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PRESIDING JUSTICE GOLDENHERSH delivered the opinion of the court:

After a bench trial in the circuit court of Johnson County, Thomas Ming (defendant),was convicted of four counts of unlawful delivery of a controlled substance (720 ILCS570/401(c)(2) (West 1996)) and was sentenced to concurrent four-year terms in theDepartment of Corrections on each count. The issue raised on appeal is whether anundercover police officer's actions, which included allowing defendant to have for hispersonal use a small amount of the cocaine purchased by the undercover officer, were sooutrageous as to constitute a violation of defendant's due process rights. We affirm.

The charges against defendant stemmed from his assistance in the purchase of cocainefor undercover agent Richard Malone. Malone was a Pulaski County deputy sheriff assignedas a narcotics investigator to the Southern Illinois Drug Task Force. Malone's confidentialsource was Tony Belden. Malone and Belden approached defendant, a person with a longhistory of drug abuse and a penchant for cocaine, to arrange a drug transaction with RickyGoodman, a drug dealer who was moving cocaine and cannabis from Chicago. A series offive drug purchases was arranged by defendant in which Malone was present. On the firstfour occasions, defendant was present. On the fifth occasion, Malone purchased narcoticsfrom Goodman, but defendant was not present. The transactions occurred between June 2,1998, and July 9, 1998. On each of the deliveries in which defendant was present, defendantcalled Goodman and arranged for him to bring the cocaine to defendant's residence.

On September 17, 1998, defendant was charged by information with six drug offenses,including one count of calculated criminal drug conspiracy (720 ILCS 570/405(a) (West1998)) and five counts of unlawful delivery of a controlled substance (720 ILCS 570/ 401(West 1998)). At the preliminary hearing, Malone testified that defendant was notcompensated for setting up the transactions. However, on February 16, 1999, defendant fileda motion to dismiss on the basis that he was given cocaine for his personal consumption, thathe used the cocaine in the presence of Malone on more than one occasion, and that "deliveryof drugs by the Government to an addict to obtain his cooperation is illegal, outrageous, andviolates basic concepts of fairness and due process." Attached to the motion was theaffidavit of Malone's confidential source, Tony Belden. The affidavit stated that Belden waspresent on several occasions in June and July 1998 when Malone purchased cocaine fromGoodman. Belden stated: "[A]fter the delivery was completed, Malone would take some ofthe cocaine out of the package and give it to [defendant] for making the call to Goodman andfor using the house. I have observed the delivery from Malone to [defendant] on more thanone occasion." On March 4, 1999, a hearing was held on defendant's motion to dismiss.

Defendant's first witness was Officer Malone, who testified that he was present at fourdrug transactions, which occurred on June 2, June 4, June 12, and June 17, 1998, atdefendant's residence, and that Belden was present at the first three transactions. In eachinstance, Malone purchased powdered cocaine from Ricky Goodman. Defendant introducedMalone to Goodman as a favor to Belden. At the preliminary hearing, Malone denied givingany narcotics to defendant as payment. He stated that during the last transaction on July 9,1998, he left $50 with Goodman to give to defendant "as compensation for arranging thedeal." However, during the hearing on the motion to dismiss, Malone admitted thatdefendant did receive a small amount of cocaine, but Malone explained that it only occurredduring the first transaction on June 2, 1998, and only because defendant insisted. Malonedescribed what happened after his transaction with Goodman was completed: "[Defendant]asked me if I could take care of him, if I could hook him up." The prosecutor then inquiredwhat the above response meant, and Malone explained as follows:

"Meaning give him some of the cocaine out of the bag. I told him no and hepersisted[;] he kept telling me that I was messed up because I had, correction, he hadintroduced me to Mr. Goodman and I needed to take care of him and what not, andat the time, not wanting to[,] I guess you'd say[,] blow the investigation, definitelythere was going to be a larger transaction later, I complied with Mr. Ming. I wantedout of that house at that time. And I was under the impression that if I didn't give Mr.Ming something, we would not have another deal."

Malone testified that he did not see defendant consume any drugs and that defendant did notreceive any additional drugs during the later transactions.

Malone changed his report nearly three months after Belden's affidavit was filed andnearly seven months after the first transaction, to reflect that defendant removed and ingestedapproximately one line of cocaine from the bag. At the time the charges were filed, the Statewas unaware that defendant had ingested cocaine out of the bag purchased by Malone fromGoodman. Malone acknowledged that all cocaine amounts delivered to the lab weighed lessthan the amounts allegedly purchased. Malone explained that dealers routinely try to short-change the purchasers in order to increase profits and that once the drugs are taken out of thepackages in which they are sold, the weight is reduced.

During all the transactions, Malone wore a body microphone. Defense counsel playedportions of those tapes and suggested that there were sniffing and scratching noises that werethe ingestion and cutting of cocaine provided to defendant by Malone. Malone denieddefense counsel's allegations.

Tony Belden testified that he was with Malone on three occasions in June 1998 duringwhich Malone purchased cocaine from Goodman. Defendant arranged the meetings betweenGoodman and Malone. Belden testified that it was his understanding that defendant, "themiddle man," would ultimately be cut out of the transactions but that he would be paid forhis involvement by getting to consume some of the drugs for his personal use. Belden neversaw defendant actually consume any of the drugs because he left the room after thetransactions were completed. On cross-examination, Belden explained that he instigateddiscussions about a "turn on" for defendant with Malone because he knew that defendantwould not "keep getting [Malone] hooked up with drugs without getting something." Beldentold Malone to give defendant some drugs or cash if defendant asked for either.

Defendant testified that while growing up in California, he began using marijuana inthe eighth grade and gradually started doing other drugs, including acid, mushrooms, andcocaine, which he particularly enjoyed but could not often afford. Defendant agreed that hewas approached by Malone and Belden to arrange some drug deals with Goodman. According to defendant, he was to receive some cocaine "out of the bag" for introducingMalone to Goodman. Defendant claimed that after each transaction, Malone gave him aportion of the cocaine for his personal consumption and that on one occasion Malone useda razor to cut the cocaine and form it into lines for defendant's consumption. Defendanttestified that he asked Malone to "cut" the cocaine for him because he was too shaky to doit himself; however, the tapes fail to reflect that such a conversation occurred. Defendantclaimed that scraping sounds on the tape were caused by chopping up lumpy cocaine and thatsniffing sounds were caused by defendant "snorting" the cocaine. At one point, defendantasserted that he had been involved with cocaine since he was a freshman in high school. Helater stated that he had not been involved with drugs for a long time but that he becameinvolved again when Malone and Belden came by to speak with him. Defendant admittedthat he had been convicted of burglary in California.

The State recalled Officer Malone to rebut defendant's testimony. Malone testifiedthat he interviewed defendant on September 17, 1998, after defendant was arrested. At thattime, defendant told Malone that he remembered Malone coming over to his house andpurchasing cocaine but that he could not remember the specific details. Defendant toldMalone his memory was limited due to habitual drug use. Malone insisted that defendantonly took some cocaine out of the bag after the first transaction on June 2, 1998, and not afterany other transaction. Malone testified that between the second and third transactions,sometime between June 4 and June 12, 1998, he told one of his supervisors that he alloweddefendant to take cocaine out of the bag. Malone admitted that he was under investigationby internal affairs based upon information provided to the department by defense counsel.

The trial court denied defendant's motion to dismiss, and a stipulated bench trialensued. Counts I and II were dismissed, and defendant was found guilty on the remainingfour counts of delivery of a controlled substance on the theory that he was accountable forthe conduct of Goodman. At the sentencing hearing, the trial court remarked that OfficerMalone's conduct was "not a glowing example of what law enforcement should demonstrate***." The court stated: "I don't think there's any question he exceeded the bounds ofzealousness here. Whatever his motives were to ferret out crime, but [sic] in the end heaccomplished that goal." Thereafter, the trial court sentenced defendant to concurrent four-year prison terms. Defendant now appeals.

The issue raised by defendant is whether Officer Malone's actions were so outrageousas to constitute a violation of defendant's due process rights. Defendant contends that theState should have been barred from using the judicial process to obtain a conviction againstdefendant, due to the outrageous actions of the undercover narcotics agent, and that, thus, thetrial court erred in refusing to dismiss the case. The State responds: (1) the concept ofoutrageous police conduct as a bar to prosecution should be rejected outright, and (2)alternatively, the actions of the undercover officer in the instant case were not so outrageousthat defendant's motion to dismiss should have been granted. We address first whether or notoutrageous police conduct is a viable defense.

The doctrine of "outrageous conduct," sometimes referred to as "outrageousmisconduct," was introduced by the Supreme Court. In the course of discussing theentrapment defense, the Court speculated that it "may some day be presented with a situationin which the conduct of law enforcement agents is so outrageous that due process principleswould absolutely bar the government from invoking judicial process to obtain a conviction***." United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423, 431-32, 36 L. Ed. 2d 366, 93 S. Ct. 1637, 1643(1973). The Russell court went on to state that in order to rise to the level of outrageous, themisconduct must be of such a nature that it violates " 'fundamental fairness, shocking to theuniversal sense of justice,' mandated by the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment." Russell, 411 U.S. at 432, 36 L. Ed. 2d 366, 93 S. Ct. at 1643, quoting Kinsella v. UnitedStates ex rel. Singleton, 361 U.S. 234, 246, 4 L. Ed. 2d 268, 80 S. Ct. 297, 303 (1960). Theoutrageous-misconduct defense was further addressed by the Supreme Court in Hampton v.United States, 425 U.S. 484, 48 L. Ed. 2d 113, 96 S. Ct. 1646 (1976).

In Hampton, the defendant was convicted of distributing heroin, despite his argumentthat because the heroin had been supplied by a government informer and sold by thedefendant to an undercover agent, the defendant's due process rights had been violated. TheSupreme Court affirmed the conviction but wrote three separate opinions. The pluralityopinion found that neither the defense of entrapment nor the defense of outrageous conductwas available to the defendant because the defendant was predisposed to commit the crime. The plurality opinion stated, "If the police engage in illegal activity in concert with adefendant beyond the scope of their duties[,] the remedy lies[] not in freeing the equallyculpable defendant[] but in prosecuting the police under the applicable provisions of state orfederal law." Hampton, 425 U.S. at 489, 48 L. Ed. 2d 113, 96 S. Ct. at 1650 (pluralityopinion of Rehnquist, J., joined by Burger and White, JJ.). Two justices concurred in theresult but refused to foreclose the possibility of the fundamental-fairness defense even wherepredisposition is shown. Hampton, 425 U.S. at 491-95, 48 L. Ed. 2d 113, 96 S. Ct. at 1650-53 (Powell, J., concurring, joined by Blackmun, J.). On the other hand, the dissentingjustices believed that the behavior of the law enforcement officials was sufficiently offensiveto bar a conviction. Hampton, 425 U.S. at 495-500, 48 L. Ed. 2d 113, 96 S. Ct. at 1653-55(Brennan, J., dissenting, joined by Stewart and Marshall, JJ.). Accordingly, Hampton standsfor the proposition that even though proof of predisposition to commit a crime will bar theapplication of the entrapment defense, fundamental fairness will not permit any defendantto be convicted of a crime in which police conduct is outrageous. See United States v.Twigg, 588 F.2d 373, 378-79 (3^rd Cir. 1978).

The outrageous-conduct defense is distinct from the entrapment defense because whilethe entrapment defense looks to the state of mind of the defendant in order to determinewhether he or she was predisposed to commit the crime being prosecuted (Jacobson v.United States, 503 U.S. 540, 118 L. Ed. 2d 174, 112 S. Ct. 1535, 1540 (1992)), theoutrageous-conduct defense looks at the government's behavior. See United States v.Gamble, 737 F.2d 853, 858 (10^th Cir. 1984). The defense of outrageous conduct is premisedupon the notion that the due process clause imposes limits upon how far the government cango in detecting crime irrespective of the character of the target. See People v. Hirsch, 221Ill. App. 3d 772, 779, 582 N.E.2d 1228, 1232 (1991). We are cognizant that "[t]he bannerof outrageous misconduct is often raised but seldom saluted" (United States v. Santana, 6F.3d 1, 4 (1^st Cir. 1993)) and that one circuit of the United States Court of Appeals hasdeclared the defense dead (United States v. Boyd, 55 F.3d. 239 (7^th Cir. 1995)). In addressingwhether or not the doctrine is valid, the Boyd court stated:

"Today we let the other shoe drop, and [we] hold that the doctrine does not exist inthis circuit. The gravity of the prosecutors' misconduct is relevant only insofar as itmay shed light on the materiality of the infringement of the defendants' rights; it maysupport, but it can never compel, an inference that the prosecutors resorted toimproper tactics because they were justifiably fearful that without such tactics thedefendants might be acquitted." Boyd, 55 F.3d at 241.

First, we point out that decisions of United States district courts and courts of appeal are notbinding on Illinois courts. See City of Chicago v. Groffman, 68 Ill. 2d 112, 118, 368 N.E.2d891, 894 (1977). Second, it is noteworthy that Boyd dealt with prosecutorial misconduct,while the instant case deals instead with the alleged misconduct of an undercover drug agent. Finally, we disagree with the Boyd court's holding that the doctrine is dead. Contrary to theholding in Boyd, the fact remains that most jurisdictions at least acknowledge that such adefense exists.

For example, United States v. Mosley, 965 F.2d 906, 909 (10^th Cir. 1992), cited casesfrom 11 circuits, all of which agreed that the defense of outrageous conduct exists. SeveralIllinois cases have discussed the defense of outrageous government conduct with respect toundercover drug officers and recognize its validity, including People v. D'Angelo, 223 Ill.App. 3d 754, 585 N.E.2d 1239 (1992), decided by the Fifth District. The D'Angelo courtfound that because defendant failed to raise the issue of outrageous conduct in his posttrialmotion, the issue was waived, but the court legitimized the defense by stating, "In any event,we do not believe that the conduct of the government agents in this case is so outrageous thatit violates fundamental fairness or shocks the conscience." D'Angelo, 223 Ill. App. 3d at 782,585 N.E.2d at 1257. In both People v. Johnson, 123 Ill. App. 3d 363, 462 N.E.2d 948(1984), and People ex rel. Difanis v. Boston, 92 Ill. App. 3d 962, 416 N.E.2d 333 (1981), thedefense of outrageous governmental conduct was recognized as a separate defense from thatof entrapment. However, none of those courts believed that the conduct complained of roseto the level of outrageousness necessary to bar the action or exclude evidence. In fact, noIllinois case has yet to find outrageous government conduct sufficient to bar the prosecutionof the defendant; on the other hand, no Illinois case has denied the doctrine's validity. Afterconsidering the historical perspective of the doctrine, we hold that it is a valid defense inIllinois. We now must consider whether the doctrine is applicable to the facts of the instantcase.

Whether the circumstances of a case demonstrate outrageous government conduct isa question of law for the court to decide. See People v. Johnson, 123 Ill. App. 3d 363, 373-74, 462 N.E.2d 948, 955 (1984). A defendant can raise the defense of outrageous conductif the government was overly involved in the creation of a crime or if the governmentcoerced the defendant into participating. See United States v. Mosley, 965 F.2d 906, 912(10^th Cir. 1992). Whether or not conduct is outrageous must be determined on an ad hocbasis and cannot be reduced to a specific formula. See United States v. Santana, 6 F.3d 1,6 (1993).

In reaching its determination that outrageousness must be applied on a case-by-casebasis, the Santana court reviewed the lower court's seven-part test, which was devised to beapplied in situations in which it is alleged that the conduct of a drug enforcement agent wasso outrageous that a defendant's due process rights were violated. The test directed courtsto consider (1) the type of drug furnished, (2) the sample's potency or purity, (3) the size ofthe sample, (4) whether the defendant requested the sample, (5) whether or not the drugswere recovered, (6) what likely happened to the drugs, and (7) whether the sample itselfconstitutes the corpus delicti of the crime charged. Santana, 6 F.3d at 6. While the Santanacourt appreciated the district court's efforts to structure such a test, it found that "there issimply no way to reduce the myriad [of] combinations of potentially relevant circumstancesto a neat list of weighted factors without losing too much in the translation." Santana, 6 F.3dat 6. We agree with the Santana court that there is no universal litmus test for a court toutilize to determine whether or not conduct is outrageous. The seven factors listed above,as well as other tests devised, such as the Drug Enforcement Administration's guidelines,described in a footnote in Santana (6 F.3d at 6 n.8), are a good place to start in drug cases,but each case must be judged on its own facts. Ultimately, the outrageousness of a policeofficer's actions must be evaluated by (1) taking into account the totality of the relevantcircumstances (Santana, 6 F.3d at 7) and (2) considering whether or not the totality of thecircumstances show misconduct of such a nature that it violates fundamental fairness and isshocking to our universal sense of justice. See Russell, 411 U.S. at 432, 36 L. Ed. 2d at 366,93 S. Ct. at 1643.

The practicalities of drug enforcement require that on some occasions, law officerswill need to supply some item of value. See Russell, 411 U.S. at 432, 36 L. Ed. 2d at 374,93 S. Ct. at 1643. The general rule is that the government may supply drugs to a suspect inthe course of a drug investigation. See Hampton, 425 U.S. at 491, 48 L. Ed. 2d 113, 96 S.Ct. at 1650. Several courts have held that providing a known addict a small quantity of drugsin order to facilitate the progress of an undercover agent's work does not constituteoutrageous misconduct. See United States v. Harris, 997 F.2d 812, 817-19 (10^th Cir. 1993);United States v. Barrera-Moreno, 951 F.2d 1089, 1092 (9^th Cir. 1991); United States v. Ford,918 F.2d 1343, 1349-50 (8^th Cir. 1990). In Ford, the defendant testified at the trial that hehad been involved with drugs for 30 years and was a heroin addict. During the course ofundercover police operations, the government supplied small amounts of both cocaine andheroin to the defendant in order to "create trust and facilitate the undercover relationship." Ford, 918 F.2d at 1347. The Ford court held "that an undercover officer's providing a knownaddict with small quantities of drugs to facilitate and enhance the undercover relationshipdoes not constitute outrageous conduct." Ford, 918 F.2d at 1350. We agree with the Fordcourt's analysis that providing a small amount of drugs to a known addict in order to maintaineffective enforcement activities per se is not shocking to our sense of justice.

One of the few cases to actually advance the defense of outrageous police misconductfrom pure theory to reality is United States v. Twigg, 588 F.2d 373 (3^rd Cir. 1978), which isdistinguishable from the case before us. In Twigg, a government informant suggested theestablishment of a laboratory to manufacture "speed." The government supplied a chemicalused to make the drug, made arrangements with chemical supply houses to provide the otheringredients, and provided the production site, and a government agent was completely incharge of the operation. Thus, Twigg involved an egregious case of governmentoverinvolvement in which the government's undercover operative essentially concocted andconducted the entire illicit scheme. The Twigg court characterized the police conduct as "sooverreaching as to bar prosecution of the defendants as a matter of due process of law." Twigg, 588 F.2d at 377. In a footnote, the Twigg court stated:

"We are adhering to Justice Powell's reasoning [in Hampton] that in evaluatingwhether government conduct is outrageous, the court must consider the nature of thecrime and the tools available to law enforcement agencies to combat it." Twigg, 588F.2d at 378 n.6.

Unlike Twigg, which dealt with manufacturing operations, the instant case deals with the saleof drugs.

Malone testified that after the first transaction, defendant insisted that Malone givehim some drugs out of the bag, for introducing Malone to Goodman. Finally, Malonerelented and allowed defendant to take some cocaine out of the bag, but Malone did not seedefendant actually consume the cocaine. Malone insisted that defendant received cocaineonly after the first transaction. Later, Malone paid defendant $50 for defendant'sparticipation in the transactions. On the other hand, defendant testified that Malone gave hima few lines of cocaine out of the bag after each transaction. A complete review ofdefendant's testimony shows that he was less than credible, but whether it happened on onlyone occasion or on four occasions would not change our determination. Even defendantagreed that he was only given cocaine after the crime was already committed and that it wasnever more than a few lines. The tape recordings made during the course of the transactionsdid not show that Malone was the initiator, and overall, the record does not show thatdefendant was reluctant to commit the crime. Malone was not overly involved, nor did hecoerce defendant into participating.

We will assume for purposes of this appeal that defendant was, in fact, an addict. Aspreviously stated, providing a small amount of drugs to an addict in order to aid the progressof undercover operations does not shock our conscience. While we do not condone it, wecannot say that because it happened, defendant is entitled to have the charges against himdismissed. Nevertheless, we do not excuse Agent Malone's lack of forthrightness aboutgiving defendant cocaine. The remedy, however, lies not in freeing defendant but inprosecuting Malone for perjury, if such a charge can be proven, or in disciplining Malonethrough internal affairs. See Hampton, 425 U.S. at 490, 48 L. Ed. 2d 113, 96 S. Ct. at 1650. At the time of the hearing on defendant's motion to dismiss, Malone was already underinvestigation by internal affairs based upon information provided by defense counsel. Nevertheless, in citing the plurality opinion in Hampton, we do not mean to imply that ifpresented with the same factual scenario as Hampton, we would necessarily affirm. Thefacts in Hampton were more offensive than the facts of the instant case, because in Hamptonthe government actually supplied the heroin ultimately sold by the defendant to anundercover agent. Under the facts of the instant case, however, it would not have beenappropriate to dismiss the charges against defendant because of the actions of Malone.

We hold that the defense of outrageous police conduct is a valid defense. However,its application is not warranted under the facts of the instant case. Should the proper factualsituation arise, courts should apply the doctrine of outrageous police misconduct and dismissthe charges against a defendant. In our civilized society, the government cannot be allowedto become criminal in combating crime.

For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the circuit court of Johnson County ishereby affirmed.

Affirmed.

KUEHN, J., concurs.

JUSTICE RARICK, specially concurring:

Although I am compelled to concur with the majority decision, I write separately toexpress my profound distaste for the unprofessional and totally inappropriate conduct of theundercover agent in this instance, conduct that I would condemn.