NO. 5-00-0277

JUSTICE HOPKINS delivered the opinion of the court:

James W. Owen (defendant) appeals from the trial court's denial of his motion torescind a statutory summary suspension (625 ILCS 5/2-118.1 (West 2000)) entered inconjunction with charges of driving under the influence of alcohol and drugs (625 ILCS5/11-501(a)(4) (West 2000)). On appeal, defendant argues that the trial court erred indenying his motion to rescind the statutory summary suspension, because the arrestingofficer was outside of his jurisdiction at the time of the arrest and the officer failed to notifythe law enforcement officials in the county of the arrest. We affirm.

The facts are not disputed. On January 27, 2000, Officer Robert Rich of theEffingham County sheriff's office was on patrol on Route 45, close to the county linebetween Effingham County and Shelby County. Officer Rich spotted defendant drivingsouth in Effingham County and used his radar detection gun to clock defendant traveling 67miles per hour in a 55-mile-per-hour speed zone. Officer Rich turned his vehicle around to attempt to stop defendant for speeding. Officer Rich waited to activate his emergency lightsuntil defendant went around a curve in the road. As defendant was negotiating the curve,Officer Rich noticed defendant's car run off the right side of the road and then maneuverback onto the road. The officer activated his emergency lights, and defendant pulled over. By the time Officer Rich caught up with defendant, they were in Shelby County.

Officer Rich walked to defendant's car and asked defendant for his driver's licenseand registration. As Officer Rich was talking to defendant, he noticed that defendantsmelled of alcohol. When the officer asked defendant if he had been drinking, defendantadmitted that he had one beer. Defendant agreed to exit his vehicle and perform a fieldsobriety test.

When defendant got out of his car, Officer Rich noticed a plastic bag sticking out ofdefendant's pants at the waist. Defendant admitted that the bag contained "crystal meth." Officer Rich placed defendant under arrest and transported defendant and his passenger backto Effingham County to process the arrest.

After arriving at the Effingham County correctional facility, Officer Rich askeddefendant to submit to a field sobriety test, but defendant refused. Officer Rich then readthe warning to motorists that advised defendant of his rights and liabilities when taking orrefusing tests for blood alcohol content. Defendant refused to submit to blood testing. Officer Rich issued defendant tickets for possession of cannabis in the amount of 10 to 30grams, possession of a controlled substance, possession of drug paraphernalia, driving underthe influence of drugs and alcohol (DUI), speeding, and illegal transportation of alcohol. Officer Rich wrote the tickets as if defendant were arrested in Effingham County rather thanin Shelby County. At no time did Officer Rich notify Shelby County law enforcementofficials of the arrest of defendant in Shelby County.

Defendant filed several motions attacking his arrest, all of which were based uponOfficer Rich's failure to notify the Shelby County authorities of his arrest. All of thosemotions were denied. Defendant appeals from the denial of his motion to rescind hisstatutory summary suspension of his driving privileges.

The statutory provision that controls this case is section 107-4 of the Code ofCriminal Procedure of 1963, which provides, in pertinent part, as follows:

"Arrest by peace officer from other jurisdiction.

(a) As used in this Section:

(4) 'Law enforcement agency' means a municipal police department orcounty sheriff's office of this State.

(a-3) Any peace officer employed by a law enforcement agency of this Statemay conduct temporary questioning pursuant to Section 107-14 of this Code and maymake arrests in any jurisdiction within this State if: (1) the officer is engaged in theinvestigation of an offense that occurred in the officer's primary jurisdiction and thetemporary questioning is conducted or the arrest is made pursuant to thatinvestigation; or (2) the officer, while on duty as a peace officer, becomes personallyaware of the immediate commission of a felony or misdemeanor violation of the lawsof this State. While acting pursuant to this subsection, an officer has the sameauthority as within his or her own jurisdiction.

(a-7) The law enforcement agency of the county or municipality in which anyarrest is made under this Section shall be immediately notified of the arrest." 725ILCS 5/107-4 (West 2000).

Defendant argues that Officer Rich's failure to notify the Shelby County sheriff'soffice invalidates his arrest and entitles him to a rescission of his statutory summarysuspension. According to defendant, in order to properly suspend his driver's license, hisarrest must have been valid. See 625 ILCS 5/2-118.1(b)(1) (West 2000). Defendantcontends that since his arrest was invalid, the trial court's denial of his motion to rescind thestatutory summary suspension was improper and should be reversed.

The State counters that the language of the statute does not require the extrememeasure of dismissing the charges against defendant or, in this instance, rescinding thestatutory summary suspension. No cases in Illinois interpret the notice provision of thestatute (725 ILCS 5/107-4(a-7) (West 2000)). Therefore, we will discuss this issue in termsof how it relates to the rescission of a statutory summary suspension and also in terms of adismissal of the charges, the relief defendant requested in the trial court.

When a person is arrested for DUI, his driving privileges are automatically suspendedunder the Illinois Vehicle Code. 625 ILCS 5/11-501.1(e) (West 2000). Under section 2-118.1(b)(1) of the Illinois Vehicle Code, within 90 days after the defendant is notified of hisstatutory summary suspension, he may request to have the statutory summary suspensionrescinded. 625 ILCS 5/2-118.1(b) (West 2000). The hearing on the request for rescissionis limited to four issues, one of which is whether the defendant was arrested for DUI. 625ILCS 5/2-118.1(b)(1) (West 2000). The arrest referred to in section 2-118.1(b)(1) "must bea lawful and valid arrest." People v. Krueger, 208 Ill. App. 3d 897, 904 (1991). "TheSecretary [of State]'s power to impose a summary license suspension is derived from thestatute, and we decline to read the statute as, in effect, authorizing unconstitutional arrestsor searches and the imposition of new deprivations based on those unconstitutional arrestsor searches." Krueger, 208 Ill. App. 3d at 905. In Krueger, the arrest violated thedefendant's right to be free from unconstitutional searches and seizures because thedefendant was arrested inside his home without a warrant. Krueger, 208 Ill. App. 3d at 899.

In the case at bar, defendant admits that Officer Rich had the authority to arrest himin Shelby County, based upon the officer's observation of a traffic offense committed inEffingham County and other offenses committed in Shelby County. However, defendantclaims that the officer's failure to notify the Shelby County authorities of the arrestautomatically invalidates the arrest, without any other showing of prejudice or constitutionalinfirmity. This argument is without merit.

The statute does not prescribe any sanction for the failure to comply. The statuteprovides only, "The law enforcement agency of the county or municipality in which anyarrest is made under this Section shall be immediately notified of the arrest." 725 ILCS5/107-4(a-7) (West 2000). Defendant nevertheless contends that the language of the above-quoted statute demonstrates that the legislature clearly intended to safeguard the rights ofdefendants who are arrested in one jurisdiction by law enforcement officers from a differentjurisdiction. Defendant claims that no sanction other than invalidating the arrest guaranteesthe accused his substantive due process right to the notification provided for in the statute. This argument is flawed for two reasons: the notification provided for in the statute is nota substantive right, and invalidating the arrest is not a requirement of the statute.

Defendant relies upon People v. Ciesler, 304 Ill. App. 3d 465 (1999), for thecontention that the notification provision of section 107-4 is a substantive right. In Ciesler,the court held that section 107-4 was invalidated under People v. Reedy, 186 Ill. 2d 1 (1999),for a violation of the single-subject rule. Ciesler, 304 Ill. App. 3d at 469. The court inCiesler also determined that although section 107-4 was reenacted by Public Act 90-593(Pub. Act 90-593,