On January 12, 2000, the defendant, Faygie Fields, was tried before a jury andconvicted of two counts of aggravated battery to corrections officers at Tamms CorrectionalCenter (Tamms), where Fields was incarcerated. Fields was sentenced to four years'imprisonment to run consecutively with a previously imposed sentence. Fields contends onappeal that (1) the trial court erred in denying without an evidentiary hearing his motion todismiss the charges as selective, vindictive, and retaliatory, (2) he was denied a fair trialbecause of the types of security measures taken in the courtroom, and (3) the prosecutor'scomments during closing argument were prejudicial. We affirm.

On October 19, 1998, Fields twice committed aggravated battery to a correctionsofficer when he reached through the chuckhole in his cell door and grabbed the keys of anofficer and then struck the metal cover of his chuckhole when a different officer wasattempting to lock it down. Neither officer sustained serious injury. Immediately followingthis incident, disciplinary reports were provided to the assistant warden, and Fields wasrecommended for a year of segregation time, one year's demotion, and the loss of good-conduct credit.

Almost three months later, on January 7, 1999, Fields and three other inmates fileda class action lawsuit against various Department of Corrections (DOC) officials (RobertBoyd v. Donald Snyder, No. 99-280-DRH). On January 28, 1999, two weeks after the classaction was filed, DOC began to investigate the October 19, 1998, incident. On March 26,1999, DOC sent a referral letter to the Alexander County State's Attorney recommendingthat Fields be criminally prosecuted for the incident. Criminal referrals were also made ontwo of Fields' coplaintiffs in the civil litigation. During pretrial motions it was agreed that(1) there were 389 nonviolent inmate-on-staff assaults between Tamms' opening in March1998 and when charges were filed against Fields, (2) only eight or nine inmates from Tammshave ever been criminally prosecuted for aggravated assault and battery for alleged impropercontact with Tamms correctional officers, and (3) Fields and his two coplaintiffs make upthree of that group.

Fields sought an evidentiary hearing and further discovery regarding the selection andreferral of Tamms cases for prosecution. The trial court found that Fields failed to make aprima facie showing that the prosecutor had improper motives, and the court denied Fields'motion. In Fields' motion for reconsideration, Fields argued that there was clear evidencethat DOC had the ability to prevail upon the prosecutor to prosecute those whom DOCselects. The trial court denied Fields' request for reconsideration.

Prior to the trial, the State argued that Fields should be shackled during his jury trial. The trial court ruled that Fields' legs would be shackled, and the court ordered that thecourtroom be arranged in such way so that the jury could not see the shackles. In addition,the trial court ordered a number of uniformed guards stationed in the courtroom. One guardwas behind the defense table, one guard was at each entrance to the courtroom, and a groupof guards was seated in the front row of the spectators' seats.

The trial consisted of testimony from both of the corrections officers involved andone corrections officer who witnessed the incident. The defense laid out during the openingstatement and the closing argument was that the incident was so insubstantial that it shouldnot result in criminal liability. During his closing argument, the prosecutor stated, "[T]osuggest that no crime was committed, a little incident as was made mention of in thedefendant's opening statement, *** is insulting to your intelligence." The prosecutor alsostated, [The defense's theory] simply does not make any legal or logical sense whatsoever." Also, in rebuttal, the prosecutor added, "How dare this attorney try to insult your intelligenceand your sense of right and wrong by suggesting this defendant has a right to act in the wayhe clearly has." The trial court found that the prosecutor's comments during closingargument were harmless error. Fields appeals.

Selective prosecution and vindictive prosecution, though often arguedsimultaneously, are actually two separate claims. "[S]elective prosecution requires ashowing that the defendant '(1) ... [was] singled out for prosecution while other violatorssimilarly situated were not prosecuted; and (2) the decision to prosecute was based on anarbitrary classification such as race, religion, or the exercise of constitutional rights.' " United States v. Monsoor, 77 F.3d 1031, 1034 (7th Cir. 1996) (quoting United States v.Cyprian, 23 F.3d 1189, 1195 (7th Cir. 1994)). Vindictive prosecution exists if the defendantcan show that the prosecution was pursued in retaliation for the exercise of a protectedstatutory or constitutional right. Monsoor, 77 F.3d at 1034. In determining if theprosecution was retaliatory, a court will look at "whether '(1) the prosecutor harboredgenuine animus[] and[,] (2) absent this motive, defendant would not have been prosecuted.'" Monsoor, 77 F.3d at 1034 (quoting Cyprian, 23 F.3d at 1195). Fields is only entitled toa hearing on either claim if he offers " 'sufficient evidence to raise a reasonable doubt thatthe government acted properly in seeking [to prosecute]' " (Monsoor, 77 F.3d at 1034(quoting United States v. Benson, 941 F.2d 598, 611 (7th Cir. 1991))).

Fields argues, as did the defendant in Monsoor, that it is not required that theprosecutor himself harbor animus against the defendant but that if the referring agencyharbors the animus, it can be imputed to the prosecutor. See Monsoor, 77 F.3d at 1034. However, the court in Monsoor went on to clarify that such animus may be imputed onlywhen a defendant can establish that the agency in some way prevailed upon the prosecutorto make the decision to prosecute. Monsoor, 77 F.3d at 1035.

In the case sub judice, Fields conceded at a motion hearing that (1) he is not allegingany type of misconduct by the prosecutor and (2) the prosecutor "in most cases" does makean independent determination of whether to prosecute an inmate after receiving the referralletter from DOC. Fields suggests, however, that it is DOC that makes the decision ofwhether to prosecute an inmate at Tamms and then prevails upon the prosecutor to do so.

Fields discusses in his brief several theories supporting this argument, including that"[the prosecutor] has never declined to prosecute a case referred by DOC because of itsindependent judgment" and that "[a] portion of the Assistant State's Attorney's salary is paid[under a statute] which required that Assistant to perform services 'in connection with'Tamms." These theories, however, fail to establish a sufficient nexus between DOC and theprosecutor's actions, which is required to show that DOC prevailed upon the prosecutor. See Monsoor, 77 F.3d at 1035.

Fields' argument is tenuous at best, with the only linking piece of evidence being theletter sent by DOC to the prosecutor referring the case for criminal prosecution. This letteralone is not enough to make a prima facie showing of the prosecutor's improper motives. Fields does not present any evidence of collaboration between DOC and the prosecutor. SeeMonsoor, 77 F.3d at 1035. Since Fields' motion failed to set forth a colorable basis forconcluding that his prosecution was selective or vindictive, we conclude that no furtherdiscovery is required, and we affirm the decision of the trial court.

Fields' second argument on appeal is that he was denied a fair trial because of the typeof security measures taken in the courtroom. Fields' first contention is that requiring himto wear shackles on his legs denied him a fair trial. A defendant may be shackled when (1)there is reason to believe that he may attempt to escape or he may pose a threat to the safetyof the people in the courtroom or (2) it is necessary to maintain order in the courtroomduring the trial. People v. Boose, 66 Ill. 2d 261, 266, 362 N.E.2d 303, 305 (1977).

The trial judge has a great amount of discretion in determining if physical restraintsare required and, if so required, what types of restraints are necessary, considering all of thecircumstances. Boose, 66 Ill. 2d at 266, 362 N.E.2d at 305. The trial judge must take intoconsideration a variety of factors in making this determination, including, but not limited to:(1) the seriousness of the charge, (2) the defendant's temperament and character, (3) thedefendant's age and physical attributes, (3) the defendant's past record, (4) any history ofpast attempted and completed escapes, (5) the nature and physical security of the courtroom,and (6) the adequacy and availability of alternative remedies. Boose, 66 Ill. 2d at 266-67,362 N.E.2d at 305-06.

The only question for us to consider is whether the trial judge abused this discretionin requiring Fields to wear shackles during the trial. See Boose, 66 Ill. 2d at 267, 362N.E.2d 306. We conclude, based on the record before us, that there was no abuse ofdiscretion and that wearing the shackles did not deny Fields a fair trial.

Fields contends that the evidence which the State introduced in support of its requestfor shackling, specifically, his previous convictions for violent crimes and numerousdisciplinary tickets (several for assaults on corrections officers at Tamms), is not a sufficientbasis for shackling Fields. Citing Boose, 66 Ill. 2d at 267, 362 N.E.2d at 306, defendantstates, "The simple fact that a defendant is accused of a violent act does not justifyshackling." However, in Boose, the court noted, "there is nothing to suggest violentbehavior before or during the trial." Boose, 66 Ill. 2d at 268, 362 N.E.2d at 306. Here, onthe other hand, Fields has consistently had violent tendencies throughout his years withDOC and specifically since being at Tamms. The evidence presented by the State supportsseveral of the factors that the trial judge should consider in making the determinationregarding restraints. In particular, it focuses on Fields' temperament and character and thenature of the charge. Here, Fields was charged with two counts of battery on a correctionsofficer. In addition, he had a clear history of violent behavior, with 11 disciplinary reportsfor assaultive behavior, 7 on corrections officers, in the less than two years he had been atTamms.

Fields argues that nothing in the record shows that he would have done or saidanything to disrupt the judicial process or offend the dignity of the proceedings. While itis true that Fields had not acted violently during pretrial matters for this case, the trial judgewas attempting to balance the level of security required with Fields' right to a fair trial. Thisbalancing is illustrated by the modification of the order for restraints. The trial judge hadinitially ordered Fields to have his legs shackled and one of his arms immobilized. However, before the trial began, the trial judge modified the order for restraints so thatFields was allowed the use of both of his arms, thus reducing the possibility of prejudicingthe jury and allowing Fields to assist counsel during his trial. Thus, the record supports thetrial judge's order requiring Fields to wear shackles, and we conclude that this did not denyhim a fair trial.

Fields' second issue regarding the security measures taken involves the presence ofuniformed guards in the courtroom. It is "a common courtroom practice" to have uniformedguards present. People v. Friesland, 130 Ill. App. 3d 595, 598, 474 N.E.2d 865, 867 (1985),aff'd, 109 Ill. 2d 369, 488 N.E.2d 261 (1985). In fact, the United States Supreme Court hasstated, "Our society has become inured to the presence of armed guards in most publicplaces," and the Court has noted that human experience suggests that a case-by-caseapproach is appropriate to determine whether the presence of guards is prejudicial. Holbrook v. Flynn, 475 U.S. 560, 569, 89 L. Ed. 2d 525, 106 S. Ct. 1340, 1346 (1986). Additionally, although it may be preferable for guards to wear civilian clothes rather thanuniforms, it is not reversible error merely because the guards wear uniforms. Friesland, 130Ill. App. 3d at 598, 474 N.E.2d at 867.

The defense presents three arguments focusing on this issue. First, Fields argues thatthe number of uniformed guards located in the courtroom during the trial denied him a fairtrial. Next, Fields suggests that the trial judge did not consider him to be much of a threatto be violent, as evidenced by the fact that the trial judge had already reduced the restraintsFields was required to wear. Last, Fields argues that having numerous guards present whilealready requiring him to be shackled was unnecessary and therefore prejudicial.

The record shows that the trial judge had an open dialogue with both partiesregarding both the presence and the number of uniformed guards. He stated specifically thathe was attempting to balance the rights of the defendant to a fair trial with the level ofprotection he felt necessary. The defendant does not cite in his brief, nor have we been ableto find in our research, any case that states an absolute limit on the number of uniformedguards. Cases that analyze this issue range from one guard seated at the counsel table (seePeople v. Glasco, 66 Ill. App. 2d 445, 214 N.E.2d 495 (1966)), to a South Carolina casewhere the trial judge allowed 36 law enforcement officers (two-thirds in uniform) to belocated in and around the courtroom (see State v. Gore, 257 S.C. 330, 185 S.E.2d 826(1971)). In support of his second argument, Fields cites to State v. Borman, a Missouri case,which held that it was an abuse of discretion for the trial court to permit the defendant to behandcuffed and shackled and guarded by six or seven uniformed guards during the trial. State v. Borman, 529 S.W.2d 192 (Mo. App. 1975). We can distinguish Fields' situationfrom that case, however, based on the fact that the defendant in Borman wore handcuffs thatwere visible to the jury, while the trial judge here did not find handcuffs to be necessary. See Borman, 529 S.W.2d at 193. Above all else, the trial judge has discretion in makingdecisions regarding the safety and security of the courtroom. We will not subvert thatdiscretion absent good reason. Therefore, we conclude that Fields was not denied a fair trialdue to the presence of numerous uniformed guards in the courtroom.

Lastly, we address the defendant's argument regarding the prosecutor's statementsduring closing argument and rebuttal. Generally, counsel is given great latitude inpresenting his or her closing argument to the jury. Black v. Laggren, 313 Ill. App. 3d 39,44, 728 N.E.2d 1208, 1213 (2000).

During the opening statement and the closing argument, the defense counselcharacterized the incident at issue as being so insubstantial that it should not result incriminal liability. The prosecutor then made several statements during closing argument thatnot only attacked this theory of defense but also personally attacked the defense counsel. At issue were the following statements: (1) "[T]o suggest that no crime was committed, alittle incident as was made mention of in the defendant's opening statement *** is insultingto your intelligence," (2) [The defense's theory] simply does not make any legal or logicalsense whatsoever," and (3) "How dare this attorney try to insult your intelligence and yoursense of right and wrong by suggesting this defendant has a right to act in the way he clearlyhas." A closing argument must be clearly improper or prejudicial in order to warrant areversal of the judgment. Black, 313 Ill. App. 3d at 44, 728 N.E.2d at 1213. The trial courtfound the comments made by the prosecutor to be improper, but it held that they wereharmless error because they did not prejudice the jury. We agree and conclude that thesecomments did not deny Fields a fair trial.

For the aforementioned reasons, we conclude that no further discovery was required,because the defendant failed to make a prima facie showing of selective and vindictiveprosecution, and that the defendant was not denied a fair trial because of the type of securitymeasures taken in the courtroom or by the prosecutor's comments during closing argument. We therefore affirm the defendant's convictions and sentences for aggravated battery of acorrections officer.

Affirmed.

HOPKINS and KUEHN, JJ., concur.