After a bench trial in the circuit court of Williamson County, Anthony Newbolds(defendant) was convicted of home invasion. On April 10, 2000, defendant was sentencedto 22 years' imprisonment. As a part of the sentencing, the trial court found that the victimof the home invasion had suffered great bodily harm, and as a result, the court ordereddefendant to serve 85% of his 22-year prison sentence, pursuant to section 3-6-3(a)(2)(iii)of the Unified Code of Corrections (Unified Code) (730 ILCS 5/3-6-3(a)(2)(iii) (West1998)). On appeal, defendant contends only that the statutory provision under which he isrequired to serve 85% of his term of imprisonment is unconstitutional under the UnitedStates Supreme Court's decision in Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 147 L. Ed. 2d435, 120 S. Ct. 2348 (2000). We affirm.

The evidence at defendant's bench trial was as follows. During the evening ofDecember 14, 1998, defendant and the two brothers of the woman he was dating wereallowed into the home of Raymond Cook upon the ruse that their motor vehicle had brokendown and they wanted to use the telephone. Their real purpose was to collect a debt Cookallegedly owed to defendant or Ralph Sam Gibbs, although Gibbs did not encourage orcondone their activity. The trio, who had concealed crowbars in their winter clothing, beatCook with the crowbars. When the attackers saw Cook's wife, two of them started to followher. Cook, being a man of considerable build and strength, was then able to fend off hisattackers and get his shotgun. The trio fled the residence and area. Evidence establishedthat Cook's knees were swollen and black and blue due to the attack. His shirt was rippedand he had an abrasion on his chest. Cook's arms were scraped. Cook also sustainedabrasions on his face. Apparently, a considerable amount of Cook's blood was found in theroom where the attack took place. Photographs of the blood and Cook's injuries wereintroduced into evidence but were not made a part of the record on appeal. Prior to the trial,Cook died of a cause unrelated to the home invasion.

At the sentencing hearing, Cook's widow testified that as a result of the attack, Cooksustained a gouge between his left thumb and forefinger which required eight to ten stitchesto close and that the injury to the left hand resulted in scarring.

In sentencing defendant, the court stated:

"So apparently I have to make a finding based on the evidence submitted asto whether great bodily harm resulted from this incident. What I remember of thetestimony in this case, at least from my notes and my memory at this point in time, isthat Mr. Cook's hands were bleeding. He had scrapes on his arms. He ended up withbruises on his kneecaps[,] and there was blood on the kitchen floor[,] which Iremembered pictures of. Officer Nagle testified that Mr. Cook had cuts on his hands[and] red marks on his forehead, and that the injury was to his left hand. OfficerWebb testified basically to the same injuries. *** I understand the argument, Mr.Orloski [defense counsel], that there may have very well been previous scars on thehand of Mr. Cook. However, I believe the causing of injuries which requires stitcheson that hand to be great bodily harm. The bruising at the knees would not be[,] butthe cuts on the hand would be. So the way I understand the definition of great bodilyharm, I believe that based on the evidence I am required to make the finding thatgreat bodily harm resulted from this."

Defendant filed a motion to reconsider sentence. At the hearing on the motion,defendant, relying on Apprendi, asked the court to hold section 3-6-3(a)(2)(iii) of theUnified Code unconstitutional. The court declined to hold the statute unconstitutional anddenied the motion to reduce sentence.

Defendant was convicted of home invasion, a conviction that requires the sentencingjudge to "make a finding as to whether the conduct leading to conviction for the offenseresulted in great bodily harm to a victim[] and *** enter that finding and the basis for thatfinding in the record." 730 ILCS 5/5-4-1(c-1) (West 1998). Under a separate section of theUnified Code, the Department of Corrections is required to "prescribe rules and regulationsfor the early release on account of good conduct" of those incarcerated. 730 ILCS 5/3-6-3(a)(1) (West 1998). When a defendant is convicted of home invasion and the trial courtmakes the finding that the conduct leading to that conviction resulted in great bodily harmto a victim, then the Department of Corrections is allowed to give that prisoner "no morethan 4.5 days of good[-]conduct credit for each month of his or her sentence ofimprisonment." 730 ILCS 5/3-6-3(a)(2)(iii) (West 1998). In this case, the trial court madethe finding that the victim of defendant's home invasion suffered great bodily harm, theresult of which is that the Department of Corrections may not give defendant more than 4.5days of good-conduct credit per month. In other words, defendant is required to serve 85%of his 22-year prison sentence.

Defendant claims that this statutory scheme is unconstitutional under the recentUnited States Supreme Court decision in Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 147 L. Ed.2d 435, 120 S. Ct. 2348 (2000). In Apprendi, the Court invalidated a New Jersey statute thatpermitted a sentencing judge to enhance a defendant's sentence beyond the prescribedstatutory maximum if the judge found by a preponderance of the evidence that the crime wascommitted with a racially biased motive. The effect of the sentencing scheme at issue inApprendi was to elevate the defendant's sentence, which would have been between 5 and10 years' imprisonment without the judge's finding, to between 10 and 20 years'imprisonment with the finding. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 468-69, 147 L. Ed. 2d 435, 120 S.Ct. at 2351. The Court held, "Other than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact thatincreases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must besubmitted to a jury[] and proved beyond a reasonable doubt." (Emphasis added.) Apprendi,530 U.S. at 490, 147 L. Ed. 2d 435, 120 S. Ct. at 2362-63. After discussing the historicalfoundation for the ruling, the Court acknowledged that it was not suggesting that it was"impermissible for judges to exercise discretion-taking into consideration various factorsrelating both to offense and offender-in imposing a judgment within the range prescribedby statute." (Emphasis in original.) Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 481, 147 L. Ed. 2d 435, 120 S.Ct. at 2358.

In the instant case, defendant argues that the statutory scheme under which he wassentenced is unconstitutional under the rules set forth in Apprendi because the length of timehe is to serve in prison was heightened by the judge's finding of great bodily harm. Thisargument must fail. Whether defendant serves all or part of the 22-year term ofimprisonment to which he was sentenced, that term will not be in excess of the prescribedmaximum penalty for home invasion, a Class X felony (720 ILCS 5/12-11(c) (West 1998)). Nothing in Apprendi constrains the legislature's ability to define the manner in which asentence imposed within the statutory range must be served. People v. Fender, No. 5-00-0227, slip op. at 13 (September 27, 2001).

The rationale upon which the Apprendi decision is based negates defendant'sargument. The Court in Apprendi explained its decision in part based upon its prior decisionin McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79, 91 L. Ed. 2d 67, 106 S. Ct. 2411 (1986). InMcMillan, the defendant challenged Pennsylvania's Mandatory Minimum Sentencing Actas violating his sixth amendment right to a jury trial. McMillan, 477 U.S. at 80, 91 L. Ed.2d at 73, 106 S. Ct. at 2413. That act requires sentencing judges to impose a minimumsentence of five years' imprisonment for certain enumerated felonies if the judge finds, bya preponderance of the evidence, that the defendant visibly possessed a firearm during thecommission of the offense. McMillan, 477 U.S. at 81, 91 L. Ed. 2d at 73, 106 S. Ct. at2413. The Court in McMillan noted, "[Pennsylvania's Mandatory Minimum Sentencing]Act operates to divest the judge of discretion to impose any sentence of less than five yearsfor the underlying felony; it does not authorize a sentence in excess of that otherwiseallowed for that offense." McMillan, 477 U.S. at 81-82, 91 L. Ed. 2d at 73, 106 S. Ct. at2413-14.

The Court in Apprendi noted that the sentencing scheme reviewed in McMillanremained constitutional under its analysis in Apprendi. We find that the statutory schemeat issue in the case at bar is similar to the sentencing scheme found to be constitutional inMcMillan and again in Apprendi. In McMillan, the sentencing scheme provided for amandatory minimum sentence of five years. In the case at bar, the statutory scheme providesfor a mandatory minimum sentence of 85% of defendant's term of incarceration. Just as inMcMillan, the statutory scheme under which defendant is required to serve a minimumportion of his term of imprisonment " 'neither alters the maximum penalty for the crimecommitted nor creates a separate offense calling for a separate penalty; it operates solely tolimit the sentencing court's discretion in selecting a penalty within the range alreadyavailable to it without the special finding.' " Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 486, 147 L. Ed. 2d 435,120 S. Ct. at 2361 (quoting McMillan, 477 U.S. at 87-88, 91 L. Ed. 2d at 77, 106 S. Ct. at2417).

We follow the rulings of the United States Supreme Court in McMillan and Apprendiand hold that the statutory scheme under which defendant is eligible for no more than 4.5days of good-conduct credit per month is constitutional. Fender, slip op. at 14. We alsofollow the decision of the Fourth District Appellate Court in People v. Garry, 323 Ill. App.3d 292, 752 N.E.2d 1244 (2001), wherein the court held that Apprendi concerns are notimplicated by section 3-6-3(a)(2)(iii) of the Unified Code. Garry, 323 Ill. App. 3d at 299,752 N.E.2d at 1250.

For all of the reasons stated, we affirm defendant's conviction and sentence.

GOLDENHERSH and RARICK, JJ., concur.