Defendant, Winifred L. Moss, was arrested for possession of a controlled substance. Defendant filed a motion to suppress evidence, which the circuit court of Saline Countygranted. The State appeals pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 604(a)(1) (188 Ill. 2d R.604(a)(1)). We affirm.

On November 8, 2002, at approximately 4 p.m., Illinois Secretary of State PoliceInvestigator Lowe stopped a truck driven by John Sanders for a speeding violation. Defendantowned the truck and was seated in the passenger seat. A third man, Shawn McGee, sat in themiddle.

Prior to approaching the vehicle, Lowe called in the license plate and was cautioned thatthe registered owner of the truck was a parolee. Lowe requested identification from all threemen and returned to his squad car to run checks on each of them. Lowe was told that bothdefendant and Sanders had drug-related criminal histories. Illinois State Trooper Boylesoverheard the information and offered his assistance to Lowe. Boyles was already aware ofdefendant's prior record and was personally aware of McGee's recent arrest for a gun violation. Lowe accepted his offer. After verifying that Sanders' license was valid even though brokenin two, Lowe returned to defendant's truck. By this time, Sanders had exited the vehicle. Loweinformed Sanders he needed to get a new license and then told him he was going to issue hima speeding ticket. Lowe returned to his squad car and began writing the ticket. Boyles arrivedat the scene as Lowe was exiting his squad car after writing the ticket. Lowe then askeddefendant for permission to search the truck, which defendant gave. Lowe next asked McGeeand defendant to exit the vehicle. McGee stood with Sanders in front of the truck, anddefendant walked to the rear, where he met Boyles. Lowe did a brief pat-down search ofSanders and McGee without asking permission and then searched the truck. Boyles conducteda pat-down of defendant at the same time. The pat-down revealed a hard object, slightly largerthan two nine-volt batteries, in defendant's crotch area. Concerned that the object might be aweapon, Boyles asked defendant what the object was. Defendant refused to answer. Boylesthen asked defendant to open his pants so he could remove the object. Defendant reached inhis pants and withdrew a package containing two rocks of cocaine and a powdery substance. Defendant was placed under arrest for unlawful possession of a controlled substance.

Defendant filed a motion to suppress the evidence. The court granted the motionbecause the evidence had been discovered as a result of a warrantless pat-down of defendant'sperson that was not supported by reasonable suspicion. The court concluded that Lowe hadbased the frisk of Sanders and McGee not on any particular observation but on procedure fromgeneral past experiences and safety reasons. Lowe admitted that other than the occupants'criminal histories there was no specific information or behavior which caused him to believethey were going to be a danger to him. Boyles also did not have any information, nor had heobserved anything, which caused him concern for his safety or caused him to believe that themen were committing any offenses other than speeding. Prior to starting the pat-down, Boylesdid not observe any bulges on defendant which gave rise to any suspicion that there might besomething under his clothing. Boyles admitted he conducted the frisk because he did not takeany chances and he always checked everyone who is out of the vehicle, even if the driver hasbeen stopped for only a traffic violation.

The State argues on appeal that the trial court erred in granting defendant's motion tosuppress evidence. The State asserts that the cocaine had been discovered as a consequenceof an appropriate search conducted for purposes of officer safety. We agree with defendantthat the frisk was conducted without reasonable suspicion that defendant was armed anddangerous.

A motion to suppress evidence generally presents mixed questions of law and fact. Areviewing court accords great deference to the factual findings of the trial court but considersde novo the ultimate determination whether to grant or deny the motion to suppress. Peoplev. Cox, 202 Ill. 2d 462, 465-66, 782 N.E.2d 275, 278 (2002). When the ruling involvesprimarily factual determinations and assessments of credibility, the trial court's ruling will notbe disturbed unless it is manifestly erroneous. People v. Gonzalez, 204 Ill. 2d 220, 223, 789N.E.2d 260, 263 (2003).

The fourth amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees the "right of thepeople to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searchesand seizures." U.S. Const., amend. IV. This provision applies to all seizures of the person,including seizures that involve only a brief detention that falls short of a traditional arrest. Gonzalez, 204 Ill. 2d at 225, 789 N.E.2d at 264; Cox, 202 Ill. 2d at 466, 782 N.E.2d at 278. Because a vehicle stop constitutes a seizure of the vehicle's occupants, a vehicle stop istherefore subject to the fourth amendment requirement of reasonableness. People v. Bunch,207 Ill. 2d 7, 13, 796 N.E.2d 1024, 1029 (2003); Gonzalez, 204 Ill. 2d at 226, 789 N.E.2d at265. The reasonableness of a traffic stop is analyzed under Terry principles (Terry v. Ohio,392 U.S. 1, 20 L. Ed. 2d 889, 88 S. Ct. 1868 (1968)), because a traffic stop is more analogousto a Terry investigative stop than to a formal arrest. Bunch, 207 Ill. 2d at 13-14, 796 N.E.2dat 1029; Gonzalez, 204 Ill. 2d at 226, 789 N.E.2d at 265. Therefore, in addition to therequirement that the conduct constituting the stop be justified at its inception, the policeofficer's action must be reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which justified theinterference in the first place. Cox, 202 Ill. 2d at 467, 782 N.E.2d at 278-79.

Here, no issue exists regarding the lawfulness of the initial stop of the vehicle. Whena police officer observes a driver commit a traffic violation, the officer is justified in brieflydetaining the driver to investigate the violation. Cox, 202 Ill. 2d at 468, 782 N.E.2d at 279. The officer may perform some initial inquiries and check the driver's license, but if no furthersuspicion is aroused in the officer, the traffic stop should go no further. Rather, the officershould issue a warning ticket or citation, as appropriate, and allow the driver to leave. Cox, 202Ill. 2d at 468, 782 N.E.2d at 279. " '[A]n investigative detention must be temporary and last nolonger than is necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop. Similarly, the investigativemethods employed should be the least intrusive means reasonably available to verify or dispelthe officer's suspicion in a short period of time.' [Citation.]" Gonzalez, 204 Ill. 2d at 233, 789N.E.2d at 269. What we must analyze here, therefore, is the officers' conduct following theinitial stop. Lowe's request for identification was facially innocuous and did not impermissiblyprolong the length of the detention or change the fundamental nature of the stop. See Peoplev. Harris, 207 Ill. 2d 515, 524, 802 N.E.2d 219, 225-26 (2003); Gonzalez, 204 Ill. 2d at 236,789 N.E.2d at 270. It is also well established that following a lawful traffic stop, the policemay order the driver and any passengers out of the vehicle pending the completion of the stop,without violating the protections of the fourth amendment. Bunch, 207 Ill. 2d at 14-15, 796N.E.2d at 1029; People v. Sorenson, 196 Ill. 2d 425, 433, 752 N.E.2d 1078, 1084 (2001). A stop for a minor traffic violation does not justify a general search of the vehicle, however,and, without more, does not provide a reasonable basis for believing that an occupant is armedand dangerous. People v. Robinson, 322 Ill. App. 3d 169, 175, 748 N.E.2d 739, 744 (2001). An officer's authority to investigate may not become a subterfuge to obtain other evidence ofcriminal activity merely based on the officer's suspicion or curiosity. Robinson, 322 Ill. App.3d at 175, 748 N.E.2d at 744. On the other hand, when the officer reasonably believes that hissafety is in danger, he may conduct a limited search or frisk of an individual for weapons. People v. Flowers, 179 Ill. 2d 257, 262, 688 N.E.2d 626, 629 (1997); Robinson, 322 Ill. App.3d at 175, 748 N.E.2d at 745. The officer conducting the frisk must be able to point tospecific, articulable facts that, when taken together with natural inferences, reasonably warrantthe intrusion. Flowers, 179 Ill. 2d at 264, 688 N.E.2d at 630. The officers here could not doso. The evidence presented at the suppression hearing failed to establish any facts which wouldsupport a reasonable belief that defendant was armed and dangerous. Both officers candidlyadmitted that they did not have any reason to believe that defendant was armed. Defendant didnot appear to be nervous or acting strange, and Boyles observed no suspicious bulges beforestarting the pat-down. Rather, the pat-down was a general precautionary measure on Boyles'part. Likewise, nothing occurred during the stop to allow Lowe to legally expand the scope ofthe stop into a drug investigation. Neither of the officers testified that the odor of drugs wasdetected or that the occupants appeared to be under the influence of drugs or that drugparaphernalia or drugs were visible. Lowe's decision to search the vehicle and its occupantswas based solely on the occupants' criminal histories. That information provided no more thana hunch that drugs might be found. Hunches, however, are insufficient to establish reasonablesuspicion. Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 123-24, 145 L. Ed. 2d 570, 576, 120 S. Ct. 673,676 (2000).

The State counters that defendant consented to such searches when he accepted theterms of his parole. The State further asserts that, in the case of parolees and probationers, anindividual's reasonable expectation of privacy under the fourth amendment is significantlylimited by the supervisory relationship and restrictions imposed by the state. See UnitedStates v. Jones, 152 F.3d 680, 686 (7th Cir. 1998). While recognizing this fact, the trial courtconcluded that consent is not automatically given by a parolee upon the signing of thedocument describing the parole conditions. We agree with the conclusion of the trial court. The Illinois Supreme Court in People v. Lampitok, 207 Ill. 2d 231, 798 N.E.2d 91(2003), held that a search of a probationer upon no individualized suspicion is constitutionallyunreasonable and that agreeing to a probation order does not constitute a prospective consentto all probation searches or a waiver of all fourth amendment rights. Lampitok, 207 Ill. 2d at252, 262, 798 N.E.2d at 105, 110. The court further stated there was no constitutionallysignificant difference between the status of parolees and the status of probationers for fourthamendment purposes. Lampitok, 207 Ill. 2d at 256 n.1, 798 N.E.2d at 107 n.1. Defendant'sparole status might have reduced his expectation of privacy, but it did not eliminate it entirely. The "special needs" associated with the probation and parole systems might justify departuresfrom the usual warrant and probable-cause requirements, but the permissible impingement ona parolee's privacy is not unlimited. Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 873-75, 97 L. Ed. 2d709, 717-18, 107 S. Ct. 3164, 3168-69 (1987). No case purports to authorize substantialinvasions of the privacy of a probationer or parolee without any suspicion of individualizedwrongdoing whatsoever, and we decline to so extend the law. Neither Lowe nor Boyles hadany reasonable suspicion that defendant was engaged in criminal activity. Consequently, we,too, conclude that the search of defendant was unreasonable.

For the aforementioned reasons, we affirm the order of the circuit court of SalineCounty.

Affirmed.

JUSTICE KUEHN, specially concurring:

I write to address several of the observations expressed by our esteemed colleague inhis dissent from today's decision.

It is important to understand that the detention required to issue John Sanders (Sanders)a speeding citation became unlawful long before any reason to conduct pat-down searchesmight have reasonably developed. The speeding ticket was written, and the reason for anyfurther detention was over, before anyone even thought of conducting a pat-down search.

When Officer Lowe (Lowe) obtained identification from the defendant, a passenger,and proceeded to run a criminal history check on him, he exceeded the scope of the trafficstop. See People v. Harris, 207 Ill. 2d 515, 802 N.E.2d 219 (2003) (warrant checksconducted on a passenger's identification changed the fundamental nature of a minor trafficstop and exceeded the scope of the initial detention in violation of the fourth amendment). After conducting a probe into the criminality of the traffic offender's passengers, Lowe wroteup Sanders' speeding ticket. At that point, no further detention was necessary or warranted inorder to fulfill the lawful reason for detention. However, Lowe again veered from the businessat hand. Instead of giving Sanders his ticket and sending him on his way, Lowe asked forpermission to conduct a search of the vehicle. His request further prolonged the detentionbeyond the legal detention authorized by the probable cause that Sanders' heavy foot hadprovided. See People v. Gonzalez, 204 Ill. 2d 220, 789 N.E.2d 260 (2003). Simply put, hadthe officers afforded the captive threesome their fourth amendment rights, there would havebeen no need whatsoever to frisk for weapons.

Our colleague writes, "I believe that a pat-down of the three men was objectivelyreasonable and was warranted under all existing precedent." Slip op. at 11. He no doubt feelsthat the circumstances facing Lowe and Illinois State Trooper Boyles (Boyles) would causemost other law enforcement officers to feel endangered. Conversely, he must believe thatLowe and Boyles were both unreasonable to think otherwise.

Whether an officer possesses safety concerns sufficient to warrant a pat-down searchis a circumstance measured by the facts known to the officer at the time. The question iswhether the officer can articulate facts which would lead someone to reasonably suspect thata detainee might be armed and dangerous. The dissent answers this question affirmativelybecause of the officers' knowledge of their detainees' criminal histories. With all due respect,I can think of no case that permits the search of someone's person because of familiarity withhis or her past misconduct. The suspicion must arise from current observations in the conductor behavior of the detainee, not the detainee's mere status as someone who possesses a pastcriminal tendency.

In an effort to heighten the objectively reasonable police officer's fear factor, thedissent tells us that "darkness" was "quickly approaching" at 4 p.m. on November 8, 2002. Slipop. at 11. That may have been the case on the streets of Juneau, Alaska, but on the byways ofSaline County, Illinois, where this stop occurred, there was probably close to an hour ofdaylight remaining by the time that Lowe finished writing Sanders his speeding ticket. Bothofficers were able to observe all of their detainees' behavior in God's good sunlight. And theirobservations revealed nothing that gave rise to any fear or suspicion of danger, reasonable orotherwise. This is not a conclusion that I reach from the facts that the arresting officerspresented. This was the officers' testimony-their collective belief based upon theirobservations at the time of the stop.

More importantly, both officers plainly testified that the pat-down searches werenothing more than routine procedure before conducting a consent search of the vehicle. Theyapparently do it all the time as a matter of protocol.

Our colleague suggests that routine pat-down searches are constitutionally permissible. He thinks that the noninvasive nature of a pat-down search makes it "permissible as a matterof routine" (slip op. at 11) rather than a matter requiring just cause. He then writes:

"Following a prescribed routine with every suspect who is removed from a vehicleduring a traffic stop is a prudent, sensible course of action for a police officer tofollow. Such a procedure is not invasive and helps guarantee the safety of the policeofficers serving and protecting the rest of us. We should support basic routine safetyprecautions on the part of those officers, so that they and we can be assured that theywill return safely to their homes and families at the end of their shifts." Slip op. at 11.

We do support police conduct designed to ensure officer safety. That support isprovided in a manner consistent with the privacy rights of our citizenry. If there is reason tofeel endangered, to suspect harm, the constitution permits a pat-down search for weapons. However, the constitution does not allow pat-down searches of traffic offenders as anunvarying or habitual method of police procedure. Nor should it.

Perhaps our colleague has never found himself in a situation where he had to submit toa pat-down search. Anyone who has ever experienced a trained officer's attempt to detectconcealed weapons through a thorough search of the outer clothing would not consider itnoninvasive. Pat-down searches, while less intrusive than strip searches, constitute asubstantial invasion of personal privacy. Our colleague might well note where Boyles' handswere when he discovered the contraband in this case.

There is nothing "sensible," much less constitutional, about "[f]ollowing a prescribedroutine" (slip op. at 11) that requires every traffic offender to spread-eagle for a weaponssearch. Indeed, it is decidedly unreasonable to think that officers should grope the underarms,upper thighs, and crotch of every person, male and female, whom they stop for speeding. Because I believe that the promise of freedom from unreasonable searches and seizuresprotects people from having their bodies routinely probed during traffic stops, I speciallyconcur.

I specially concur.

I respectfully dissent. The validity of a weapons pat-down conducted during a validinvestigatory stop is assessed by an objective standard. People v. Flowers, 179 Ill. 2d 257,264 (1997). The question is whether a reasonably prudent person in the circumstances wouldbe warranted in the belief that his safety or that of others was in danger. Flowers, 179 Ill. 2dat 264. Although the standard is an objective one, the officer's subjective belief regarding thesafety of the situation is one of the factors that may be considered in determining whether theweapons pat-down was valid under Terry. Flowers, 179 Ill. 2d at 264.

In the case at bar, Trooper Boyles' subjective belief regarding the safety of the situationmight not have warranted the pat-down of the defendant. However, the officer's subjectivebelief is not dispositive. Flowers, 179 Ill. 2d at 264. Even giving Trooper Boyles' subjectivebelief its due weight, I believe that an objective evaluation of the circumstances of this casedemonstrates that the pat-down was warranted under all existing precedent, that the evidenceseized could reasonably have been construed during the pat-down to be a weapon, and that theevidence should not have been suppressed.

The testimony adduced before the trial court demonstrates that the two officers presentat the scene of the traffic stop were dealing with three men the officers knew to have criminalhistories-one of the men was a parolee and another of the men had been arrested very recentlyfor a gun violation. Furthermore, it was past 4 p.m. in early November, with darkness quicklyapproaching. One officer was to watch the three men while the other officer, with thepermission of the defendant, searched the truck, an entirely separate task that placed both thesearching officer and the guarding officer in compromising positions. Under thesecircumstances I believe that a pat-down of the three men was objectively reasonable and waswarranted under all existing precedent. I also believe that given the size of the objectdiscovered on the person of the defendant during the pat-down and given the testimony ofTrooper Boyles, that object could easily have been construed to be a weapon. I conclude,accordingly, that the removal of the object from the defendant's person was warranted. Thus,the discovery that the object was in fact two rocks of cocaine was legitimate, and the evidenceshould not have been suppressed.

I note as well that I believe it is important to distinguish between a full search of asuspect's person, which I agree should require that the officer reasonably believe that his orher safety is in danger, and a simple pat-down such as occurred in this case, which I believeshould be permissible as a matter of routine. Following a prescribed routine with everysuspect who is removed from a vehicle during a traffic stop is a prudent, sensible course ofaction for a police officer to follow. Such a procedure is not invasive and helps guarantee thesafety of the police officers serving and protecting the rest of us. We should support basicroutine safety precautions on the part of those officers, so that they and we can be assured thatthey will return safely to their homes and families at the end of their shifts.