JUSTICE GOLDENHERSH delivered the opinion of the court:

Following a bench trial in the circuit court of Montgomery County, the defendant,Wesley G. Diestelhorst, a convicted child sex offender, was convicted of three counts ofimproper approaching, contacting, or communicating with a child within a public park zoneby a child sex offender in violation of section 11-9.4(a) of the Criminal Code of 1961 (theCode) (720 ILCS 5/11-9.4(a) (West 2000)). The defendant was sentenced to concurrent, six-year, extended-term sentences in the Department of Corrections on counts I and II. Nosentence was imposed on count III, because the trial court found that it was based upon thesame physical act as count II. On appeal, the defendant argues (1) that the charges againsthim are fatally defective because only the conclusory language of the statute is recited, (2)that he was denied his right to a preliminary hearing on a superceding information, (3) thathe was not proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of any of the three charges, (4) thatsection 11-9.4(a) of the Code is unconstitutionally broad, (5) that he was denied a fair trialdue to the ineffective assistance of his counsel, (6) that the three alleged acts for which hewas convicted are parts of a single act rather than separate acts, and (7) that the sentenceimposed is excessive and should be reduced to time served. We affirm.

The defendant has multiple convictions for child sexual offenses. In 1985 aMontgomery County jury found the defendant guilty of one count of aggravated criminalsexual assault (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 38, par. 12-14 (now see 720 ILCS 5/12-14 (West2002))) for sexually penetrating a male child under the age of 13 and three counts of indecentliberties with a child (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 38, par. 11-4 (now see 720 ILCS 5/12-12 etseq. (West 2002))) for performing various sexual acts with a female child under the age of16. The defendant received a prison sentence of 20 years and served approximately 10 yearsin the Department of Corrections for these convictions. In 1996, the defendant was chargedwith three counts of child abduction and ultimately pled guilty to one count of childabduction (720 ILCS 5/10-5(b)(10) (West 1996)) for luring or attempting to lure a childunder the age of 16 into a motor vehicle. The defendant received a sentence of three yearsin the Department of Corrections.

Pursuant to section 11-9.4 of the Code, effective January 1, 2000, it became illegalfor child sexual offenders to interact with children in public parks. The statute provided inpertinent part as follows:

"Approaching, contacting, residing, or communicating with a child withinpublic park zone by child sex offenders prohibited.

(a) It is unlawful for a child sex offender to knowingly be present in any publicpark building or on real property comprising any public park when persons under theage of 18 are present in the building or on the grounds and to approach, contact, orcommunicate with a child under 18 years of age, unless the offender is a parent orguardian of a person under 18 years of age present in the building or on the grounds." 720 ILCS 5/11-9.4(a) (West 2000).

A person who violates section 11-9.4(a) is guilty of a Class 4 felony. 720 ILCS 5/11-9.4(e)(West 2000).

This is not the first time the defendant has been charged with a violation of the abovestatute. On April 3, 2001, the defendant drove a truck to a park in Montgomery County andparked near a ball field where a girls' high school team was holding practice. The defendantexited the truck but left loud music playing. He went to the ball field and made commentsto the girls, such as "nice catch." After the girls complained to their coach that the defendantwas interfering with their practice, the defendant was charged with violating sections 11-9.4(a) and 11-9.4(b) of the Code (720 ILCS 5/11-9.4(a), (b) (West 2000)).

On May 1, 2001, the defendant was charged with another violation of section 11-9.4(a) of the Code after he interfered with a boys' high school baseball practice. That chargeemanated from the defendant's actions on the evening of April 29, 2001. At that time, thedefendant drove his mother's truck to Raymond Park and parked it near a ball diamond wherea high school boys' team was holding practice. The defendant blasted music from the truckas he watched the practice. The defendant also shagged foul balls and kept a runningcommentary going with the players, saying such things as "that was beautiful" and "that's thespot." At one point, a player dropped his glove to retrieve a ball that had gone over thefence, and the defendant picked up the glove, forcing the player to have to recover his glovefrom the defendant.

Prior to the start of a trial on any of the above-described charges, defense counselfiled a motion to dismiss on the basis that section 11-9.4(a) is unconstitutionally vaguebecause the terms "approach," "contact," and "communicate" are not defined by the statute. The trial court denied the defendant's motion to dismiss and found that the statute is not voidfor vagueness. The first two charges centering around the events of April 3, 2001, proceededto a trial in September 2001. Ultimately, the defendant was acquitted of both charges arisingfrom the events surrounding the girls' softball practice. The defendant was not so lucky inthe instant case.

In November 2001, the State filed an amended information concerning the eventssurrounding the boys' baseball practice. The original information had charged the defendantwith only one count and alleged that the defendant "communicated with a child" in violationof section 11-9.4(a). Count I of the amended information recited the original charge basedupon communication with a child and added "alternate charges of the same statute." CountII alleged that the defendant violated section 11-9.4(a) when he "approached" a child, andcount III alleged that the defendant violated section 11-9.4(a) when he "contacted" a child.

At a pretrial hearing on May 2, 2002, the trial court stated that there was no need toconduct a preliminary hearing on the two additional counts in the amended information. Thetrial court then asked for the parties' thoughts on the matter. The State agreed, noting thatthe additional charges did not "create any substantial or new issues that would catch thedefendant by surprise" and did not change the manner in which the State would proceed inattempting to prove the charges. Defense counsel stated, "I would just for therecord[-]would indicate that I think at least two of these are new charges[,] and I wouldsubmit that there should be a preliminary hearing." Defense counsel did not claim that apreliminary hearing was necessary in order to properly prepare a defense. The trial courtconcluded that a preliminary hearing was not necessary, and the cause proceeded to a benchtrial.

The parties stipulated that the defendant's actions had occurred in a public park andthat the defendant "was not the parent or guardian of any of the persons under 18 years ofage present on the park grounds." The State offered the testimony of Dennis Matli, the coachof the boys' baseball team, M.M., a 16-year-old team member, Todd Brown, a member ofthe team who was 18 years old at the time of the trial, and B.W., a 16-year-old team member.

Coach Matli recalled that on the evening of April 29, 2001, his team, which wascomprised of 15- to 17-year-old males, was practicing at a baseball field. The defendantdrove up in a pickup truck with music playing loudly. Matli told the team to ignore thedefendant. The defendant walked back and forth between his parked truck and various areasaround the field. Matli saw the defendant sitting on the bleachers behind home plate,walking around the dugouts, and standing by the fence. At one point, some of the playerswere hitting foul balls over a fence, and the defendant retrieved the balls and threw themback to the players. Matli did not have direct contact with the defendant, nor did he see himhave direct contact with the players.

M.M. testified that he was 16 years old on the date when the alleged events occurred. M.M. recalled that the defendant "[p]ulled up in his truck with his radio blaring[,] causingattention to himself." He also drew attention to himself by sitting on the bleachers andmaking comments on the game, such as "nice hit" and "good try." M.M. testified that thedefendant talked directly with one of his friends, B.W. M.M. could not hear what thedefendant said to B.W., but he saw him talking to B.W. M.M. said that this occurred whenB.W. went to shag a foul ball which had gone over a fence. In order to retrieve the ball,B.W. dropped his baseball glove and jumped over the fence. The defendant picked up theglove and then gave it back to B.W. by the fence line. M.M. noted that the defendant andB.W. were close enough that the defendant could hand the glove back to B.W.

Todd Brown was also practicing at the park on the night in question and corroboratedthe testimony of M.M. regarding the defendant's actions and his commentating on the game. He also witnessed the glove exchange between B.W. and the defendant. Brown said thatB.W. and the defendant were only a "[c]ouple feet" apart when the exchange was made. Hesaid it looked like the defendant said something to M.M., but Brown was too far away tohear anything.

B.W. testified that the defendant arrived at the park with music blaring from his truck. The defendant then proceeded to pace the right field line, sit behind the backstop onbleachers, and comment upon the team's batting practice. At one point, B.W. was behind thebackstop retrieving foul balls. A ball went over the fence and B.W. dropped his glove andjumped over the fence to retrieve the errant ball. After B.W. retrieved the ball, he turnedaround and saw the defendant wearing his glove. The defendant then stated directly to B.W.,"Look, I found a glove." B.W. told the defendant that it was his glove. B.W. retrievedanother ball that had sailed over the fence. On his way back, he met the defendant at the gateand the defendant handed him the glove. B.W. testified that he was an arm's length awayfrom the defendant during the exchange. B.W. said the defendant remained at the park untilapproximately 8:15 p.m., when the practice ended.

The defendant testified on his own behalf that on the date in question he was out fora drive when he noticed an organized baseball practice in the park and decided to stop andwatch. He admitted that he went back and forth between his truck and different areas aroundthe baseball field. At one point, he was sitting in his truck and heard a train, so he got outof his truck to watch the train. As he got near a gate, he noticed a baseball glove lying onthe ground and thought someone might have lost it. After he picked it up to look at it, heheard B.W. say either "That's mine" or "That's my glove." He testified that B.W. thenwalked toward him, took the glove out of his hand, and went back to his baseball practice. The defendant walked through the gate and watched the train. The defendant denied sayinganything to B.W. or to anyone else at the park. He said he made some comments to himself,but they were not directed toward anyone.

After hearing all the evidence, the trial court found the defendant guilty on all threecounts. At the sentencing hearing, the trial court noted that it would enter a judgment oncounts I and II only, because counts II and III were based upon the same physical act. Thetrial court found the defendant to be a threat to the community, and the court sentenced thedefendant to concurrent, six-year, extended-term sentences on counts I and II. The defendantfiled a motion to reconsider and a motion for the reduction of the sentences, which the trialcourt denied. The defendant now appeals.

The defendant first contends that the charges against him are fatally defective becausethe information alleged only the conclusory language of the statute, rather than particularacts. The defendant insists that he was not told which acts he allegedly committed amountedto a communication, an approach, or a contact and that, therefore, he was unable to properlyprepare a defense and now fears future prosecution arising from the same conduct for whichhe was found guilty. We disagree.

The Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 provides that a criminal charge must allegethe offense committed by setting forth the nature and the elements of the offense charged. 725 ILCS 5/111-3(a)(3) (West 2000); People v. Smit, 312 Ill. App. 3d 150, 151, 726 N.E.2d62, 63 (2000). The relevant inquiry is not whether the alleged offense could have beendescribed in greater detail but whether there is sufficient particularity to allow the accusedto prepare a proper defense. Smit, 312 Ill. App. 3d at 151, 726 N.E.2d at 63-64. When anindictment is attacked for the first time on appeal, as it is here, it is sufficient if it "apprise[d]the defendant of the precise offense charged with sufficient specificity to enable him toprepare his defense and allow the pleading of the judgment as a bar to future prosecutionarising out of the same conduct." People v. Gilmore, 63 Ill. 2d 23, 28-29, 344 N.E.2d 456,460 (1976).

Set forth in the language of section 11-9.4(a) of the Code, count I of the informationcharged the defendant with unlawful presence within a public park. Count I alleged:

"[The defendant] was knowingly present on real property comprising a public park*** when persons under 18 years of age were present on the park grounds and [thedefendant] communicated with B.W., a child under 18 years of age, at the time when[the defendant] was not a parent or guardian of any of the persons under 18 years ofage present on the grounds."

Counts II and III made the same allegations, except the word "communicated" is supplantedby the word "approached" in count II and the word "contacted" in count III.

An indictment may incorporate the statutory language of the charge as long as itdescribes with reasonable certainty the type of conduct alleged. People v. Wisslead, 108 Ill.2d 389, 394, 484 N.E.2d 1081, 1083 (1985). An information charging an offense of lewdfondling or touching, worded in substantially the same language as the statute, is sufficientand does not have to specify the particular acts that constitute the crime. People v. Bradley,128 Ill. App. 3d 372, 378, 470 N.E.2d 1121, 1126 (1984). Likewise, we find that the instantinformation was sufficient to inform the defendant of the nature of the charges against him.

In making a determination on appeal on whether or not the information is sufficient,we are allowed to consider the record. Gilmore, 63 Ill. 2d at 30, 344 N.E.2d at 460. Therecord before us belies the defendant's claim that he was unable to prepare a defense. In histestimony, the defendant specifically denied speaking to, approaching, or contacting B.W. The defendant testified that he was on his way to watch an approaching train when henoticed a baseball glove lying on the ground. As soon as he picked it up, he heard B.W. saythat it was his glove. The defendant was quick to point out that B.W. walked toward him and"took the glove out of [his] hand." A review of the defendant's testimony shows that heattempted to set forth the proper defense, namely, that he did not approach, communicate,or have any contact with B.W. In effect, the defendant testified that any contact betweenhim and B.W. was, at worst, inadvertent on his part.

We have reviewed the cases cited by the defendant in support of his contention thatthe information was insufficient. We are unconvinced. The cases cited by the defendant aredistinguishable because in all those cases the offenses charged were such that additionalclarification or specific words were necessary to set forth the alleged crime with sufficientspecificity. See, e.g., People v. Davis, 281 Ill. App. 3d 984, 668 N.E.2d 119 (1996) (thedefendant was charged with official misconduct). Here, we believe that the informationcouched in the terms of section 11-9.4(a) was sufficient to inform the defendant of theprecise offenses with which he was charged and allowed him to prepare a defense. Moreover, the information clearly states the time and the date of the alleged offenses and,therefore, acts as a bar to any future prosecutions arising out of the defendant's actions at theboys' baseball practice on the date and time in question.

The defendant argues that he was denied his right to a preliminary hearing on thesuperceding information. As the State points out, however, the defendant waived this issueby failing to raise it in his posttrial motion. See People v. Enoch, 122 Ill. 2d 176, 186, 522N.E.2d 1124, 1129-30 (1988). Even assuming arguendo that the defendant did not waivethis issue, we find no error in the trial court's decision not to conduct another preliminaryhearing.

If a defendant is charged with a felony by information, the accused is entitled to apreliminary hearing to determine whether probable cause exists to believe that the accusedcommitted the crime. 725 ILCS 5/111-2(a) (West 2000). Section 111-2(f) of the Code ofCriminal Procedure of 1963 allows the State to amend an information to charge additionaloffenses arising out of the same transaction or occurrence without conducting anotherpreliminary hearing. 725 ILCS 5/111-2(f) (West 2000). A preliminary hearing is not a trialand is not intended to be a discovery proceeding; rather, it is a proceeding connected tocharging a defendant by an information in order to determine probable cause. People v.Blackman, 91 Ill. App. 3d 130, 132, 414 N.E.2d 246, 247 (1980).

Here, a preliminary hearing was held on May 17, 2001, on the State's originalinformation, charging that the defendant "communicated with a child under 18 years of age." The State called only one witness, Chief of Police Jim Engelman. Engelman described theincident involving the boys' baseball team. Engelman did not testify that the defendantactually spoke with B.W. Engelman's testimony revealed only that B.W. told the defendantit was his glove and then retrieved the glove from the defendant. After Engelman testified,defense counsel argued that the testimony failed to show that the defendant communicatedwith a child under the age of 18. The trial court disagreed and found probable cause. Thereafter, the State filed an information adding two counts based upon the same statute, butthis time for improperly approaching and contacting B.W.

After careful consideration, we agree with the State that the two additional chargesarose out of the same occurrence and pertained to the same conduct that formed the basis ofthe first information. We find nothing in the record before us to indicate that anotherpreliminary hearing was warranted. We disagree with the defendant's assertion that a newpreliminary hearing was warranted because during the first preliminary hearing there was noindication that the defendant actually talked to B.W. The purpose of the preliminary hearingwas only to determine whether there was probable cause to believe that a crime had beencommitted, not to conduct a trial. The State was not required to produce all the evidence itplanned to produce at the trial. Blackman, 91 Ill. App. 3d at 132, 414 N.E.2d at 247. Wefind no error in the trial court's refusal to conduct an additional preliminary hearing on thesuperceding information.

The defendant asserts that he was not proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of anyof the three charges because his actions were innocent and insignificant and none of hisactions amounted to a criminal level of communication, approach, or conduct. In effect, thedefendant argues that section 11-9.4(a) violates substantive due process because it punishesinnocent conduct in the absence of any culpable intent. The defendant also contends therewas no proof he knew that anyone was under the age of 18.

In People v. Wick, 107 Ill. 2d 62, 481 N.E.2d 676 (1985), the Illinois Supreme Courtoutlined the test for whether a legislative exercise of police power meets constitutionalrequirements:

"[T]he question of whether a legislative exercise of the police power meets theconstitutional requirement of due process involves [1] identifying the public interestthat the statute is intended to protect, [2] examining whether the statute 'bears areasonable relationship' to that interest, and [3] determining whether the method usedto protect or further that interest is 'reasonable.' " Wick, 107 Ill. 2d at 66, 481 N.E.2dat 678.

After careful consideration, we find that section 11-9.4(a) does not violate substantive dueprocess.

It is clear from a reading of the statute that section 11-9.4(a) is intended to protectchildren from known sex offenders, who have a notoriously high recidivism rate. See Peoplev. Stork, 305 Ill. App. 3d 714, 721, 713 N.E.2d 187, 192 (1999). Section 11-9.4(a) prohibitsknown child sex offenders from approaching, contacting, or communicating with a childwithin a public park zone, unless the child sex offender is a parent or guardian of a childunder the age of 18 and that child is present, thereby reducing the risk that children in thepark will become victims of the known child sex offender. We must consider whetherprohibiting child sex offenders from approaching, contacting, or communicating with a childin a public park bears a reasonable relationship to protecting children from known sexoffenders. We find that it does.

A court must ascertain and give effect to the legislature's intent in enacting a statute. Collins v. Board of Trustees of the Firemen's Annuity & Benefit Fund of Chicago, 155 Ill.2d 103, 110, 610 N.E.2d 1250, 1253 (1993). In construing a statute, a court has a duty toaffirm the statute's validity and constitutionality if reasonably possible. Collins, 155 Ill. 2dat 110, 610 N.E.2d at 1253. An interpretation that renders a statute valid is always presumedto have been intended by the legislature. Harris v. Manor Healthcare Corp., 111 Ill. 2d 350,363, 489 N.E.2d 1374, 1379 (1986).

In Stork, the Second District examined the constitutionality of section 11-9.3 of theCode (720 ILCS 5/11-9.3 (West 1998)), which makes it unlawful for a child sex offender tobe present on school grounds or within 500 feet of school property unless the offender is aparent or guardian of a student present on school grounds or the offender has permission tobe present. The Stork court concluded that prohibiting known child sex offenders fromhaving access to children in schools bears a reasonable relationship to protecting schoolchildren from known sex offenders. Stork, 305 Ill. App. 3d at 722, 713 N.E.2d at 193. Likewise, we believe that prohibiting known child sex offenders from approaching,contacting, or communicating with a child within a public park zone bears a reasonablerelationship to protecting children from known sex offenders. As the Stork court pointed out,"If a group of persons creates a greater danger to the public, then it is reasonable to deterthose persons by a statute reasonably designed to remedy the threat to the public safety." Stork, 305 Ill. App. 3d at 722, 713 N.E.2d at 193.

Section 11-9.4(a) does not prohibit a known child sex offender from being present ina public park and enjoying its amenities. It prohibits the offender from approaching,contacting, or communicating with a child under the age of 18. The statute does, however,make an exception for a known child sex offender who is a parent or guardian of a personunder the age of 18. Section 11-9.4(a) is reasonably designed to remedy a threat to publicsafety caused by known sex offenders. We do not find that section 11-9.4(a) is overly broad,nor do we find that it violates the defendant's substantive due process rights.

The relevant inquiry is whether after viewing the evidence in the light most favorableto the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have reasonably found the essentialelements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. People v. Oaks, 169 Ill. 2d 409, 457-58,662 N.E.2d 1328, 1349-50 (1996). A conviction should only be reversed if the evidence isso improbable, unreasonable, or unsatisfactory that it raises a reasonable doubt concerningthe defendant's guilt. People v. Easley, 288 Ill. App. 3d 487, 494, 680 N.E.2d 776, 782(1997).

In the instant case, the evidence revealed that the defendant has multiple convictionsfor child sexual offenses, including sexual penetration of a male child under the age of 13. The defendant also pled guilty in 1996 to one count of child abduction for luring orattempting to lure a child under the age of 16 into a motor vehicle. Less than a month beforethe incident in question, the defendant was charged with violations of sections 11-9.4(a) and(b) for a similar incident involving a girls' high school team. While the defendant wasultimately acquitted on those charges, the defendant's history shows an alarming pattern ofoffenses against children.

On the day in question, a high school boys' baseball team was conducting practice inthe park when the defendant drove his mother's truck into the park, parked it near the balldiamond, and left the music blaring. The coach testified that he told his team to ignore thedefendant, who walked from one area to the next and made comments about the game. B.W., age 16, testified that he dropped his ball glove and jumped over a fence to retrieve afoul ball. While B.W. was retrieving the ball, the defendant picked it up and then told B.W.,"Look, I found a glove," or words to that effect. When the glove exchange occurred, B.W.and the defendant were only an arm's length apart. The trial judge, who was the trier of factin this case, noted for the record that a "reasonable person would know" that B.W. and M.M.were younger than 18 at the time of the incident. B.W. and M.M. were both 16 on the dayin question. While the defendant argues that he was simply watching a baseball game, therecord indicates that his conduct was not so innocuous. The record shows that the defendantmade numerous attempts to draw attention to himself and make contact with members of thebaseball team. After reviewing the record as a whole, we cannot say the evidence was soimprobable, unreasonable, or unsatisfactory that it raises a reasonable doubt of thedefendant's guilt.

The defendant contends that the statute is vague and must be found unconstitutional. We disagree.

"A statute violates due process when it forbids the doing of an act in terms so vaguethat persons of normal intelligence must guess at its meaning and differ as to itsapplication. [Citation.] Statutes enjoy a strong presumption of constitutionality that'is not overcome unless the terms of the statute are so ill defined that their meaningwill be ultimately determined by the opinions and whims of the trier of fact ratherthan any objective criteria.' [Citation.] When a statute does not define a term, thecourt will assume that the word has its ordinary and popularly understood meaning." Stork, 305 Ill. App. 3d at 723, 713 N.E.2d at 193-94.

Any doubts are construed in favor of upholding the statute. People v. Cochran, 323 Ill. App.3d 669, 675, 753 N.E.2d 1155, 1161 (2001). Determining whether a statute is void forvagueness is made in the factual context of each case. People v. Falbe, 189 Ill. 2d 635, 639,727 N.E.2d 200, 204 (2000).

Webster's Dictionary (Webster's) defines the term "approach" as "to come or go nearor nearer to in place or time." Webster's Third New International Dictionary 106 (1986). Webster's definitions for "contact" include "to make connection with [or] get incommunication with." Webster's Third New International Dictionary 490 (1986). Webster'sdefines "communicate" as "to make known[,] inform a person of[,] [or] convey theknowledge or information of." Webster's Third New International Dictionary 460 (1986).

While Webster's gives additional definitions for the terms in question, we do not findthat the statute in question is unconstitutionally vague. "[A]n act is not unconstitutionallyvague merely because one can conjure up a hypothetical which brings the meaning of someterms into question." In re R.C., 195 Ill. 2d 291, 299, 745 N.E.2d 1233, 1239 (2001). Thedefendant contends that innocent actions, such as observing a ball game or walking past achild, are made felonies under section 11-9.4(a). However, we find that the terms aresufficiently clear to put the defendant on notice regarding what conduct is proscribed bysection 11-9.4(a).

In support of our determination, we rely on People v. Jamesson, 329 Ill. App. 3d 446,768 N.E.2d 817 (2002). In that case, the word "contact" in a statute prohibiting unlawfulcontact with a street gang member (720 ILCS 5/25-1.1 (West 1998)) was found not to beunconstitutionally vague. Here, the defendant was found guilty of three separate counts, buta judgment was only entered on count I (communicating) and count II (approaching) becausethe trial court determined that count II and count III (contacting) were based upon the samephysical act. The terms in question are sufficiently definite so that the defendant knew thathe should not approach or initiate any communication with a child under the age of 18. Thedefendant's previous convictions classify him as a child sex offender. The statute is clearthat child sex offenders should have no contact with children under the age of 18 in a publicpark, unless the offender is a parent or guardian of a child under the age of 18. Thedefendant does not fall under the exception.

Moreover, we agree with the State that because section 11-9.4(a) applies only to childsex offenders present in public parks without children of their own, the statute does not lenditself to arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement. Prohibiting child sex offenders fromapproaching, contacting, or communicating with children in public parks, where they areoften present, bears a reasonable relationship to protecting children from known sexoffenders. A person with common intelligence and experience should easily be able todiscern that a known sex offender should stay far away from children under the age of 18.Accordingly, we find that section 11-9.4(a) is not void for vagueness.

The defendant argues he was denied a fair trial due to the ineffective assistance ofcounsel because his lawyer, inter alia, failed to confront witnesses with their priorinconsistent statements, failed to object to the vague charges, and failed to move for a billof particulars or hold the State to its expressed theory of the case. We are unconvinced.

The general rule is that to prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, adefendant must show that (1) counsel's representation fell below an objective standard ofreasonableness and (2) counsel's substandard representation so prejudiced the defendant thathe was denied a fair trial. People v. Albanese, 104 Ill. 2d 504, 525, 473 N.E.2d 1246, 1255(1984) (citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674, 104 S. Ct. 2052(1984)). To show actual prejudice, a defendant must establish the following: "The defendantmust show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors,the result of the proceeding would have been different. A reasonable probability is aprobability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694,80 L. Ed. 2d at 698, 104 S. Ct. at 2068.

The defendant first contends that counsel was ineffective for failing to confront B.W.with his pretrial statements, which did not mention that the defendant actually spoke to B.W,and for failing to seek to introduce B.W.'s written statement, which was prepared the dayafter the incident. However, despite defense counsel's failure to ask B.W. about his pretrialstatements and failure to introduce the written statement of April 30, we cannot say thatdefense counsel was ineffective. The record reveals that while B.W. may not have initiallystated that the defendant had spoken directly to him, he revealed that fact prior to the trial. For example, on May 21, 2001, Officer Jim Engelman filed a supplemental report after hereinterviewed B.W. and other witnesses. The report specifically states that the defendantpicked up B.W.'s glove, put it on, and then "told [B.W.] that he found the glove." Additionally, B.W.'s testimony that the defendant had spoken to him was corroborated byTodd Brown and M.M., both of whom testified that the defendant had spoken to B.W. Under these circumstances, any error that occurred due to defense counsel's failure tointroduce the first written statement was harmless.

The second contention of ineffective assistance is that defense counsel failed to objectto vague charges and force the State to reveal the basis of the charges against the defendant. The defendant insists that his counsel was aware that the charges were vague, because hefiled a motion in which he argued that the statutory language of section 11-9.4(a) was sovague that it was unconstitutional, yet he failed to move to dismiss the charges as too generalor ask for a bill of particulars.

While we agree that the failure to object to a vague charge or request a bill ofparticulars can be a basis for ineffective assistance of counsel (see, e.g., People v. Meier, 223Ill. App. 3d 490, 492, 585 N.E.2d 232, 234 (1992)), we do not agree that defense counselwas ineffective in the instant case. As previously set forth, we believe that the defendant wasproperly charged. Moreover, the defendant's argument that a bill of particulars was requiredis contradicted by the manner in which the defendant testified. The defendant specificallydenied speaking to or approaching B.W. and claimed that his encounter with B.W. wasinadvertent. If the trial court believed the defendant's version of events, then the defendantwould have been found not guilty. The defendant set forth the proper defense, but the trialcourt found the defendant's testimony not credible.

The defendant further contends that his trial counsel was ineffective for not filing atimely posttrial motion. However, because the State did not object to the untimely motionand participated in the proceedings conducted on the motion, the defendant cannot showprejudice due to the untimeliness of the motion. Accordingly, the defendant fails to satisfyStrickland's prejudice prong. After reviewing the record and carefully considering thedefendant's arguments regarding ineffective assistance, we find that the defendant wasprovided with adequate representation at the trial.

The defendant asserts that his convictions on counts I and II were based upon thesame physical act and that, therefore, he can only be convicted on one count. The Statereplies that the record not only supports separate convictions on counts I and II but alsosupports a conviction on count III and that, therefore, count III should be reinstated. Wedisagree with the defendant, but we decline to reinstate the conviction on count III.

In People v. King, 66 Ill. 2d 551, 363 N.E.2d 838 (1977), the Illinois Supreme Courtset forth the following with regard to whether a defendant's conduct consists of separate actsor a single physical act:

"Prejudice results to the defendant only in those instances where more than oneoffense is carved from the same physical act. Prejudice, with regard to multiple acts,exists only when the defendant is convicted of more than one offense, some of whichare, by definition, lesser[-]included offenses. Multiple convictions and concurrentsentences should be permitted in all other cases where a defendant has committedseveral acts, despite the interrelationship of those acts. 'Act,' when used in this sense,is intended to mean any overt or outward manifestation which will support a differentoffense." King, 66 Ill. 2d at 566, 363 N.E.2d at 844-45.

After considering the Illinois Supreme Court's guidelines in King, we find the trial court'sanalysis correct.

In the instant case, the defendant was charged with three separate violations of section11-9.4(a): count I alleged improper communication, count II alleged improper approach, andcount III alleged improper contact. The trial count determined that count III (contact) andcount II (approach) derived from the same physical act, and it entered a judgment on countsI and II only. We agree that the defendant committed two separate violations of the statute. The record shows that the defendant both communicated with and approached B.W. We alsoagree with the trial court that the approach and contact counts consisted of a single physicalact because there was no substantial change in the nature of the criminal objective. Thedefendant's convictions on counts I and II are, therefore, affirmed. We decline to reinstatecount III.

Finally, the defendant contends that the trial court abused its discretion in sentencinghim because the sentences imposed were excessive in light of the circumstances, inparticular, the relatively minor nature of the offenses. The defendant insists his sentenceshould be reduced to time served. The State replies, and we agree, that the trial court did notabuse its discretion in sentencing the defendant to concurrent, six-year, extended-termsentences.

The imposition of a sentence is left to the sound discretion of the trial court, andabsent an abuse of that discretion, the sentence of the trial court may not be altered uponreview. People v. Younger, 112 Ill. 2d 422, 427, 494 N.E.2d 145, 147 (1986). Greatdeference is given to the trial court because it is in the best position to consider thedefendant's "credibility, demeanor, general moral character, mentality, social environment,habits[,] and age." People v. O'Neal, 125 Ill. 2d 291, 298, 531 N.E.2d 366, 368 (1988). While reviewing courts have the power and the authority under Supreme Court Rule615(b)(4) (134 Ill. 2d R. 615(b)(4)) to reduce a sentence imposed by the trial court, thatpower should be exercised cautiously. O'Neal, 125 Ill. 2d at 298, 531 N.E.2d at 368-69.

The defendant has several strikes against him. He has a history of serious sexualoffenses against children, including sexual penetration of a male child. Less than a monthbefore the instant offenses, he had been charged with a separate violation of the statuteinvolved here. The trial court specifically found that the defendant lacked credibility andthat he was a threat to the community. The trial court was correct, because sex offenders areknown to have a high recidivism rate. Stork, 305 Ill. App. 3d at 721, 713 N.E.2d at 192. Accordingly, we cannot say that the trial court abused its discretion in sentencing thedefendant to concurrent, six-year extended terms.

For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the circuit court of Montgomery Countyis affirmed.

Affirmed.

MAAG and DONOVAN, JJ., concur.