On December 31, 1998, defendant John Pickens and Bryon Madison entered a used-car dealership in Fairmont City, Illinois, tied up two employees, and took more than $3,000in cash. Before they fled the crime scene in a stolen dealership car, they shot each of thecaptive employees two times. Both survived.

One of the victims freed himself, despite his condition. He reported the robbery andshooting. Soon thereafter, State police observed and pursued the getaway car. The chaseended when the defendant lost control of the stolen car and crashed. He and his partner wereapprehended and searched. The police found the dealership's money on them.

A St. Clair County jury found the defendant guilty of armed robbery. It also foundhim guilty on two counts of aggravated battery with a firearm and two counts of attemptedmurder. Thereafter, the trial judge decided that the defendant was a habitual criminal and,by virtue of that finding, imposed life's duration as punishment. On appeal, the defendantcontends that his dual mandatory life sentences were imposed pursuant to anunconstitutional statutory sentencing scheme. He argues that the facts that mandated hispunishment must be alleged in the charging instrument and submitted to the jury fordetermination.

The statutory provision that empowered the trial judge to impose life imprisonmentin this case-section 33B-1 of the Criminal Code of 1961 (Criminal Code)-reads as follows:

"(a) Every person who has been twice convicted in any state or federal courtof an offense that contains the same elements as an offense now classified in Illinoisas a Class X felony, criminal sexual assault, aggravated kidnaping, or first degreemurder[] and is thereafter convicted of a Class X felony, criminal sexual assault, orfirst degree murder, committed after the 2 prior convictions, shall be adjudged an[sic] habitual criminal.

(b) The 2 prior convictions need not have been for the same offense.

(c) Any convictions which result from or are connected with the sametransaction, or result from offenses committed at the same time, shall be counted forthe purposes of this Section as one conviction.

(d) This Article shall not apply unless each of the following requirements are[sic] satisfied:

(1) the third offense was committed after the effective date of this Act;

(2) the third offense was committed within 20 years of the date that judgmentwas entered on the first conviction, provided, however, that time spent in custodyshall not be counted;

(3) the third offense was committed after conviction on the second offense;[and]

(4) the second offense was committed after conviction on the first offense.

(e) Except when the death penalty is imposed, anyone adjudged an [sic]habitual criminal shall be sentenced to life imprisonment." 720 ILCS 5/33B-1 (West1998).

Section 33B-2 of the Criminal Code provides as follows:

"(a) A prior conviction shall not be alleged in the indictment, and no evidenceor other disclosure of such conviction shall be presented to the court or the juryduring the trial of an offense set forth in Section 33B-1 unless otherwise permittedby the issues properly raised in such trial. After a plea or verdict or finding of guiltyand before sentence is imposed, the prosecutor may file with the court a verifiedwritten statement signed by the State's Attorney concerning any former conviction ofan offense set forth in Section 33B-1 rendered against the defendant. The court shallthen cause the defendant to be brought before it; shall inform him of the allegationsof the statement so filed, and of his right to a hearing before the court on the issue ofsuch former conviction and of his right to counsel at such hearing; and unless thedefendant admits such conviction, the court shall hear and determine such issue[] andshall make a written finding thereon. If a sentence has previously been imposed, thecourt may vacate such sentence and impose a new sentence in accordance withSection 33B-1 of this Act.

(b) A duly authenticated copy of the record of any alleged former convictionof an offense set forth in Section 33B-1 shall be prima facie evidence of such formerconviction; and a duly authenticated copy of the record of the defendant's finalrelease or discharge from probation granted, or from sentence and parole supervision(if any) imposed pursuant to such former conviction, shall be prima facie evidenceof such release or discharge.

(c) Any claim that a previous conviction offered by the prosecution is not aformer conviction of an offense set forth in Section 33B-1 because of the existenceof any exceptions described in this Act[] is waived unless duly raised at the hearingon such conviction[] or unless the prosecution's proof shows the existence of suchexceptions described in this Act." 720 ILCS 5/33B-2 (West 1998).

Shortly after the jury returned guilty verdicts, the State invoked these provisions byfiling a document entitled "States [sic] notice of intent to Declare Defendant a HabitualCriminal". The State alleged that the defendant qualified as a habitual criminal by virtue ofa Sangamon County armed robbery conviction in May of 1983 and a subsequent SangamonCounty conviction for aggravated battery with a firearm obtained in May of 1992. Thedefendant served a 15-year prison sentence for the armed robbery and a 12-year prisonsentence for the aggravated battery with a firearm.

At the defendant's sentencing hearing the State produced authenticated copies of thetwo Sangamon County convictions. The defendant had no objection to the documents orto their admission into evidence. However, the defendant would not concede that he wasthe individual named in those documents.

The trial judge admitted the exhibits into evidence. He then informed the defendantof the allegations in the notice, his right to a hearing before the court, and his right tocounsel. When the trial judge asked the defendant if he wanted a hearing, he responded,"No, sir." The assistant State's Attorney then pointed out that the admitted exhibits bore thedefendant's name and date of birth. The trial judge asked the defendant if he wanted to denyunder oath that he was the person named in the documents from Sangamon County. Thedefendant declined the invitation.

Pursuant to the State's request, the trial judge found that the defendant was the personnamed in the Sangamon County convictions and found that he was a habitual criminalpursuant to section 33B-1 of the Criminal Code. The trial judge sentenced the defendant tonatural-life imprisonment.

Relying upon Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 147 L. Ed. 2d 435, 120 S. Ct.2348 (2000), the defendant argues that his life sentences are unconstitutional. His argumentis premised upon the judicial finding that brings a defendant within the ambit of thehabitual-criminal sentencing provision. A State officer rather than a jury determines that therequisite convictions exist. Furthermore, this finding is not made under a reasonable doubtstandard of proof. See People v. Robinson, 167 Ill. 2d 53, 656 N.E.2d 1090 (1995).

Armed robbery and attempted murder are both Class X felonies. 720 ILCS 5/18-2(b), 8-4(c)(1) (West 1998). A Class X felony is normally punishable by a determinate prisonterm of not less than 6 years and not more than 30 years. 730 ILCS 5/5-8-1(a)(3) (West1998). Thus, the defendant concludes that his life sentences, enhanced beyond theprescribed maximum sentences for the crimes that he committed, and based upon a factualfinding by the trial judge rather than the jury, are unconstitutional.

Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 147 L. Ed. 2d 435, 120 S. Ct. 2348 (2000),is a case in which the United States Supreme Court held a New Jersey hate-crime statuteunconstitutional because it commissioned judges to make a factual finding that enhancedtheir power to punish beyond the maximum penalties prescribed for any given criminaloffense.

In 1994, Charles Apprendi, Jr., took his handgun and fired a spray of .22-caliberbullets into the home of his new neighbors. Apparently, the newly arrived family did notfit Apprendi's color criteria for living in a Vineland, New Jersey, neighborhood. Apprendiwas indicted with numerous criminal offenses because of his misconduct, but none of themalleged that his actions were racially motivated. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 469, 147 L. Ed. 2dat 442, 120 S. Ct. at 2352.

Apprendi pleaded guilty to possession of a firearm for an unlawful purpose, anoffense for which the New Jersey legislature enacted a 10-year maximum prison sentence. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 469-70, 147 L. Ed. 2d at 442-43, 120 S. Ct. at 2352. However, aseparate New Jersey hate-crime statute authorized the imposition of greater punishment forany crimes motivated by racial hatred. The trial judge found that Apprendi's crime was somotivated and, because of that fact, sentenced Apprendi to a prison sentence greater than the10-year maximum that could otherwise have been imposed. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 470, 147L. Ed. 2d at 443, 120 S. Ct. at 2352.

The Supreme Court, relying upon constitutional protections of due process, notice,and the right to a trial by jury, struck down the New Jersey hate-crime statute. The Courttook an exhaustive look at what our founding fathers promised when they bestowed the rightto a trial by jury in all criminal cases. It found that a part of that promise was the right tohave a jury determine all facts necessary to a determination of the maximum punishment thelaw allows. The Supreme Court handed down a constitutional-based rule when it stated,"Other than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crimebeyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury[] and proved beyonda reasonable doubt." Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 490, 147 L. Ed. 2d at 455, 120 S. Ct. at 2362-63.

We have not found a case construing the Illinois habitual criminal statute in light ofApprendi. However, section 5-5-3(c)(8) of the Unified Code of Corrections (Unified Code)(730 ILCS 5/5-5-3(c)(8) (West 1998)), which has provisions similar to those of section 33B-1 of the Criminal Code, has been examined in light of Apprendi and found to beconstitutional. People v. Lathon, 317 Ill. App. 3d 573, 740 N.E.2d 377 (2000); People v.Dixon, 319 Ill. App. 3d 881 (2001). Section 5-5-3(c)(8) of the Unified Code provides asfollows:

"When a defendant, over the age of 21 years, is convicted of a Class 1 or Class2 felony, after having twice been convicted of any Class 2 or greater Class feloniesin Illinois, and such charges are separately brought and tried and arise out of differentseries of acts, such defendant shall be sentenced as a Class X offender. Thisparagraph shall not apply unless (1) the first felony was committed after the effectivedate of this amendatory Act of 1977[] and (2) the second felony was committed afterconviction on the first[] and (3) the third felony was committed after conviction onthe second." 730 ILCS 5/5-5-3(c)(8) (West 2000).

The argument that the defendant makes is similar to the argument made by thedefendant in Lathon, 317 Ill. App. 3d at 579, 740 N.E.2d at 380-81. See also People v.Dixon, 319 Ill. App. 3d 881 (2001). Lathon was convicted of attempted residential burglary. His criminal history spanned 30 years. When the trial judge sentenced him under section 5-5-3(c)(8) of the Unified Code, he stated that it was necessary to protect society from thedefendant's unrelenting criminality. The trial judge imposed a 25-year prison sentence,increasing Lathon's punishment because of his continuing criminality and because of hisprior convictions. Lathon claimed that under Apprendi, section 5-5-3(c)(8) wasunconstitutional. He challenged the provision's enhancement scheme, which requiredincreased penalties based upon prior convictions that were not charged in the indictment, notsubmitted to a jury, and not proved beyond a reasonable doubt.

We determined that the mandatory Class X sentencing provision of section 5-5-3(c)(8), which requires sentencing enhancement based upon the existence of priorconvictions, does not violate a defendant's due process rights or jury trial guarantees. Thereasoning that we employed applies here.

"[R]ecidivism[] is a traditional, if not the most traditional, basis for *** increasingan offender's sentence." Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224, 243, 140 L. Ed.2d 350, 368, 118 S. Ct. 1219, 1230 (1998). A provision that requires punishmentenhancement based upon the existence of prior convictions does not run afoul of Apprendi. Prior convictions need not be alleged in the charging document, submitted to the jury, orproven beyond a reasonable doubt.

Here, the defendant's prior convictions were not an element of the crimes that hecommitted. The convictions were a part of his past, a history obtained through proceedingsthat provided procedural safeguards. See Lathon, 317 Ill. App. 3d at 587, 740 N.E.2d at387.

Notwithstanding, the defendant clings to certain statements contained within theApprendi opinion (530 U.S. at 489-90, 147 L. Ed. 2d at 454-55, 120 S. Ct. at 2362) andmaintains that the Supreme Court would not abide our statute's recidivist scheme. TheApprendi Court not only endorsed the recidivism exception but also articulated the reasonsfor it, including the fact that procedural safeguards enhance the validity of any priorconviction and the fact that recidivism is not an essential element of an underlying criminaloffense. Prior convictions relate to punishment and have no bearing on the crimecommitted. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 494-96, 147 L. Ed. 2d at 457-58, 120 S. Ct. at 2365-66. The Apprendi Court was clear that is was not overruling Almendarez-Torres. Because ofthe exception carved out for prior convictions, we cannot accept the defendant's assertionthat Apprendi invalidates sentencing provisions that rely upon recidivism. See People v.Roberts, 318 Ill. App. 3d 719, 729, 743 N.E.2d 1025, 1033 (2000); Lathon, 317 Ill. App.3d at 585, 740 N.E.2d at 385. Further, to treat recidivism as a fact that relates to thecommission of the charged offense or as an element of the charged offense could result insignificant prejudice to the criminally accused. This is particularly so in a case like thiswhere the defendant's prior convictions were identical to the offenses for which he wasbeing tried. See Lathon, 317 Ill. App. 3d at 586, 740 N.E.2d at 386. Requiring the jury todecide whether the defendant's prior convictions made him eligible for mandatory lifeimprisonment would require the State to introduce evidence of the defendant's propensityto commit such crimes. See Lathon, 317 Ill. App. 3d at 586, 740 N.E.2d at 386. Such arequirement would increase the possibility of a jury finding a defendant guilty based uponprior criminal conduct, not upon the conduct underlying the criminal charge beingconsidered. See Lathon, 317 Ill. App. 3d at 586, 740 N.E.2d at 386. Based on the foregoingconsiderations, we also reject the defendant's contention that the jury should have beenrequired to find beyond a reasonable doubt that the sequence of the defendant's priorconvictions met the requirements of section 33B-1 of the Criminal Code.

Since the increase in the defendant's penalty beyond the sentencing range otherwiseprovided was based on prior convictions, it was constitutionally permissible for the trialjudge to impose life imprisonment. See Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 476-77, 147 L. Ed. 2d at 446,120 S. Ct. at 2355; Jones v. United States, 526 U.S. 227, 248-49, 143 L. Ed. 2d 311, 329-30,119 S. Ct. 1215, 1226-27 (1999)

[Nonpublishable text under Supreme Court Rule 23 (166 Ill. 2d R.23)omitted here.]

For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the circuit court is affirmed.

Affirmed.

WELCH and GOLDENHERSH, JJ., concur.