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People v. Hale
State: Illinois
Court: 5th District Appellate
Docket No: 5-99-0700 Rel
Case Date: 12/14/2001

NOTICE
Decision filed 12/14/01.  The text of this decision may be changed or corrected prior to the filing of a Petition for Rehearing or the disposition of the same.


NO. 5-99-0700

IN THE

APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS

FIFTH DISTRICT

____________________________________________________________________________

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS,) Appeal from the
 ) Circuit Court of
Plaintiff-Appellee, ) Edwards County.
 )
v.                                                                                                                                 )
        ) No. 98-CF-13
 )
STEVE HALE, ) Honorable
 ) Terry H. Gamber,
Defendant-Appellant. ) Judge, presiding.

____________________________________________________________________________

JUSTICE KUEHN delivered the opinion of the court:

The evidence presented in this case told the chilling tale of an April Fools' Day killingspree that began in parts of rural Indiana and ended in the darkness of a cemetery on theoutskirts of Albion, Illinois. When Steve Hale and Chalk Wessell, a deadly duo, failed intheir effort to make David Chalcraft their fifth murder victim of the day, Chalcraft was ableto alert the authorities, focus an ongoing search, and enable the police to hunt them down.

The State was spared the task of bringing Wessell to justice. As the search partyclosed in, they heard a series of gunshots. When they found Wessell, he had a bullet lodgedin his brain. Three misfortunate souls in Indiana, and one in Illinois, expired from the samecondition that day.

Steve Hale faced a capital murder prosecution. This is the story that unfolded duringthe course of his trial.

The day was April 1, 1998. Hale and Wessell were in western Indiana when DavidChalcraft left his Albion, Illinois, farmhouse and drove the country mile to where his parentslived. David shared an evening meal with his mom and dad. It might easily have been theirlast supper together.

While David enjoyed his mother's home cooking, Hale and Wessell enjoyed a mixof methamphetamine and cocaine. Their drug-induced pleasure had no conscience. Theyroamed the Indiana territory just east of the Wabash River, leaving a trail of human remainsin their wake.

David completed his evening visit and prepared to return home. But as he exited thefront door, an old friend passed by. Larry Sams decided to stop and share a few momentswith his old buddy. It proved to be a fatal decision.

The spring foliage on the trees had not yet filled to a point that prevented David fromseeing his own house from his parents' front porch. As he and Larry stood there chatting,David noticed a mysterious green car enter his driveway. Its occupants seemed to beinspecting David's home, his barn, and the surrounding grounds. David decided toinvestigate. He asked Larry if he would mind coming along to lend support. Larry gladlyobliged. The two companions got into David's pickup truck and drove off to confront thetwo silhouettes in the green car that continued to troll the grounds next to David's house.

The green Chevrolet Camaro in David's driveway was the property of Pam Cook. But she was not in it. About the same time that David had started to dine with his folks, Pamhad attended to a knock at her front door. When she greeted the stranger standing outside,he answered with the barrel of a pistol and a demand for her Camaro. After she readilysurrendered her keys, she received an unkind bullet to the brain. Pam had died on her frontporch a few hours earlier.

David and Larry were about to meet her killers, who were looking to trade one stolenvehicle for another.

Pam Cook was the third Indiana resident to have the misfortune of running into Haleand Wessell that day. Jeremiah Miller and Marlin Knepp each had their brief encounter withthem. They, too, died from gunshot wounds to the head.

About 7 p.m. that same evening, while Indiana authorities continued to discover deadbodies, Hale and Wessell crossed the Wabash River into Illinois. They pulled into a Casey'sGeneral Store in Albion, Illinois. Wessell aroused the manager's suspicion by purchasingsuch sundry items as duct tape, leather gloves, a pair of pliers, and a set of screwdrivers. Thinking that Wessell was up to no good, the manager instructed a coworker to get thelicense number of the green Camaro resting on the parking lot. Wessell saw what washappening. He threw a large amount of money onto the counter, told the cashier to keep thechange, and rushed out of the store and into the car. He drove away in a hasty fashion.

The encounter was reported to the Albion police, who traced the car to the reportedmurder of Pam Cook in Indiana. Illinois State Police officers were summoned to the Albionarea, where a massive manhunt got under way.

Hale and Wessell, worried that the store manager would report their license numberto the police, decided to ditch Pam Cook's Camaro. They drove into the countryside insearch of a different vehicle. Their search led them up David Chalcraft's driveway. Havingdiscovered that Chalcraft's farm offered no vehicle to steal, Hale and Wessell decided toleave. As they drove down the long and narrow driveway, intent on finding another rideelsewhere, their search for another vehicle ended. David and Larry arrived in David'spickup truck.

The pickup and Camaro converged to a stop, five feet apart and squarely facing eachother. There was nowhere for either vehicle to go. The two vehicles met at a point wherethe driveway rested atop a steep embankment, effectively blocking both vehicles fromfurther movement.

Hale and Wessell had precisely what they wanted, a vehicle to replace the one thatlaw enforcement officers would now be looking for. Their method of vehicular hijackingspelled imminent danger for David and Larry.

It was dark. David left his truck running and his headlights on as he exited hispickup. The Camaro's headlights were off, enabling David to see the two occupants inside. David approached the driver, intent on finding out his purpose for being there. He wasabout to find out, without inquiry. Wessell sat in the driver's seat armed and ready for thekill. The driver's door opened.

As David leaned forward to ask Hale and Wessell about their presence on his farm,Wessell thrust his weapon in the direction of David's head. David flinched from what hethought was an effort to hit him. Wessell shot him at point-blank range. Because of hisreaction, David was spared a bullet to the head. The bullet passed through his neck instead. Fortunately, Wessell, now experienced at the effect of point-blank head shots, did not knowthat he had missed his target. Moreover, his attention immediately turned to Larry Sams.

As David spun to the ground, he saw Larry in front of the pickup. He saw Halestanding in front of Larry. David started to fall down the embankment. The last thing thathe saw was Hale shooting his old friend "almost right between the eyes."

David laid motionless at the bottom of the bank. Wessell decided to ensure David'sfate, firing another shot at him. As the bullet slammed into the ground next to David, he hadthe presence of mind to remain still. Immediately thereafter, he could hear Hale and Wessellwalking toward Larry. He heard a barrage of gunfire from two different weapons. WhatDavid heard was Hale and Wessell planting a host of bullets into Larry's body.(1) David couldhear Larry gasping for air. Larry's lungs were filling with blood from a chest wound. Davidcontinued to listen as an old friend took his dying breath.

Next, David heard either Hale or Wessell get into the Camaro and back it up in thedirection of the house. The other assailant got into the pickup. The truck was driven towardDavid's house as well. David seized the opportunity to find Larry. When he realized thatLarry was beyond help, he stayed in the darkness and circled through a field to his barn,where he kept a loaded shotgun. When he got to the barn, he saw that his truck was sittingempty, with the right door ajar. The Camaro was again moving slowly down the lane in thearea that David had just vacated. Hale and Wessell were attempting to assure themselvesof his demise. David armed himself and got into his truck. The Camaro was backing up inhis direction. Shotgun in hand, he started the pickup and drove toward Hale and Wessellfor a second encounter. Hale and Wessell might have stayed, finished off David, andobtained a replacement vehicle. However, David Chalcraft's survival and grit, along withthe barrel of a shotgun hanging out of the window, must have unnerved them. Rather thanengage in a duel in order to retake the pickup, Hale and Wessell ran. Apparently, they hadno stomach for gunplay unless their prey was helpless and unarmed.

David did not give chase. He drove to his parents' house and called the sheriff. Hespent the next two days in the hospital.

After David's report, the authorities closed in quickly. Spearheaded by a helicopterwith a searchlight, the police mounted a full-scale search of the area. They located theCamaro, abandoned several miles away in a cemetery. Officers on the ground heard a seriesof gunshots. They found Wessell dead, with a gun held in each hand. The gun in Wessell'sright hand fired a bullet later removed from his head. The police found Hale in short order. He was unarmed and appeared to be in a state of bewilderment. He was asked, but couldnot answer, how Wessell had died.

The aforementioned was the story that the State's evidence told. In this case, we mustdecide whether it was fair for the State to tell all of its particulars. The jury heard Hale'stape-recorded statement, which included his version of those crimes committed in Indiana,as well as the crimes for which he stood trial.

A death-qualified jury heard the evidence presented and found Hale guilty of first-degree murder, aggravated battery with a firearm, armed violence, attempted murder, andaggravated vehicular hijacking. A sentencing hearing ensued. The jury found, beyond areasonable doubt, that Larry Sams' murder qualified Hale for the death penalty. The Statehad proved to the jury's satisfaction that the death occurred during an aggravated vehicularhijacking. Thereafter, the jury considered evidence in aggravation and mitigation and votedto spare Hale's life. The determination of appropriate punishment passed to Judge Gamber. He found that the murder of Larry Sams was accompanied by brutal and heinous behaviorindicative of wanton cruelty, and based upon that finding, he sentenced Hale to spend therest of his life in prison. Judge Gamber tacked on 30-year consecutive prison terms asfurther punishment for each of Hale's other crimes. By so doing, he ensured that Hale couldneither satisfy the punishment imposed nor expiate his misdeeds, at least not in this lifetime.

On appeal, the State agrees that Hale's convictions for aggravated battery with afirearm and armed violence are based upon the same act that underlies his attempted murderconviction, and it agrees that those convictions must therefore be vacated. Hale asks us tooverturn all of his convictions and grant a new trial. Alternatively, he challenges theconstitutionality of his life sentence.

The primary question raised on appeal takes aim at the trial court's decision to allowthe submission of other-crimes evidence to the jury. Judge Gamber permitted the State tointroduce to the jury evidence of the car theft in Indiana, the three murders committed in thatState, and the circumstances of Chalk Wessell's death. Hale maintains that this evidence ofcriminality, extraneous to the charged conduct, infected his trial with a prejudice thatcompels the reversal of his convictions.

Here is his argument.

The jury should never have heard the portion of Hale's tape-recorded statement thatdetailed Hale's claim of how Wessell shot Pam Cook in order to steal her Camaro. Thisclaim of how and why another murder occurred lacked sufficient probative value tooutweigh its prejudicial effect. In addition, the jury should not have heard those portionsof Hale's recorded statement that blamed Wessell for Jeremiah Miller's death and explainedhow that murder led to the drive-by killing of Marlin Knepp. Hale's statements, about howMiller died and why that led to Knepp's untimely death, added nothing to the State's case. However, evidence of these two murders clearly conveyed the message that the Hale-Wessell twosome possessed a penchant for senseless bloodshed. Finally, the State shouldnot have suggested to the jury that Wessell may well have been another murder victim, witha head wound that was not self-inflicted. These various references to other crimescommitted on April 1, 1998, clearly prejudiced the chance of acquittal. They painted aportrait of a man willing to accompany, countenance, assist in, and engage in a killingrampage.

Hale was only on trial for the crimes alleged to have occurred in Illinois. Theevidence should have been confined to proof related to those allegations. The jury shouldhave decided guilt or innocence based upon evidence offered to establish what happened onDavid Chalcraft's driveway, without hearing evidence that established the accused's cold-blooded bent for murder.

Hale concludes his argument by quoting case law: "[A] defendant, no matter howreprehensible his crime or how black his history of past misdeeds, is entitled to have his guiltor innocence determined solely with reference to the crime with which he is charged." People v. Gregory, 22 Ill. 2d 601, 603, 177 N.E.2d 120, 122 (1961). He argues that he wasdeprived of this right when Judge Gamber allowed the State to introduce evidence of othercriminality that occurred in Indiana. The evidence of murders committed earlier in the day,and the suggestion of Wessell's murder, harbored a prejudice that far outweighed itsprobative value. Its prejudicial effect was compounded by the fact that proof of the othercrimes was totally unnecessary in order for the State to establish Hale's guilt for the murderof Larry Sams. The evidence of what happened in Illinois, without the proof of crimescommitted in Indiana, was sufficient to establish Hale's direct participation in, andaccountability for, Sams' death.

We certainly agree with the contention that the State had enough evidence to convictHale without proving the commission of three Indiana murders, the theft of an Indiana motorvehicle, and the circumstances of Wessell's death. We also agree that the admission of suchevidence diminished Hale's chances of acquittal, however slim those chances might havebeen. Notwithstanding, the State was entitled to introduce Hale's tape-recorded statement,a statement that detailed Hale's version of how and why all of the crimes, including thosecommitted in Indiana, occurred. The evidence of other crimes was integral to the State'scase, made necessary to sound decision-making by virtue of the defense that Hale tendered. Knowledge of the circumstances surrounding the earlier crimes allowed the jury to properlyweigh Hale's claim that he was a blameless follower, acting out of fear and a desire for self-preservation. It also allowed the jury to better understand why Hale and Wessell went tosuch lengths and were so intent to ensure that Chalcraft and Sams did not survive theirencounter.

It is well-settled that proof of other crimes, unrelated to those alleged in the charginginstrument, cannot be introduced merely to show a propensity for criminal wrongdoing. People v. Lindgren, 79 Ill. 2d 129, 137, 402 N.E.2d 238, 242 (1980). If the State has noother legitimate reason for proving extraneous criminality, we will not countenance the useof such proof. People v. Bobo, 278 Ill. App. 3d 130, 132, 662 N.E.2d 623, 625 (1996). Even where the State has good reason to introduce other-crimes evidence, we acknowledgethat an inference of criminal propensity will necessarily accompany its use and will requirethe trial judge to weigh the probative value of such evidence against its potential forproducing an improper prejudicial effect, before deciding whether to allow for its admission. People v. Heard, 187 Ill. 2d 36, 58, 718 N.E.2d 58, 71 (1999).

The determination of whether other-crimes evidence should be admitted is within thesound discretion of the trial judge and will not be disturbed by us in the absence of an abuseof that discretion. Heard, 187 Ill. 2d at 58, 718 N.E.2d at 71.

The State possessed overwhelming evidence of guilt. David Chalcraft's survivalprovided a credible eyewitness to Hale's criminality. It also led to Hale's prompt arrest,moments after the crimes were committed. He was arrested a short distance from anabandoned car that Chalcraft identified. His dead associate held two murder weapons,linked to Larry Sams' death through ballistics testing. The manager of the Casey's GeneralStore placed Hale in Pam Cook's car shortly before the murder. Finally, Hale provided histape-recorded account of the crimes.

The evidence stacked against Hale was practically insurmountable. Yet the State'scase, not unlike most cases, lacked perfection. Defense counsel was able to utilize portionsof Hale's statements to authorities, coupled with Hale's bewildered demeanor when arrested,to fashion an argument that Wessell was solely to blame for all of the criminality. Thedefense blamed Wessell and attempted to raise doubt about Hale's legal responsibility forWessell's conduct.

There was one significant dispute in the evidence. Although Chalcraft provedcredible in his account of what happened, there was a question raised over whether he reallysaw Hale shoot Larry Sams "almost right between the eyes" before he fell down theembankment. Although he testified that he did, his initial statements to the authorities didnot mention that fact. The defense questioned the absence of this information fromChalcraft's original statements and suggested that Wessell, rather than Hale, fired the initialhead shot that killed Larry Sams, a suggestion consistent with Hale's tape-recorded claim.

Defense counsel attempted to exploit the only possible weakness in the State's case. She did not have much to work with. The defense was not a very compelling one in lightof several facts that were virtually beyond dispute. Hale and Wessell were trying to ditchone stolen motor vehicle and commandeer another, in order to continue the day's journey inan undetected fashion. When they found that vehicle and the deadly encounter ensued, Haleshot Larry Sams. His admission that he did so was neither challenged nor denied. The onlyquestion raised by the defense was whether Hale willingly fired the first shot into Sams'head, according to Chalcraft's claim, or whether he fired a reluctant second of several shots,according to Hale's tape-recorded statement. Finally, once Hale and Wessell believedChalcraft and Sams to be mortally wounded, Hale continued to assist in the effort toexchange vehicles and in the patrol of Chalcraft's driveway to ensure that Chalcraft wasdead.

In sum, there was a very good case of Hale's accountability for Wessell's acts, evenif the jury had disregarded Chalcraft's testimony that he saw Hale fire the initial shot intoLarry Sams' head. Hale would contend that this is precisely why the other-crimes evidenceshould have been excised from the case. The State had so little need for it in light of theother evidence that the State possessed. Hence, its probative value was slight while itspotential for undue prejudice was great.

Hale thinks that the probative value of a piece of evidence is measured by how muchother evidence exists to establish guilt. In weighing the probative value of other-crimesevidence against its potential for prejudice, the inquiry does not turn upon the relativestrength or weakness of the State's case in its absence. The admissibility of other-crimesevidence is determined by whether it serves a legitimate purpose in the search for truth, eventhough an inevitable by-product of its admission is a showing of criminal propensity. In thiscase, Hale exploited a small weakness in the State's evidence, in an effort to raise doubt insome juror's mind about his complicity in Wessell's conduct. The State possessed highlyprobative evidence that could foreclose that possibility and remove all doubt about Hale'sguilt. The probative value of the other-crimes evidence to the question placed atissue-Hale's accountability for the acts Wessell committed in Illinois-was compelling. Under such a circumstance, it was within the trial judge's discretion to admit it, even thoughthe State's other evidence may well have carried the day without it.

A part of the State's case was Hale's tape-recorded statement. While it assisted theState in several ways, it also provided the basis for the defense. Hale's recorded statementblamed Wessell for everything that happened that day. He conveyed a subservient andreluctant role in the crimes, motivated out of a fear for his own safety rather than a genuinedesire to assist in the killings. Hale also claimed that Wessell fired the first shot that led toLarry Sams' death.

Given Hale's efforts to exculpate himself, the other-crimes evidence became relevantto the decision-making process in ways other than its capacity to demonstrate Hale'spropensity for committing murder.

Initially, we need to address Hale's complaint about the State's suggestion during thetrial that Hale murdered Wessell. The State did not charge Hale with Wessell's murder. Inaddition, the circumstances surrounding the discovery of Wessell's body were ambiguous. It seemed entirely possible that Wessell chose suicide in lieu of capture. Hence, Hale arguesthat it was error for the State to suggest that he had murdered Wessell. He maintains that thesuggestion was improper for two reasons: first, it interjected highly prejudicial other-crimesevidence into the case and, more importantly, it was based upon pure conjecture and lackedany probative value.

We think it within the bounds of propriety for the State to have suggested that Halemay have murdered Wessell. There is no reason to preclude the State from establishing howsuspects are apprehended. The State had every right to tell the jury about the manhunt andits results. This included the circumstances surrounding the discovery of Wessell's body. When those circumstances are examined, it was not unreasonable for the State to point outthat Hale may well have done in his cohort in crime and made it appear to be a suicide.

The State did not argue that Hale may have murdered Wessell merely to demonstratea penchant for killing. The possibility of Wessell's murder placed Hale's exculpatorystatements, and the defense derived from those statements, into better perspective. After all,Hale's effort to shed responsibility for Sams' death was contradicted by Chalcraft, andWessell's death made it impossible for anyone to contradict Hale's claims about his role inthe day's criminality.

The following facts allowed the State to argue, and the jury to reasonably infer, thatWessell had not committed suicide. As the search party closed in on Hale and Wessell, itheard a series of gunshots. Normally, someone intent on suicide does not fire a parade ofbullets in order to effect death. Nor does he use two guns. Moreover, when a suicide bulletenters the brain, it is usually accompanied by a loss of muscular control over the suicideweapon. Here, Wessell took a large-caliber bullet to the head at close range without losinga firm grip on two large pistols, one held in each hand. One of those pistols was the weaponHale had used against Sams a short time earlier. It was in Hale's possession when thegunplay on Chalcraft's driveway began. Hale offered no explanation of how a weapon thathe used throughout the day ended up in Wessell's possession. Based upon these peculiarcircumstances, all inconsistent with the notion of suicide, we think that it was fair for thejury to consider the possibility that Wessell's death was a murder made to look like a suicide.

The suggestion that Hale shot Wessell was clearly offered for a legitimate purpose. The reasonable inference that he shot his cohort was necessary and relevant to discountHale's defense. It belied Hale's claim of a relationship subservient to Wessell throughouttheir murderous trek across Indiana and Illinois.

The fact that the State had evidence to establish accountability without evidence ofthe three Indiana murders and the car theft did not preclude the State from using proof ofthose other crimes to cement the picture of Hale's ongoing countenance and aid in acontinuous course of criminal conduct. Proof of the other murders and the car theft wasessential to a proper understanding of why Hale's efforts to deny fault should be rejected. It blocked Hale's ability to argue that he was unaware of what was about to happen whenChalcraft approached Wessell. Hale's effort to create doubt about his role and motive in thecrimes committed on Chalcraft's driveway was certainly prejudiced by the evidence of hisparticipation in the earlier crimes. However, that prejudice flowed from how the earliercrimes conveyed an accurate picture of Hale's prior knowledge of Wessell, which enhancedthe inference that he knowingly and willingly joined Wessell in producing Larry Sams' deathand in the effort to hijack Chalcraft's pickup truck. The purpose of all evidence offered bythe prosecution is to prejudice the accused's chances of acquittal. While the other-crimesevidence demonstrated a penchant for killing and stealing, it had the kind of probative valuenecessary to outweigh that side effect. It had a legitimate purpose necessary to the State'scase. It provided significant evidence to refute the tendered claim of innocence and to dispelthe suggestion that Hale joined in the gunplay only out of shock and fear for his own safety.

Finally, proof of other crimes is admissible to establish motive. People v. Coleman,158 Ill. 2d 319, 333, 633 N.E.2d 654, 662 (1994). Here, each murder contained the motivefor a murder that ensued, and the evidence of the other murders enabled the jury tounderstand the full nature and extent of what motivated the shooting of Chalcraft and Sams. Again, the information came from Hale's tape-recorded statement. The statement constitutedhis claim of how and why the series of deaths occurred.

According to Hale, Wessell's murder of Jeremiah Miller was pointless. However, itmade the killing of Marlin Knepp necessary. According to Hale, Wessell insisted that Haleneeded to kill someone else in order to become an equal partner in crime. Hence, MarlinKnepp, an Amish farmer, riding an old tractor, was randomly targeted for death. The motivewas Wessell's need for a criminal cohort that he could trust. Hale shot Knepp in the headas Wessell drove by the tractor. According to Hale, Wessell feared that an observer whodrove by as the shooting occurred would report their car to the police. Wessell felt that theyneeded to abandon their car in order to avoid arrest. The need for new transportationprovided the reason Wessell shot and killed Pam Cook.

A full understanding of the motive behind the crimes committed against DavidChalcraft and Larry Sams required proof of what happened leading up to those crimes. David and Larry were not marked for death because of the motor vehicle they were in or thedesire of Hale and Wessell to possess it. The real motive was more complex than a meredesire to hijack a pickup truck.

A fresh ride was a necessary ingredient in the effort of Hale and Wessell to avoidarrest, prosecution, and punishment for a series of unimaginable crimes. Given the exposureto punishment that already existed in the event of arrest and prosecution, Hale and Wessellhad significant reason to obtain another vehicle and leave no eyewitnesses to report thehijacking. The real motive behind the murder of Larry Sams and the attempted murder ofDavid Chalcraft was continued freedom. The other murders and the car hijacking placedthe relentless effort to kill David and Larry into clear perspective. The jury was entitled toknow that Hale and Wessell needed the pickup in order to continue their deadly journey inan undetected fashion. It was also entitled to know that Chalcraft and Sams were shotbecause Hale and Wessell wanted to ensure that the trail of death left behind in Indianawould never lead to them.

Hale argues that the State is not required to prove motive (People v. Fickett, 204 Ill.App. 3d 220, 232, 562 N.E.2d 238, 245 (1990)) and that other-crimes evidence is prohibitedfrom use when motive is not in issue (People v. Davis, 248 Ill. App. 3d 886, 892, 617N.E.2d 1381, 1386 (1993)). While the State is not required to prove motive, it is certainlyentitled to do so when evidence of motive exists. The fact that the motive evolves from anongoing crime spree does not require its removal from the process of decision-making. Here, motive was not only relevant to a proper understanding of the reasons behind LarrySams' death, but it was also essential to a proper measure of Hale's complicity in that death. To the extent that Hale argues that motive was not in dispute, he fails to understand what thetrue motive was. The fact that Hale and Wessell wanted to commandeer a motor vehicle wasnot in dispute. However, as previously noted, the murder of Larry Sams had a muchstronger motive behind it-a motive that developed over the course of the day's criminality. Proof of what truly motivated the crimes committed on Chalcraft's driveway was animportant facet of the State's case. That motive was directly linked to other crimes and madeproof of those crimes admissible.

For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that Judge Gamber did not abuse hisdiscretion in allowing the State to tell the full story of what happened on April 1, 1998. TheIndiana murders and car theft and the circumstances of Wessell's death were a necessary partof the State's case, properly admitted to prove things other than Hale's propensity forcriminal wrongdoing.

Constitutionality of Sentence

The defendant challenges the constitutionality of his sentence. We are asked toexamine the statutory sentencing scheme employed in this case, in light of Apprendi v. NewJersey, 530 U.S. 466, 147 L. Ed. 2d 435, 120 S. Ct. 2348 (2000), a case in which the UnitedStates Supreme Court held a New Jersey hate-crime statute unconstitutional because itcommissioned judges to make a factual finding that enhanced their power to punish beyondthe maximum penalties prescribed for New Jersey criminal offenses.

The challenge is premised upon the fact that, in arriving at the life sentence that heimposed, Judge Gamber employed the statutory finding that this murder was accompaniedby brutal behavior indicative of wanton cruelty. It is argued that this finding empoweredhim to impose a sentence in excess of a 60-year prison term, the maximum sentence the lawallowed in the absence of the finding. See People v. Nitz, 319 Ill. App. 3d 949, 964, 747N.E.2d 38, 50-51 (2001).

This was a capital case where the jury determined, beyond a reasonable doubt, thatan aggravating factor existed and qualified the defendant's crime for a death sentence. Sucha finding also raised the maximum penalty to which Hale was exposed, in the event thatcapital punishment was not imposed. See 720 ILCS 5/9-1(b) (West 1998). Under thiscircumstance, "[t]he trial court's subsequent finding that the murder 'was accompanied byexceptionally brutal or heinous behavior indicative of wanton cruelty' did nothing to increasethe penalty that defendant was facing." People v. Ford, No. 90083, slip op. at 5 (October18, 2001). Since the life sentence was established as the maximum sentence in lieu of death,by those facts heard and decided by a jury, the sentence was imposed in accordance with theprocedural safeguards that accompany a jury trial. Simply put, the jury decided, beyond areasonable doubt, those facts that determined the maximum sentence the law would allow. See Nitz, 319 Ill. App. 3d at 969, 747 N.E.2d at 54. Therefore, there was no constitutionalviolation in the imposition of Hale's life sentence.

Judge Gamber's finding in arriving at the sentence that he deemed fit and proper forthis defendant is of no consequence. We can affirm the trial judge's judgment on anygrounds warranted by the record, regardless of the trial judge's stated reasons for the ruling. See People v. Lee, No. 5-99-0166, slip op. at 19 (October 26, 2001).

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm Steve Hale's convictions for first-degree murder,aggravated vehicular hijacking, and attempted murder, we vacate his convictions foraggravated battery with a firearm and armed violence, and we affirm his sentence to natural-life imprisonment for the crime of first-degree murder.

Affirmed as modified.

MAAG, P.J., and WELCH, J., concur.

1. The pathologist noted a straight-on wound to the eye, five wounds to the left side ofthe head, one wound to the front chest, and one wound to the back.

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