Walter Dent, the defendant, was arrested on September 6, 2001, and later charged byinformation with unlawful possession of cannabis with intent to deliver (720 ILCS 550/5(d)(West 2000)). The defendant filed a motion to suppress the statements and physical evidenceobtained by the police. After conducting a hearing on the motion, the circuit court found thatthe defendant had been illegally seized by the police and the court granted the defendant'smotion. The State appealed. The issue for review is whether the circuit court erred ingranting the defendant's motion to suppress. We affirm.

The defendant was arrested by police on September 6, 2001, and was charged by wayof information the next day with unlawful possession of cannabis with intent to deliver (720ILCS 550/5(d) (West 2000)). On September 28, 2001, a preliminary hearing was held. Sergeant Richard Gillespie of the Alton, Illinois, police department was the only witness totestify at the hearing.

Sergeant Gillespie testified that he participated in the arrest of the defendant. He saidthat on September 6, 2001, he and several other officers were assigned a detail that involvedgoing to selected drug locations to perform a "knock-and-talk." Gillespie testified that theywere in undercover vehicles when they observed the defendant get out of his vehicle andwalk up to an identified drug house. Gillespie and the other officers pulled up behind thedefendant and approached him from behind. The defendant was talking on a cell phone atthe time and appeared surprised when he turned around to see that there were five or sixpolice officers around him.

Sergeant Gillespie asked the defendant whether he had any dope on him. Thedefendant responded in the negative. Gillespie then said, "Well, you won't mind mechecking." Gillespie testified that the defendant responded that he did not have any drugsand to "go ahead." Gillespie then patted the defendant down, felt a bulge in the lower partof the defendant's left pant leg, and immediately secured the defendant in handcuffs. Fourteen small bags of what he believed was cannabis were removed from the defendant'sperson.

After the defendant was in custody, Gillespie searched the defendant's vehicle. Hesaid that the vehicle was unsecured with the keys left in the ignition and that the defendantwas actually in physical control of the vehicle at the time of the stop. He performed aninventory on the vehicle and found two other bags of what he believed to be marijuana.

On cross-examination, Sergeant Gillespie testified that there was a total of nineofficers, four police vehicles, and a transport vehicle involved in the "knock-and-talk" detail. Gillespie said that all nine officers wore their police uniforms, including badges and side armpistols. Gillespie testified that the defendant walked to the front door walkway of 912College Avenue after he exited his vehicle. When asked about what happened after that,Gillespie testified as follows:

"Q. [Defense counsel:] How far was he from his car when he was stopped?

A. Twenty-five, thirty feet.

Q. Okay. At any point did he go back to his vehicle before he was arrested?

A. Oh, no, sir.

Q. Now, when *** he was stopped, in what fashion did that happen? Didyour officers surround him? Did someone tell him to stop? How did that comeabout?

A. Well, he was trying to make it in the front door of the house upon seeingme. Once I got close enough to him and [sic] he turned and acted very surprised. Heattempted-he can't run because he's been shot from an old gunshot wound. I believeit's his left leg that is a little messed up.

Q. So what did he do?

A. He attempted to open the front door, and I said, ['][W]ait a minute, *** doyou have any dope on you[?][']

Q. You told him, as he started to open the front door, to wait a minute?

A. Right.

***

A. And I asked him, ['][D]o you have any dope on you[?][']

Q. At that time where were the other police officers? Were they in the samearea you were in?

A. Yes, sir. Some of them were just pulling up and parking and getting outof their vehicle and so forth.

Q. How many police officers were around [the defendant] at the time you toldhim to wait up?

A. Probably just two or three of us.

Q. And did he comply with your directive and stop-and stop attempting to gointo the house at that point?

A. Yes.

***

Q. *** Did he comply with what you had stated to hold up or not go into thehouse?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. And at that point that you made that statement to him, had you observedhim commit any criminal act?

A. No, sir.

Q. Did you have any information that you had received that he had any drugson him on this particular day ***[?]

A. No, sir."

Sergeant Gillespie testified further that he had not observed the defendant engage inany criminal activity before he asked to search the defendant's pockets or clothing. He didnot have a warrant for the defendant's arrest. Gillespie said that he patted down thedefendant within seconds of asking him whether he had drugs in his possession and after hehad consented to being searched. He did not detect anything that felt like a weapon duringthe pat-down.

Concerning the search of the defendant's vehicle, Sergeant Gillespie testified that hedid not first obtain consent from the defendant, that he did not have a warrant for the search,and that the defendant was in custody at the time of the vehicle search. Gillespie said thatthe drugs found in the vehicle were inside the console and that opening the console wasnecessary to discover their presence.

At the conclusion of the preliminary hearing, the court found that probable causeexisted. The next day the defendant entered a plea of not guilty and the matter was set fora trial.

On October 10, 2001, the defendant filed a motion to suppress all the statements madeby him during the incident, pursuant to section 114-11 of the Code of Criminal Procedureof 1963 (the Code) (725 ILCS 5/114-11 (West 2000)), as well as all the physical evidenceretrieved from his person and vehicle, pursuant to section 114-12 of the Code (725 ILCS5/114-12 (West 2000)). In his motion, the defendant alleged that at the time the uniformedpolice stopped him, they did not have a warrant to detain him and they had not observed himengaging in conduct that would reasonably lead them to believe that he was about to commit,was then committing, or had committed a crime. The defendant alleged that SergeantGillespie stopped him from entering 912 College Avenue by directing him to "[w]ait aminute" and that he complied with this directive. The defendant alleged further that he wassurrounded by police and in their custody when Gillespie retrieved plastic baggies ofsuspected marijuana from his pant leg. The defendant also alleged that the police conducteda warrantless search of his vehicle, which was legally parked approximately 25 feet awayfrom him, resulting in the discovery of two baggies of suspected marijuana inside thevehicle's console.

The defendant argued that the actions of the police violated his federal and stateconstitutional rights as well as the Code. He argued that when the police stopped him, theydid not have a reasonable inference based upon specific and articulable facts that he hadcommitted or was committing a crime. He contended further that the retrieval of suspectedcannabis from his person without the reasonable belief that it was a weapon or contrabandand the frisk of his person were performed by police absent probable cause for an arrest andwithout a reasonable suspicion that they were in danger of attack. Lastly, the defendantdenied Sergeant Gillespie's claim that he had consented to the search of his person after thestop; the defendant maintained that even if he had given consent, Gillespie's request andquestioning of him would have been unlawful because he was in police custody at the timeand had not been advised of his rights under Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 16 L. Ed.2d 694, 86 S. Ct. 1602 (1966).

The defendant's motion to suppress was heard on January 29, 2002. At the hearing,the defendant testified that he drove to a friend's house at 912 College Avenue on September6, 2001, at approximately 2 p.m. As he approached the front door of his friend's home, heheard a voice say "Wait a minute." The defendant turned around and saw that the voice wasthat of Sergeant Gillespie. Gillespie then asked him if he had any drugs on him. Thedefendant testified that he observed Gillespie and approximately seven to nine police officerscoming toward him. All the officers were uniformed with badges, and all carried side arms. The defendant, believing that he was in custody, obeyed Gillespie's command and stopped. The officers came up to where the defendant was standing on the steps leading to theporch of his friend's home. With the door of his friend's house behind him, the officerssurrounded the defendant on three sides. The defendant informed Sergeant Gillespie that hedid not have any drugs in his possession. The defendant testified that Gillespie thenproceeded to begin patting down his pockets and pants. Sergeant Gillespie asked thedefendant if he could search him as he was already patting him down. The defendanttestified that he did not respond. Gillespie then removed some baggies from the defendant'slower pant leg. The defendant said that he was then handcuffed and taken to a police car. Without his consent to do so, the police searched the vehicle.

The State called Sergeant Gillespie as its only witness. When asked if any otherofficers accompanied him when he approached the defendant, Gillespie testified that therewere a total of four officers in his car but that he was the first one that approached thedefendant. Gillespie said that he was unsure whether any of the other officers were with himat the time he first approached the defendant.

Gillespie testified that when he approached the defendant, he asked the defendantwhether he had any dope or guns in his possession. The defendant said that he did not. Gillespie said that he asked the defendant if he minded submitting to a pat-down search andthat the defendant said that he did not mind. Gillespie testified that when he asked thedefendant whether he would submit to a pat-down, the defendant was free to leave.

Gillespie denied that he started patting down the defendant before the defendant gaveconsent to do so. He further denied that the defendant was surrounded at the time of the pat-down. Gillespie said that only two other officers were present at the time the pat-down wasperformed and that the other officers were just getting out of their vehicles. Gillespie saidthat only three or four police officers were within five feet of the defendant at the time thepat-down was performed. He said that until the defendant was handcuffed, neither he northe other officers blocked the defendant from leaving.

On cross-examination Gillespie was asked to describe a "knock-and-talk." Gillespieexplained that it is an attempt by police to elicit cooperation from residents in order toconduct a drug investigation. Gillespie explained further that the purpose of the knock-and-talk detail on September 6, 2001, was not to perform arrests or issue warrants of any kind. He added that he was not authorized by any search warrant that day. He further expressedhis belief that he did not have probable cause to arrest the people inside of the homes hevisited. Gillespie testified that the only knowledge he had of 912 College Avenue before thedefendant's arrest was that several anonymous complaints had been received by the drugabuse hotline involving the address and that the residence was leased or rented by someonewith the same last name as a family known to be narcotics traffickers in Alton, Illinois.

Gillespie testified that he and eight of his fellow officers pulled up to the CollegeAvenue address in four unmarked police vehicles and one marked prison transport van, alldriving in tandem. Gillespie said that he did not observe the defendant committing anycriminal conduct when he exited his vehicle or when he was on the 912 College Avenuepremises. Gillespie did not have a warrant to search or stop the defendant or to search hisvehicle.

Gillespie testified that when the defendant approached the College Avenue residence,he flung the door to the house open. Gillespie said, "Rather than it coming back and hittingboth of us or him, I just grabbed ahold of the door to keep it open." Gillespie recognized thatthe defendant was on private property at the time of the incident. He said that he did notread the defendant his Miranda rights before asking whether he could search him, becausethe defendant was not in custody at the time.

Both the defendant and the State sought to have the transcript of Sergeant Gillespie'stestimony from the September 28, 2001, preliminary hearing admitted into evidence as a jointexhibit. On redirect examination, Gillespie said that the defendant could have entered thehouse after he asked him to wait a minute but that the people inside the house would not lethim in. He said that he did not block the defendant's ability to enter the house in any way. Sergeant Gillespie also testified that before he saw the defendant arrive at 912 CollegeAvenue, he was already aware that the defendant had been charged with and convicted forprior marijuana possession in 1997. He said that other officers had informed him that theyknew that the defendant was dealing dope and committing crimes but that they could notcatch him. Gillespie testified, "[The defendant] hangs with all the right people to buy dopeand to deal dope ***[;] that's what he's doing."

At the conclusion of the testimony, the court heard argument from the parties and thentook the matter under advisement. On May 22, 2002, the court entered an order granting thedefendant's motion to suppress. The court's order reflected its findings:

"The Court finds that this is not a Terry stop [(Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20 L. Ed.2d 889, 88 S. Ct. 1868 (1968))] as the police do not claim to have seen a crimecommitted or believe that the defendant was committing a crime upon their approach. The officers approached the defendant under circumstances were [sic] a reasonableperson would believe rightly that they [sic] were detained. The defendant wasapproached with an immediate directive from a uniformed police officer to wait orwait a minute. He was then in the observable presence of seven to nine uniformedpolice officers and two to three marked vehicles. The Court finds that he was seizedand detained without a lawful basis at that point. The Court believes that a reasonableperson encountering those circumstances would believe that a directive *** from auniformed police officer approaching in the presence of several other police officers[]would cause that person to reasonably believe that they [sic] must abide by that orderand are detained." (Emphasis in original.)

The court found further that any search and seizure resulting from such a stop and detentionis barred and that the items seized from the person or property of the defendant were to besuppressed.

The State appealed.

On appeal, the State contends that the circuit court erred in granting the defendant'smotion to suppress. The State asks that we find that the encounter between SergeantGillespie and the defendant was consensual and therefore did not implicate the defendant'sfourth amendment rights. We decline to so hold.

"Generally, a trial court's decision on a motion to suppress evidence is subject toreversal only if it is clearly or manifestly erroneous." People v. Thomas, 198 Ill. 2d 103,108, 759 N.E.2d 899, 902 (2001). In ruling on a motion to suppress evidence, the circuitcourt must determine the credibility of the witnesses and resolve any conflict in thetestimony. People v. Koutsakis, 272 Ill. App. 3d 159, 162, 649 N.E.2d 605, 607 (1995). Ruling on a motion to suppress evidence involves a mixed question of law and fact in whichthe trial court must (1) weigh the evidence and determine the facts surrounding thecomplained-of conduct and then (2) decide whether, as a matter of law, the facts constitutean unconstitutional seizure. People v. Cox, 202 Ill. 2d 462, 465-66, 782 N.E.2d 275, 278(2002). A circuit court's determination on a motion to suppress will be accorded greatdeference. Koutsakis, 272 Ill. App. 3d at 162, 649 N.E.2d at 607. However, we will reviewthe circuit court's ultimate ruling on a defendant's motion to suppress evidence de novo. People v. Gherna, 203 Ill. 2d 165, 175, 784 N.E.2d 799, 805 (2003).

The fourth amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees people the rightto be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects from unreasonable searches andseizures. U.S. Const., amend. IV. This guarantee applies to all seizures of the person,including those that include only a brief detention short of a traditional arrest. Thomas, 198Ill. 2d at 108, 759 N.E.2d at 902.

Not all encounters between citizens and police raise fourth amendment concerns. Courts have recognized three tiers of police-citizen contact, each with its own constitutionalparameters. The most intrusive of these is an arrest, which requires probable cause to satisfythe fourth amendment's protection against unreasonable searches and seizures. The next tieris a brief investigative detention or Terry stop, which requires a reasonable and articulablesuspicion of wrongdoing. People v. Murray, 137 Ill. 2d 382, 387, 560 N.E.2d 309, 311(1990). The last tier is the least intrusive type of police encounter, commonly called thecommunity-caretaking function or referred to as a public safety function. Murray, 137 Ill.2d at 387, 560 N.E.2d at 311-12. Because this last tier involves no coercion or detention,it does not constitute a "seizure" within the meaning of the fourth amendment. Murray, 137Ill. 2d at 387, 560 N.E.2d at 311.

Here, the State notes that the police had probable cause to arrest the defendant aftersearching him and detecting a bulge in his pant leg. This, however, does not resolve thequestion presented by the defendant and decided by the circuit court, i.e., Was the defendantin custody at the time he was questioned and later searched by the police?

Generally, reasonableness under the fourth amendment requires a warrant supportedby probable cause. Thomas, 198 Ill. 2d at 108, 759 N.E.2d at 902. However, the UnitedStates Supreme Court has recognized a limited exception to the probable cause requirementin Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20 L. Ed. 2d 889, 88 S. Ct. 1868 (1968). In Terry the SupremeCourt held that a law enforcement officer could, under appropriate circumstances, brieflydetain an individual for investigatory purposes if the officer reasonably believed that theperson had committed or was about to commit a crime. Terry, 392 U.S. at 22, 20 L. Ed. 2dat 906-07, 88 S. Ct. at 1880.

Terry provides a dual inquiry for deciding whether a law enforcement officer'sinvestigatory detention is reasonable: (1) "whether the officer's action was justified at itsinception" and (2) "whether it was reasonably related in scope to the circumstances whichjustified the interference in the first place." Terry, 392 U.S. at 19-20, 20 L. Ed. 2d at 905,88 S. Ct. at 1879. Whether the detention of a suspect by police is appropriate is objectivelydetermined after considering the facts available to the officer at the time the situationconfronted him or her. Thomas, 198 Ill. 2d at 110, 759 N.E.2d at 903. The police officermust be able to point to specific and articulable facts that, taken together with rationalinferences, reasonably warranted the intrusion. Cox, 202 Ill. 2d at 467, 782 N.E.2d at 278(citing Terry, 392 U.S. at 20-21, 20 L. Ed. 2d at 905-06, 88 S. Ct. at 1879-80). Factssupporting an officer's suspicion need not rise to the level of probable cause but must justifymore than a mere hunch. Cox, 202 Ill. 2d at 467, 782 N.E.2d at 278 (citing Thomas, 198 Ill.2d at 110, 759 N.E.2d at 903). The scope of an investigative detention must be temporaryand not last longer than is necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop. Florida v. Royer,460 U.S. 491, 500, 75 L. Ed. 2d 229, 238, 103 S. Ct. 1319, 1325 (1983). "[T]he State bearsthe burden of showing that a seizure based on reasonable suspicion was sufficiently limitedin scope and duration to satisfy the conditions of an investigative seizure." People v.Brownlee, 186 Ill. 2d 501, 519, 713 N.E.2d 556, 565 (1999) (citing Royer, 460 U.S. at 500,75 L. Ed. 2d at 238, 103 S. Ct. at 1326). Further, where a law enforcement officer'sconfinement of an individual goes beyond the permissible limits of a Terry investigative stop,all the evidence gained as a result of the illegal stop should be excluded as "fruit of thepoisonous tree." See Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 9 L. Ed. 2d 441, 83 S. Ct.407 (1963).

Here, the State agrees with the circuit court's finding that the police encounter withthe defendant was not a Terry stop. In agreeing with this finding, the State concedes thatevidence adduced at both the defendant's preliminary hearing and the suppression hearingestablished that the police did not have a reasonable belief that the defendant had committedor was about to commit a crime to justify a brief detention of the defendant for investigatorypurposes. We agree with both the findings of the circuit court and the State's position onappeal-the defendant's encounter with the police was not a Terry stop.

The State contends that the police were performing a community-caretaking functionwhen they encountered the defendant. The State claims that, with the information that theresidence at which the defendant was encountered was rented by a family known to be drugtraffickers in the city and based on several complaints made on the drug hotline about theresidence, the police went to the residence to perform community caretaking, i.e., knock-and-talks, and specifically to investigate the reports of criminal activity there. The State contendsthat the police may question citizens during criminal investigations and that citizens have aduty to cooperate. Accordingly, the State believes that the defendant had a duty to assist thepolice in their investigation of these reports.

The State has misapprehended the meaning of the community-caretaking function ofthe police. Performing a knock-and-talk at the residence at which the defendant was foundfor the purpose of investigating reports of criminal activity is not police activity that canproperly be characterized as community caretaking. Community caretaking, or theperforming of a public safety function, by police "involves no coercion or detention andtherefore does not involve a seizure." Murray, 137 Ill. 2d at 387, 560 N.E.2d at 312. Theproper performance of the community-caretaking function involves police activity that is" 'totally divorced from the detection, investigation, or acquisition of evidence relating to theviolation of a criminal statute.' " Murray, 137 Ill. 2d at 388, 560 N.E.2d at 312 (quotingCady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433, 441, 37 L. Ed. 2d 706, 93 S. Ct. 2523, 2528 (1973)). Police are not performing a community-caretaking function when they are specifically investigating reports of criminal activity.

The issue presented by the defendant's motion to suppress was whether he was incustody at the time the police engaged him in questioning. Said differently, we must decidewhether the defendant was improperly seized by the actions of the police at the time he wasasked whether he had drugs in his possession.

While a police officer, in most cases, does not violate the fourth amendment guaranteeagainst unreasonable searches and seizures by approaching an individual and questioninghim or asking for identification (Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 497, 75 L. Ed. 2d 229, 236,103 S. Ct. 1319, 1324 (1983)), this is only the case when " 'the person to whom [the]questions are put remains free to disregard the questions and walk away," because then"there has been no intrusion upon [the] person's liberty or privacy as would under theConstitution require some particularized and objective justification' " (Murray, 137 Ill. 2dat 388, 560 N.E.2d at 312 (quoting United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 553-56, 64L. Ed. 2d 497, 509-10, 100 S. Ct. 1870, 1877-78 (1980))). It is not necessary for policeofficers to physically restrain a person in order to effect a seizure. All that is needed is ashow of authority that would lead a reasonable person to conclude that he or she is not freeto leave. See Brownlee, 186 Ill. 2d at 520, 713 N.E.2d at 565 (citing Mendenhall, 446 U.S.at 553, 64 L. Ed. 2d at 509, 100 S. Ct. at 1877). This occurs when, in view of all thecircumstances, a reasonable person, innocent of any crime, would conclude that he or shewas not free to leave. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 554, 64 L. Ed. 2d 497, 100 S. Ct. at 1877. Factors relevant to this determination include (1) the presence of several officers, (2) thedisplay of a weapon, (3) language or tone of voice that indicates that the officer may compelcompliance, and (4) physical contact. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 554, 64 L. Ed. 2d 497, 100S. Ct. at 1877. However, this list of factors is not exhaustive but provides only a fewexamples of circumstances that may lead to a finding that an individual was seized. City ofHighland Park v. Lee, 291 Ill. App. 3d 48, 53-54, 683 N.E.2d 962, 966 (1997).

Here, the State claims that the reason the defendant stopped had nothing to do withhis compliance with a police directive, because the defendant did not know who wasinstructing him to "[w]ait a minute" until after he had stopped and turned around. Further,the State suggests that the presence of several uniformed police equipped with badges,pistols, mace, and bulletproof vests would not cause an innocent person to reasonably believethat he or she was detained. We disagree with both contentions.

In determining whether the actions of the police constituted a show of authority thatresulted in the defendant's detention, it is not necessary to determine whether the defendantfelt that he was in custody at the moment that Sergeant Gillespie instructed him to "[w]aita minute." The relevant inquiry is whether, in view of the totality of the circumstances, areasonable person in the defendant's place could conclude that he was not free to leave at thetime the police began questioning him.

This query was addressed most recently by the Illinois Supreme Court in People v.Gherna, 203 Ill. 2d 165, 784 N.E.2d 799 (2003). Gherna involved two police officers whoapproached a vehicle that was parked in a parking lot. The officers were on bicycle patrol. They observed a bottle of beer in a cup holder between the seats and noticed that thepassenger appeared to be very young. Gherna, 203 Ill. 2d at 168, 784 N.E.2d at 801. Oncethe officers ascertained that the bottle of beer was not open and that the passenger was notdrinking it, they continued to engage the driver in conversation, which eventually led to asearch of the vehicle. Gherna, 203 Ill. 2d at 168-69, 784 N.E.2d at 802. Similar to the casesub judice, the officers positioned themselves on either side of the truck, next to the doors. Gherna, 203 Ill. 2d at 179, 784 N.E.2d at 808. In holding that the officers' actions"constituted an official show of authority to which a reasonable innocent person would feelcompelled to submit," the court noted that the officers wore uniforms, displayed policebadges, and carried weapons, handcuffs, radios, and flashlights. Gherna, 203 Ill. 2d at 180,784 N.E.2d at 808. Additionally, the court noted that the officers' positioning beside thetruck restrained the occupants' movement by blocking them from exiting the vehicle. Gherna, 203 Ill. 2d at 180, 784 N.E.2d at 808.

We believe that the show of authority exhibited by the police in the instant case waseven more pronounced than that involved in Gherna. Here, Sergeant Gillespie instructed thedefendant to wait a minute. The defendant's hearing of this instruction was immediatelyfollowed by his realization that seven to nine uniformed, badge-clad, side arm-carryingpolice officers were emerging from five vehicles arriving in tandem, the last of which wasmarked "Alton Police Department." The officers ultimately surrounded him on three sides. We believe that this was a sufficient show of authority from which any reasonable personwould objectively conclude that his or her freedom of movement was restricted. A personpresented with these circumstances could reasonably conclude that if he or she were todepart, law enforcement "would soon be in hot pursuit." Brownlee, 186 Ill. 2d at 520, 713N.E.2d at 566. The fact that the defendant answered the questions put to him by police andmay have consented to the search of his person does not transform the nature of theencounter from a detention to a consensual encounter. We conclude that the defendant wasunlawfully detained in violation of the fourth amendment. All the evidence obtained as aresult of the illegal stop should be excluded as "fruit of the poisonous tree," including theseizure of the items discovered by police in their later search of the defendant's vehicle. SeeWong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 9 L. Ed. 2d 441, 83 S. Ct. 407 (1963).

Lastly, the State contends that in its order the court committed error in misstating theevidence and in drawing unsupported conclusions based upon the evidence. While we donot find that the later claim has merit, we do recognize that the court incorrectly stated thatthe police arrived in "two to three marked vehicles" when in fact the evidence showed thatall but one of the vehicles were unmarked. We do not see that this minor misstatement bythe court in its order undermines the reasoning supporting the ultimate decision to suppressthe evidence obtained by the police. Our review of the circuit court's ultimate ruling on themotion to suppress is de novo. Review under this standard has allowed us to thoroughlyexamine the entire record before us. Based on this examination, we conclude that the circuitcourt's grant of the defendant's motion was supported by the manifest weight of the evidence.

For the foregoing reasons, the order of the circuit court granting the defendant'smotion to suppress all the statements and physical evidence obtained by police in theirSeptember 6, 2001, encounter is affirmed.

Affirmed.

GOLDENHERSH and KUEHN, JJ., concur.