Rule 23 Order filed
August 17, 2000;
Motion to publish granted
September 13, 2000.
Opinion filed
September 13, 2000.

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JUSTICE MAAG delivered the opinion of the court:

Orion Ingram (defendant) was indicted for the offense of first-degree murder. Subsequent to a hearing held prior to the trial, the circuit court granted defendant's motionto suppress evidence. The State filed an interlocutory appeal.

The State filed a criminal complaint against defendant on November 16, 1998, forfirst-degree murder. The court also issued an arrest warrant. On December 11, 1998, anindictment was filed charging defendant with first-degree murder in the death of AureliousBurris. On August 13, 1999, defendant filed a motion to suppress evidence and a motionin limine seeking to preclude the State's introduction of evidence that he attempted to fleeat the time that he was arrested. A hearing on the motions was held on August 25, 1999.

At the hearing, now-retired East St. Louis police detective Gerald Crenshaw testifiedthat the victim was attacked and beaten on October 1, 1998. The case was apparentlyassigned to Crenshaw approximately one week later. In his grand jury testimony, Crenshawtestified that the victim died on October 8, 1998, after being removed from life support.

Crenshaw interviewed Damon Cobin and Gwendolyn Cherry on October 8, 1998. (Cherry was defendant's cousin, and Cobin was Cherry's boyfriend.) Cobin and Cherry toldCrenshaw that defendant and his brother, Clarence Guy, came to Cobin's and Cherry'sapartment. Defendant was apparently very excited and "hyper." Cobin and Cherry bothobserved blood on defendant's clothes and on Guy's shoes.

Defendant told Cobin and Cherry that he had beaten up the victim because he hadbeen selling crack cocaine out of the residence of defendant's grandmother. Defendant alsostated that he had struck the victim several times with a tire iron. Cherry said that defendantdescribed the victim's "guts" hanging out of his wound. Defendant repeatedly stated that heknew the victim got his point.

Guy was arrested on November 13, 1998. The next day, he gave Crenshaw astatement regarding the offense. Guy told Crenshaw that after being told that the victim wasselling crack cocaine from their grandmother's home, defendant and Guy went to a liquorstore for cigarettes. On their way home, they saw the victim sitting in a burgundy car. Defendant confronted the victim and struck him with his fist, knocking him out. Defendantthen picked up a wooden board and struck the victim with it several times. After the attack,defendant and Guy went to Cherry's house where they remained for "awhile."

Guy told Crenshaw where he might find defendant. At Crenshaw's request, Guytelephoned defendant, and Crenshaw spoke with him on the telephone. When Crenshawasked defendant to come to the police station, defendant initially claimed that he did nothave transportation. When Crenshaw offered to give him a ride, defendant stated that he didnot wish to talk to him. Defendant also told Crenshaw that he would talk to him when hewas ready.

Subsequent to this conversation, Crenshaw asked Guy to show him where he couldfind defendant. Guy, Crenshaw, and Detective Desmond Williams drove to St. Louis,Missouri, in an unmarked police car. The officers did not have an arrest warrant fordefendant. Crenshaw claimed that he believed that he had probable cause to arrestdefendant, but he did not approach the State's Attorney's office because it was that office'spolicy that police officers submit proof beyond a reasonable doubt and, ideally, a statementfrom the suspect prior to seeking a warrant.

Upon his arrival in St. Louis at the apartment that Guy pointed out, Crenshaw, whodid not know that building's address prior to his arrival, used his cellular telephone andattempted to telephone the St. Louis police for assistance. Crenshaw stated that he knew thathe did not have jurisdiction in St. Louis and that he needed St. Louis police officers present. Crenshaw said that the battery on his cellular telephone was low and that he lost hisconnection with the St. Louis police. Crenshaw then telephoned his supervisor and askedher to relay his message to the St. Louis police. She obliged and the dispatcher to whom shespoke told her that Crenshaw had contacted them.

Crenshaw stated that he drove to the rear of the building and stopped. He directedDetective Williams to monitor the front of the building. Crenshaw testified that since he wasawaiting the arrival of the St. Louis police, he did not knock on the door.

Detective Williams testified that while he was standing at the front of the building,he saw defendant climb out of a window on the second floor. The window appeared to beapproximately 10 feet or more above the ground. When Williams saw defendant place onefoot and his head out of the window, Williams announced his office and ordered defendantto come down. Defendant said something, climbed back into the room, and closed thewindow. Williams stated that he assumed that Crenshaw had knocked on the door beforedefendant began climbing out.

Crenshaw stated that while he was waiting for the St. Louis police to arrive, he heardWilliams say that someone was trying to come out of the front window. Crenshaw heardWilliams tell defendant to come down. A few seconds later, Crenshaw saw defendantattempting to leave the building by the rear door. Crenshaw arrested him. A few secondslater, the St. Louis police arrived and Crenshaw turned defendant over to them. Crenshawstated that he never knocked on the door, rang the doorbell, yelled out to defendant, or didanything of that sort.

Crenshaw, Williams, defendant, and the St. Louis police all returned to the policestation. Defendant signed a waiver of extradition and was taken to Illinois.

Crenshaw explained that when he left for St. Louis, he had no intention of arrestingdefendant. Instead, Crenshaw wanted to interview defendant. Although defendant had toldCrenshaw over the telephone that he did not wish to speak with him, Crenshaw did notbelieve that he had to give up trying to obtain an interview with a suspect in a murder case. Crenshaw claimed that he contacted the St. Louis police as a precaution, in order to "cover"himself.

After hearing arguments, the circuit court denied defendant's motions to excludeevidence of his flight.

On August 27, 1999, defendant filed a motion to quash his arrest and to dismiss hisindictment. On September 15, 1999, a hearing was held on the motion, and the circuit courtevidently treated the motion as a motion to reconsider its previous ruling.

From the beginning of the hearing, the assistant State's Attorney announced that theState was conceding that defendant's arrest in St. Louis by Illinois officers should bequashed because the officers did not have jurisdiction to make the arrest and thecircumstances did not fall into any exception, such as fresh pursuit or a citizen's arrest, foran extraterritorial arrest. The State argued, however, that defendant was not prejudiced bythe extraterritorial arrest because no evidence was obtained following the arrest, such as aconfession or the murder weapon.

The defense called Sandra Muckensturm, who was Crenshaw's supervisor onNovember 14, 1998. Muckensturm testified that the State had requested that she prepare areport on February 11, 1999, regarding Crenshaw's cellular telephone call to her onNovember 14, 1998. In her report, Muckensturm stated that Crenshaw told her that he hadcalled the St. Louis police for assistance in making an arrest if the suspect was present. Thereport also states that Crenshaw and Williams were going to St. Louis in an attempt to locatedefendant. When Muckensturm spoke with the detectives prior to their departure for St.Louis, they did not tell her they were going to arrest someone.

At the close of Muckensturm's testimony, the circuit court made a finding, atdefendant's request, that his arrest was illegal and ordered it quashed. The circuit courtdenied defendant's motion to dismiss the indictment.

The State argued that the evidence of defendant's flight should be admissible at trialbecause defendant's attempt to flee occurred before the officers attempted to arrest him. TheState argued that defendant's flight precipitated the arrest because it caused Crenshaw tomake the arrest before the St. Louis police officers could arrive. The State also argued thatdefendant's arrest was not contemporaneous with defendant's flight because defendantreentered the house and attempted to leave through the back door. Hence, the State arguedthat there was no causal connection between the evidence of flight and the unlawful arrest.

The circuit court stated that there was no clear-cut demarcation between defendant'sarrest and his attempt to flee. The court said that the presence of the police officersprompted defendant's flight; hence, the circuit court reversed itself and granted defendant'smotion. The circuit court ruled that the State could not introduce evidence of defendant'sattempt to flee.

The State filed a timely notice of appeal. The State certified that the suppression ofevidence of defendant's flight substantially impaired the State's ability to prosecute the case.

The State claims that the circuit court erred in granting defendant's motion to suppressevidence of his flight because defendant's attempt to flee occurred prior to the unlawfularrest.

Initially, we note that a reviewing court will not disturb a circuit court's ruling on amotion to suppress evidence unless the ruling is manifestly erroneous. However, when theissue is purely a question of law and the circuit court's determinations of the credibility ofthe witnesses are not at issue, the standard of review is de novo. See People v. Ciesler, 304Ill. App. 3d 465, 470, 710 N.E.2d 1270, 1274 (1999).

In this case, the issue is a question of the circuit court's interpretation of the law. Thecircuit court ruled as a matter of law that evidence of defendant's flight was so intertwinedwith the illegal arrest that the flight evidence had to be suppressed. The credibility of thewitnesses was not an issue because only the arresting officers and their supervisor testifiedat the hearing. Defendant did not testify. Hence, our review in this case is de novo.

The State's sole issue in this appeal is whether the circuit court erred in grantingdefendant's motion to suppress evidence of his flight where defendant's attempt to fleeoccurred prior to the unlawful arrest.

Defendant initially contends that this appeal should be dismissed on the basis that thecircuit court's pretrial ruling did not suppress evidence but merely limited the evidence thatthe State could present. We disagree.

Supreme Court Rule 604(a)(1) (145 Ill. 2d R. 604(a)(1)) allows an interlocutoryappeal by the State of a pretrial suppression order whenever the prosecutor certifies to thecircuit court that the suppression substantially impairs the State's ability to prosecute thecase. See People v. Young, 82 Ill. 2d 234, 248, 412 N.E.2d 501, 507 (1980). The State'sright to appeal prior to trial includes the right to appeal pretrial rulings excluding evidence,without regard to its nature, when the State certifies that the exclusion of the evidencesubstantially impairs the State's ability to prosecute the case. See People v. Hatfield, 161 Ill.App. 3d 401, 405, 514 N.E.2d 572, 574-75 (1987). For purposes of the State's right toappeal prior to trial, no distinction exists between pretrial orders suppressing evidence andpretrial orders excluding evidence. Only when the State is appealing a midtrial ruling by thecircuit court does the reviewing court consider whether the ruling suppressed evidence,which is appealable, or merely excluded evidence, which is not appealable. See Hatfield,161 Ill. App. 3d at 405, 514 N.E.2d at 574-75.

Defendant relies on People v. Drum, 307 Ill. App. 3d 743, 718 N.E.2d 302 (1999),appeal allowed, 187 Ill. 2d 577, 724 N.E.2d 1271 (2000), for his argument that the Statemay not appeal an order granting a defendant's motion in limine. We need not address theDrum decision, however, because the court's reasoning in Drum was based on the fact thatthe State was appealing a ruling by the circuit court denying a motion in limine by the Statethat sought the admission of evidence. Hence, Drum does not apply to an appeal such as thisone where the defendant was the one that filed the motion in limine.

In this case, the State is appealing a pretrial ruling precluding the admission ofevidence, and the State has certified to the circuit court that the suppression of the evidencesubstantially impairs the State's ability to prosecute the case. Hence, we have jurisdictionof this case.

Defendant claims that if this court has jurisdiction of the appeal, his attempt to leavethe apartment by a 10-foot-high window was not evidence of flight because there was noevidence that he was aware that he was a suspect. Defendant also claims that even if heknew that he was a suspect, it was the officers' presence that prompted his flight and theState should not be allowed to profit from the officers' allegedly illegal actions. Wedisagree.

As we previously stated, the State conceded that defendant's arrest in St. Louis bypolice officers from Illinois must be quashed because the Illinois officers had no jurisdictionto make an arrest in Missouri. See People v. Every, 184 Ill. 2d 281, 285, 703 N.E.2d 897,899 (1998). According to Every, an officer may go to another state to seek and collectevidence. Every, 184 Ill. 2d at 285, 703 N.E.2d at 899.

It is important to note, however, that an illegal arrest has no legal consequences whenno evidence was obtained as a result of the arrest. See People v. Pettis, 184 Ill. App. 3d 743,751, 540 N.E.2d 1097, 1103 (1989). Stated another way, when no evidence is obtained asa result of the illegal arrest, there is nothing to exclude. See People v. Brumfield, 100 Ill.App. 3d 382, 387, 426 N.E.2d 1012, 1017 (1981). In this case, the State represented to thecircuit court that no evidence was obtained from defendant following the unlawful arrest.

In Brumfield, the court stated that the purpose of the exclusionary rule is to preventthe State from profiting from evidence that has been unlawfully obtained; "it does not reachbackward and taint information that was in official hands prior to any illegality." Brumfield,100 Ill. App. 3d at 387-88, 426 N.E.2d at 1017. In fact, evidence that the police havealready gathered is not subject to suppression as a result of subsequent illegal conduct ontheir part. See Pettis, 184 Ill. App. 3d at 752, 540 N.E.2d at 1103; People v. Durgan, 281Ill. App. 3d 863, 868, 667 N.E.2d 730, 733 (1996).

In the instant case, it is clear that the evidence that the circuit court orderedsuppressed was evidence that defendant attempted to flee by climbing out the front windowof the building. These actions by defendant occurred prior to any attempt by the policeofficers to arrest him and did not follow from an unlawful arrest. At the time that defendantattempted to jump out of the window, the police officers had done nothing unlawful andwere in a place where they had a lawful right to be.

Defendant's initial flight and arrest were separated in time by several seconds. Defendant reentered the house upon seeing Williams. Defendant closed the window, fleddownstairs to the door at the rear of the building, and was arrested upon emerging from thatexit. Hence, a review of the record shows that defendant's illegal arrest clearly followed andwas not contemporaneous with defendant's initial attempt to flee.

Defendant also contends that his attempt to climb out the window and leave by theback door of the building were not evidence of flight because there was no evidence that herealized that he was a suspect or that he knew police officers were standing outside of thebuilding. The record shows, however, that prior to going to St. Louis, Crenshaw and Guytelephoned defendant. Both talked with defendant and Crenshaw asked defendant to cometo the police station. Hence, it is clear that defendant knew that the police wanted to talk tohim regarding the victim's murder.

A review of the record also shows that Crenshaw, Williams, and Guy-who was stillunder arrest and seated in the back seat of an unmarked police car-all went to St. Louis. Although Crenshaw parked the police car behind the apartment building where Guyindicated that defendant was staying, defendant attempted to flee through a window at least10 feet above the ground on the front of the building.

We can only presume that defendant saw the unmarked police car outside the buildingand saw his brother in the back seat of the car. As a result of talking with Guy andCrenshaw earlier, defendant realized that Guy was with police officers, and he attempted toflee through a window on the front of the building. A trier of fact would certainly beentitled to believe that defendant was attempting to flee. We also note that after defendantwas ordered to come down, he reentered the house and attempted to leave by the rear door. Therefore, we find no merit to defendant's argument in his brief that he "may simply havebeen leaving his home, however strangely."

Finally, defendant argues that the State should not be allowed to use evidence of hisflight after police prompted the flight by their presence at his building. Defendant fails tonote, however, that the Illinois officers were certainly in a place where they had a lawfulright to be and were merely awaiting the arrival of the St. Louis police. The officers had notknocked on the door of defendant's apartment or otherwise attempted to contact defendantprior to his climbing out the window. The suppression of evidence of defendant's flightwould not serve any public policy of deterring improper police conduct.

Based upon the foregoing analysis, the circuit court erred when it essentially ruledthat the exclusionary rule can apply backward in time to exclude evidence that was obtainedprior to the illegality. Hence, we reverse the circuit court's order suppressing evidence ofdefendant's flight since defendant's attempt to flee occurred prior to the unlawful arrest.

Reversed and remanded.

HOPKINS and KUEHN, JJ., concur.