In March 2001, a jury convicted the defendant, Thomas Bradley Leigh, of unlawfulpossession of a firearm by a felon (720 ILCS 5/24-1.1(a) (West 1998)). The chargestemmed from a routine traffic stop, during which officer Dennis Hout asked the defendantif there was anything in his pickup truck that would cause a police dog to alert and thedefendant responded that a pistol belonging to his wife, Traci Leigh, was in the truck. Thedefendant appeals, arguing that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress,because Officer Hout's question impermissibly expanded the scope of the stop. We reversethe trial court's order denying the motion to suppress and reverse the defendant's conviction.

On May 23, 1999, at approximately 9:25 in the evening, the defendant was drivingto the store with his wife, Traci, to purchase some milk. Officer Hout observed that thedefendant's pickup truck had no rear license plate illumination light, and he pulled thedefendant over. He was acquainted with both the defendant and Traci. Officer Hout askedthe defendant for his driver's license, registration, and proof of insurance, and he returnedto his squad car to run the driver's license through the dispatch computer. He also ran acriminal check on the defendant. The defendant and Traci remained in the truck while hewas doing this. Officer Hout discovered that the defendant's driver's license was valid andthat the defendant had a prior conviction for criminal damage to property dating from 1984.

Officer Hout asked the defendant to sit in the passenger's seat of his squad car, whichthe defendant did. As Officer Hout finished writing the defendant a warning ticket for thefailure to illuminate his registration (625 ILCS 5/12-201(c) (West 1998)), he asked thedefendant if there was anything in the truck that would cause a police dog to alert were heto call a canine unit to the scene. According to Officer Hout's testimony, the defendantresponded that nothing in the truck that he was aware of would cause the dog to alert. Officer Hout stated, "You don't sound too sure of yourself." The defendant then said thathis wife's pistol was in the truck. The defendant's version of the confrontation was slightlydifferent. He testified as follows:

"And then he questioned me, ['][I]s there anything in the car that a dog can-the dogwould hit on[?]['] And I said[,] ['][N]ot to my knowledge.['] I said[:] ['][T]he onlything I know of in there is my wife's got her little gun with her. That's all I knowof.['] He said, ['][W]ell, you don't sound too sure of yourself.['] Well, how muchmore sure can you get?"

It is undisputed that Traci Leigh was lawfully entitled to carry the pistol. Both sheand the defendant testified that she carried it for protection from her physically abusive firsthusband. Both also testified that the defendant was not aware that Traci had brought the gunwith her until they were at least halfway into town to go to the store.

Officer Hout told the defendant to remain in the squad car while he approached thepassenger's side of the pickup truck to obtain the pistol from Traci. He also called forbackup at this point. The pistol, which was not loaded, was inside its holster under a jacketon the seat next to Traci's left side. Traci handed the pistol, in its holster, to Officer Hout. She also gave him a clip of ammunition, which had been on the floorboard on her side ofthe truck. Officer Hout then placed the defendant under arrest.

The following day, the State charged the defendant by information with unlawfulpossession of a weapon by a felon. On August 26, 1999, the defendant filed a motion tosuppress, contending that Officer Hout impermissibly exceeded the scope of the initial stop,in violation of the fourth amendment. The trial court denied the motion.

On March 12 and 13, 2001, the court held the trial in this matter. The jury found thedefendant guilty, and the court entered a conviction. This appeal followed. We note thatthe defendant raises additional issues related to the sufficiency of the evidence and thepropriety of the jury instructions. Because of our conclusion that the evidence against himmust be suppressed, we do not address these further contentions.

The defendant argues that Officer Hout's questions about the contents of his truckwere neither related to the original purpose of the stop nor supported by an additionalreasonable, articulable suspicion of criminal activity and that, therefore, Officer Houtviolated the fourth amendment by asking them. The State contends that no fourthamendment violation occurred because (1) Officer Hout's questions did not extend theduration of the stop and (2) Officer Hout did not impose additional restrictions on thedefendant's movement. Our decision is controlled by the recent Illinois Supreme Courtdecision in People v. Gonzalez, No. 92305 (April 17, 2003). We conclude that thequestioning impermissibly expanded the scope of the traffic stop.

The fourth amendment protects citizens from unreasonable searches and seizures. U.S. Const., amend. IV. Routine traffic stops, such as the one at issue in the case at bar, are"seizures" within the meaning of the fourth amendment. Gonzalez, slip op. at 4. Becauseof their brevity, traffic stops are analyzed within the framework of Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S.1, 20 L. Ed. 2d 889, 88 S. Ct. 1868 (1968), which involves a two-part inquiry: (1) the stopmust be justified at its inception and (2) it must be reasonably related in scope to thecircumstances that justified the stop in the first place. Gonzalez, slip op. at 7 (relying onTerry, 392 U.S. at 19-20, 20 L. Ed. 2d at 905, 88 S. Ct. at 1879). The State bears the burdenof demonstrating that the stop was "sufficiently limited in scope and duration to satisfy"these conditions. People v. Cox, 202 Ill. 2d 462, 467, 782 N.E.2d 275, 279 (2002). Wherethese guidelines are not met, evidence obtained as a result must be suppressed. See UnitedStates v. Green, 111 F.3d 515, 520-21 (7th Cir. 1997) (discussing the application of theexclusionary rule in the context of a traffic stop). A motion to suppress evidence generallypresents a mixed question of law and fact. Cox, 202 Ill. 2d at 465-66, 782 N.E.2d at 278. We accord great deference to the trial court's findings of fact; however, we review de novothe trial court's ultimate determination to grant or deny the motion. Cox, 202 Ill. 2d at 466,782 N.E.2d at 278.

There is no dispute that Officer Hout acted properly in stopping the defendant's truckinitially. The only issue before us is whether his questioning the defendant about thecontents of the truck exceeded the permissible scope of the stop, thereby rendering anyevidence obtained as a result subject to suppression. We find that it did.

Both Illinois courts and federal courts have split on the meaning of the scopelimitation in Terry. Some courts have held that the "scope" of the detention refers only toits duration because questioning is not itself a seizure. Gonzalez, slip op. at 8 (citing UnitedStates v. Shabazz, 993 F.2d 431, 436 (5th Cir. 1993)); see also People v. Smith, 266 Ill. App.3d 362, 366-67, 640 N.E.2d 647, 649-50 (1994). Others, meanwhile, have held that thescope limitation includes " 'both the length of the detention and the manner in which it iscarried out.' " (Emphasis omitted.) Gonzalez, slip op. at 9 (quoting United States v. Holt,264 F.3d 1215, 1230 (10th Cir. 2001)); see also People v. White, 331 Ill. App. 3d 22, 34,770 N.E.2d 261, 271 (2002) ("Scope and duration are two different dimensions of the Terryanalysis."). Those courts that have concluded that the scope requirement includes both aduration component and a manner component have generally held that questions that areneither directly related to the initial reason for the stop nor supported by an additionalreasonable, articulable suspicion improperly broaden the scope of the stop. See, e.g., White,331 Ill. App. 3d at 34, 770 N.E.2d at 271; United States v. Murillo, 255 F.3d 1169, 1174(9th Cir. 2001); see also Holt, 264 F.3d at 1229 (rejecting the Shabazz court's holding thatpolice questioning "on matters unrelated to the purpose of the detention" does not expandthe scope).

While the instant appeal was pending, the Illinois Supreme Court resolved thisconflict in Gonzalez. The court rejected both approaches, finding that neither "strikes theproper balance between the government's interest in effective law enforcement and theindividual's interest in being free from arbitrary governmental intrusions, which lies at thecore of the concept of 'reasonableness.' " Gonzalez, slip op. at 10. The court annunciatedthe following principles for analyzing the scope requirement:

"If the question is reasonably related to the purpose of the stop, no fourth amendmentviolation occurs. If the question is not reasonably related to the purpose of the stop,we must consider whether the law enforcement officer had a reasonable, articulablesuspicion that would justify the question. If the question is so justified, no fourthamendment violation occurs. In the absence of a reasonable connection to thepurpose of the stop or a reasonable, articulable suspicion, we must consider whether,in light of all the circumstances and common sense, the question impermissiblyprolonged the detention or changed the fundamental nature of the stop." (Emphasisadded.) Gonzalez, slip op. at 12-13.

We believe that Officer Hout's questioning changed the fundamental nature of thestop. Essentially, what began as a routine traffic stop for the purpose of issuing a warningticket became an all-encompassing investigation.

A comparison with the questioning alleged to exceed the scope of the initially validtraffic stop at issue in Gonzalez illustrates the point. There, the defendant was a passengerin a car that had been stopped by two police officers because it did not have a front licenseplate. One officer asked Gonzalez for his identification. He offered a traffic ticket in lieuof other identification. During the ensuing encounter, the officer discovered that thedefendant had cocaine on his person. Gonzalez, slip op. at 1.

Following the above-described analysis, the court first noted that the request for apassenger's identification was not related to the purpose of the stop, nor was it supported bya reasonable, articulable suspicion that the passenger had committed any crime. Gonzalez,slip op. at 13. Here, too, Officer Hout's questioning regarding the contents of thedefendant's truck was unrelated to the purpose of the stop and was not based on anyreasonable, articulable suspicion. The Gonzalez court then noted that the request foridentification did not extend the duration of the stop impermissibly. Gonzalez, slip op. at13. The questioning involved in the case at bar did not extend the duration of the detentionhere, either.

In finding that the request for identification from the passenger had not changed thefundamental nature of the initial stop, the supreme court noted, "A simple request foridentification is facially innocuous. It does not suggest official interrogation and is not thetype of question or request that would increase the confrontational nature of the encounter." Gonzalez, slip op. at 13. Here, by contrast, Officer Hout asked the defendant whetheranything at all in his truck would cause a police dog to alert. The implicit threat to call acanine unit and the statement, "You don't sound too sure of yourself," each increased theconfrontational nature of the stop. Moreover, asking if anything at all was in the car thatmight cause a dog to alert expanded the scope of the investigation itself well beyond thepurpose of the stop. Indeed, the questioning amounted to a fishing expedition in the absenceof any basis to suspect a crime had been or was being committed. As the supreme courtstated in Gonzalez, "[W]e do not believe that unfettered police questioning of drivers andpassengers can be justified by relying on the principle that ' "mere police questioning doesnot constitute a seizure." ' [Citation.]" Gonzalez, slip op. at 11. Thus, we conclude that thequestioning exceeded the permissible scope of the detention and that the trial court erred indenying the defendant's motion to suppress.

For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the order of the trial court denying thedefendant's motion to suppress. Because the State cannot prevail on remand without thesuppressed evidence, we reverse his conviction and need not remand for further proceedings. See People v. Avant, 331 Ill. App. 3d 144, 154, 771 N.E.2d 420, 429 (2001); People v.Fondia, 317 Ill. App. 3d 966, 972-73, 740 N.E.2d 839, 844 (2000).

Reversed.

HOPKINS, P.J., and WELCH, J., concur.