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JUSTICE WELCH delivered the opinion of the court:

Following a jury trial, the defendant, Eugene R. Hughes, was found guilty of unlawfulpossession of drug paraphernalia, unlawful possession of a controlled substance, unlawfulpossession of a methamphetamine-manufacturing chemical, and unlawful use or possessionof weapons by a felon. The defendant was sentenced to 14 years' imprisonment.

On appeal, the defendant challenges (1) the trial court's denial of his motion to quasha warrant and suppress evidence, (2) the sufficiency of the evidence as it pertains to hisconviction for unlawful possession of drug paraphernalia, and (3) the sufficiency of theevidence as it pertains to his conviction for unlawful use or possession of weapons by afelon; the defendant also argues (4) that he is entitled to an $895 credit against his fine. Forthe reasons that follow, we affirm as modified in part and reverse in part, and we remandwith directions.

The evidence presented at the defendant's trial, viewed in the light most favorable tothe prosecution (see People v. Miller, 339 Ill. App. 3d 990, 992-93 (2003)), is as follows. On July 24, 2001, at approximately 10:30 p.m., Officer Morris went to the defendant'sresidence to serve the defendant with a legal document. Upon arriving at the defendant'sresidence, Morris went to the front door and knocked on the screen door that was in front ofit. Morris did not receive a response, so he opened the screen door to knock on the frontdoor. When he opened the screen door, Morris was met with a strong order of anhydrousammonia and ether. Based upon his experience, Morris believed that the odor wasassociated with the manufacturing of methamphetamine.

Morris then walked to the back of the house, where he smelled ether. Morris thenlooked through a kitchen window, where he observed several glass jars containing a whiteresidue. These observations confirmed Morris's suspicion that methamphetamine was beingmanufactured at the residence, so he immediately called for police backup. In addition,Morris contacted the Saline County State's Attorney and inquired about a search warrant.

After backup had arrived, Morris left the residence to meet with the State's Attorney. After meeting with the State's Attorney, Morris filled out a complaint for a search warrant. At 11:53 p.m., a search warrant was issued by Judge Stewart.

While Morris was away from the residence, the defendant returned to the residenceand encountered police officers waiting outside. The officers informed the defendant thatthe defendant was not required to stay but was free to leave. The defendant then left hisresidence. Morris returned to the residence and a search was conducted.

A search of the defendant's residence resulted in the recovery of numerous items. Atank containing anhydrous ammonia was found in the basement of the home. Three glassjars containing a white residue were found on a kitchen stove. Numerous blister packs oftablets containing pseudoephedrine were found in a dresser drawer in a bedroom. Coffeefilters were found in a cardboard box in a bedroom. Blister packs of tablets containingpseudoephedrine and four lithium batteries were found in a Wal-Mart bag in a filing cabinetin the living room. A cigarette lighter containing a clear baggie with methamphetamine inits cap was found on the top of the filing cabinet in the living room. A plastic hose thatlooked as though there had been a fire around it was found near a closet near the living room.Four empty bottles of Equate antihistamine tablets were found in a kitchen drawer.

Morris testified that based upon his experience and training, he knew that the itemsdescribed above are the ingredients used in the manufacturing of methamphetamine. Otheritems found in the residence included scales, syringes, rifle shells, shotgun shells, andhandgun ammunition.

At the trial, the defendant testified that he had not been at the residence for a coupleof days prior to the search. Further, he testified that he did not know how the items seizedby the police had gotten into his residence. The defendant denied his ownership of most ofthese items. However, the defendant did admit that the ammunition was his.

After hearing the evidence, the jury found the defendant guilty of the charges set forthin the opening paragraph. The defendant does not challenge his convictions for unlawfulpossession of a controlled substance or unlawful possession of a methamphetamine-manufacturing chemical, except that he argues that the evidence supporting these convictionsshould have been suppressed. The defendant does not challenge the sufficiency of theevidence to prove his guilt of these charges. We now turn to the arguments that thedefendant does raise on appeal.

The first argument raised by the defendant on appeal is that the trial court erred indenying his motion to quash the search warrant and suppress evidence. The defendantclaims that the trial court did not have probable cause to issue the search warrant because thefacts contained in the complaint for a search warrant signed by Morris did not contain anytemporal description. The defendant argues that because the complaint failed to set forthwhen Morris had observed the alleged criminal activity and it failed to state that the allegedcriminal activity was of a continuing nature, probable cause could not be established becausethere is no way of knowing whether the alleged criminal activity had been observed just afew hours prior to the signing of the complaint or several years prior to the signing of thecomplaint. The defendant argues that because the complaint for a search warrant failed toshow probable cause, the search warrant should be quashed and the evidence suppressed.

In response, the State first argues that the defendant has waived the argument hemakes on appeal because this argument was not raised before the trial court. Although thedefendant did file in the trial court a motion to quash his arrest and suppress evidence,neither in the motion nor at the motion hearing did the defendant ever make an argument thatprobable cause was lacking due to the absence of a temporal description in the complaint fora search warrant. As the record reveals, the defendant argued before the trial court that thecomplaint was insufficient because it failed to allege that Morris was experienced with theodors of anhydrous ammonia and ether and that, accordingly, Morris was not able todetermine that these smells were consistent with the manufacturing of methamphetamine.

Although the State argues that this issue should be considered waived because thedefendant raises it for the first time on appeal, we note that the waiver rule is binding onlyon the parties and that, in the interests of justice, we may relax the waiver rule and addressthe issue raised. People v. Fontana, 251 Ill. App. 3d 694, 704-05 (1993). We choose to doso in the instant case.

On July 24, 2001, Morris filed the complaint for a search warrant. In the complaint,Morris alleged as follows:

"I, [Morris], was in [the] process of serving private civil papers at the [defendant's]residence at 275 Gibbons Road, Harrisburg, Illinois, and smelled a very strong odorcoming from the front door[,] which smell was ether and anhydrous ammonia. I thenwent to [the] back door of [the] house and smelled [a] strong odor of ether. The odorof ether was coming from every window of the residence. While investigating thestrong odor of ether, I observed through [a] window several glass jars sitting upsidedown on the stove with white residue. There was one large glass jar in the sink withwhite residue around the mouth of the jar. All of the above information is consistentwith the manufacturing of methamphetamine."

The search warrant issued by the circuit court is dated July 24, 2001, with an 11:53 p.m. timeof issuance.

Probable cause to issue a search warrant exists where the facts set forth in an affidavitwould cause a reasonable person to believe that a crime has been committed and evidenceof that crime can be found in the place to be searched. People v. McCoy, 135 Ill. App. 3d1059, 1063 (1985). The decision to issue a search warrant is to be based on informationcontained in sworn statements or affidavits that are presented to the issuing judge. McCoy,135 Ill. App. 3d at 1064. The issuing judge is then to make a practical, common-sensedecision given all the circumstances before him or her. McCoy, 135 Ill. App. 3d at 1064.

In the instant case, the defendant contends that the trial court erred in issuing a searchwarrant because the complaint did not indicate when the alleged criminal activity had beenobserved. The law pertaining to search warrants is codified in section 108-3(a) of Illinois'sCode of Criminal Procedure of 1963 (725 ILCS 5/108-3(a) (West 2000)). It provides asfollows:

"[U]pon the written complaint of any person under oath or affirmation whichstates facts sufficient to show probable cause and which particularly describes theplace or person, or both, to be searched and the things to be seized, any judge mayissue a search warrant ***." 725 ILCS 5/108-3(a) (West 2000).

We note that although the statute specifically requires that the complaint include adescription of the place or person to be searched and the things to be seized, there is nospecific requirement that the complaint reveal when the alleged criminal activity wasobserved. However, we acknowledge that the question of when the alleged criminal activitywas observed plays an important role in the determination of probable cause. People v.Rehkopf, 153 Ill. App. 3d 819, 822 (1987).

The time at which a search warrant is issued should not be too remote from the timethe crime was observed. People v. Sellers, 237 Ill. App. 3d 545, 548 (1992). Probable causemay not exist when an extended period of time has transpired between the observance of thealleged crime and the filing of a complaint seeking a search warrant. See Rehkopf, 153 Ill.App. 3d at 823 (finding no probable cause where a warrant was issued 13 months after thecrime).

In the instant case, the defendant contends that where a written complaint fails tocontain any temporal description, probable cause cannot be established because the trialcourt is bound to consider only the four corners of the complaint and the issuing judge hasno way of determining when the alleged criminal activity was observed. We disagree. Asthe State points out, this court has recently rejected a claim that an issuing judge is bound toa "rigid, four-corners approach" when reviewing a complaint for a search warrant. Peoplev. Ward, 326 Ill. App. 3d 897, 904 (2002). Although the better practice would be to includeall pertinent information within the four corners of a complaint for a search warrant, anissuing judge is able to go outside the four corners of the document in order to obtainadditional facts supporting probable cause. See Ward, 326 Ill. App. 3d at 904 (holding thatthe issuing judge may go outside the four corners of the document in order to obtainsufficient indicia of the reliability of the cooperating witness). Because the record in the caseat bar reveals that Morris had observed the alleged criminal activity less than a couple ofhours before the search warrant was issued and because we presume that the trial courtproperly follows the law, especially when there is nothing in the record indicating otherwise,we reject the defendant's argument that the search warrant must be quashed and that theevidence recovered from that warrant must be suppressed.

Based on Morris's testimony at the trial, it is clear that the search warrant wasobtained within just a few hours of his observation of the alleged criminal activity. Althoughthis evidence was set forth at the defendant's trial, it was not brought out at the motionhearing, most likely because the alleged temporal deficiency of the complaint for a searchwarrant had not yet been raised by the defendant. Had the defendant raised the issue at thattime, Morris would have had the opportunity to testify concerning whether or not thisinformation had been revealed to the issuing judge at the time the complaint for a searchwarrant was presented. We must presume that it was, based on the fact that the searchwarrant was issued late in the evening (the warrant was issued at 11:53 p.m.) and becausewe presume that a trial judge knows and follows the law unless the record indicatesotherwise (People v. Dauer, 293 Ill. App. 3d 329, 333 (1997)). There is nothing in therecord to indicate otherwise. Accordingly, based upon the facts in the instant case, we rejectthe defendant's claim that the trial court erred in denying his motion to quash the searchwarrant and suppress evidence.

The second argument raised by the defendant on appeal challenges the sufficiency ofthe evidence as it pertains to his conviction for unlawful possession of drug paraphernalia. On appeal, the defendant contends that none of the items found at his residence fall withinthe definition of "drug paraphernalia" as defined by section 2(d) of the Drug ParaphernaliaControl Act (Act) (720 ILCS 600/2(d) (West 2000)). We agree.

The crime of unlawful possession of drug paraphernalia is codified in section 3.5 ofthe Act (720 ILCS 600/3.5 (West 2000)). It provides, "A person who knowingly possessesan item of drug paraphernalia with the intent to use it in ingesting, inhaling, or otherwiseintroducing cannabis or a controlled substance into the human body, or in preparing cannabisor a controlled substance for that use, is guilty of a Class A misdemeanor ***." 720 ILCS600/3.5 (West 2000). "Drug paraphernalia" is defined in section 2(d) of the Act as follows:

" 'Drug paraphernalia' means all equipment, products[,] and materials of anykind which are peculiar to and marketed for use in planting, propagating, cultivating,growing, harvesting, manufacturing, compounding, converting, producing, processing,preparing, testing, analyzing, packaging, repackaging, storing, containing, concealing,injecting, ingesting, inhaling[,] or otherwise introducing into the human bodycannabis or a controlled substance in violation of the 'Cannabis Control Act' [(720ILCS 550/1 et seq. (West 2000))] or the 'Illinois Controlled Substances Act' [(720ILCS 570/100 et seq. (West 2000))]." (Emphasis added.) 720 ILCS 600/2(d) (West2000).

Sections 2(d)(1) through 2(d)(6) then list a variety of items that fall within the scope of thisdefinition. 720 ILCS 600/2(d)(1) through (d)(6) (West 2000). These items includeisomerization devices peculiar to and marketed for use in increasing the potency of anyspecies of plant that is cannabis or a controlled substance and diluents and adulterantspeculiar to and marketed for cutting cannabis or a controlled substance. 720 ILCS600/2(d)(2), (d)(4) (West 2000). Also included are water pipes, miniature cocaine pipes,miniature cocaine spoons, and bongs, peculiar to and marketed for use in ingesting, inhaling,or otherwise introducing cannabis, cocaine, hashish, or hashish oil into the human body. 720ILCS 600/2(d)(5)(A), (d)(5)(D), (d)(5)(I) (West 2000).

On appeal, the defendant claims that none of the items found in his residence areincluded in the list of items set forth by the statute and that they are not "peculiar to andmarketed for use in" introducing a controlled substance into the body. Accordingly, thedefendant argues that his conviction must be reversed because there was no evidencepresented at his trial of drug paraphernalia as it is defined by the Act.

The clear language of the Act requires the State to prove at the trial that the allegeditems of "drug paraphernalia" possessed by the defendant are "peculiar to" and "marketedfor use in" growing, producing, storing, or ingesting cannabis or a controlled substance. People v. Reeves, 326 Ill. App. 3d 1083, 1086 (2002). Because the phrases "peculiar to" and"marketed for use" are set out in the conjunctive, the State must prove that the itemsrecovered are both "marketed for use" with drugs and "peculiar to" the use of drugs, and theabsence of either renders the item outside the scope of the Act. Reeves, 326 Ill. App. 3d at1086 (finding that a defendant's homemade crack pipe was not drug paraphernalia under theAct because, although it was peculiar to the use of drugs, it was homemade and it did not fallinto the category of "marketed for use" with drugs).

In the instant case, the items recovered from the defendant's residence included scales,syringes, coffee filters, blister packs of tablets containing pseudoephedrine, lithium batteries,and a plastic hose. Morris testified that these items could be found at a local departmentstore. Although Morris testified that these ingredients are used in the production ofmethamphetamine, he did not testify that any of these ingredients are primarily used fordrug-related purposes or that any of these items are marketed for drug use. In fact, there wasno evidence presented by the State supporting that notion.

"Peculiar to" has been defined as "primarily." People v. Ziegler, 139 Ill. App. 3d1088, 1091 (1986). Simply because a product can be used with drugs does not indicate thatthe product is primarily for drug use. People v. Feld, 267 Ill. App. 3d 56, 63 (1994). "Bydefining drug paraphernalia as that which is 'peculiar to and marketed for use' with drugs, thelegislature sought to remove any uncertainty as to what constitutes drug paraphernalia bydefining it with reference to the seller's marketing intentions." People v. Monroe, 118 Ill. 2d298, 303 (1987). The legislative intent is set forth in section 6: "This Act is intended to beused solely for the suppression of the commercial traffic in and possession of items that ***are clearly and beyond a reasonable doubt marketed for the illegal and unlawful use ofcannabis or controlled substances." 720 ILCS 600/6 (West 2000). It continues, "[A]llreasonable and common-sense inferences shall be drawn in favor of the legitimacy of anytransaction or item." (Emphasis added.) 720 ILCS 600/6 (West 2000). Unlike manycriminal statutes, this statute draws a strong presumption particularly favorable to defendants. Feld, 267 Ill. App. 3d at 61.

Based upon our review of the evidence, we agree with the defendant that the Statefailed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that any of the items recovered at the defendant'shome constitute drug paraphernalia as defined by the Act. No evidence was presented thatany of the items were peculiar to or marketed for use in the creation, distribution, orconsumption of drugs. The list of what constitutes drug paraphernalia, contained in sections2(d)(1) through 2(d)(6) of the Act, although not all-inclusive, includes items clearlydistinguishable from the type of items found in the defendant's residence and evinces thestated intent by the legislature to limit the items encompassed by the Act. Accordingly, wereverse the defendant's conviction for unlawful possession of drug paraphernalia.

The third argument raised by the defendant on appeal challenges the sufficiency ofthe evidence as it pertains to his conviction for unlawful use or possession of weapons by afelon. The defendant argues that there was insufficient evidence upon which the jury couldhave convicted him of unlawful use or possession of weapons by a felon because the jurywas instructed that it could not use the evidence of his prior convictions as substantiveevidence but only as it pertained to the credibility of the defendant. Accordingly, thedefendant argues that because the jury is presumed to have followed the instructions and wasinstructed that it could not consider the defendant's prior convictions as substantive evidence,the evidence was insufficient to support a conviction for unlawful use or possession ofweapons by a felon.

In support of his argument, the defendant cites the Illinois Supreme Court's decisionin People v. Edwards, 63 Ill. 2d 134 (1976). In Edwards, the defendant was charged withunlawful use of weapons by a felon. During the trial, the defendant stipulated to a previousburglary conviction. Edwards, 63 Ill. 2d at 137. After the presentation of the evidence, thejury was instructed that the evidence of the defendant's prior conviction could only beconsidered by the jury in determining the defendant's credibility as a witness. Edwards, 63Ill. 2d at 140. The jury found the defendant guilty of unlawful use of weapons by a felon.

On review, the supreme court reversed the conviction because the jury had beeninstructed that the evidence of the defendant's prior conviction could only be considered inassessing the defendant's credibility. The supreme court reasoned that the jury could nothave made the determination that all the elements of the charge of felonious use of a weaponhad been proven beyond a reasonable doubt, due to the instruction. Edwards, 63 Ill. 2d at140-41. In the instant case, the defendant relies on Edwards and contends that his convictionfor unlawful use of weapons by a felon must be reversed. Because we believe thecircumstances in the instant case differ from those in Edwards, we disagree.

In the instant case, as in Edwards, there is no dispute that the defendant had a priorfelony conviction, and the parties stipulated to the prior conviction. In fact, in the instantcase, the defendant testified that he was a convicted felon. However, what differentiates thiscase from Edward is that in the instant case the jury was instructed on the elements ofunlawful possession of a weapon by a felon and was also instructed that, based on thestipulation between the parties, the State did not have to prove that the defendant was a felonfor purposes of this offense. This additional instruction was absent from the Edwards case.

After the presentation of the evidence, the jury was instructed as follows:

"A person commits the offense of unlawful possession of a weapon by a felonwhen he, having previously been convicted of a felony, knowingly possesses firearmammunition. To sustain the charge of unlawful possession of a weapon by a felon,the State must prove the following propositions: That the defendant knowinglypossessed firearm ammunition, and second proposition that the defendant hadpreviously been convicted of a felony.

If you find from your consideration of all the evidence that any one of thesepropositions has not been proved beyond a reasonable doubt, you should find thedefendant not guilty. If you find from your consideration of all the evidence that eachone of these propositions has been proved beyond a reasonable doubt, you should findthe defendant guilty.

The parties have stipulated that the defendant has previously-been previouslyconvicted of a felony."

During the trial, immediately following the parties' stipulation to the fact that the defendantwas a convicted felon, the trial court instructed the jury as follows:

"[W]hat this means, Ladies and Gentlemen, is that since the parties agree to it, that'sa matter that does not have to be proven since the defense and the State agree to thatfact."

Accordingly, we believe that although the jury was instructed, "Evidence of thedefendant's previous conviction of an offense may be considered by you only as it may affecthis believability as a witness and must not be considered by you as evidence of his guilt inthe offense for which he is charged," in light of the other instructions given by the trial courtthat the "prior conviction" of a felon in possession had already been proven, the jury couldhave found the defendant guilty of unlawful use or possession of weapons by a felon beyonda reasonable doubt. Accordingly, we reject the third argument raised by the defendant onappeal.

The fourth and final argument raised by the defendant on appeal is whether he isentitled to a credit of $895 against his fine. See 725 ILCS 5/110-14 (West 2002). The Stateconcedes this argument. Accordingly, we order that the defendant receive a $895 creditagainst his fine.

For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed as modified inpart and reversed in part, and we remand with directions to grant the defendant a credit of$895 against his fine.

Affirmed as modified in part and reversed in part; cause remanded with directions.

KUEHN and DONOVAN, JJ., concur.