PRESIDING JUSTICE HOPKINS delivered the opinion of the court:

Jack Gandy (defendant) appeals from the dismissal of his second petition forpostconviction relief pursuant to the Post-Conviction Hearing Act (Act) (725 ILCS 5/122-1et seq. (West 2000)). On appeal, defendant, relying on Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S.466, 147 L. Ed. 2d 435, 120 S. Ct. 2348 (2000), contends that his extended-term sentenceof 50 years' imprisonment must be vacated because the extended-term sentencing statuteviolates due process by subjecting a defendant to increased penalties without providingnotice or the right to a jury determination of the qualifying facts.

In 1988, under section 9-1(a)(1) of the Criminal Code of 1961 (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1981,ch. 38, par. 9-1(a)(1)), defendant was charged in Marion County with the June 1983 murderof Clarence Eugene Wilson. On November 15, 1989, following a bench trial, defendant wasfound guilty of murder, and on December 22, 1989, he was sentenced to an extended-termsentence of 50 years' imprisonment in the Department of Corrections.

On August 31, 1990, defendant filed a pro se postconviction petition. The petitionalleged violations of his rights via perjured testimony, ineffective assistance of trial counsel,and newly discovered evidence. The State filed a motion to dismiss defendant's petition,stating as grounds therein that the allegations of the petition did not constitute anysubstantial denial of defendant's constitutional rights which had denied defendant a fair trialor had substantially affected the outcome of the trial, as required under the Act. The circuitcourt granted the State's motion to dismiss, following a hearing held on November 30, 1990. On direct appeal to this court, we consolidated defendant's direct appeal from the judgmentand sentence imposed therein and defendant's appeal of the circuit court's order dismissinghis pro se postconviction petition. Concerning the direct appeal, defendant alleged that hehad been denied his constitutional right to confront witnesses when his trial counsel did notimpeach the State's main witness with a prior perjury conviction and that he had not beenproved guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Defendant also contended that the trial court haderred in finding that the offense had been accompanied by "brutal and heinous behaviorindicative of wanton cruelty" (see Ill. Rev. Stat. 1981, ch. 38, par. 1005-5-3.2(b)(2)). Thiscourt need not discuss the issues raised in his postconviction petition. This court affirmedthe judgment and order. People v. Gandy, 227 Ill. App. 3d 112, 591 N.E.2d 45 (1992).

In Apprendi, which was decided on June 26, 2000, the United States Supreme Court

held, "Other than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crimebeyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury[] and proved beyonda reasonable doubt." Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 490, 147 L. Ed. 2d at 455, 120 S. Ct. at 2362-63. In the case at bar, at the time of defendant's offense, June 1983, murder was punishable bya determinate prison sentence of not less than 20 years and not more than 40 years (Ill. Rev.Stat. 1981, ch. 38, par. 1005-8-1(a)(1)). If certain aggravating factors are found to bepresent, one of which is that if the felony was accompanied by exceptionally brutal orheinous behavior indicative of wanton cruelty (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1981, ch. 38, par. 1005-5-3.2(b)(2)), an extended prison term of not less than 40 years and not more than 80 years canbe imposed. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1981, ch. 38, par. 1005-8-2(a)(1). On May 8, 2003, the IllinoisSupreme Court in People v. De La Paz specifically found, "Apprendi does not applyretroactively to causes in which the direct appeal process had concluded at the time thatApprendi was decided." People v. De La Paz, No. 93208, slip op. at 1 (May 8, 2003). Inthe case at bar, the direct appeal process had concluded at the time Apprendi was decided. Defendant also complains that he had not been put on notice of the final factor used toimpose an extended term. In United States v. Cotton, 535 U.S. 625, 152 L. Ed. 2d 860, 122S. Ct. 1781 (2002), the United States Supreme Court held that an Apprendi violation wasnot plain error because there was " 'no basis for concluding that the error "seriouslyaffect[ed] the fairness, integrity[,] or public reputation of judicial proceedings." ' " Cotton,535 U.S. at 633, 152 L. Ed. 2d at 869, 122 S. Ct. at 1786 (quoting Johnson v. United States,520 U.S. 461, 470, 137 L. Ed. 2d 718, 729, 117 S. Ct. 1544, 1550 (1997)).

Defendant lastly contends that this court should reverse the circuit court's orderdismissing his postconviction petition, because the record does not show that postconvictioncounsel amended the pro se petition for an adequate presentation of defendant's claims.

On November 29, 2000, defendant filed his pro se second petition for postconvictionrelief, which alleged that his sentence violated Apprendi. On January 5, 2001, the courtappointed Michael McHaney to represent defendant. On January 9, 2001, McHaney filedan entry of appearance. On January 11, 2001, as a supplement to the order of January 5,2001, the court found that the petition of defendant was not patently frivolous or withoutmerit. On January 30, 2001, the State filed a motion to dismiss the petition. The motionalleged that the petition was untimely and that Apprendi should not be applied retroactively.

At a hearing on February 14, 2001, McHaney stated that he had briefly spoken withdefendant and that he was requesting additional time to review the record and to ascertainwhether or not any amendments needed to be made to the pro se petition. The court granteddefendant a 45-day extension to file an amended petition and ordered the State to file amotion to dismiss within 21 days of the filing of the amended petition.

On March 27, 2001, McHaney filed a motion for an extension of time to file anamended postconviction petition. In this motion, McHaney stated that he and a privateinvestigator interviewed defendant in prison on March 19, 2001. McHaney further statesin the motion, "During this meeting the Defendant raised numerous issues which requiremore investigation before counsel will be in a position to file any necessary amendments." The court granted the extension to July 20 and set May 16 as a date for a status hearing andpretrial.

On March 30, 2001, McHaney filed a petition for interim attorney fees andreimbursement for costs, which showed that McHaney had reviewed the pro se petition andthe State's motion to dismiss, had traveled to interview defendant in person, and hadresearched cases dealing with Apprendi. On April 18, 2001, the court granted the feepetition.

At a May16, 2001, hearing, McHaney informed the court of the status of a numberof postconviction proceedings in which he represented defendants. When this defendant'spostconviction proceeding was discussed, McHaney stated: "I will be filing an amendmentto Gandy. Gandy goes beyond Apprendi, Your Honor. His initial pro se petition dealt withApprendi, but it touched on other issues." The court asked McHaney if defendant's caseshould be separated from the other postconviction petitions that raised Apprendi claims, andMcHaney replied, "Gandy is much more lengthy and complex and goes much further beyondApprendi than any of these others." The State responded that it would file motions todismiss all of the petitions on the basis of untimeliness. The court ordered that anyamendments to the postconviction petition were to be filed within 28 days and that anyamendments to the motion to dismiss were to be filed 14 days after the amended petition wasfiled. Briefing or authority was to be filed by July 5, 2001.

On June 13, 2001, McHaney filed another motion for extension of time to file anamended postconviction petition. The motion alleged, "[A]fter further conversations withthe Defendant, counsel has learned that the Defendant has a substantial amount [sic] ofissues other than Apprendi."

On June 27, 2001, the State filed an amended motion to dismiss the petition. Themotion alleged that Apprendi constitutes a new rule of law and should not be appliedretroactively, that defendant's petition was not timely filed, that defendant is entitled to onlyone postconviction petition and this petition is his second, and that defendant was notsentenced beyond the statutory limits for murder.

On July 17, 2001, the court vacated the setting for July 18, 2001, and granteddefendant 28 days to respond to the State's motion to dismiss.

On January 2, 2002, the court granted the State's motion to dismiss. The court founddefendant's petition to be untimely and a successive petition and that this court's decision inPeople v. Rush, 322 Ill. App. 3d 1014, 757 N.E.2d 88 (2001), which held that Apprendi wasapplicable to timely filed postconviction petitions, was inapplicable to defendant's case.

It is well established that a defendant has no constitutional right to counsel inpostconviction proceedings. People v. Williams, 186 Ill. 2d 55, 60, 708 N.E.2d 1152, 1154(1999); Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551, 555, 95 L. Ed. 2d 539, 546, 107 S. Ct. 1990,1993 (1987). Counsel for indigent defendants who file pro se postconviction petitions thatare not dismissed at the first stage of postconviction proceedings is provided for by statute. 725 ILCS 5/122-4 (West 2002); see also 134 Ill. 2d R. 651(c). Rule 651(c) establishes thelevel of assistance appointed counsel must provide to postconviction petitioners. Rule651(c) provides in relevant part as follows:

"The record filed in [the circuit] court [in postconviction proceedings] shall containa showing, which may be made by the certificate of petitioner's attorney, that theattorney has consulted with petitioner either by mail or in person to ascertain hiscontentions of deprivation of constitutional right, has examined the record of theproceedings at the trial, and has made any amendments to the petitions filed pro sethat are necessary for an adequate presentation of petitioner's contentions." 134 Ill.2d R. 651(c).

Rule 651(c) does not require that defendants receive the same level of assistance of counselthat the United States Constitution guarantees to defendants at a trial, but it does requirecounsel to provide a " 'reasonable level of assistance' " in postconviction proceedings. (Emphasis omitted.) Williams, 186 Ill. 2d at 60, 708 N.E.2d at 1155 (quoting People v.Owens, 139 Ill. 2d 351, 364, 564 N.E.2d 1184, 1189 (1990)). The absence of a Rule 651(c)certificate is harmless only if the record shows that counsel met the requirements of the rule. People v. Edwards, 291 Ill. App. 3d 476, 487, 684 N.E.2d 802, 810 (1997). In the case atbar, 10 months elapsed between the time counsel asked for an extension of time to file anamended petition and the time the petition was dismissed without an amended petition beingfiled. The State argues that Rule 651 does not state that counsel is obligated to determineother contentions which could have been raised but were not raised in the pro se petition. In the case at bar, counsel determined that issues other than Apprendi were "touched" on inthe pro se petition. It then became counsel's duty to legally develop those issues, andcounsel's statements and motions indicate that there are valid issues. There is norequirement that postconviction counsel amend a defendant's pro se postconviction petition. People v. Turner, 187 Ill. 2d 406, 412, 719 N.E.2d 725, 729 (1999). Nevertheless, Rule651(c) plainly requires that appointed postconviction counsel make " 'any amendments tothe petitions filed pro se that are necessary for an adequate presentation of [defendant's]contentions.' " Turner, 187 Ill. 2d at 412, 719 N.E.2d at 729 (quoting 134 Ill. 2d R. 651(c)). The State further argues, "[T]here has been no showing that the petition could have beenamended to state [a] case upon which relief could be granted." The State's argument begsthe question because it is not a matter of record what transpired during McHaney'sconversations with defendant. Nearly half a year elapsed between the filing of the State'slast motion to dismiss and the dismissal of the pro se petition, but counsel did not file aresponse to the State's motion. Based upon the state of the record, this court concludes thatdefendant was denied a reasonable level of the assistance of counsel. The judgmentdismissing the second pro se petition is reversed, and this cause is remanded to the circuitcourt with directions that it allow defendant the opportunity to replead his secondpostconviction petition with the assistance of counsel. See Turner, 187 Ill. 2d at 417, 719N.E.2d at 731.

Reversed; cause remanded with directions.

KUEHN and CHAPMAN, JJ., concur.

Opinion Filed: June 26, 2003

Justices: Honorable Terrence J. Hopkins, P.J.

Honorable Clyde L. Kuehn, J., and

Honorable Melissa A. Chapman, J.,

Concur

Attorney Daniel M. Kirwan, Deputy Defender, Office of the State Appellate

for Defender, Fifth Judicial District, 730 East Illinois Highway 15, P.O.

Appellant Box 2430, Mt. Vernon, IL 62864

Attorneys Hon. James Creason, State's Attorney, Marion County Courthouse,

for P.O. Box 157, Salem, IL 62881; Norbert J. Goetten, Director, Stephen

Appellee E. Norris, Deputy Director, T. David Purcell, Staff Attorney, Office

of the State's Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor, 730 East Illinois Highway

15, P.O. Box 2249, Mt. Vernon, IL 62864