JUSTICE KUEHN delivered the opinion of the court:

On December 20, 2002, Tony W. Lomas was traveling the streets of Centralia,Illinois, a passenger in his brother Johnny's car. Two friends of the Lomas brothers, Jeff andJody, were also along for the ride, as was something that dangled from the car's rearviewmirror.

Officer Sean Richards was on patrol that day. He cruised the same Centralia bywaystraveled by Johnny Lomas and his passengers.

Richards patrolled with a piece of recently received information conveyed to theCentralia police department by some unknown caller. The department learned from ananonymous voice that four men had just made a purchase of Sudafed at the local Wal-Martstore. The dispatcher passed on this anonymous claim to the officers on patrol.

Sometimes, people buy Sudafed to relieve the discomforts of a common cold. It canalso be used to make the illegal drug methamphetamine. Would-be drug dealers buy Sudafedin large quantities. The officers who patrolled Centralia's streets that day were familiar withits unlawful uses.

No one knows how Sean Richards linked the foursome in Johnny Lomas's car to theindividuals who purportedly purchased Sudafed at the Centralia Wal-Mart. No one botheredto ask him how he made that connection.

Richards did not testify that Johnny Lomas and his three passengers fit a descriptionof the four males who had purchased the Sudafed. Indeed, he did not testify that theunknown tipster even provided a description. Nor did Richards say that the tipster reportedhow the four males had left the store or whether the tipster described any vehicle in whichthey had departed. There was no testimony that the presence of four young men cruisingCentralia streets on a winter's day was particularly odd, uncommon, or suspicious.

For some reason that was never made clear, Richards immediately targeted thefoursome riding in Johnny Lomas's car for a stop and detention because he somehowbelieved that they were the four men who had made the Wal-Mart Sudafed purchase.

Richards knew full well that he could not act upon the information that he possessed. There was no way to credit it. Nonetheless, he decided to shadow the Lomas vehicle. Richards candidly admitted that he pursued the Lomas vehicle in order to fulfill his desireto search it, and its occupants, for illegal drugs. He believed, based upon the Sudafedpurchase, an event the occurrence of which depended entirely upon the word of ananonymous caller, that a search of Lomas's car would uncover illegal drugs. And so,Richards tailed the vehicle, in order to observe Johnny Lomas's driving. Richards was intentupon conducting a drug investigation. The fulfillment of that desire awaited the observationof Johnny Lomas's breach of some rule of the road. Richards knew that any minor infractioncould provide the means to conduct a probe more in line with his true goal, and the curiositythat fed it.

As Richards tailed Johnny Lomas's vehicle, waiting for a reason to legally bring it toa halt, he radioed for assistance. He wanted the assistance to be there when he executed hisplan to search the car and its occupants. Three other patrol cars heeded his request andconverged upon the area where Richards was following the Lomas automobile. The firstpatrol officer to find Richards, Officer Stevenson, fell in line behind Richards' squad car andthe targeted vehicle. Shortly thereafter, other officers did the same. Soon, four police carstailed the Lomas vehicle. They loomed behind Johnny Lomas, awaiting that moment whenhe would grant them a valid reason to stop and detain him.

Finally, Richards saw it. We do not know whether it was an oversized pair ofStyrofoam dice, a pair of baby shoes, Mardi Gras beads, a St. Christopher medal, or simplya parking pass. Richards only referred to it as "an object."

Whatever was dangling from the rearview mirror in Johnny Lomas's car providedRichards with the welcomed reason to engage his overheads and bring Johnny Lomas to ahalt. It provided the probable cause to seize Lomas and his passengers. It provided a meansto the officers' desired end. The four officers were not there to investigate a windshield'spartially obstructed view. They were there to probe for illegal drugs during the traffic stop'sdetention period.

After Lomas was brought to a curbside stop, Richards approached him. Richardsasked for a driver's license and proof of insurance. Thereafter, he asked everyone in thevehicle for some form of identification.

Richards testified that it is routine operating procedure for all Centralia patrol officersto check the validity of registrations and licenses. It is also common practice, even on minortraffic violations, to run a criminal history check on drivers and on all their passengers.

After collecting everyone's identifications, Richards gave them to Stevenson. WhileRichards examined Lomas's license and proof of insurance, Stevenson took theidentifications that Richards had obtained, placed them into his mobile data computer, andran a criminal history check on everyone. When the computer checked for Tony Lomas, theexistence of two prior drug possession convictions popped up.

After the criminal history check was completed, Richards directed Johnny Lomas tostep out of the car. Lomas complied. Richards still had Lomas's license and proof ofinsurance. He had not started to write a citation for anything. Richards did not ask anythingabout the rearview mirror's decor. He did not ask about the license, the registration, or theproof of insurance. Richards' mind was not on the rules of the road.

Richards immediately turned his attention to the real reason that he had stopped thevehicle. He was interested in finding guns, drugs, or anything else that might constituteillegal contraband. He asked Lomas if he had guns, illegal drugs, or any other kind ofcontraband in his automobile. When Lomas responded in the negative, Richards asked forpermission to check it out for himself. Lomas consented to a search of his car. The Centraliapolice officers then fulfilled their true objective in stopping the Lomas motor vehicle.

Richards and his fellow officers searched. During the search, they found a smallquantity of methamphetamine inside a nylon lunch bag lying on the back seat of thepassenger side of the car. None of the officers asked any of the car's occupants aboutownership of the lunch bag before it was searched. They apparently assumed that it belongedto Johnny Lomas, the only member of the group of potential owners who consented to thesearch. See People v. James, 163 Ill. 2d 302, 645 N.E.2d 195 (1994) (where the driverlacked the apparent authority to give an effective consent to the search of his companions'belongings).

After the contraband was discovered, Tony Lomas claimed ownership of the bag andthe methamphetamine that it contained.

The State charged Tony Lomas (the defendant) with unlawful possession of acontrolled substance. After a bench trial on stipulation, the defendant was found guilty andwas sentenced to 18 months of imprisonment in the custody of the Department ofCorrections.

The defendant appeals the trial judge's denial of his motion to suppress themethamphetamine found inside his nylon lunch bag and his motion to suppress hissubsequent admissions as fruit of the poisonous tree.

The trial judge denied the motion to suppress because, in his judgment, the durationof the detention following the stop was not extended beyond what was a necessary detentionincident to the traffic stop itself and because the driver of the car had authorized a legalsearch by way of consent, during this legal detention period.

Initially, we note the unabashed pretextual nature of this traffic stop. In respondingto the defendant's claim that Officer Richards "engaged in nothing more than an illegalinvestigatory detention in the hope he would discover evidence of crimes wholly unrelatedto any vehicle code violation," the State incorrectly observes that Officer Richards' subjectiveintentions in effectuating the traffic stop play no role in the fourth amendment analysis.While it is true that a traffic violation will provide the probable cause to stop and detain, evenwhen officers really have on their minds things other than ensuring lawful driving (seePeople v. Thompson, 283 Ill. App. 3d 796, 670 N.E.2d 1129 (1996)), an obviously pretextualstop is a matter that does have play when courts examine the reasonableness of any searchthat ensues.

As we pointed out in People v. Thompson:

"The validity of a traffic stop does not automatically afford a reasonable basisto fulfill an underlying ambition to conduct a search. [Citation.] Our determinationthat the initial stop was valid but pretextual does not resolve the legitimacy of thechallenged search. Rather, it requires our examination of the record to determine thereasonableness of actions taken after the traffic stop.

The State argues that circumstances after the stop warranted a protectivesearch. ***

One circumstance sets this case apart from other cases that have validatedprotective searches made in the course of traffic stops. This was a pretextual stop. We know that the officers stopped the van motivated by a desire to search it. Theofficers recognized that their information did not afford a reasonable basis to arrestor search. They therefore refrained from stopping the van until they detected a trafficoffense. Thereafter, their actions were calculated to develop a legal reason to supporta search.

The officers' subjective intent in a pretextual setting cannot make otherwiselawful conduct illegal. It cannot invalidate the stop. It is not, however, totallyirrelevant to questions that accompany a pretextual stop. A pretextual stop, bydefinition, harbors an underlying ambition to exceed its original scope. Once a trafficstop's pretextual nature is established, as it was in this case, we know that the trueobjective is to find a legal excuse to accomplish a warrantless search. This goalexposes to careful scrutiny disputes over ensuing events." (Emphasis added.) Thompson, 283 Ill. App. 3d at 799, 804, 670 N.E.2d at 1131, 1134.

The open use of traffic laws as sheer pretense in order to fulfill an ambition to detainsomeone, and in order to conduct a warrantless search during that detention, is a factor to beweighed when testimony diverges over how events unfolded and led to an inevitable searchof the motor vehicle. In weighing factual disputes over what happens after an obviouspretextual traffic stop, trial judges should be mindful of the officers' true purpose in makingthe stop, when they consider inconsistencies over the length of the detention and disputesover the events that led to the ultimate search.

Here, however, no one disputes the basic facts. Nor is there any question over witnesscredibility. In cases like the one before us, we review a decision to deny a suppressionmotion without deference to the trial judge's determination. People v. Bunch, 207 Ill. 2d 7,13, 796 N.E.2d 1024, 1028-29 (2003).

The State questions the defendant's standing to complain about the consensual searchof his brother's car. It correctly points out that "defendants charged with crimes of possessionmay only claim the benefits of the exclusionary rule if their own Fourth Amendment rightshave in fact been violated." United States v. Salvucci, 448 U.S. 83, 85, 65 L. Ed. 2d 619,623, 100 S. Ct. 2547, 2549 (1980).

This is a sound proposition that the State simply misapplies in this case. The Statefails to understand that this defendant is not attempting to avail himself of his brother's fourthamendment freedoms. The defendant is asserting that his own liberty was infringed as anoccupant of a vehicle that was stopped by the police. He seeks the vindication of his ownliberty interests-the vindication of his right to be free from an unreasonable seizure of hisperson.

The temporary detention of individuals-passengers and drivers-during a vehicle stopconstitutes a "seizure" of "persons" within the meaning of the fourth amendment. People v.Gonzalez, 204 Ill. 2d 220, 225, 789 N.E.2d 260, 264 (2003). In recognition of this fact, theIllinois Supreme Court has repeatedly held that passengers have standing to challenge theillegal seizure of a vehicle in which they are riding. People v. Harris, 207 Ill. 2d 515, 525,802 N.E.2d 219, 226 (2003); Bunch, 207 Ill. 2d at 13, 796 N.E.2d at 1029.

Vehicle stops must be reasonable seizures that comport with the fourth amendment'scall for reasonableness. U.S. Const., amend. IV. The reasonableness of a traffic stop ismeasured by the criteria set forth in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20 L. Ed. 2d 889, 88 S. Ct.1868 (1968). In determining whether a valid Terry stop has occurred, we engage in a two-part inquiry. First, we must determine whether the officer's actions were justified at theirinception. If so, we must further examine whether subsequent actions were reasonablyrelated in scope to the circumstances that justified official interference in the first place. Gonzalez, 204 Ill. 2d at 235, 789 N.E.2d at 270.

Where an officer's detention of a person exceeds his authority under Terry v. Ohio,a subsequent consent to search can be tainted by that illegality. People v. White, 331 Ill. App.3d 22, 34-35, 770 N.E.2d 261, 272 (2002).

The Illinois Supreme Court has provided us with instructions on how to examinepolice questioning during a traffic stop, in order to determine whether the questioning isreasonably related in scope to that stop:

"[W]e must consider, as an initial matter, whether the question is related to theinitial justification for the stop. If the question is reasonably related to the purpose ofthe stop, no fourth amendment violation occurs. If the question is not reasonablyrelated to the purpose of the stop, we must consider whether the law enforcementofficer had a reasonable, articulable suspicion that would justify the question. If thequestion is so justified, no fourth amendment violation occurs. In the absence of areasonable connection to the purpose of the stop or a reasonable, articulable suspicion,we must consider whether, in light of all the circumstances and common sense, thequestion impermissibly prolonged the detention or changed the fundamental natureof the stop." Gonzalez, 204 Ill. 2d at 235, 789 N.E.2d at 270.

Relying upon People v. Gonzalez, we recently held that questioning an individualabout the contents of his car during a traffic stop exceeded the permissible scope of the stop. People v. Leigh, 341 Ill. App. 3d 492, 494, 792 N.E.2d 809, 811 (2003).

On the night of May 23, 1999, Thomas Leigh was accompanying his wife to the storefor the purpose of buying milk. Leigh, 341 Ill. App. 3d at 493, 792 N.E.2d at 810. PatrolmanDennis Hout noticed that Leigh was driving his pickup truck without a rear licenseillumination light. Hout engaged his overheads and pulled Leigh over. Hout obtainedLeigh's license, registration, and proof of insurance, and he returned to his squad car to runeverything in the dispatch computer. Shortly thereafter, he learned that the license andregistration were valid. He also learned that Leigh had been convicted of criminal damageto property in 1984.

Officer Hout returned to the pickup truck and directed Leigh to get out of it and toaccompany him to his squad car. As Hout finished writing a warning ticket for the failureto illuminate his registration, he asked Leigh if there was anything inside the truck that apolice dog "would hit on." Leigh told Hout that his wife, Traci, had her pistol inside thetruck.

Hout seized the pistol. Leigh, 341 Ill. App. 3d at 494, 792 N.E.2d at 811. Asuccessful prosecution for unlawful possession of a firearm by a felon ensued. ThomasLeigh appealed the trial judge's denial of his motion to suppress. He contended that OfficerHout had impermissibly exceeded the scope of the initial stop in violation of Leigh's fourthamendment rights.

Using the roadmap set forth in People v. Gonzalez, we found that Officer Hout'squestion was unrelated to the purpose of the stop and was asked without a reasonable,articulable suspicion. Leigh, 341 Ill. App. 3d at 496, 792 N.E.2d at 813. We held that thequestion changed the fundamental nature of the stop from a warning ticket for a minor trafficoffense to an all-encompassing probe into illegal criminal activity. The question expandedthe scope of the stop from an initial inquiry about a motor vehicle violation into an open-ended investigation about illegal contraband.

When we turn to the facts before us in this case, it is far clearer that Officer Richards'detention of Johnny Lomas and the occupants of his car had nothing to do with the initialstop. Indeed, Richards readily admitted that the stop and detention was never about JohnnyLomas's obstructed view of traffic. The stop and detention was entirely about the anonymoustip and Richards' desire to search for illegal drugs because of it. Clearly, the anonymous tipdid not provide enough detail to be able to credit it. And without knowledge about thereliability of its source, the information could never validate an investigatory stop to inquireabout illegal drugs. It is questionable whether the information itself could even give rise toa reasonable suspicion, because Sudafed is a legal over-the-counter medication. Richardsdid not testify that the unknown caller mentioned an inordinately large purchase that mightdiscount its valid use and suggest that it was being purchased as an ingredient formethamphetamine production.

The officers surely knew that the tip did not provide them with enough informationto make a valid investigatory stop. They followed the Lomas vehicle for some time, knowingthat they needed a traffic violation to make a valid, albeit pretextual, stop.

The admitted pretextual nature of the traffic stop in this case underscores the kind ofconstitutional protection the Illinois Supreme Court has recently fashioned and refined forpeople subjected to valid traffic stops made with ulterior motives. See People v. Brownlee,186 Ill. 2d 501, 713 N.E.2d 556 (1999); Harris, 207 Ill. 2d 515, 802 N.E.2d 219; Bunch, 207Ill. 2d 7, 796 N.E.2d 1024; Gonzalez, 204 Ill. 2d 220, 789 N.E.2d 260; People v. Cox, 202Ill. 2d 462, 782 N.E.2d 275 (2002).

Law enforcement officers have come to understand that they can have ulteriorinvestigatory motives in stopping motor vehicles as long as they have the probable cause tobelieve that a traffic violation has occurred. Thompson, 283 Ill. App. 3d 796, 670 N.E.2d1129; Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 135 L. Ed. 2d 89, 116 S. Ct. 1769 (1996). Asthis case so graphically demonstrates, officers are no longer the slightest bit duplicitous aboutminor traffic stops initiated for the purpose of making probes into the possible possession ofcontraband. However, the recent development of cases that scrutinize traffic stops with aview toward questioning whether the fundamental nature of the stop strays from theenforcement of traffic laws into investigatory inquiries about other criminal activityconstrains valid traffic stops engaged in as pretexts for invalid roadside fishing expeditionsto uncover illegal contraband. If officers want to engage in a pretextual traffic stop, they mayconstitutionally do so. Whren, 517 U.S. at 813, 135 L. Ed. 2d at 98, 116 S. Ct. at 1774.

However, the probable cause that they possess is all that justifies subsequent detentions. Andunless the officers possess, or subsequently develop, reasonable, articulable suspicions thatsome kind of other criminal activity is afoot, they must attend to the business of charging atraffic offense and confine their investigation to the minimal inquiries attendant to it. Anyquestioning about the possession of contraband during the traffic stop detention quiteobviously changes the fundamental nature of the stop.

Officer Richards candidly admitted that the traffic stop was a total ruse, in order tosearch based upon the anonymous tip. He summoned three other officers before he couldfind a traffic violation to justify a stop and detention. He further testified that he was notabout to write a ticket for that traffic violation until he had sought permission to search forevidence of drugs.

The State maintains that Officer Richards and his cohorts had a reasonable, articulablesuspicion that the car's occupants either possessed methamphetamine or were about tomanufacture it. It points out that Richards knew that four males had just been to Wal-Martand had just purchased Sudafed, a legal, over-the-counter drug that can be used tomanufacture methamphetamine. The State combines this knowledge with two othercircumstances to arrive at the position that Richards had a reasonable, articulable suspicionwhen he strayed from writing a traffic ticket and embarked upon his true purpose for thestop-his quest to search for illegal drugs. First, Richards found out that one of the occupantsof the stopped vehicle had two prior drug convictions. Second, Richards testified that thequantity of the Sudafed purchased heightened his belief that it had been purchased formethamphetamine production.

The State's reliance upon testimony that the quantity of the purchase contributed toa reasonable, articulable suspicion is misplaced. The State concedes that the quantity ofSudafed that was actually purchased by the four males at Wal-Mart is completely unknown. Officer Richards did not say that the anonymous tipster told him how much Sudafed hadbeen purchased.

This was Richards' testimony about the anonymous tip:

"We received a call from Wal-Mart stating that there were four males inside buyingSudafed."

Even assuming that Richards construed this to mean that there were four males inWal-Mart and that all four were buying Sudafed, which is not entirely clear from thetestimony, the total quantity of the purchase is still a mystery. We assume that Sudafedcomes in different size packages. A suspicion that the defendant was about to manufacturemethamphetamine would hardly be reasonable without more information about the amountof Sudafed purchased.

We cannot presume that the quantity of Sudafed purchased would contribute to areasonable, articulable suspicion that the Sudafed was being purchased for the production ofmethamphetamine, when the record provides absolutely no indication of what amount wasactually purchased. The State argues the existence of a reasonable suspicion based upon purespeculation, without any specific and articulable facts in the record to support the inferencesit wants us to draw.

There simply was never a reasonable, articulable suspicion to believe that anyoccupant of the car had committed, was committing, or was about to commit a criminaloffense. Significantly, the State's argument hinges upon the false assumption that theanonymous information that Richards possessed was information about the defendant andhis friends. There is nothing in this record to reasonably link the anonymous information tothe foursome riding in Johnny Lomas's car. Presumably, Richards could not articulate factsthat drew him to suspect that Lomas and his passengers were the same four men who hadmade the Wal-Mart Sudafed purchase. The only connection that we can decipher is a likesex and a like number of fellow travelers. Absent more information identifying the defendantand his companions as the reported Wal-Mart customers, it cannot be said that the suspicionwas reasonable.

Coupling the anonymous information to the postdetention acquisition of informationabout the defendant's criminal record assumes that Richards could articulate how he tied thetipster's knowledge to the defendant, which is something he apparently could not do. Richards lacked a reasonable, articulable suspicion even after Officer Stevenson retrievedthe defendant's criminal history out of his mobile data computer, for he lacked sound reasonto believe that the defendant was one of the recent Sudafed purchasers.

As to the defendant-a passenger caught up in a traffic stop and detention that wasbeing used as a fishing expedition into other criminal activity-the fundamental nature of thisstop changed, and the detention therefore became illegal, before any of the officers learnedof his criminal history. See Harris, 207 Ill. 2d 515, 802 N.E.2d 219 (where warrant checksconducted on a passenger's identification changed the fundamental nature of a minor trafficstop and exceeded the scope of the initial detention in violation of the fourth amendment). The State points out that even if Richards did not have a reasonable suspicion to runa warrant check on the defendant, the warrant check did not prolong the duration of the stopand was therefore permissible. This was what the trial judge deemed determinative. However, whether the warrant check prolonged the detention's duration is not the onlyinquiry. As the Illinois Supreme Court has made clear:

"In the absence of a reasonable connection to the purpose of the stop or a reasonable,articulable suspicion, we must consider whether *** the question impermissiblyprolonged the detention or changed the fundamental nature of the stop." (Emphasisadded.) Gonzalez, 204 Ill. 2d at 235, 789 N.E.2d at 270.

The Illinois Supreme Court has determined that running a criminal history check onthe passenger of a motor vehicle changes the basic nature of the stop from ticketing a minortraffic offender into a general probe of the passenger's criminality, or lack thereof. Harris,207 Ill. 2d at 528, 802 N.E.2d at 228. Officers are no longer detaining the passenger toeffectuate his or her driver's traffic ticket but are using the passenger's detention to conducta much broader type of investigation into the passenger himself. That is precisely whathappened here.

Finally, the State urges us to find that the contraband is still admissible, even if thewarrant check was impermissible under People v. Harris. It argues that themethamphetamine would have been found regardless of the officers' violation. JohnnyLomas's insurance had lapsed and he was ticketed because of it. The State maintains that thepolice would have taken him into custody, conducted an inventory search of his automobile,and inevitably discovered the methamphetamine that the illegal detention had produced.

The inevitable-discovery doctrine permits the admission of evidence obtained inviolation of a citizen's constitutional rights if the prosecution can show that the evidencewould inevitably have been discovered without the constitutional violation. People v.Edwards, 144 Ill. 2d 108, 142, 579 N.E.2d 336, 349 (1991).

While the possibility of a valid inventory search certainly existed and such a searchmay have uncovered the methamphetamine, we hardly think such an outcome was inevitable. There are other potential outcomes that appear to be more reasonable under thecircumstances. We doubt that the defendant would have wanted to remain with the carduring the inventory search. We further doubt that he would have left his belongings in thecar, particularly the nylon lunch bag that contained illegal contraband. Speculation andassumption will not support the application of the inevitable-discovery doctrine, and theState's argument here is highly speculative. See Harris, 207 Ill. 2d at 533, 802 N.E.2d at230.

The questioning of the defendant and the questioning of the driver who caused thedefendant's traffic stop detention were unrelated to the stop. The questions were tenderedat a time when the officers lacked a reasonable, articulable suspicion that warranted questionsabout the possession of guns, illegal drugs, or any other form of contraband. The questionsposed evinced a fundamental change in the nature of the stop, from a stop and detention fora minor traffic violation into a detention for the purpose of an open-ended probe designedto satisfy official curiosity about the existence of illegal drugs inside the car or on the personof any of its four occupants. Therefore, we find that the defendant's detention impermissiblyexceeded the scope of the initial traffic stop and became an illegal detention in violation ofthe defendant's fourth amendment freedoms at that point in time when the focus of theofficers shifted from enforcing a law that requires motor vehicle operators to maintain a clearand unobstructed view outside of their vehicles into a fishing expedition about other kindsof potential criminality.

Thus, we hold that the defendant had standing to challenge the validity of his illegaldetention. We further hold that the consent which ultimately led to the search of thisdefendant's personal belongings was given at a time when the defendant was being illegallydetained. The consent was tainted by that illegality. It could not validate the search.

Accordingly, we reverse the trial judge's rulings on the motion to suppress. Themethamphetamine that formed the basis of this prosecution was discovered in violation ofour constitution's promise of freedom from unreasonable search and seizure. The contrabandand the admissions that flowed from its discovery should have been suppressed as productsof an unconstitutional search and seizure. We reverse the conviction obtained by use of thetainted evidence.

For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the circuit court of Marion County ishereby reversed.

Reversed.

WELCH and DONOVAN, JJ., concur.

Opinion Filed: June 11, 2004

Justices: Honorable Clyde L. Kuehn, J.

Honorable Thomas M. Welch, J., and

Honorable James K. Donovan, J.,

Concur

Attorneys Daniel M. Kirwan, Deputy Defender, Rita K. Peterson, Assistant Defender, Elaine

for M. Belcher, Attorney Applicant, Office of the State Appellate Defender, Fifth

Appellant Judicial District, 730 E. Illinois Highway 15, Suite #1, Mt. Vernon, IL 62864

Attorneys Hon. James Creason, State's Attorney, Marion County Courthouse, P.O. Box 157,

for Salem, IL 62881; Norbert J. Goetten, Director, Stephen E. Norris, Deputy Director,

Appellee Rebecca E. McCormick, Staff Attorney, Office of the State's Attorneys Appellate

Prosecutor, 730 E. Illinois Highway 15, Suite 2, P.O. Box 2249, Mt. Vernon, IL

62864