Rule 23 order filed
December 18, 2003;
Motion to publish granted
January 21, 2004.

JUSTICE DONOVAN delivered the opinion of the court:

Defendants Susan Gott and Clyde Gott were charged with one count of unlawfulmanufacture of a controlled substance that consisted of more than 400 grams but less than900 grams of methamphetamine in violation of section 401(a)(6.5)(C) of the IllinoisControlled Substances Act (Act) (720 ILCS 570/401(a)(6.5)(C) (West 2000)) and with asecond count of unlawful manufacture of a controlled substance that consisted of more than900 grams of a substance containing methamphetamine in violation of section 401(a)(6.5)(D)of the Act (720 ILCS 570/401(a)(6.5)(D) (West 2000)). Defendants moved to suppress thedrugs seized, arguing that they had been obtained during a warrantless search withoutprobable cause or exigent circumstances. The trial court granted defendants' motion. TheState now appeals the Fayette County circuit court's decison granting defendants' motion tosuppress. For the following reasons, we affirm.

On January 18, 2002, Dennis Ramsey, the owner of Okaw Valley Campground inFayette County, Illinois, rented a cabin to Susan Gott. The cabin is approximately 10 feetby 10 feet, with a window on each side of the cabin, a small window on the front of thecabin, a small porch, and its own parking area, fire pit, and grill. The grill is located a fewfeet from the front of the cabin door. Inside the cabin, there is a bed on one side and bunkbeds on the other side. The cabin does not have toilet facilities or running water. Thecheckout time of 11 a.m. was posted inside the cabin.

On January 19, 2002, sometime around 1 p.m., Mr. Ramsey noticed that the cabin wasstill occupied. Around 2 p.m., Mr. Ramsey saw that defendants' car was gone andapproached the cabin to see if it was still occupied. He knocked on the door, and Susan'shusband, Clyde, opened the door a "slit," exited, and quickly shut the door behind him. Clyde told Mr. Ramsey that he and Susan intended to stay and that Susan had gone to townto obtain money for the additional night. Mr. Ramsey instructed Clyde to put the money inthe night deposit box.

Growing suspicious because Susan and Clyde had not yet paid for the additional nightand their car was not there, Mr. Ramsey called the sheriff's department around 3 p.m. Deputy Gary Washburn responded to Mr. Ramsey's request for assistance. He walkedaround the cabin and knocked on the door. Deputy Washburn saw a plastic Wal-Mart bagwith a small pitcher in it on the porch of the cabin and a burnt blister pack in the grill. Onthe blister pack he could make out a part of the word "ephedrine." The grill was not warm,but there was also no snow on the blister pack. He also noticed an unusual chemical odor.

Mr. Ramsey asked Deputy Washburn to look in the cabin. Deputy Washburn hadreservations about doing this, so he contacted the State's Attorney, who instructed him notto accompany Mr. Ramsey on a search of the cabin and, instead, recommended surveillance.Deputy Washburn acknowledged that up to that point he knew he needed more informationbefore he could proceed further. Based on Deputy Washburn's suspicion of amethamphetamine lab, Deputy Washburn told Mr. Ramsey that although he could not searchthe cabin, Mr. Ramsey could. Deputy Washburn and Mr. Ramsey then had a discussionabout methamphetamine labs, and Deputy Washburn showed Mr. Ramsey law enforcementmaterials on the topic, complete with photos and descriptions of paraphernalia sometimesfound in locations where methamphetamine is being produced.

Mr. Ramsey entered the cabin while Deputy Washburn remained in the campgroundoffice. Mr. Ramsey returned and reported to Deputy Washburn that he had seen a handgunwith pellets next to it, a hunting knife, rock salt, drain opener, and a cooler and that he hadnoted a chemical odor. Mr. Ramsey agreed to allow the police to conduct surveillance fromhis property. Deputy Washburn left the campground at roughly 3 or 4 p.m. to prepare.

Deputy Washburn contacted Deputy Lay, Deputy Halleman, and Trooper Smith forassistance in investigating defendants' cabin. Around 6 p.m., Deputy Washburn and DeputyLay went to the campground and proceeded to conduct surveillance from a second-floorroom above the campground office with a view of the cabin. The officers noticed that therewas now a vehicle outside the cabin. Trooper Smith and Deputy Halleman waited at anearby truck stop for further directions.

Susan left the cabin sometime after 6 p.m. driving an older model Crown Victoria. Deputy Halleman followed Susan to a gas station and convenience store. He lost track ofher, but it was not because she was in any way attempting to elude him. Susan returnedaround 6:45 p.m., dropped something off in the night deposit box, and went into the cabin.

Susan left again around 7:30 p.m. Deputy Halleman followed her to a differentconvenience store. Again, she showed no sign of knowing that she had been followed. Shereturned to the cabin around 8 p.m. Shortly thereafter, Deputy Halleman and Trooper Smithdrove up to the cabin with their lights off. Deputy Washburn and Deputy Lay moved towithin 15 to 20 feet of the cabin to see what was being carried in and to detect any odor fromthe area. After 8 p.m., Deputy Washburn saw Clyde exit the cabin carrying a clear containerand dump clear liquid on the ground. Immediately after he dumped the liquid, there was astrong smell of ether. Based on his experience in several methamphetamine labinvestigations, Deputy Washburn was aware of the smell of ether. Deputy Washburntestified that ether is used in the manufacture of methamphetamine. Around this same time,Deputy Lay and Deputy Halleman proceeded to the front door while Trooper Smith andDeputy Washburn waited on the side of the cabin by one of the windows. Deputy Washburnand Trooper Smith could see into the cabin through an opening in the blinds.

Deputy Lay and Deputy Halleman knocked on the door but did not identifythemselves as police. As soon as they knocked, Trooper Smith and Deputy Washburn sawClyde pick up a glass container, set it inside a thermos, and put a lid on the thermos. Theyalso saw Susan take a container and a bottle and put them under some clothing. From hisposition, Trooper Smith could not see the shelf where Mr. Ramsey had said the gun waslocated. Neither defendant made any effort to answer the door. Instead, Clyde turned offthe lights. Until Clyde turned off the lights, Trooper Smith had not seen anyone pouranything on the floor or burn or destroy anything. The officers moved to the front door,knocked, and announced "Sheriff's Department," and all four police officers went throughthe door. Trooper Smith handcuffed Susan, took her outside, and put her in his squad car. Trooper Smith then read Susan her Miranda rights (Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 16L. Ed. 2d 694, 86 S. Ct. 1602 (1966)) and had no further conversation with her. DeputyWashburn went to the front porch and read Clyde his Miranda rights and asked for hisconsent to search the cabin. After Clyde talked to Susan, he signed a written consent tosearch the cabin. Upon searching, the officers found, among other things, a pellet handgun,ether cans, lithium battery packs, tubing, a hot glue gun, muriatic acid, drain opener, knives,a needle on a plate, and a substance that was later determined to be methamphetamine.

On January 22, 2002, defendants Clyde and Susan were charged with unlawfulmanufacture of a controlled substance that consisted of more than 400 grams but less than900 grams of methamphetamine in violation of section 401(a)(6.5)(C) of the Act (720 ILCS570/401(a)(6.5)(C) (West 2000)). On March 22, 2002, defendants were charged with asecond count of unlawful manufacture of a controlled substance that consisted of more than900 grams of a substance containing methamphetamine in violation of section 401(a)(6.5)(D) of the Act (720 ILCS 570/401(a)(6.5)(D) (West 2000)). Defendants filedmotions to quash the arrest and suppress the evidence obtained. The court held hearings onJune 21 and 26, 2002.

On July 29, 2002, the trial court issued its order granting the motion to suppress. Thecourt barred all the evidence seized from the cabin and the subsequent statements as "fruitsof the poisonous tree." The trial judge, in his detailed, written, mixed findings of law andfact, drew the following conclusions: Deputy Washburn could rightfully approach the cabinat Mr. Ramsey's request and knock on the door; Deputy Washburn was authorized to observethe Wal-Mart bag outside the defendants' cabin and detect the unknown chemical odor; theblister packs were properly discovered since there had been no effort to protect them fromview and they had been discarded; Mr. Ramsey's search was undertaken as an agent of thepolice since the police gave Mr. Ramsey a training brochure on what items someone wouldfind on the premises being used for the manufacture of methamphetamine, and, as a result,Mr. Ramsey's search of the cabin was unconstitutional; the court concluded that the officerssmelling ether from 25 feet away was neither an exigent circumstance nor probable cause tosearch the cabin; and even if the pellet gun observed by Mr. Ramsey was considered, it didnot create exigent circumstances. Finally, the trial judge concluded that since this was a one-room cabin, without a telephone or plumbing, and with only one road leading in or out, if thepouring of the clear liquid believed to be ether was sufficient to create probable cause, therewas no reason why the officers could not have waited outside the cabin while a warrant wasobtained.

The State filed a motion to reconsider on August 16, 2002, and on August 26, 2002,the trial court denied the motion. Defendants then moved to dismiss the charges. On August28, 2002, the State filed its notice of appeal and a certificate of impairment.

When arguing a motion to suppress, the defendant has the burden of proving that thesearch and seizure were unlawful. 725 ILCS 5/114-12(b) (West 2000). The function of thetrial court at the hearing on the motion to suppress is to determine the credibility of thewitnesses, the weight to be given their testimony, and the inferences to be drawn from theevidence. People v. Garcia, 296 Ill. App. 3d 769, 776, 695 N.E.2d 1292, 1297 (1998). "Generally, a trial court's ruling on a motion to suppress will not be disturbed unless it ismanifestly erroneous. This deferential standard applies when the disposition of thesuppression motion turns on factual determinations and credibility assessments. Where,however, no dispute exists as to the facts or witness credibility, the trial court's ruling willbe reviewed de novo." People v. Bunch, 207 Ill. 2d 7, 13, 796 N.E.2d 1024, 1028 (2003);see also People v. Anthony, 198 Ill. 2d 194, 200-01, 761 N.E.2d 1188, 1191 (2001). In thepresent case, what occurred is largely undisputed. Accordingly, we conduct a de novoreview under the officers' version of the events.

The fourth amendment to the United States Constitution protects people fromunreasonable searches and seizures of their persons, houses, papers, and effects. U.S.Const., amend. IV. This protection extends to protect people from an unreasonable searchof their hotel rooms. People v. Eichelberger, 91 Ill. 2d 359, 364-65, 438 N.E.2d 140, 142-43(1982) (residents of a hotel are accorded the same constitutional protections againstunreasonable searches as those enjoyed by residents of private homes in Illinois) (citingPeople v. Bankhead, 27 Ill. 2d 18, 23, 187 N.E.2d 705, 707 (1963), and People v. Wilson,86 Ill. App. 3d 637, 640, 408 N.E.2d 988, 991 (1980)). The fourth amendment seeks tobalance the interests of citizens in being free from unreasonable interferences with privacyand the interests of fair law enforcement in protecting the community. People v. Abt, 269Ill. App. 3d 831, 836, 646 N.E.2d 1341, 1345 (1995). " 'Absent exigent circumstances, thatthreshold may not reasonably be crossed without a warrant.' " People v. Hilgenberg, 223 Ill.App. 3d 286, 293-94, 585 N.E.2d 180, 186 (1991) (quoting Payton v. New York, 445 U.S.573, 590, 63 L. Ed. 2d 639, 653, 100 S. Ct. 1371, 1382 (1980)).

The State bears the burden of demonstrating that exigent circumstances authorized thewarrantless entry by the police. People v. McNeal, 175 Ill. 2d 335, 345, 677 N.E.2d 841,846 (1997). The cornerstone of an exigency analysis is whether the police officers actedreasonably. People v. Williams, 161 Ill. 2d 1, 26, 641 N.E.2d 296, 306 (1994). Each caseis evaluated based upon the totality of the circumstances known to the officers at the timeof the warrantless entry. People v. Yates, 98 Ill. 2d 502, 515, 456 N.E.2d 1369, 1376 (1983). The State must present evidence of the specific facts available to the police officers thatwould warrant a person of reasonable caution to believe that the action taken wasappropriate. People v. Washington, 269 Ill. App. 3d 862, 866, 646 N.E.2d 1268, 1271-72(1995).

Although each case must be decided on its own facts, the Illinois Supreme Court hasrecognized the following factors as relevant to a determination of exigency in circumstancesinvolving a warrantless entry into a private residence to effectuate an arrest: (1) whether thecrime under investigation was recently committed, (2) whether there was any deliberate orunjustified delay by the police during which time a warrant could have been obtained, (3)whether a grave offense was involved, particularly a crime of violence, (4) whether there wasreasonable belief that the suspect was armed, (5) whether the police officers were acting ona clear showing of probable cause, (6) whether there was a likelihood that the suspect wouldescape if he was not swiftly apprehended, (7) whether there was strong reason to believe thesuspect was in the premises, and (8) whether the police entry was made peaceably, albeitnonconsensually. People v. Williams, 161 Ill. 2d 1, 25-26, 641 N.E.2d 296, 306 (1994)(citing People v. Foskey, 136 Ill. 2d 66, 75, 554 N.E.2d 192, 197 (1990), People v. White,117 Ill. 2d 194, 216-17, 512 N.E.2d 677, 685 (1987), People v. Yates, 98 Ill. 2d 502, 515,456 N.E.2d 1369, 1376 (1983), and People v. Abney, 81 Ill. 2d 159, 169-74, 407 N.E.2d 543,547-50 (1980)). This list of factors is not exhaustive of facts that may constitute exigentcircumstances. Williams, 161 Ill. 2d at 26, 641 N.E.2d at 306.

In support of the first factor, the State argues that an offense was committed in theofficers' presence. In Illinois, the commission of an offense in the presence of an officermilitates in favor of a finding of exigent circumstances. Eichelberger, 91 Ill. 2d at 369, 438N.E.2d at 144-45 (exigent circumstances to make a warrantless arrest in a suspect's homeexist where an offense is committed in the presence of an officer). The testimony showedthat when the officers looked into the window of defendants' cabin, they saw defendantsmoving things around inside. Specifically, Trooper Smith testified:

"ATTORNEY: What happened after the officers started knocking on the door?

TROOPER SMITH: As soon as the officers on the front knocked on the door,I saw a male subject walk over to a glass container-I'm not for sure how big it was,it was at least as big as that pitcher on your desk-pick it up and set it inside of ayellow-like thermos water cooler and put the lid on top of it.

ATTORNEY: What did he do with that?

TROOPER SMITH: What do you mean? With the glass container? He setit inside and put the lid on it so you couldn't see the glass container again.

ATTORNEY: How many people did you see in this cabin?

TROOPER SMITH: Then I saw a female in the cabin walk over to-it was acontainer-I'm not for sure what it was or what was in it, and there was a bottle andI'm not for sure what was in it either. She took it to the window area where I was andtried to put it underneath some clothing and stuff, but I pulled my head back becauseI didn't want to be seen."

Similarly, Deputy Washburn testified to the following:

"ATTORNEY: From your position you saw people inside, right?

DEPUTY WASHBURN: Yes.

ATTORNEY: You were peering through this crack?

DEPUTY WASHBURN: Correct.

ATTORNEY: You could see people moving things around?

DEPUTY WASHBURN: Correct.

ATTORNEY: Nobody was burning anything?

DEPUTY WASHBURN: No.

ATTORNEY: Destroying anything?

DEPUTY WASHBURN: I didn't know at that point.

ATTORNEY: You saw them simply moving things, right?

DEPUTY WASHBURN: I saw a container being placed inside anothercontainer, items being jostled around and hid."

There was no testimony that the officers witnessed defendants in the process ofmanufacturing methamphetamine. The observations of the officers through the slits in theblinds of the cabin windows do not support the contention that the active manufacture ofmethamphetamine was taking place in their presence.

Regarding the second factor, the State contends that there was no deliberate orunjustified delay by the officers during which time they could have obtained a searchwarrant. The State recognizes that Mr. Ramsey was acting as a police agent when he enteredthe cabin earlier in the day and observed items normally used in the production ofmethamphetamine. See People v. Barber, 94 Ill. App. 3d 813, 815, 419 N.E.2d 71, 72-73(1981) (landlord acted as an agent of the police in entering an apartment at their request). As a result, the information Mr. Ramsey acquired was in violation of the constitution andcould not be used in determining probable cause. Consequently, the State is correct inconcluding that if probable cause existed, it would have to be based on Deputy Washburn'searlier observations, the smell of ether, and the information obtained by peering into thecabin immediately prior to the forced entry. The delay in obtaining a warrant in this casewould not preclude a finding of exigent circumstances.

Regarding the third factor, we note that when evidence of the serious potential hazardsconnected with the manufacture of methamphetamine are presented to the trial court, somecourts have upheld limited warrantless searches by police officers who had probable causeto believe they had uncovered an ongoing methamphetamine manufacturing operation. SeeUnited States v. Wilson, 865 F.2d 215, 217 (9th Cir. 1989); United States v. Echegoyen, 799F.2d 1271, 1278-79 (9th Cir. 1986); United States v. Brock, 667 F.2d 1311, 1318 (9th Cir.1982); United States v. Erb, 596 F.2d 412, 418 (10th Cir. 1979). However, in each of thesecases, evidence was presented that the officers were aware of the dangers ofmethamphetamine production. See Wilson, 865 F.2d at 216-17 (officer knew that ether ishighly explosive and flammable); Echegoyen, 799 F.2d at 1274 (officers were aware thathome was a fire hazard); Brock, 667 F.2d at 1314-15 (the smell of cookingmethamphetamine and the officer's observation of the defendant choking on fumes supportedthe officer's fears of a potential explosion and justified a warrantless entry into the mobilehome); Erb, 596 F.2d at 417-18 (the strong smell of ether emanating from the house for morethan six hours, reliable tips from an informant, the officer's fear that the defendant might tryto destroy evidence, and the fact a methamphetamine lab could cause danger to the publicestablished exigent circumstances allowing a warrantless entry of dwelling); see also UnitedSates v. Rhiger, 315 F.3d 1283 (10th Cir. 2003) (the record provided ample evidenceregarding the inherent volatility of a methamphetamine lab and of the agents' reasonablebelief of its existence in the residence); United States v. Walsh, 299 F.3d 729, 733 (8th Cir.2002) (evidence was presented of the officers' knowledge of a substantial risk of a fire or theexplosion of a methamphetamine lab); United States v. Spinelli, 848 F.2d 26, 29-30 (2d Cir.1988) (evidence was presented that the officer was aware of the highly volatile nature of themanufacture of methamphetamine). But see United States v. Jackson, 199 F. Supp. 2d 1081,1090 (D. Kan. 2002) (despite the officers' detection of a strong chemical odor and suspicionsthat methamphetamine was being produced in the residence, the government failed to provethe existence of exigent circumstances because no testimony was entered into evidenceregarding the officer's knowledge of the danger of an explosion or the volatility ofmethamphetamine); United States v. Warner, 843 F.2d 401, 404 (9th Cir. 1988) (there wasevidence of the officer's knowledge of the potential explosive nature of stored chemicals, butthe lack of a perception of an immediate emergency did not justify a warrantless entry);United States v. Bonitz, 826 F.2d 954, 957 (10th Cir. 1987) (the officers' alleged fearsregarding the explosive nature of undisturbed gun powder and ammunition was notsufficiently supported by the record to establish exigent circumstances).

In the case at bar, there was no evidence presented by the State that the officers wereaware of a current dangerous condition or that there was in fact a dangerous condition as aresult of an active methamphetamine lab. We do not find that this element of a justificationof exigent circumstances was shown by the evidence presented.

Regarding the fourth factor, as a result of the search by Mr. Ramsey the officers wereaware there was a handgun in the cabin with pellets next to it. While the constitutionalproscription against unreasonable searches and seizures does not normally apply to a searchor seizure carried out by private individuals, it will apply if they are acting as agents orinstruments of the State. See Barber, 94 Ill. App. 3d at 815, 419 N.E.2d at 72-73. AfterDeputy Washburn informed Mr. Ramsey that he believed there was a methamphetamine labin the cabin, he showed him a color photo pamphlet used in officer training. The act ofDeputy Washburn informing Mr. Ramsey of the particular items that might be found at alocation where methamphetamine was being produced effectively made Mr. Ramsey an agentof the State. Mr. Ramsey entered the cabin as an agent of the police, not to accomplish somenormal housekeeping function. As we observed earlier, the items that were found by Mr.Ramsey were the products of an illegal search.

Even if we allowed the argument that Mr. Ramsey, as the owner of the cabin, wouldhave been allowed to enter the property and would have been able to identify the gun thatwas sitting in plain view on the shelf, a gun is not sufficient on its own to create exigentcircumstances. No evidence was presented at the hearing from which it could be inferredthat defendants "exhibited some sign of a violent character." Abney, 81 Ill. 2d at 171, 407N.E.2d at 548. Therefore, the trial court did not err in finding that the presence of a pelletgun in the cabin did not create an exigent circumstance sufficient to authorize a warrantlessentry into the cabin.

The fifth factor is whether the officers were acting on a clear showing of probablecause. In order to determine whether probable cause exists to effectuate a warrantlesssearch, a court must look to the totality of the circumstances and make a practical,commonsense decision whether there was a fair probability that an offense was committedand that the defendant committed it. People v. Tisler, 103 Ill. 2d 226, 237, 469 N.E.2d 147,153 (1984) (citing People v. Wright, 41 Ill. 2d 170, 174, 242 N.E.2d 180, 183 (1968)). Indetermining whether the officer had probable cause, the officer's factual knowledge, basedon prior law enforcement experience, is relevant. Tisler, 103 Ill. 2d at 237, 469 N.E.2d at153 (citing People v. Smith, 95 Ill. 2d 412, 419-20, 447 N.E.2d 809, 812 (1983)). In thiscase, the combination of Deputy Washburn finding the blister pack, Clyde's suspiciousbehavior, Susan's trips to the convenience store, the strong odor of ether, the officers'knowledge that ether is involved in the manufacture of methamphetamine, and defendantsrearranging and hiding items after the officers knocked on the door were the basis for theofficers' determination that probable cause existed. The critical factor would appear to havebeen the odor of ether.

Courts across the nation have held that the detection of an odor associated withmethamphetamine, by itself or with other evidence, is sufficient to establish probable causeto support the issuance of a search warrant. See, e.g., State v. Bowles, 28 Kan. App. 2d 488,18 P.3d 250 (2001) (information supplied to the police by local store owners that the residenthad bought equipment that might be used for manufacturing methamphetamine and theevidence from two police officers that they had detected the strong odor of ether emanatingfrom the resident's home); United States v. Cervantes, 219 F.3d 882 (9th Cir. 2000) (a policeofficer and an investigator detected a strong chemical odor outside the residence and believedit was consistent with methamphetamine production, and the same police officer andinvestigator observed a large hydraulic press in the apartment and a stainless steel pot on thekitchen floor, which contained a brown chunky substance that they believed wasmethamphetamine, and this was sufficient to create probable cause); United States v.Mueller, 902 F.2d 336 (5th Cir. 1990) (a police officer's detection of the odor ofmethamphetamine, emanating from a private residence, was sufficient evidence to establishprobable cause for the issuance of a search warrant for the private residence, as the policeofficer was trained and knowledgeable with regard to the odor of the chemicals used in themanufacture of methamphetamine), denial of postconviction relief vacated on other grounds,168 F.3d 186 (5th Cir. 1999); Chavez v. State, 769 S.W.2d 284 (Tex. App. 1989)(information in the search warrant affidavit, which outlined the landlord's detection of anodor associated with a methamphetamine lab, and the police captain's detection of the odorof phenyl acetone emanating from the house established probable cause for the issuance ofthe search warrant); United States v. Sweeney, 688 F.2d 1131 (7th Cir. 1982) (the agent'sdetection of an odor, which he attributed to the manufacture of methamphetamine, emanatingfrom an open door of a private residence was sufficient to establish probable cause for theissuance of a search warrant for the private residence, as the agent was experienced in thedetection of the distinctive odors associated with methamphetamine production); see alsoAnnotation, Odor Detectable by Unaided Person as Furnishing Probable Cause for SearchWarrant, 106 A.L.R. 5th 397 (2003); People v. Franklin, 159 Ill. App. 3d 923, 929-30, 512N.E.2d 1318, 1321 (1987) (sufficient probable cause was established regarding a PCP lab,based on the agent's detection of the odor of ether emanating from the defendant's apartment,in addition to the agent's knowledge that ether is used in the drying stage of PCP, thedefendant's purchase of various chemicals used in the manufacture of PCP, and the discoveryof a major precursor of PCP in the alley behind the defendant's apartment).

In the case at bar, the information available to the officers prior to their forced entryinto the cabin may well have justified the issuance of a search warrant by a judge of thecircuit court, but we do not find that the trial judge erred in determining that there was nota clear showing of probable cause to justify a finding of exigent circumstances. Thisdistinction at first glance may appear to be slight, but it is consistent with the overridingprinciple that "the 'physical entry of the home is the chief evil against which the wording ofFourth Amendment is directed.' " Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 585-86, 63 L. Ed. 2d639, 100 S. Ct. 1371, 1379-80 (1980) (quoting United States v. United States District Court,407 U.S. 297, 313, 32 L. Ed. 2d 752, 92 S. Ct. 2125, 2134 (1972)).

The sixth factor is the likelihood that defendants would have escaped if they were notswiftly apprehended. Here, the cabin had only one door and three windows, which thepolice were watching. If defendants would have attempted to leave, the police would haveseen them and would have been able to stop them. Additionally, at least until the officersknocked on the door of the cabin, defendants were unaware that the police were conductingsurveillance of the cabin. Thus, they would not have been concerned with leaving as soonas they could. See, e.g., People v. Pierini, 278 Ill. App. 3d 974, 978-79, 664 N.E.2d 140,144 (1996) (since the officers' presence was known to defendant and his wife, had theofficers delayed in order to obtain a warrant, the drugs may have been destroyed). This isalso not a case where the police could be concerned that defendants would dispose of thedrugs. This cabin did not have a sink or a toilet. There was no evidence presented regardinghow defendants could have disposed of the various bottles, syringes, or othermethamphetamine-manufacturing paraphernalia or the methamphetamine itself that wasfound in the cabin. Nevertheless, we note that even if it was possible to dispose of the drugs,the Illinois Supreme Court has expressly declined to establish a bright-line rule that the easydisposability of drugs per se creates exigent circumstances when drugs are the subject of theinvestigation. People v. Ouellette, 78 Ill. 2d 511, 519, 401 N.E.2d 507, 510 (1979).

Finally, this is not a case where the entry was peaceful. See, e.g., People v. Garcia,296 Ill. App. 3d 769, 779, 695 N.E.2d 1292, 1299 (1998) (a peaceful entry since the doorto the house was open and unlocked); Pierini, 278 Ill. App. 3d at 979, 664 N.E.2d at 144(although not consensual, the officers' brief incursion into the defendant's apartment to seizeone of the cannabis cigarettes was peaceable and minimal). The events at issue in this caseoccurred on January 18, at 8:30 p.m. The Okaw Valley Campground was nearly empty. After the police knocked, defendants turned off their lights. The cabin door was then kickedin, and four police officers entered the small cabin, in darkness, with weapons drawn, andfound defendants lying in their beds. Based on this evidence, we find that the trial judge didnot err in determining that this method of entry was not peaceful.

Looking at the totality of the circumstances, we conclude that the trial judge's findingthat there was insufficient evidence presented from which it could be determined that exigentcircumstances existed which would have allowed the police to make a warrantless entry onto defendants' property was correct.

The State's final contention on appeal is that if this case lacks sufficient exigentcircumstances to justify the warrantless entry, then Clyde's consent to search within a fewminutes of the forced entry into the cabin and following his arrest justifies the admission ofthe evidence seized. We disagree. Clyde's consent is ineffective because it was" 'inextricably bound up with [the State's] illegal conduct and [could not] be segregatedtherefrom.' " People v. Freeman, 121 Ill. App. 3d 1023, 1032, 460 N.E.2d 125, 131 (1984)(quoting People v. Kelly, 76 Ill. App. 3d 80, 86-87, 394 N.E.2d 739, 744 (1979)); see alsoPeople v. Raibley, 338 Ill. App. 3d 692, 704, 788 N.E.2d 1221, 1232 (2003).

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the circuit court of Fayette County.

Affirmed.

KUEHN, J., concurs.

JUSTICE WELCH, dissenting.

I respectfully dissent. I agree, as indeed do the parties, with the basic facts espousedin the majority opinion. I do not, however, agree with the conclusions the majority drawsfrom those facts, nor with the conclusions of the trial court. I begin by making a distinctionof law the majority fails to make: the eight-factor exigent circumstances test used by themajority to justify the trial court's ruling was intended by the Illinois Supreme Court to applyto situations where the crime for which the warrantless arrest was made was not committedin the presence of the arresting officers and where time had passed between the commissionof the crime and the arrest. Indeed, every case the majority cites in support of the eight-factor test involved such a situation. People v. Williams, 161 Ill. 2d 1, 15-17, 28, 641 N.E.2d296, 301-02, 306 (1994) (the offense was not committed in the presence of the police, andthe defendant was arrested 27 hours later); People v. Foskey, 136 Ill. 2d 66, 72-73, 554N.E.2d 192, 196 (1990) (the offenses were not committed in the presence of the police, andthe defendant was arrested approximately one month after the offenses began); People v.White, 117 Ill. 2d 194, 202, 206, 512 N.E.2d 677, 678, 680 (1987) (the offense was notcommitted in the presence of the police, and the defendant was arrested 11 days later);People v. Yates, 98 Ill. 2d 502, 511-12, 456 N.E.2d 1369, 1374 (1983) (the offense was notcommitted in the presence of the police, and the defendant was arrested four days later);People v. Abney, 81 Ill. 2d 159, 162, 407 N.E.2d 543, 544 (1980) (the offense was notcommitted in the presence of the police, and the attempt to arrest the defendant was madeat the defendant's home, not the location of the offense, one and a half hours later).

The Illinois Supreme Court has devised a different exigent circumstances test forsituations where the crime was committed in the presence of the arresting officer and thearrest immediately followed. In People v. Eichelberger, 91 Ill. 2d 359, 369, 438 N.E.2d 140,144 (1982), the Illinois Supreme Court held that a police officer may arrest a person withouta warrant when the officer has reasonable grounds to believe that the person the officer seeksto arrest is committing or has committed a felony in the presence of the officer. The courtadded, "An offense is committed in an officer's presence when knowledge of the commissionof an offense is acquired through any of his senses." Eichelberger, 91 Ill. 2d at 369, 438N.E.2d at 144. The court went on to hold that where the offense was committed in thepresence of an officer, that officer could enter the premises where the offense occurredwithout a warrant for the purpose of making a warrantless arrest. Eichelberger, 91 Ill. 2dat 369, 438 N.E.2d at 145. The premises in question was a hotel room rented by thedefendant. Eichelberger, 91 Ill. 2d at 369, 438 N.E.2d at 145. The Illinois Supreme Courtspecifically found that the commission of a felony in the presence of a police officer was inand of itself an exigent circumstance and that no additional exigent circumstances wererequired, stating, "The fact that the officers reasonably believed that a felony was beingcommitted in their presence demanded prompt police action and constituted an exigentcircumstance which justified the warrantless entry into the hotel room and the arrest." Eichelberger, 91 Ill. 2d at 369, 438 N.E.2d at 145. I note that subsequent to its publication,Eichelberger has never been overruled or even criticized by the Illinois Supreme Court. Inote as well that although in Eichelberger the entry into the rented room in question was notforced, the Eichelberger court did not restrict its holding to situations where there has beenno forced entry. Eichelberger, 91 Ill. 2d at 370, 438 N.E.2d at 145. Because in the case atbar the police had a reasonable belief that a felony was being committed in their presence,the exigent circumstances test of Eichelberger, rather than the eight-factor test relied uponby the majority, should be applied to this case. When that is done, it is clear that the arrestof the Gotts was proper.

When Deputy Washburn lawfully approached the Gotts' cabin at the request of Mr.Ramsey, Deputy Washburn discovered a burned blister pack and noticed an unusualchemical odor. As the majority notes, the trial court specifically found that DeputyWashburn had been authorized to make each of these discoveries. On the basis of DeputyWashburn's prior experience with illegal meth labs, he grew suspicious and Mr. Ramsey'ssearch of the cabin followed. Surveillance of the cabin was instituted, and sometime after8 p.m. officers observed Clyde Gott exit the cabin and pour a clear liquid onto the ground. According to the sworn testimony of four police officers-two of whom witnessed the pouringand two of whom arrived moments later-the strong smell of ether immediately permeatedthe surrounding area. The defendants contend that there are legitimate uses for ether, andindeed there are, but common sense should inform this court that people using ether forlegitimate purposes generally use it in aerosol form and certainly do not, as a general rule,go outside on cold winter nights to pour containers of liquid that reek of ether onto theground. The defendant, the trial court, and the majority have not posited a legitimate use ofether that would have led to such a remarkable sequence of events. To the contrary, anypolice officer at all familiar with the manufacture of methamphetamine could and almostcertainly would, when Clyde Gott's actions are coupled with Deputy Washburn's earlierlawful discoveries, entertain a reasonable belief that the manufacture of methamphetamine,a felony, was occurring within the cabin. The constitution does not require police officersto abandon experience and common sense.

Accordingly, as soon as the officers recognized the odor of ether emanating from thearea where Clyde Gott dumped the clear liquid, they had the right under Eichelberger tomake a warrantless arrest of the occupants of the cabin. By the time all four officers hadconfirmed the presence of the odor, however, Clyde Gott had returned to the inside of thecabin. Under Eichelberger, to effect their lawful warrantless arrest the officers had the rightto enter the cabin as well. Because the officers had been advised that both a hunting knifeand a handgun might be present in the 10-foot by 10-foot cabin-and recall that the trial courtcorrectly found that the officers had the right to treat the "apparent" firearm as an actualdeadly weapon until such item was conclusively found to be otherwise-the officersproceeded with caution, forcing their way into the cabin only when their attempts topeacefully engage the Gotts were ignored. I believe that under Eichelberger, the officerswere within their rights to enter the cabin in the manner in which they did. Accordingly, thearrest of the Gotts was proper. Because it was obtained pursuant to this lawful arrest, theconsent obtained from the Gotts, minutes after they were arrested, to search the cabin wasproper as well. Under these circumstances, I believe that the evidence obtained from thatlegal, consensual search was not tainted, regardless of whether evidence obtained as theresult of Mr. Ramsey's earlier, improper search of the cabin would have been tainted. Thisis particularly so when one considers the fact that Susan Gott had made two trips to townsince the first search had been conducted, a fact that renders suspect the proposition thatevidence seized in the second search was necessarily identical or even remotely similar tothat which would have been seized as the result of the first search.

Likewise, although it may be argued that absent the evidence found in the first search,the police would not have ordered the surveillance of the cabin-and that, of course, withoutsurveillance the officers never would have seen Clyde Gott disperse the clear liquid thatreeked of ether-I do not believe that is necessarily true. Rather, I believe that even if Mr.Ramsey had reported that he had found nothing suspicious in his search of the cabin, DeputyWashburn, on the basis of the burned blister pack and the unusual chemical odor, would havebeen justified in setting up surveillance and on the basis of his previous experience withillegal meth labs in all likelihood would have done so. Accordingly, the surveillance itselfwas not a poisonous product of Mr. Ramsey's search of the cabin; rather, it was the result ofDeputy Washburn's earlier, completely lawful discovery of a burned blister pack and anunusual chemical odor. Thus, even if one discards Mr. Ramsey's search and the fruitsthereof entirely, the officers were still justified in conducting the surveillance of the cabinand in making the arrests they made.

For the foregoing reasons, I would reverse the decision of the trial court suppressingthe evidence and would remand the cause for the Gotts to stand trial for the crimes they arealleged to have committed. Unless and until the Illinois Supreme Court determines thatEichelberger is no longer good law, I believe we are required to follow it. Because themajority chooses to do otherwise, I respectfully dissent.