Following a bench trial in the circuit court of Williamson County, Charles McNeill(defendant) was convicted of aggravated driving under the influence of alcohol andsentenced to a fine and 24 months' probation. Prior to his trial, defendant filed a motion inlimine to exclude the opinion testimony of the arresting police officer and to bar the Statefrom using that testimony against him. This motion was denied, as were subsequent motionsto reconsider the denial. Defendant appeals his conviction, arguing only that the trial courterred in denying his motion in limine and allowing the arresting police officer to testifyagainst him at the trial.

Defendant argues on appeal, as he did before the trial court, that an opinion witness(an arresting police officer) whose employer (a municipality) receives a payment (fines)contingent on the outcome of the case (a conviction) cannot be allowed to testify before thetrial court in the proceedings resulting in the conviction. Defendant argues that undervarious statutes of the State, fines paid to the circuit clerk by convicted criminals are to bedisbursed in part to the municipality that effected the arrest, provided the police officers ofthat municipality seasonably prosecute for all fines and penalties under the law. See 705ILCS 105/27.6(a) (West 1998); 625 ILCS 5/16-105(a)(1) (West 1998). Defendant arguesthat this amounts to the payment of a contingent fee to an opinion witness based upon theoutcome of the case. If the arresting officer is able to procure a conviction, then thearresting officer earns a fee for his employer, contingent on the outcome of the case. Defendant further argues that this is in direct contravention of the Illinois Supreme Court'sopinion in First National Bank of Springfield v. Malpractice Research, Inc., 179 Ill. 2d 353(1997).

In Malpractice Research, Inc., our supreme court invalidated, as against publicpolicy, a contract between a plaintiff in a medical malpractice action and a consulting firmhired to procure expert opinion witnesses. The contract promised to the consulting firm acontingent fee of 20% of any amount recovered by the plaintiff in the action. The fee to theconsulting firm was obviously contingent on the outcome of the case. The expert witnesses,however, were paid a flat rate of compensation for their time, as is customary. Our supremecourt held that such a contingent-fee arrangement, in which a professional witness-finderreceives a fee dependent on the testimony of the witness and the favorable outcome of thecase, tends to corrupt the judicial process by, among other things, encouraging thesubornation of perjury and is void as against public policy.

Defendant argues that the situation in the case at bar is analogous to the situationpresented in Malpractice Research, Inc. and that a police officer, whose employer willreceive a payment contingent on the outcome of the case in which the officer's testimony issought, should not be allowed to testify. According to defendant, the temptation for theofficer to testify falsely in order to procure a favorable outcome and receive a payment forhis employer is too strong and tends to pervert justice. We simply do not find the twosituations to be analogous and find Malpractice Research, Inc. to be inapplicable to the caseat bar.

The most obvious distinction between Malpractice Research, Inc. and the case at baris that the instant case is a criminal proceeding whereas Malpractice Research, Inc. was acivil proceeding. We point out that in many, if not most, criminal proceedings in which aconviction may result in a fine, the arresting agency stands to receive a portion of the finecollected. Accordingly, to apply the holding of Malpractice Research, Inc. to the case at barwould disallow arresting police officers from testifying in almost every criminal case. Wethink it is apparent that this was not the intention or even within the contemplation of thesupreme court in rendering its decision in Malpractice Research, Inc.

Furthermore, Malpractice Research, Inc. involved the invalidation of a contract asagainst public policy, not the disqualification of a witness for bias, which is essentiallydefendant's argument in the case at bar. The case at bar does not involve a witness-finder. Defendant's argument in the case at bar is essentially that the police officer may be biasedin favor of the government agency for which he works because that agency may receive aportion of the fine in the event of a conviction. It is clear that the police officer himself, asa witness, is not eligible to receive compensation for his testimony. Thus, this case does noteven involve the payment of a fee to a witness.

We find the position of the arresting police officer in the case at bar to be more akinto that of a party to the action, or a representative of a party, than to that of an independent,retained, expert opinion witness. A party to an action always stands to benefit from afavorable outcome in the case, and to the extent the testimony of that party or itsrepresentative may result in that favorable outcome, there may be a temptation to testifyfalsely. This does not result in the disqualification of a party from testifying. Indeed,section 115-16 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 expressly provides that no personshall be disqualified as a witness in a criminal case by reason of his or her interest in thecase, as a party or otherwise, but the interest may be shown for the purpose of affecting thecredibility of the witness. 725 ILCS 5/115-16 (West 1998).

Thus, while the arresting police officer's testimony in the case at bar was admissible,defendant had the option of attempting to impeach the officer by introducing evidence that,if defendant was to be convicted and fined, the municipality for which the officer workedwould receive a portion of the fine. Accordingly, the trial court did not err in denyingdefendant's motion in limine to exclude the arresting police officer's testimony.

For the foregoing reasons the judgment of the circuit court of Williamson County isaffirmed.