraband into a penal institution or (2)causes another to bring an item of contraband into a penal institution or (3) places anitem of contraband in such proximity to a penal institution as to give an inmate accessto the contraband." 720 ILCS 5/31A-1.1(a) (West 1998).

In People v. Carillo, 323 Ill. App. 3d 367, 751 N.E.2d 1243 (2001), we reversed asimilar conviction for bringing contraband into a penal institution. Pedro Carillo entered theShawnee Correctional Center and parked his car on the same designated visitors' parking lotat issue here. Carillo, 323 Ill. App. 3d at 369, 751 N.E.2d at 1245. He had four unopenedcans of beer in a paper bag inside his car. He locked the car and walked towards the visitors'center for a visit with his cousin. Prison officials requested a consent to search Carillo'svehicle, and he consented. After the search yielded the four cans of beer, Carillo wasprosecuted for and convicted of bringing contraband into a penal institution, a Class 4felony. Carillo, 323 Ill. App. 3d at 369-70, 751 N.E.2d at 1245-46.

Unlike the allegation lodged against Barbic and Chrisman, Carillo's charge allegedthat he knowingly brought contraband into a penal institution, rather than placing it whereprisoners could gain access to it. Although we are presented with different alleged criminalconduct, the reasoning that led to our decision in People v. Carillo aptly fits the particularsof this case as well. The same constitutional concerns, raised and avoided by our statutoryconstruction there, are implicated by virtue of the position the State maintains here.

We start with a simple observation. If the legislature wanted a blanket prohibitionagainst the possession of contraband in any motor vehicle driven onto prison grounds, itwould be easy for some legislator to put that desire into words. However, because of all ofthe things that presently constitute prohibited contraband, a per se ban against driving ontoprison grounds with an item of contraband in a car or its trunk would create a seriouspractical problem. Most people routinely carry certain items in their cars that easily fitwithin the present definition of contraband. Moreover, a complete ban of contraband itemswould have no bearing on the evil that the crime was designed to cure-prisoner access tothings that we do not want in the hands of confined criminals.

It is the expansive contraband list, which includes a host of things that are entirelylegal to possess, things that are also commonly carried in motor vehicles or their trunks, thatrequires a limited view of what conduct is necessary in order to make contraband accessibleto inmates. Over the years, our legislature has expanded the statutory definition of prisoncontraband, providing a comprehensive list of things that it wants to keep beyond the reachof prison inmates. As we pointed out in People v. Carillo:

"In order to deny prisoners the ability to freely communicate with the outside world,the legislature added devices like cellular phones, computers, and pagers to thecontraband list. They can no longer be brought into a penal institution withoutcommitting a Class 1 felony offense. Additionally, legislators wanted to bring withinthe ambit of the law's prohibition certain items that prisoners could easily convert intolethal weapons. Such things as broken bottles and safety flares were expressly addedto the contraband list [citation], while the term 'weapon' was broadly defined to coveranything from tire irons to golf clubs [citation]." Carillo, 323 Ill. App. 3d at 368, 751N.E.2d at 1244-45.

If cell phones, pagers, laptop computers, tire irons, golf clubs, marijuana, or rum,locked inside of a motor vehicle on a designated visitors' parking lot, create a hazard thatneeds a cure, it is an evil that commends a statutory amendment rather than an untenableview of what the present statutory language outlaws. Were we to hold that the conduct inthis case gave an inmate access to contraband, we would have to question the constitutionalvalidity of the statute, something easily avoided by a narrower reading of accessibility. Wedo not think the legislature intended to outlaw parking a motor vehicle where it ispresumptively off-limits to prisoners-a parking lot prison officials require visitors touse-and locking a cell phone inside before leaving the vehicle unattended. The State thinksthe legislature wanted people prosecuted for a Class 1 felony offense if they engaged in suchbehavior. As we pointed out in People v. Carillo, such a view would raise constitutionalconcerns:

"The United States Supreme Court noted long ago: 'If the legislatureundertakes to define by statute a new offence[] and provide for its punishment, itshould express its will in language that need not deceive the common mind. Everyman should be able to know with certainty when he is committing a crime.' [Citation.] Most people of common intelligence would understand that it is againstthe law to bring a safety flare, a tire iron, or even a golf club with them when theywalk into a prison facility for a visit. However, few would think to empty suchsundry items of contraband from the trunk of their car before embarking on a prisonvisit with family or friend. Moreover, reasonable minds might fairly conclude thatkeeping the contents of their car secure would prevent those contents from formingthe basis of a criminal prosecution. Even those learned in the law-the attorneys whofrequent penitentiaries and county jails every day-might reasonably think that theycould leave their cell phones, laptop computers, and pagers locked inside of theircars, parked on a jail parking lot, without a risk of prosecution for committing a Class1 felony." Carillo, 323 Ill. App. 3d at 375, 751 N.E.2d at 1250 (quoting UnitedStates v. Reese, 92 U.S. 214, 220, 23 L. Ed. 563, 565 (1876)).

When we decided People v. Carillo, we also addressed the State's method of provinginmate access:

"The State emphasizes the fact that prison work details have access to areasthat the Shawnee Correctional Center dedicates to prison visitor parking. The prisonuses prison labor to keep the areas clean. *** [T]he State concludes that prisoneraccess to the parking lot conveys access to the contents of cars parked there. Itfollows that allowing the contraband to be brought onto the parking lot would permitthe evil that the legislature intended to remedy.

Initially, we are not presented a case where a visitor popped the trunk of hiscar or left the car unlocked before entering the prison for a visit. Since prisonerswork on the parking lot, leaving contraband in an unlocked car might evoke thatportion of the statute that prohibits placing an item of contraband in such proximityto a penal institution as to give an inmate access to the contraband. Here, the beerwas securely locked inside of the car before the car was left unattended on theparking lot.

In any event, the fact that prison labor is used to clean parking lots does notmean that prison workers gain access to cars or their contents. The workers gainaccess to the parking lot, but there is no access to the contents of a car withoutcommitting a burglary, presumably in the presence of supervisors.

Prison labor is not unsupervised, particularly when the work is performedbeyond prison walls and within reach of a motor vehicle. We cannot imagine thatprison authorities would allow unrestricted movement around unattended cars parkedoutside prison restraints. After all, a few of the inmates housed in our penitentiariesknow how to start a car without the use of a key. We will not presume that thecontents of unattended cars parked on a prison parking lot are accessible to prisonworkers by virtue of a work detail to clean the area. Prison authorities will takewhatever precautions are needed to keep the unattended cars completely secure." Carillo, 323 Ill. App. 3d at 374-75, 751 N.E.2d at 1249-50.

Here, the State went a step further in trying to establish why people could not leavecontraband items locked inside their vehicles when parked in the designated visitors' parkinglot. Apparently, Shawnee Correctional Center authorities actually allow unsupervisedinmates to trek across the designated visitors' parking lot. Although the testimony of thatfact is somewhat surprising, it does not change our view about the inaccessibility of itemslocked inside any motor vehicle on that lot. We adhere to the view that "authorities will takewhatever precautions are needed to keep the unattended cars completely secure." Carillo,323 Ill. App. 3d at 375, 751 N.E.2d at 1250. The prison official who testified about limited,unsupervised inmate access to the parking lot was not asked about the screening process thatan inmate goes through before he is allowed to stroll outside prison walls unsupervised. Weassume that before an inmate would qualify for that degree of freedom, authorities wouldhave a very high level of official confidence in such an individual's behavior. Even so, theevidence further established that the visitors' parking lot is under constant surveillance fromseveral guard towers. If a trusted inmate was seen trying to pry open a locked vehicle orotherwise trying to board it, we would expect the guards to prevent entry, with a show or useof force, if necessary.

"Access" is a word used in many contexts, having many meanings. When weexamine its various uses, we think that access to the van itself would mean "permission,liberty, or ability to enter." Webster's Third New International Dictionary 11 (1986). Whenused in the statutory phrase "as to give access," the word would appear to mean "freedomor ability to obtain or make use of." Webster's Third New International Dictionary 11(1986). The evidence did not establish that any prison inmate, hypothetically present on thevisitors' parking lot, would have had permission to enter Barbic's locked van. Moreover, wefind nothing in the State's case that establishes that either Barbic or Chrisman gave inmatesthe freedom or ability to obtain or make use of the marijuana or the rum. Contraband is notfree to obtain when locked up in a motor vehicle on a parking lot dedicated by prisonofficials for unattended visitors' vehicles.

Because we find that, based upon the evidence presented, no rational trier of factcould find beyond a reasonable doubt that either Barbic or Chrisman knowingly placedcontraband in such close proximity to a penal institution as to give an inmate access to thecontraband, we reverse their convictions.

Reversed.

MAAG, P.J., and HOPKINS, J., concur.

IN THE

Opinion Filed: October 29, 2002

Justices: Honorable Clyde L. Kuehn, J.

Honorable Gordon E. Maag, P.J., and

Honorable Terrence J. Hopkins, J.,

Concur

Attorneys Daniel M. Kirwan, Deputy Defender, Office of the State Appellate Defender, 730 E.

for Illinois Hwy. 15, P.O. Box 2430, Mt. Vernon, IL 62864-0047; Curtis L. Blood, 1602

Appellants Vandalia, Collinsville, IL 62234-4459 (additional counsel for appellants)

Attorneys Hon. Brian Trambley, State's Attorney, Johnson County Courthouse, P.O. Box 1257,

for Vienna, IL 62995; Norbert J. Goetten, Director, Stephen E. Norris, Deputy Director,

Appellee Sharon Shanahan, Contract Attorney, Office of the State's Attorneys Appellate

Prosecutor, Route 15 East, P.O. Box 2249, Mt. Vernon, IL 62864