JUSTICE HOPKINS delivered the opinion of the court:

Floyd E. Murphy (defendant) appeals from convictions of predatory criminal sexualassault of a child (720 ILCS 5/12-14.1 (West 1998)) and aggravated criminal sexual abuse(720 ILCS 5/12-16(c)(1)(i) (West 1998)). Defendant claims that he was deprived of a fairtrial due to the admission of hearsay evidence concerning the child victim's statements madeto a police officer and the child's mother. Defendant also argues that the trial court abusedits discretion when sentencing defendant because the court failed to take into account certainmitigating factors. Additionally, defendant argues that he is entitled to credit for time servedin jail prior to posting bond. The State concedes that defendant is entitled to credit for timeserved. Finally, defendant argues that under the recent United States Supreme Court caseof Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 147 L. Ed. 2d 435, 120 S. Ct. 2348 (2000), hisconsecutive sentences must be vacated and the cause remanded for resentencing because thefacts that increased his sentence from concurrent to consecutive terms of imprisonment werenot charged in the charging instrument or submitted to the jury for proof beyond areasonable doubt. We affirm on all issues, except we modify defendant's sentence to includecredit for time served.

The victim in this case (P.C.) was 10 years old when she alleged that defendantmolested her. P.C., her sister, and her mother lived next door to defendant's family. Beforethe jury trial, the State notified defendant, pursuant to section 115-10 of the Code ofCriminal Procedure of 1963 (Code) (725 ILCS 5/115-10 (West 1998)), that it intended tointroduce statements P.C. made to Detective Brian Thomas. Thereafter, a reliability hearingwas held, in which Detective Thomas testified. P.C. did not testify at the reliability hearing. The trial court determined that the time, contents, and circumstances of P.C.'s statements toDetective Thomas were sufficiently reliable to allow him to testify about those statements.

At the trial, P.C. testified that on October 18, 1997, P.C., her sister, defendant's wife(Rebecca), the neighbors' children (Christian, Raymond, and Katie), and defendant were inthe living room of defendant's home watching movies for several hours before the incidentoccurred. In the record, Christian is also referred to as "Christina" by certain witnesses. Forease of reading, we will simply refer to the child as Christian. P.C. testified that she fellasleep on the living room floor next to Raymond and Christian. She testified that Raymondwas lying on the floor between her and the couch, where defendant was lying. P.C.acknowledged that when she spoke to Detective Thomas in the early morning hours afterthe incident, she described the sleeping positions of the various people differently, statingthat Raymond was on the couch with defendant and that Christian was lying on a recliner.

At the trial, P.C. testified that after she fell asleep, defendant woke her up when hepulled the pillow from underneath her, stuck his finger in her, and kissed her "boobs." P.C.testified that when defendant did this, he told her not to tell anyone. P.C. then tolddefendant that she had to use the bathroom. She testified that she went into the bathroom,straightened her clothing, and then went into Rebecca's room to tell her what happened. P.C. testified that when she was talking to Rebecca, she was crying, upset, and scared. P.C.testified that Rebecca immediately went into the living room, where defendant was lying onthe couch, pretending to be asleep. P.C. testified that defendant denied P.C.'s allegations,and then he left. P.C. and Rebecca went to P.C.'s house to tell her mother (Glenda) what hadhappened, and then Rebecca, P.C., and Glenda went to the police station. P.C. testified thatafter she talked to the police officer, she went to the hospital. P.C. identified defendant asthe person who molested her.

On cross-examination, P.C. again testified that defendant lifted up her top and kissedher breasts, unbuttoned her pants, and placed his finger in her "private part." P.C. alsotestified on cross-examination that she told the nurse at the emergency room the samesequence of events.

Rebecca's testimony corroborated P.C.'s testimony.

P.C.'s mother, Glenda, testified that during the early morning hours of October 18,1997, Rebecca and P.C. came to her house. Glenda testified that Rebecca told her that theyneeded to go to the police station because defendant had "hurt" P.C. At this time, P.C. wascrying and shaking. Glenda testified that she went with Rebecca and P.C. to the policestation and that she stayed with P.C. during the first part of the interview with DetectiveThomas and a policewoman. Glenda testified that Detective Thomas asked P.C. what hadhappened. Glenda stated, "[P.C.] wouldn't really say anything, so they told her that shecould whisper it in my ear and then I could tell them [what she said]." Glenda describedwhat P.C. whispered to her: "[Defendant] held his hand on her mouth, and he licked herboobs, and then he put his hands down in her pants, and that's all she said." After Glendatold the police officers what P.C. whispered, Glenda left the interview room at DetectiveThomas's request. After P.C. talked to the officers alone, Glenda took her to the hospitalemergency room.

On cross-examination, Glenda repeated her testimony regarding the statements P.C.whispered to her at the police station during the interview with Detective Thomas.

Detective Thomas testified that when he first asked P.C. about what had happened,she was reluctant to talk to him, so he asked P.C. to tell her mother what had happened. According to Detective Thomas, P.C. whispered something into her mother's ear, and thenher mother told him, "[Defendant] held his hand on her mouth, and he licked her boobs, andthen he put his hands down in her pants." Detective Thomas testified that he explained toP.C. that he understood that she did not want to talk to him about the incident but that heneeded to hear it from her and not just from her mother. Detective Thomas testified that hethen interviewed P.C. without her mother present, and she told him the same sequence ofevents that she related earlier through her mother.

Dr. Wroten McQuirter testified that he was the doctor on call at the emergency roomwhen P.C. and her mother arrived. Dr. McQuirter described what P.C. said when he askedher what had happened:

"[S]he was at a neighbor's house, um, and that she had been laying [sic] on the floorasleep, and about two o'clock or so she was awakened from sleep by [defendant] and[defendant] had put his left hand across her mouth and had opened her pants with hisright hand and had digitally manipulated her genitals."

Dr. McQuirter testified that when he performed a vaginal examination on P.C., he found alesion and discoloration on P.C.'s vaginal area and that his physical findings were consistentwith the type of abuse she described.

Gail Meiling, a clinical counselor, testified for the defense that she interviewed P.C.about four months after the incident. Meiling testified that P.C. was very hesitant to talk toher but that P.C. finally told her that on the night of the incident, she was sleeping on thefloor next to defendant, who was on the couch. According to Meiling, P.C. told her that shewas awakened by defendant grabbing her and pulling her up onto the couch, where heunbuttoned her pants and stuck his finger down her pants. Meiling described P.C.'sstatement made during the interview with her as "remarkably consistent" with P.C.'sstatements made before that interview.

Defendant was convicted of both predatory criminal sexual assault and aggravatedcriminal sexual abuse. The presentence report filed for defendant's sentencing hearingindicated that defendant was 35 years old at the time of the offense, that he had no priorcriminal convictions, that he was the father of two children (ages seven and four), and thathe was employed as a laborer. At the sentencing hearing, a child therapist, Judith Durham,testified that she counseled P.C. about 50 times prior to the hearing. Durham testified aboutthe adverse side effects P.C. was experiencing as a result of the sexual abuse.

On July 26, 1999, the trial judge entered a verbal order in which he explaineddefendant's sentence and the various factors he used in setting the appropriate punishmentfor defendant. The judge found as mitigating factors defendant's lack of a criminal historyand his ability to financially compensate the victim, and the judge found as aggravatingfactors the necessity to deter others from similar crimes, defendant's lack of remorse, and thegravity of the offense. Defendant was eligible for a prison sentence of 6 to 30 years for theClass X felony of predatory criminal sexual assault and three to seven years for the Class 2felony of aggravated criminal sexual abuse. The trial court sentenced defendant toconsecutive terms of 10 years' imprisonment for the predatory criminal sexual assaultconviction and five years' imprisonment on the aggravated criminal sexual abuse conviction.

Defendant filed a motion to reconsider his sentence, alleging that his sentence wasimproper because the trial court failed to consider certain mitigating factors, includingdefendant's family situation and defendant's potential for rehabilitation. The trial courtdenied the motion to reconsider sentence, and this appeal followed.

Defendant argues that he was deprived of a fair trial where Glenda, P.C.'s mother,testified about statements P.C. whispered to her at the police station. Defendant contendsthat Glenda's testimony, which involved P.C.'s out-of-court statements about sexual abuseby defendant, entitled him to a hearing outside the presence of the jury, pursuant to section115-10, and that the hearing should have been held prior to Glenda's testimony, so that thecourt could determine the reliability of those statements. Defendant claims that since thestatements were admitted without the necessary hearing, we must reverse his convictions andremand for a new trial.

Section 115-10 provides, in pertinent part, as follows:

"(a) In a prosecution for a physical or sexual act perpetrated upon or againsta child under the age of 13 *** at the time the act was committed, including but notlimited to prosecutions for violations of Sections 12-13 through 12-16 of theCriminal Code of 1961 ***, the following evidence shall be admitted as an exceptionto the hearsay rule:

(1) testimony by the victim of an out of court statement made by thevictim that he or she complained of such act to another; and

(2) testimony of an out of court statement made by the victimdescribing any complaint of such act or matter or *** offense which is thesubject of a prosecution for a sexual or physical act against that victim.

(b) Such testimony shall only be admitted if:

(1) The court finds in a hearing conducted outside the presence of thejury that the time, content, and circumstances of the statement providesufficient safeguards of reliability; and

(2) The child *** either:

(A) testifies at the proceeding; or

(B) is unavailable as a witness and there is corroborativeevidence of the act which is the subject of the statement; and

(3) In a case involving an offense perpetrated against a child under theage of 13, the out of court statement was made before the victim attained 13years of age or within 3 months after the commission of the offense,whichever occurs later, but the statement may be admitted regardless of theage of the victim at the time of the proceeding." 725 ILCS 5/115-10 (West1998).

The State responds that defendant has waived his right to our review of this issue byhis failure to object to the testimony at the trial, by eliciting virtually the same testimonyfrom the victim's mother during her cross-examination, and by failing to raise the issue ina written posttrial motion. We agree. When a defendant fails to object at the trial to hearsayevidence on the basis of the failure to conduct a section 115-10 hearing and when thatdefendant also fails to include this issue in a written posttrial motion, then the issue iswaived for appellate review. People v. Roman, 260 Ill. App. 3d 436, 443 (1992). Additionally, when a defendant fails to object to testimony and then elicits the same orsimilar testimony on cross-examination, any error in admitting that testimony is waived. People v. Heidelberg, 190 Ill. App. 3d 743, 746 (1989). In the case at bar, the Statecorrectly points out that defense counsel did not object to Glenda's testimony during the trial,he elicited testimony from Glenda on cross-examination that is essentially the sametestimony about which he now complains, and he failed to raise this issue in his motion fornew trial. Defendant has waived his right to our review of this issue.

We note, however, that even if the issue is not deemed waived, the trial court didreview Glenda's potential testimony during the section 115-10 hearing, as Detective Thomastestified at that hearing regarding the method by which he had obtained P.C.'s out-of-courtstatement. Glenda's testimony at the trial was purely cumulative to the testimony of P.C.,Detective Thomas, and the emergency room physician.

In a supplemental brief, defendant argues that the trial court erred in ruling upon theadmissibility of the victim's statements to Detective Thomas without requiring P.C. to testifyat the section 115-10 hearing. Defendant admits that the Fourth District Appellate Court hasruled in two separate cases that the child witness does not have to testify at the section 115-10 hearing because the term "proceeding" in the statute refers to the trial rather than thereliability hearing: People v. Back, 239 Ill. App. 3d 44 (1992), and People v. Wilson, 246Ill. App. 3d 311 (1993), which follows and adopts the ruling in Back. Defendant argues,however, that the analysis in the Wilson and Back cases is "seriously flawed."

In Back, the court allowed certain witnesses to testify regarding statements made toeach of them by the child victim of a sexual assault. Back, 239 Ill. App. 3d at 51. The trialcourt made this ruling after a section 115-10 hearing in which the child victim did nottestify. The defendant raised this issue for the first time at oral argument before the appellatecourt. Back, 239 Ill. App. 3d at 52. Since the defendant in Back did not raise the issue ina timely manner, the court found that the defendant waived review of the issue. Back, 239Ill. App. 3d at 52. However, the court addressed the issue in order "to provide guidance tolegal professionals about the procedural requirements for reliability hearings regarding achild victim's out-of-court statements." Back, 239 Ill. App. 3d at 53.

Similarly, defendant in the case at bar did not raise this issue in a timely manner: hedid not raise the issue in the trial court but waited to raise it via a supplemental brief filedwith this court. Thus, defendant has technically waived the issue on review. See Roman,260 Ill. App. 3d at 443; Heidelberg, 190 Ill. App. 3d at 746. However, since the waiver ruleis a limitation on the parties and not on the jurisdiction of the courts (Committee forEducational Rights v. Edgar, 174 Ill. 2d 1, 11 (1996)), we, too, choose to discuss the issuein the hopes that it will provide some guidance.

The court in the Back case held that the term "proceeding," as used in section 115-10,"refers to trial proceedings, not the reliability hearing." Back, 239 Ill. App. 3d at 53. Thecourt based its decision on the statute's direction that the focus of the reliability hearing isto be on the timing, content, and circumstances surrounding the child victim's statements. 725 ILCS 5/115-10 (West 1998). "The child's testimony at the reliability hearing is notnecessary to enable the trial judge to evaluate whether there were sufficient safeguards ofreliability when the statements were made." Back, 239 Ill. App. 3d at 54.

Defendant argues that this reasoning is flawed because the perceptions of the childare very important to the determination of whether sufficient safeguards of reliability existto allow the testimony. Defendant urges us to find that the statute requires the court to heartestimony from the child as to the child's perceptions of the setting in which the statementswere made and the methods employed by the person to whom the child spoke. Thisargument fails because it is not required by the plain and unambiguous language of thestatute and, moreover, because it would add an unnecessary layer of procedure to thesestatutory reliability proceedings.

The statute plainly directs the court to determine "that the time, content, andcircumstances of the statement provide sufficient safeguards of reliability." 725 ILCS5/115-10(b)(1) (West 1998). The legislature did not presume to direct the court to employany particular method in reaching the reliability decision but instead left that determinationto the discretion of the trial judge, knowing that the specific circumstances of each case willdictate varying degrees and methods of proof. Since the burden of persuasion is upon theState as the proponent of the statements (People v. Zwart, 151 Ill. 2d 37, 43 (1992)), it willbe incumbent upon the State in each case to decide exactly how to convince the judge thatsufficient safeguards of reliability exist to allow the testimony about the child's statements. We agree with the court in the Back case that there is no statutory requirement that the Statecall the child as a witness in the reliability hearing.

Additionally, case law from both the appellate court and our supreme court indirectlysupports a finding that the child does not have to testify at the reliability hearing. In Peoplev. West, 158 Ill. 2d 155 (1994), and People v. Hubbard, 264 Ill. App. 3d 188 (1994), eachcourt considered a situation in which the child victim did not testify at the reliability hearing. While not specifically addressing the issue of the necessity of the child victim's testimonyat the reliability hearing, both cases support the proposition that a trial court is capable ofmaking a reliability determination without the testimony of the child. In People v. Bowen,183 Ill. 2d 103 (1998), while discussing section 115-10, the court noted, "[U]nless a findingof unavailability is made, statements admitted under section 115-10 can never serve assubstitutes for trial testimony, because section 115-10 makes the introduction of thestatements expressly contingent upon the child's production for direct and cross-examinationat trial." (Emphasis added.) Bowen, 183 Ill. 2d at 114-15. Clearly, within the context ofthe Bowen case, the supreme court found that the testimony of the child is essential at thetrial, not at the reliability hearing.

Furthermore, as the State points out, since the statute refers to only one "proceeding"at which the child must testify, if that proceeding is the reliability hearing rather than thetrial, a logical argument could be made that the requirements of the statute are met if thechild testifies at the reliability hearing but not the trial. Such an interpretation would notprotect a defendant's confrontation rights at trial. We have a duty to avoid construing astatute to defeat the purpose of the legislation or yield an absurd or unjust result. People v.Latona, 184 Ill. 2d 260, 269 (1998).

For all of these reasons, we hold that the trial court did not err in allowing DetectiveThomas to testify about P.C.'s statements to him even though P.C. did not testify at thereliability hearing.

We next address defendant's argument that the trial court erred, under the recentSupreme Court decision of Apprendi, in sentencing him to consecutive terms ofimprisonment for his two sexual offense convictions. In Apprendi, the United StatesSupreme Court held, "Other than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases thepenalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury[]and proved beyond a reasonable doubt." Apprendi, 530 U.S. at __, 147 L. Ed. 2d at __, 120S. Ct. at 2362-63. The corollary of this rule applies with equal force: the legislature cannotconstitutionally remove from the jury's consideration the assessment of facts that increasethe prescribed range of penalties to which a criminal defendant is exposed, as those factsmust be established before a jury by proof beyond a reasonable doubt. Apprendi, 530 U.S.at __, 147 L. Ed. 2d at __, 120 S. Ct. at 2363. In Apprendi, the Court foundunconstitutional a statute that allowed a trial judge to sentence a defendant to an extendedterm of imprisonment based upon a finding that the defendant's crimes were committed withthe purpose " 'to intimidate an individual *** because of race, color, gender, handicap,religion, sexual orientation[,] or ethnicity,' " commonly referred to as a hate-crime law. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at __, 147 L. Ed. 2d at __, 120 S. Ct. at 2351, (quoting N.J. Stat. Ann.