JUSTICE CHAPMAN delivered the opinion of the court:

The State charged the defendant, William E. Grove, with driving while his licensewas revoked (625 ILCS 5/6-303(d) (West 2000)), after a routine traffic stop for apparentlydriving a car without a valid registration. The defendant filed a motion to suppress theevidence, arguing that the police officer exceeded the permissible scope of the traffic stopby checking the defendant's license after discovering that the defendant's car registration wasvalid. The trial court granted the defendant's motion to suppress. The State appealspursuant to Illinois Supreme Court Rule 604(a)(1) (188 Ill. 2d R. 604(a)(1)), arguing thatthe officer acted properly because checking a driver's license is standard procedure duringa routine traffic stop. We reverse the trial court's ruling.

On February 3, 2001, at approximately 5:15 a.m., officer Jayson Murbarger observedthe defendant's car. The registration tag was obscured by dust and dirt, so Officer Murbargercould not read it. To determine whether the defendant's registration was valid, OfficerMurbarger checked the defendant's license plate number through a computer. While doingso, he followed the defendant's car. He estimated that he followed the defendant forapproximately seven blocks. During this time, the defendant committed no traffic violations. The computer report indicated that defendant's registration had expired in November 1999and that the license plate was registered to a car other than the car the defendant was driving. As a result of this information, Officer Murbarger stopped the defendant.

Officer Murbarger told the defendant the reason for the stop and asked him for hisdriver's license, registration, and proof of insurance. The defendant told the officer that hedid have a valid registration for the car and gave him the requested documentation. OfficerMurbarger took the documents back to his patrol car, where he looked at them and checkedthe defendant's driver's license number through the computer. Although the officer was notcertain in which order he had looked at the documents, he unequivocally testified that he hadrequested all three at the same time. Upon inspecting the registration card, OfficerMurbarger determined that it was valid for the car that the defendant was driving. At somepoint, he inspected the sticker on the defendant's plate and determined that it was valid aswell, although he does not recall exactly when this occurred. As a result of checking the defendant's driver's license through the computer, Officer Murbarger discovered that it hadbeen revoked. He issued the defendant a citation for that offense.

On February 9, 2001, the State charged the defendant by information with drivingwhile license revoked (625 ILCS 5/6-303(d) (West 2000)). On July 12, 2001, the defendantfiled a motion to suppress the evidence against him, contending that Officer Murbargerimpermissibly extended the investigatory stop beyond the time needed to discover that hisregistration was valid. The court held a hearing on September 19, 2001, at which time itgranted the defendant's motion to suppress. The State filed a motion to reconsider, whichthe court denied on November 14, 2001. The State filed a notice of impairment the next dayand filed the instant appeal pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 604(a)(1) (188 Ill. 2d R.604(a)(1)) on December 11, 2001.

The State contends that the trial court erred in suppressing the evidence that thedefendant's license had been revoked. The defendant argues that the ruling was properbecause the trial court found that Officer Murbarger had determined that his registration wasvalid, thereby satisfying the purpose of the stop, prior to checking his license. The Stateargues that (1) it is unclear from the record exactly when Officer Murbarger determined thatthe registration sticker was valid and (2) even if he made this determination prior tochecking the license, an officer may properly run a computer check on a motorist's licenseas a routine part of a traffic stop. We agree with the State's second argument.

The fourth amendment protects citizens from unreasonable searches and seizures. U.S. Const., amend. IV. Routine traffic stops, such as the one at issue in the case at bar,constitute "seizures" within the meaning of the fourth amendment. People v. Gonzalez, 204Ill. 2d 220, 225, 789 N.E.2d 260, 264 (2003). Traffic stops are analyzed within theframework of Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20 L. Ed. 2d 889, 88 S. Ct. 1868 (1968). Terryrequires a two-part inquiry: (1) the stop must be justified at its inception and (2) it must bereasonably related in scope to the circumstances that justified the stop in the first place. Gonzalez, 204 Ill. 2d at 228, 789 N.E.2d at 266 (relying on Terry, 392 U.S. at 19-20, 20 L.Ed. 2d at 905, 88 S. Ct. at 1879). There is no dispute that the stop here at issue was justifiedat its inception. The only issue is whether Officer Murbarger exceeded the permissiblescope of the detention.

When a police officer sees a driver commit a traffic violation, he is justified indetaining the driver briefly. The officer may inquire about the circumstances of the observedviolation. People v. Cox, 202 Ill. 2d 462, 468, 782 N.E.2d 275, 279 (2002). Under mostcircumstances, the officer may also run a quick warrant check of the driver's license. Peoplev. Branch, 295 Ill. App. 3d 110, 113, 692 N.E.2d 398, 401 (1998). However, the detentionmust " 'last no longer than is necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop.' " Cox, 202 Ill.2d at 467, 782 N.E.2d at 279 (quoting Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 500, 75 L. Ed. 2d229, 238, 103 S. Ct. 1319, 1325 (1983) (plurality opinion)).

If the officer detains the driver for longer than necessary to effectuate the purpose ofthe stop, evidence obtained as a result must be excluded. See United States v. Green, 111F.3d 515, 520-21 (7th Cir. 1997) (discussing the application of the exclusionary rule in thecontext of a traffic stop). A motion to suppress evidence generally presents a mixedquestion of law and fact. Cox, 202 Ill. 2d at 465-66, 782 N.E.2d at 278. We will give thetrial court's factual findings great deference and will not set them aside unless they aremanifestly erroneous. People v. Koutsakis, 272 Ill. App. 3d 159, 162, 649 N.E.2d 605, 607(1995). However, we review the trial court's ultimate determination to deny or grant themotion de novo. Cox, 202 Ill. 2d at 466, 782 N.E.2d at 278.

The State appears to contend that the trial court erred in finding that OfficerMurbarger had determined that the defendant's registration was valid before checking hislicense through the computer. In fact, the State's argument suggests the trial court erred inaccepting Officer Murbarger's testimony that he confirmed the validity of the defendant'sregistration at all during the stop. We must reject this argument.

The State claims, "[T]he officer's confirmation of the validity of the registration issomewhat illusory, despite the officer's testimony, because at best[,] all the officer knew atthe outset, having run the plates and discovering that they were registered to a differentvehicle, was that there was a contradiction in his observations that he was entitled toinvestigate." (Emphasis in original.) See 625 ILCS 5/3-703 (West 2000) (prohibiting theimproper use of evidence of registration). In so arguing, the State asks us to assess theofficer's credibility and reject that portion of his testimony that was favorable to thedefendant. We decline to do so. Officer Murbarger testified that he had concluded that thediscrepancy between the results of the computer search and the valid registration that thedefendant showed him was likely the result of an error on the part of the Secretary of State. The trial judge was in a better position than we are to assess the witness's credibility. Koutsakis, 272 Ill. App. 3d at 162, 649 N.E.2d at 607 (citing People v. Melock, 149 Ill. 2d423, 432, 599 N.E.2d 941, 944 (1992)).

Likewise, we do not think the court's finding that Officer Murbarger had determinedthat the defendant's registration was valid prior to running a computer check on his licensewas against the manifest weight of the evidence. Specifically, the State argues, "The trialcourt chose to credit the sequence found in the officer's report because it was writtencontemporaneously with the traffic stop, even though Murbarger refused to confirm that hisreport was necessarily a precise chronological recitation of his actions." We find no error. The officer testified that he could not recall the exact order in which he inspected thedocuments that the defendant had handed him. Defense counsel confronted him with hisreport of the incident, which first indicated that the registration card was valid and thennoted that Officer Murbarger checked the defendant's license number. The report itself wasnot admitted into evidence and is not a part of the record on appeal. Thus, we do not knowthe exact wording. However, defense counsel asked Officer Murbarger if his report said thathe had checked to see if the registration was valid first, to which the officer replied,"Correct." He also admitted that the report had been written contemporaneously with thestop and was accurate. When asked by the prosecutor if he could tell the court "whether ornot this is an exact chronological report of what [he] did in exact chronological order," hereplied that he could not. This does not amount to a statement that the admittedly accuratereport was written in anything other than chronological order. Moreover, the conclusion thatthe report was an accurate, chronological representation of events was supported by othertestimony. Specifically, Officer Murbarger testified: "Once I was in my patrol vehicle, I ranhis driver's license through dispatch, and they gave me a response back that he was revoked. I looked at his other information while I was waiting for the response. Which I knew he didhave a valid registration card, and possibly [it] was a problem with the [Secretary of State]. I mean, I don't know anything about that." (Emphasis added.) We conclude that theevidence supports the trial court's findings that Officer Murbarger had determined that thedefendant's registration was valid and that he had done so prior to checking the defendant'sdriver's license.

The State contends, however, that Officer Murbarger was justified in checking thedefendant's license even after determining that the registration was valid because (1) the factthat the registration sticker was obscured by dust and dirt was itself a violation of the IllinoisVehicle Code (625 ILCS 5/3-413(b) (West 2000) (requiring, among other things, thatregistration stickers be "clearly visible" at all times)), which could have provided anindependent justification for the stop, and (2) Officer Murbarger requested all threedocuments simultaneously and checked the license as a routine procedure pursuant to atraffic stop that the defendant concedes was valid at its inception. Because we agree withthe State's second contention, we need not address the argument that the condition of thesticker itself would justify continuing the stop.

The defendant cites People v. Arteaga, 274 Ill. App. 3d 781, 655 N.E.2d 290 (1995),in support of his contention that Officer Murbarger exceeded the permissible scope of thestop by checking the validity of his documents on the computer. Although Arteaga isfactually similar to the case at bar, we find it distinguishable. There, as here, an officer sawa car with no visible registration. He pulled the driver over. Arteaga, 274 Ill. App. 3d at781, 655 N.E.2d at 290. As he approached the car on foot, he saw a valid temporaryregistration card inside the car's rear window. He had been unable to see the temporaryregistration because it was dark and the window was tinted. Arteaga, 274 Ill. App. 3d at782, 655 N.E.2d at 290. The officer nevertheless requested the driver's license, checked itthrough the computer, and discovered that it had been revoked. Arteaga, 274 Ill. App. 3dat 782, 655 N.E.2d at 290-91. The Third District affirmed the trial court's order grantingArteaga's motion to suppress, reasoning that the officer had exceeded the "underlyingjustification for the initial stop," by detaining the defendant to run a computer check of hislicense after he had established that the car was validly registered. Arteaga, 274 Ill. App.3d at 783, 655 N.E.2d at 291-92; see also United States v. McSwain, 29 F.3d 558, 561 (10thCir. 1994) (once the state trooper who stopped a vehicle only for the purpose of determiningthe validity of its temporary registration sticker discovered the sticker was valid, the furtherdetention of the driver was impermissible).

The State argues, and we agree, that Arteaga is distinguishable because the officerthere satisfied the purpose of the stop before he even approached the driver. In the instantcase, by contrast, Officer Murbarger could not determine that the defendant's registrationcard was valid without looking at the card and questioning the defendant about it. Inessence, the difference is that Officer Murbarger had to conduct an investigation once hemade the stop, while the officer in Arteaga did not.

This distinction is significant because the touchstone of fourth amendment analysisis reasonableness. United States v. Holt, 264 F.3d 1215, 1220 (10th Cir. 2001). As theIllinois Supreme Court recently stated, striking "the proper balance between thegovernment's interest in effective law enforcement and the individual's interest in being freefrom arbitrary governmental intrusions *** lies at the core of the concept of 'reasonableness.'" Gonzalez, 204 Ill. 2d at 233, 789 N.E.2d at 268. In the instant case, the law enforcementpurpose of requesting to see a valid driver's license cannot be served without a computercheck. As Officer Murbarger testified, the only way to determine the validity of a driver'slicense is to run a computer check on it. By contrast, the impact such a check has on acitizen's right to privacy is insubstantial. A motorist who is pulled over for an investigatorytraffic stop may reasonably expect to be asked for a driver's license and proof of registrationand insurance. Likewise, the motorist can expect that the officer will check the validity ofthese documents on a computer. Holt, 264 F.3d at 1220. Thus, both Illinois courts andfederal courts have repeatedly held that an officer may properly run a computer check on amotorist's driver's license, registration, or insurance card. Branch, 295 Ill. App. 3d at 113,692 N.E.2d at 401; Koutsakis, 272 Ill. App. 3d at 164, 649 N.E.2d at 609; People v.Clodfelder, 172 Ill. App. 3d 1030, 1035, 527 N.E.2d 632, 635 (1988); United States v.Shabazz, 993 F.2d 431, 437 (5th Cir. 1993); United States v. Guzman, 864 F.2d 1512, 1519(10th Cir. 1988).

The general authority to run a computer check on a driver's license is not absolute,however. In Clodfelder, for example, the court stated, "[R]etention *** of the personstopped long enough to make a warrant check has usually been permissible." Clodfelder,172 Ill. App. 3d at 1035, 527 N.E.2d at 635. The court then compared the facts before it tothose precedents holding that a computer check was valid before concluding that such acheck was reasonable under the circumstances of the case. Clodfelder, 172 Ill. App. 3d at1035, 527 N.E.2d at 635. Similarly, in Branch, the court stated that the United StatesSupreme Court has " 'consistently eschewed bright-line rules' " in the fourth amendmentcontext. Branch, 295 Ill. App. 3d at 113, 692 N.E.2d at 401 (quoting Ohio v. Robinette, 519U.S. 33, 39, 136 L. Ed. 2d 347, 354, 117 S. Ct. 417, 421 (1996)). Rather than adopt a perse rule of any kind, the court stated, "We adhere to the rule *** that permits an officer to runa warrant check if, under the circumstances, to do so is reasonable." Branch, 295 Ill. App.3d at 113, 692 N.E.2d at 401. While it may be unreasonable for a motorist to expect anofficer to run a computer check on his driver's license where, as in Arteaga, he realizes assoon as he stops the vehicle that there is no need for further investigation, it is entirelyreasonable to expect such a minor intrusion where the officer conducts even a cursoryinvestigation such as the one involved in the instant case. Because the license check isreasonable, it does not violate the fourth amendment, and the results should not have beensuppressed.

For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the order of the trial court suppressing theevidence and remand for a trial.

MAAG, J., concurs.

JUSTICE WELCH, specially concurring:

I write separately merely for clarification purposes. The traffic stop at issue in thiscase is not a "Terry stop." Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21-22, 20 L. Ed. 2d 889, 906, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 1880 (1968). This case concerns a lawful probable cause stop for a trafficviolation. 625 ILCS 5/3-413(b) (West 2000) (regarding the obstructed visibility of aregistration plate). However, Terry standards are still applied to determine thereasonableness of the continuing detention. See, e.g., People v. Gonzalez, 204 Ill. 2d 220,228, 789 N.E.2d 260, 266 (2003) ("Terry principles apply even in the presence of probablecause"). In other words, the reasonableness analysis does not apply to the initial stop butdoes apply to the continuing stop. In all other respects, I concur with the majority. 

Opinion Filed:  June 27, 2003

Justices: Honorable Melissa A. Chapman, J.

Honorable Gordon E. Maag, J., and

Honorable Thomas M. Welch, J.,

Concur

Attorneys Hon. Kevin Kakac, Wayne County State's Attorney, Wayne County Courthouse,

for Fairfield, IL 62837; Norbert J. Goetten, Director, Stephen E. Norris, Deputy

Appellant Director, Patrick D. Daly, Staff Attorney, Office of the State's Attorneys Appellate

Prosecutor, Route 15 East, P.O. Box 2249, Mt. Vernon, IL 62864

Attorney Alan C. Downen, 204 North Washington Street, McLeansboro, IL 62859

for

Appellee