JUSTICE CHAPMAN delivered the opinion of the court:

In May 2001, a jury found the defendant, Courtney Hubbard, guilty of one count eachof attempt (first-degree murder) (720 ILCS 5/8-4(a), 9-1(a)(1) (West 2000)) and aggravatedcriminal sexual assault (720 ILCS 5/12-13(a)(1), 12-14(a)(8) (West 2000)). The defendantappeals, arguing that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress evidence againsthim that he claims was obtained as a result of an illegal stop. We affirm.

On May 17, 2000, at approximately 2:25 a.m., Madison County sheriff's deputiesWilliam Papa and Christopher Hoffestot were completing a traffic stop just north of theparking lot of the Piasa Pantry in Godfrey, Illinois, when they noticed the defendant driveinto the parking lot in a blue Chevrolet Caprice. The defendant parked the Caprice and wentinto the Piasa Pantry to buy some apple juice. Almost immediately after the officersobserved the defendant, they heard a radio transmission informing them that a shooting hadoccurred on Rocky Ford Road. The transmission did not include a physical description ofthe suspect or any other additional information. The Caprice had approached the PiasaPantry from the north on Boy Scout Lane, the direction of Rocky Ford Road. Althoughsomeone coming from Rocky Ford Road could have avoided passing the Piasa Pantry on BoyScout Lane by driving through one of the neighboring subdivisions, Boy Scout Lane was themain route from Rocky Ford Road out of Godfrey. There was very little traffic in thevicinity at that hour, and the defendant was the only motorist who had driven past the PiasaPantry on Boy Scout Lane in the 10 minutes the officers had been stopped there. Theofficers decided to stop the defendant.

When the defendant got back into the Caprice and began to drive away, Deputy Papastopped him while Deputy Hoffestot drove ahead to the home on Rocky Ford Road wherethe shooting had been reported. Deputy Papa explained to the defendant that he wasstopping him because a shooting had occurred and that he was going to take the defendantto the scene of the crime and would release him if he had nothing to do with the shooting. He patted the defendant down for weapons, handcuffed him, and locked him in the back ofthe squad car. Deputy Papa ran the license plates on the Caprice through the dispatchcomputer as he drove to Rocky Ford Road, and he discovered that the car was registered tothe victim.

Deputy Hoffestot arrived at the home on Rocky Ford Road from which the shootinghad been reported. There, he spoke with the victim, who told him that she had been shot and raped. She told him that her assailant was a black man with braided red hair, that he waswearing a red T-shirt and dark, baggy pants, and that he had driven away in her car. Thedefendant matched this description. When Deputy Papa arrived with the defendant, thedefendant was placed under arrest.

Later that morning, detectives Marc McLemore and Scott Sandidge questioned thedefendant at the Madison County sheriff's department. There, the defendant gave avideotaped statement in which he confessed to having shot the complaining witness threetimes and told the detectives he could lead them to the gun he had used. The detectivesdrove him to Boy Scout Lane and recovered the gun where the defendant said it would be. The defendant later gave another videotaped statement in which he admitted to having hadconsensual sexual relations with the victim.

On April 26, 2001, the defendant filed a motion to suppress his confessions, anyphysical evidence discovered "directly or indirectly" as a result of his detention, and thetestimony of any witnesses discovered as a result of his detention. At the May 1, 2001,suppression hearing, Deputies Papa and Hoffestot testified to the facts as stated above. Thetrial court denied the defendant's motion, stating that based on all the circumstances, theofficers had a reasonable, articulable suspicion to detain the defendant for investigatorypurposes.

At the trial, the complaining witness testified that she regularly purchased crackcocaine from the defendant, whom she knew only as "Redhead." On the night in question,she picked him up in her car, as was her usual practice. The defendant told her that he didnot have any crack but that he could get some from a friend of his if she would drive him tothe friend's house. She did so. However, the friend had no crack. She drove to a secondhouse, where the defendant's contact also had no crack. At this point, she testified, she wasready to give up and take the defendant back to where she had picked him up. However, thedefendant told her that his cousin would likely have some crack. The defendant directed herto turn down a dirt road. He told her to stop the car, showed her that he had a gun, anddemanded that she give him all of her cash, which she did. He then shot her in the knee andtold her to get out of the car. He also took her car keys. Outside the car, the defendant told her to take off her clothes and give them to him. He threw her clothes into the woods andthen raped her. Then he told her to get her clothes, which she did, but she was unable to findher shoes. The defendant told her to run. She replied that she was unable to run because hehad shot her in the leg. He then shot her again, causing her to fall to the ground. Shepretended to be dead and the defendant shot her again and drove away in her car. Medicalevidence showed that he shot her a total of five times. After the defendant drove away, shegot dressed and ran to the nearest house for help.

The complaining witness's testimony was corroborated by other witnesses. Richardand Melissa Gibson, whose house she ran to, both testified that they awoke to their doorbellringing "as fast as she could push the bell." Richard Gibson testified that just prior tohearing the doorbell, he thought he heard three gunshots. Because the Gibsons allow peopleto hunt on their property, he did not think this was unusual, however. Melissa Gibson notedthat it was 2:26 a.m. when they awoke to the doorbell ringing. As they approached the door,they could hear the complaining witness saying: "Help me[.] I've been shot[.] I've beenraped." Melissa Gibson called 9-1-1 while her husband answered the door. At first thecomplaining witness told Richard Gibson that she did not know who had shot her, but thenshe told him it was a black man with red hair.

Sara Dobrinich, who also regularly bought crack cocaine from the defendant, testifiedthat in May 2000 she was staying at the home of a friend in Alton. She saw the defendantselling crack on the street in front of her friend's house nearly every day. Although she knewthat his name was Courtney, she called him "Red," which was what everybody called him. Early on the morning of May 17, 2000, she saw the defendant get into a blue Chevroletdriven by a woman. Although Dobrinich did not know who the woman was, she had seenher pick up the defendant in her car to buy crack from him several times before that.

On May 10, 2001, the jury returned verdicts of guilty on both counts. On July 18,2001, the trial court sentenced the defendant to 28 years in prison for attempted first-degreemurder and 27 years for aggravated criminal sexual assault, to be served consecutively. Thisappeal followed.

A motion to suppress evidence presents a mixed question of fact and law. People v.Cox, 202 Ill. 2d 462, 465-66, 782 N.E.2d 275, 278 (2002). While we give great deferenceto the trial court's findings of fact, we review de novo its ultimate determination to grant ordeny the motion to suppress. Cox, 202 Ill. 2d at 466, 782 N.E.2d at 278.

At the hearing on his motion to suppress, the defendant argued that he had beensubjected to an illegal arrest. The trial court, however, found that his detention, prior to thetime he was formally arrested and charged, was a valid investigative detention, or Terry stop(Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20 L. Ed. 2d 889, 88 S. Ct. 1868 (1968)). Contrary to the State'sassertion, the defendant does not concede on appeal that the detention did not constitute anarrest (he states in his brief that a trial court "could find that these conditions constituted anarrest[] but could also find a mere Terry stop"). The defendant does concede that bytransporting him the short distance to the crime scene in handcuffs, the officers did notnecessarily turn a Terry stop into an arrest. See People v. Lippert, 89 Ill. 2d 171, 184, 432N.E.2d 605, 611 (1982). The defendant offers no argument to the contrary, arguing insteadthat even a Terry stop was not justified by the facts known to Deputies Hoffestot and Papaat the time they stopped him.

Police officers may briefly detain a citizen to investigate possible criminal activity ifthey have a reasonable and articulable suspicion to believe that the person detained hascommitted or is about to commit a crime. Terry, 392 U.S. 1, 20 L. Ed. 2d 889, 88 S. Ct.1868. This standard is impossible to define with precision. Ornelas v. United States, 517U.S. 690, 695, 134 L. Ed. 2d 911, 918, 116 S. Ct. 1657, 1661 (1996). However, the UnitedStates Supreme Court has held that the level of suspicion necessary to justify a detentionunder the Terry standard is "considerably less than proof of wrongdoing by a preponderanceof the evidence." United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7, 104 L. Ed. 2d 1, 10, 109 S. Ct.1581, 1585 (1989). In evaluating whether a detention is justified by a reasonable andarticulable suspicion, courts are to examine the totality of the circumstances known to theofficers involved (United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417, 66 L. Ed. 2d 621, 629, 101 S.Ct. 690, 695 (1981)) and consider the facts presented from a common sense perspective(Ornelas, 517 U.S. at 695, 134 L. Ed. 2d at 918, 116 S. Ct. at 1661). An investigativedetention may also be justified by rational inferences drawn from the known facts. Peoplev. Dyer, 141 Ill. App. 3d 326, 332, 490 N.E.2d 237, 241 (1986).

The defendant contends that the facts known to the officers in the instant case do notjustify his detention. As he points out, the officers did not have a description of the assailant at the time they stopped him. They knew only that the defendant's car was coming from thegeneral direction of a crime that had just been reported 1.4 miles away and that his was theonly car they had seen pass their location in 10 minutes. He argues that in other cases whereIllinois courts have found Terry stops to be justified by proximity to a crime scene, thedetaining officers either had a description of the suspect or witnessed the defendant dosomething suspicious, such as drive at a high rate of speed. In the instant case, by contrast,he contends, the only additional factor to attract the officers' attention was the fact that thedefendant was a black man in a predominantly white community late at night. For thereasons that follow, we conclude that the defendant's proximity in both time and place to the scene of a serious crime, under the circumstances presented, justified his detention.

The defendant does not expressly argue that he was a victim of racial profiling.Deputy Papa testified that he did not stop the defendant because he was black; however, healso testified that he thought it was unusual to see a black motorist in Godfrey, apredominantly white community. The fact that the area where a crime has occurred is notgenerally populated by people of the same race as a suspect can be a factor in establishinga reasonable and articulable suspicion where the race of the perpetrator is known. SeePeople v. Grice, 87 Ill. App. 3d 718, 723, 410 N.E.2d 209, 215 (1980); People v. Jodie, 79Ill. App. 3d 348, 356-57, 398 N.E.2d 595, 602 (1979). This fact, standing alone, however,cannot support an investigatory detention. See, e.g., Hughes v. State, 269 Ga. 258, 260, 497S.E.2d 790, 791-92 (1998) (police did not have grounds to detain a white man in apredominantly black neighborhood late at night even where the officer knew that most whiteswho visited the neighborhood were there to buy drugs). This is because in the formercontext, the racial difference is a factor in identifying the suspect. See Grice, 87 Ill. App. 3dat 723, 410 N.E.2d at 215. In the instant case, Deputies Papa and Hoffestot did not knowthe assailant's race at the time Deputy Papa stopped the defendant. The fact that DeputyPapa testified that it was unusual to see a black motorist in Godfrey does not necessarilymean his suspicions were heightened by the inference that, because of his race, the defendantmost likely did not live in the vicinity. Moreover, we find that the detention was reasonablebased solely on permissible considerations.

The defendant argues that the instant case is distinguishable from several factuallysimilar cases where suspicion was based, largely, on spatial and temporal proximity to thescene of a crime. In People v. Bujdud, 177 Ill. App. 3d 396, 402, 532 N.E.2d 370, 373(1988), for example, an officer knew that a shooting had occurred near the area in which heobserved the defendant, he observed the defendant driving away from the direction of theshooting at an excessive speed, and he saw no other cars on the road. Similarly, in Peoplev. Sanford, 34 Ill. App. 3d 990, 993, 341 N.E.2d 453, 455-56 (1976), officers on their wayto the scene of a robbery that had just been reported saw a car traveling at high speed fromthe direction where the robbery had occurred. It was "the only car or one of very few carson the street at that late hour." Sanford, 34 Ill. App. 3d at 993, 341 N.E.2d at 456. In Peoplev. Gunderson, 66 Ill. App. 3d 516, 518, 383 N.E.2d 1296, 1298 (1978), two officers saw avehicle traveling in a direction away from the scene of an armed robbery. The car was oneof only two the officers had seen in the vicinity of the crime, and one of the car's occupantsappeared to match the description of one of the robbers. Gunderson, 66 Ill. App. 3d at 518,383 N.E.2d at 1298.

The crux of the defendant's argument is that these precedents are not preciselyanalogous to the facts before us in the case at bar. We find this argument unpersuasivebecause whether a Terry stop is justified is an inherently fact-sensitive inquiry that must bedetermined on a case-by-case basis. There are no conclusive rules. People v. Smith, 208 Ill.App. 3d 44, 48, 566 N.E.2d 939, 942 (1991).

The defendant contends, however, that the instant case is more factually analogousto People v. F.J., 315 Ill. App. 3d 1053, 734 N.E.2d 1007 (2000), and People v. Ray, 327 Ill.App. 3d 904, 764 N.E.2d 173 (2002), than to the above-cited cases. In these cases cited bythe defendant, the reviewing courts found the investigative detentions at issue to beunsupported by a reasonable and articulable suspicion. We find F.J. distinguishable and Rayinapposite.

In F.J., as the defendant points out, the officers did not have information about hownear in time or place the crime had occurred. F.J., 315 Ill. App. 3d at 1057, 734 N.E.2d at1010. Thus, in that case the proximity to the scene of a recently reported crime was lacking,unlike the case at bar.

In Ray, the Effingham County sheriff's department placed signs along Interstate 57one-half mile before a rural exit. The signs stated that a drug enforcement checkpoint waslocated a half mile ahead on the interstate. Instead, however, the checkpoint was located atthe end of the exit ramp. Ray, 327 Ill. App. 3d at 906, 764 N.E.2d at 175. The exit wasselected for the checkpoint because it was a rural exit with no services. Ray, 327 Ill. App.3d at 908, 764 N.E.2d at 176. The officer who initiated the program believed that violatorswould "self-select themselves" by exiting to avoid the checkpoint they believed to be aheadon Interstate 57. Ray, 327 Ill. App. 3d at 908, 764 N.E.2d at 176-77. The officer furthertestified that the fact that a driver leaves the highway at an exit with no services " 'does lendsuspicion to him.' " Ray, 327 Ill. App. 3d at 908, 764 N.E.2d at 176. The purpose of thecheckpoint was to look for drivers transporting illegal drugs in their cars, those drivingwithout a valid driver's license or registration or without carrying insurance, and peopledriving under the influence of drugs or alcohol. Ray, 327 Ill. App. 3d at 909, 764 N.E.2d at177. This court held that the stop of the defendant in Ray was unreasonable because theevidence supporting the stop consisted merely of an "unparticularized suspicion that anyperson getting off the interstate at exit 151 was suspicious of committing an unnamed crime." Ray, 327 Ill. App. 3d at 910, 764 N.E.2d at 178. Thus, unlike the instant case, the officersinvolved in conducting the checkpoint had no reason even to suspect that a crime mightoccur, let alone that drivers exiting Interstate 57 were involved in it.

Proximity to an area of expected criminal activity is not sufficient, standing alone, tosupport an investigative detention. People v. Elliot, 314 Ill. App. 3d 187, 192, 732 N.E.2d30, 35 (2000). However, proximity to the scene of a specific recently reported crimeprovides substantially more suspicion than mere presence in a high-crime area. See Lippert,89 Ill. 2d at 187, 432 N.E.2d at 612 ("courts have been more protective of individual libertyinterests where it is not known that a crime has been committed than where the stop occursduring the period of an immediate investigation of a known crime"); Dyer, 141 Ill. App. 3dat 332, 490 N.E.2d at 241 (rejecting a defendant's argument that he did not act suspiciouslyby turning his car around because the detaining officer "knew of a specific recently reportedcrime and did not merely observe 'suspicious' activity in a general area where crimes hadpreviously been committed"); People v. Graves, 281 Ill. App. 3d 386, 390, 667 N.E.2d 96,99 (1996) (finding knowledge of recent drug sales in a "drug house" sufficient to infer fromthe defendant's presence in the house that he was engaging in a drug transaction, even thoughhis presence in a known "drug house" alone would not have been enough to justify thedetention).

We find both Dyer and People v. Waln, 120 Ill. App. 3d 73, 457 N.E.2d 979 (1983),closely analogous to the case at bar, although we acknowledge that neither presents preciselythe scenario with which we are faced. In Dyer, an officer heard a report of a robbery at aliquor store. Dyer, 141 Ill. App. 3d at 328, 490 N.E.2d at 238. Because the suspects werewearing masks, he did not have a description of them other than the fact that they were twowhite males. Dyer, 141 Ill. App. 3d at 328, 490 N.E.2d at 238-39. The officer drove hispatrol car to the road behind the store. Two miles from the store, he saw a car heading in adirection away from the store. As in the instant case, he did not testify that he observed thecar traveling at a high rate of speed. It was the only car he had seen in the vicinity, and therewere no other stores, bars, or restaurants in the area. Dyer, 141 Ill. App. 3d at 328, 490N.E.2d at 239. In addition, the officer thought it was suspicious that the car turned aroundgiven these circumstances. Dyer, 141 Ill. App. 3d at 331, 490 N.E.2d at 241. This courtfound, "The aforementioned facts, particularly the extreme spatial and temporal proximityto the crime, establish reasonable cause for the initial stop of the car in which defendant wasriding." (Emphasis added.) Dyer, 141 Ill. App. 3d at 331, 490 N.E.2d at 241. Weemphasized the defendant's proximity to the scene of the reported robbery and the fact thathis was the only car on the road. To the extent the car's reversal of direction provided anyadditional suspicion to justify the stop, we found that this was so only "given thecircumstances."

In Waln, an officer received a radio transmission informing him that two vehicles hadleft the scene of a burglary of a home. He had no description of either the vehicles or thesuspects. He stopped two cars at the only entrance to the subdivision in which the home thathad been burglarized was located. Waln, 120 Ill. App. 3d at 76, 457 N.E.2d at 980. As inthe instant case, there was no testimony that the officer observed anything suspicious aboutthe two cars other than their location near the scene of a recently reported crime. This courtfound that the stop was justified by the "extremely close spatial and temporal proximity" tothe reported burglary, coupled with the fact that they were the only two vehicles seen leavingthe subdivision. Waln, 120 Ill. App. 3d at 77, 457 N.E.2d at 981.

Similarly, in the instant case, the defendant was less than two miles from the sceneof a crime that had just been reported. His was the only car coming from the direction of theshooting. Although, as the defendant contends, it was possible that he was coming from oneof the subdivisions between the Piasa Pantry and Rocky Ford Road, we note that it was alsopossible that the defendant in Waln could have been coming from a house in the subdivisionthat he was leaving at the time he was stopped. The defendant also contends that DeputiesPapa and Hoffestot lacked a reasonable and articulable suspicion to stop him because, unlikein Waln, the perpetrator did not necessarily have to pass the Piasa Pantry on Boy Scout Laneto leave the scene. Moreover, they did not know that the assailant had a vehicle or that hehad left the scene at all. We do not find these distinctions dispositive. Boy Scout Lane wasthe main way of leaving the area, and the defendant was the only driver on the road. Thecrime was committed in a rural area, making it reasonable to infer the use of a car to flee thescene. It was also reasonable for the officers to infer that the perpetrator would likely becoming from that direction. See Lippert, 89 Ill. 2d at 181, 432 N.E.2d at 609 ("While it isarguable that defendant had been coming from an unexpected direction, the fact remains thathe was within the area in which a search could reasonably be conducted."); Bujdud, 177 Ill.App. 3d at 402, 532 N.E.2d at 374 ("Although [the detaining officer] had no information thata car was involved in the incident, we do not find it unreasonable for him to have inferredthat suspects would attempt to flee the general vicinity of a crime in a car.").

In so holding, we emphasize that the very purpose of a Terry stop is to allow theofficers involved to investigate their suspicions. Thus, the cases interpreting and refiningTerry have generally followed the rationale that "a short period of detention was onlyminimally intrusive when compared to the benefit of immediate investigation." Lippert, 89Ill. 2d at 183, 432 N.E.2d at 610. Thus, the officers' suspicions need only rise to a level thatfurther investigation is warranted. Particularly given the seriousness of the crime involved,we think it reasonable for the officers to detain, in order to investigate, the only person theyhad seen coming from the direction of the scene of the crime.

Moreover, we think that much of the evidence the defendant sought to suppress wouldhave been admissible under the inevitable discovery doctrine. The inevitable discoverydoctrine is an exception to the rule that evidence obtained in violation of a defendant'sconstitutional rights must be excluded. If the State is able to prove that such evidenceinevitably would have been discovered without the illegal police conduct, it is admissible. People v. Burnidge, 178 Ill. 2d 429, 437, 687 N.E.2d 813, 817 (1997) (citing Nix v. Williams,467 U.S. 431, 448, 81 L. Ed. 2d 377, 390, 104 S. Ct. 2501, 2511 (1984)). The defendantargues that his identity would not have been discovered if not for the stop, because thecomplaining witness did not know his name. She did, however, know who he was and wherehe regularly sold crack. As Dobrinich's testimony demonstrates, others in the communityalso knew him, and some knew him by name. Moreover, he was driving in the complainingwitness's car. It would defy logic to find that he would not inevitably have been identified. Because we hold that the detention was justified by a reasonable and articulable suspicion,we need not determine whether the police would have discovered the gun if not for thedefendant leading them to it or whether the admission of his videotaped confessions or thefact that he led police to the gun (which we do not think would have been inevitablydiscovered if not for the detention) amounted to harmless error in face of the complainingwitness's testimony, Dobrinich's testimony, and the other physical evidence that corroboratedthe victim's testimony.

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the order of the trial court denying thedefendant's motion to suppress, and we affirm his convictions and sentences.

Affirmed.

GOLDENHERSH and DONOVAN, JJ., concur.