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JUSTICE HOPKINS delivered the opinion of the court:

Sheldon Pittman (defendant), appeals his sentence following the entry of his guiltyplea for two counts of unlawful possession of contraband in a penal institution. Defendantcontends that his sentence on his conviction for the offense of unlawful possession ofcocaine violates section 5-5-4 of the Unified Code of Corrections (the Code) (730 ILCS 5/5-5-4 (West 1996)) and that his sentence on his conviction for the offense of unlawfulpossession of cannabis is improper under the supreme court's ruling in People v. Jordan, 103Ill. 2d 192 (1984).

Initially, this court dismissed the appeal for a lack of jurisdiction because wedetermined that defendant's notice of appeal was filed prematurely, i.e., the notice of appealwas filed after the court's oral pronouncement of the sentence but before the entry of thewritten order. Our determination was based upon the following. Defendant originallypleaded guilty to two counts of unlawful possession of contraband in a penal institution(crack cocaine and cannabis) on September 22, 1997. On November 12, 1997, the courtsentenced defendant to 12 years' incarceration for unlawful possession of cocaine and toeight years' incarceration for unlawful possession of cannabis. Defendant filed a motion towithdraw his guilty plea, and on March 17, 1998, the court granted defendant's motion. Thecourt also vacated defendant's sentences, and Judge James Williamson recused himself fromthe case.

Defendant again pleaded guilty to the same offenses before Judge Terry Foster onMay 15, 1998. On July 22, 1998, Judge Foster sentenced defendant to 14 years'incarceration for the offense of unlawful possession of cocaine and eight years' incarcerationfor the offense of unlawful possession of cannabis. Defendant filed a motion to reconsiderhis sentence. A hearing was held on November 13, 1998, on defendant's motion, and JudgeFoster made the following docket entry that day:

"ASA [assistant State's Attorney] & Attorney Herbert [defense counsel] are present. Attorney Herbert is given leave to amend the Motion to Reconsider Sentence withadditional argument. The Court considers the Supplement filed yesterday to be anamendment to the Motion to Reconsider. The Attorneys argue and the matter isunder advisement. The Court finds that [section] 5-8-1(c) does not apply asdefendant did not move for reconsideration of his original sentence but withdrew hisplea of guilty and the original judgment and sentence was vacated. Also, the Courtfinds section 5-5-4 does not apply for the reasons set forth in Miller, 676 N.E.2d 309. The other arguments raised by Defendant are not well taken[,] and the Motion toReconsider and the Supplement are denied. [The assistant State's Attorney] willprepare an Order. The Clerk will mail a copy of this docket sheet to counsel."

On November 17, 1998, defendant's counsel filed a notice of appeal. Subsequently, awritten order, essentially stating the court's ruling as entered on the docket sheet above, wasentered on November 20, 1998. An amended notice of appeal was never filed afterNovember 20, 1998.

Based upon the foregoing facts, this court determined that defendant's notice ofappeal was premature under Supreme Court Rule 271 (134 Ill. 2d R. 271). Rule 271provides:

"When the court rules upon a motion other than in the course of trial, theattorney for the prevailing party shall prepare and present to the court the order orjudgment to be entered, unless the court directs otherwise." 134 Ill. 2d R. 271.

In People v. Jones, 104 Ill. 2d 268 (1984), the supreme court determined that a court'sdecision on a motion to suppress was not a final judgment but was a ruling on a motion otherthan in the course of trial and that Rule 271 applied. Jones, 104 Ill. 2d at 275. In Jones, thetrial court made an oral pronouncement that it was granting defendant's motion to suppress,and the supreme court found that the trial court contemplated that a written order would beprepared and entered. A written order was entered more than four months later. After theoral pronouncement but before the entry of the written order, the State filed a notice ofappeal. The supreme court held that the State's notice of appeal was premature and that thenotice of appeal did not confer jurisdiction on the appellate court. See Jones, 104 Ill. 2d at276. Thus, in the case sub judice, based upon the holding in Jones, this court determinedthat under Rule 271 defendant had filed his notice of appeal prematurely, becausedefendant's motion to reconsider sentence was a motion not made in the course of the trial,because the court directed that a written order be prepared and the order was prepared aweek after the hearing, and because defendant filed his notice of appeal after the oralpronouncement of the sentence and before the entry of the written order. Therefore, thiscourt dismissed defendant's appeal for a lack of jurisdiction.

Defendant filed a motion for supervisory order with the supreme court. On June 26,2000, the supreme court entered the following supervisory order:

"This cause coming to be heard on the motion of the movant, due noticehaving been given to the respondents, and the court being fully advised in thepremises;

IT IS ORDERED that the motion for supervisory order is allowed. In theexercise of this court's supervisory authority, the Appellate Court, Fifth District, isdirected to vacate its order of May 23, 2000, dismissing the appeal in People v.Pittman, No. 5-98-0747. The appeal shall be reinstated, and the appellate court shallconsider the appeal on the merits.

Order entered by the Court."

Therefore, in accord with the supreme court's supervisory order, we consider the merits ofdefendant's appeal.

Defendant, an inmate at Shawnee Correctional Center, was charged with two counts

of unlawful possession of contraband in a penal institution. Ordinarily, count one, unlawfulpossession of cocaine, would be sentenced as a class 1 felony (see 720 ILCS 5/31A-1.1(g)(West 1996)); however, due to defendant's prior convictions, he was eligible to be sentencedas a class X felon upon conviction (see 730 ILCS 5/5-5-3(c)(8) (West 1996)). Count two,unlawful possession of cannabis, is a class 3 felony. See 720 ILCS 5/31A-1.1(e) (West1996).

Defendant's two guilty pleas and their disposition have been described in the openingremarks of this opinion and will not be restated here.

Defendant contends that his sentence on count one should be reduced to 12 years'imprisonment, because section 5-5-4 of the Code prohibits the circuit court from sentencinghim to a longer prison term than 12 years, as the increase in sentence was not justified byconduct that occurred after the original sentencing hearing. Section 5-5-4 provides:

"Where a conviction or sentence has been set aside on direct review or on collateralattack, the court shall not impose a new sentence for the same offense or for adifferent offense based on the same conduct which is more severe than the priorsentence less the portion of the prior sentence previously satisfied unless the moresevere sentence is based upon conduct on the part of the defendant occurring after theoriginal sentencing." (Emphasis added.) 730 ILCS 5/5-5-4 (West 1996).

The Council Commentary to section 5-5-4 states, [This section] [l]imits the use of increasedsentences where an original conviction or sentence has been overturned by a higher court"and "This section sets out the rule adopted by the United States Supreme Court in NorthCarolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, [23 L. Ed. 2d 656,] 89 S. Ct. 2072 (1969) and followedby Illinois in People v. Baze, 43 Ill. 2d 298, 253 N.E.2d 392 (1969)." 730 ILCS Ann. 5/5-5-4, Council Commentary at 678(Smith-Hurd 1997).

In North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 23 L. Ed. 2d 656, 89 S. Ct. 2072 (1969),the Supreme Court limited the power of a sentencing court to increase a sentence after areconviction following a new trial. Pearce, 395 U.S. at 725-26, 23 L. Ed. 2d at 669-70, 89S. Ct. at 2080-81. The Supreme Court held that under the due process clause of thefourteenth amendment, an increased sentence imposed after a retrial gives rise to apresumption that the greater sentence has been imposed for a vindictive purpose, i.e., thatthe court is punishing the defendant for invoking his constitutional rights. Pearce, 395 U.S.at 724-25, 23 L. Ed. 2d at 668-69, 89 S. Ct. at 2080. The Supreme Court in Pearce did nottotally prohibit imposing a higher sentence following a retrial. The Court's main focus wasthat due process prevents a higher sentence if it is a product of judicial vindictiveness. SeeAlabama v. Smith, 490 U.S. 794, 799, 104 L. Ed. 2d 865, 872, 109 S. Ct. 2201 (1989). Following Pearce, the Illinois Supreme Court adopted and applied the holding of Pearcein People v. Baze, 43 Ill. 2d 298 (1969). Both Pearce and Baze were based on federal dueprocess considerations.

Here, defendant contends that his increased sentence following the entry of hissecond guilty plea for the offense of unlawful possession of crack cocaine violates section5-5-4 of the Code. Section 5-5-4 applies when a defendant's conviction or sentence has beenset aside on direct appellate review or on collateral attack. 730 ILCS 5/5-5-4 (West 1996). "It is a rule of statutory construction that if the language is clear it should be given effectwithout resort to other aids for construction." People v. Adams, 169 Ill. App. 3d 312, 317(1988). The clear language of section 5-5-4 precludes the use of the statute in this case sincedefendant's motion to withdraw his guilty plea was neither a direct review nor a collateralattack. See People v. Jackson, 299 Ill. App. 3d 104 (1998); People v. Miller, 286 Ill. App.3d 297 (1997); Adams, 169 Ill. App. 3d at 316.

While section 5-5-4 provides a statutory basis for the protection of rights envisionedin Pearce and Baze, the statute is not an exclusive protection. See Adams, 169 Ill. App. 3dat 317. The statute does not alter or abrogate the protective requirements of Pearce andBaze, and a defendant is still entitled to the protection of his due process rights even ifsection 5-5-4 does not apply. See Adams, 169 Ill. App. 3d at 317. However, defendant inthe case sub judice does not contend that his federal due process rights were violated or thatthe imposition of an increased sentence was an act of judicial vindictiveness. See Peoplev. Garcia, 179 Ill. 2d 55 (1997). In fact, it is noteworthy that at the hearing on defendant'smotion to reconsider sentence, defense counsel specifically stated that he found no specificevidence of judicial vindictiveness and he was not going to argue that there was anyinvolved in the court's imposition of a higher sentence after defendant entered guilty pleasfor the same offenses the second time. Defendant only contends that a statutory violationoccurred.

Defendant asks this court to follow the reasoning of People v. Pierce, 80 Ill. App. 3d514 (1980), rather than Jackson, Miller, and Adams. In Pierce, at a bench trial, thedefendant was convicted of battery and was sentenced to one year of probation. Piercetimely filed a written motion requesting a new trial based on a claim that there had been nojury waiver. Pierce's motion was granted, and the cause was reassigned to a different judge.Pierce, 80 Ill. App. 3d at 515. Subsequently, Pierce waived a jury trial, and after a benchtrial, he was convicted again and was later sentenced to a one-year term of probation plusa 30-day term of incarceration. In reversing the 30-day period of incarceration, the courtheld that section 5-5-4 may be construed to apply to a resentencing after the defendant hassuccessfully gained posttrial relief in the trial court pursuant to a statutorily authorizedmotion under section 116-1 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 (725 ILCS 5/116-1(West 1998)). Pierce, 80 Ill. App. 3d at 516.

In contrast, in Adams, the defendant pleaded guilty to voluntary manslaughter andwas sentenced to 10 years' imprisonment. Adams, 169 Ill. App. 3d at 313. On Adams'smotion, the court allowed the withdrawal of his guilty plea. Subsequently, a jury convictedAdams of voluntary manslaughter, and the court sentenced Adams to 12 years'imprisonment. On appeal, Adams contended that the increase in sentence violated his dueprocess rights. The Adams court analyzed Pearce and concluded that the Supreme Courtwas interested in protecting the review of constitutional issues, not in providing a safety netfor every convicted defendant who wished to have a second chance at trying his case. Adams, 169 Ill. App. 3d at 315. The Adams court affirmed the 12-year prison sentence andreasoned that Adams's trial and later conviction was the result of his own decision towithdraw his guilty plea; therefore, he could not claim the protection intended for those whoattack their convictions on constitutional grounds by either direct review or collateral attack. Adams, 169 Ill. App. 3d at 317. The Adams court declined to follow the holding of Pierce. Adams, 169 Ill. App. 3d at 317.

In Miller, the defendant pleaded guilty in three separate cases and was sentenced toconsecutive sentences in those cases. Miller, 286 Ill. App. 3d at 298. Miller filed a motionto reconsider his sentences, which the trial court denied. On appeal, the appellate courtfound that Miller had not been properly admonished pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 605(b)(145 Ill. 2d R. 605(b)), and the court remanded the case for proper admonishments and toallow him to file new postplea motions. On remand, Miller was granted leave to withdrawhis guilty pleas. Although a jury trial was commenced, Miller entered into an agreement andsubsequently pleaded guilty. Miller received an increased sentence on one of the offensesfor which he pleaded guilty. On appeal, Miller contended that his increase in sentenceviolated section 5-5-4. The appellate court evaluated Miller's contentions under both Adamsand Pierce and concluded that Adams was the better reasoned of the two cases. Miller, 286Ill. App. 3d at 301. The court in Miller determined that although the case was subject toappellate review, his guilty pleas were not vacated by a higher court, but by the trial court,and that the appellate review did not concern his motions to withdraw guilty pleas, so thecourt determined that the increased sentence imposed following the entry of his secondguilty pleas did not violate section 5-5-4. Miller, 286 Ill. App. 3d at 302.

In Jackson, the defendant pleaded guilty to heinous battery and was sentenced to 20years' imprisonment. Jackson, 299 Ill. App. 3d at 106. Jackson filed a motion to withdrawhis guilty plea, which was denied. Jackson pursued a successful appeal, in which theappellate court remanded the cause to the circuit court for a hearing on his motion. Thecircuit court allowed Jackson to withdraw his guilty plea and proceeded to trial on thecharge. A jury convicted Jackson of heinous battery, and the court sentenced him to 45years' imprisonment. The Jackson court found that nothing in the record indicated that therewas a reasonable likelihood that the increase in his sentence was the product of actualjudicial vindictiveness by the second sentencing judge, who was different from the firstsentencing judge. Jackson, 299 Ill. App. 3d at 115-16. The court held that the burden wasthen on Jackson to prove actual vindictiveness, which he failed to do. Jackson, 299 Ill. App.3d at 116. The court concluded that there was no due process violation when the trial courtimposed a sentence greater than 20 years' imprisonment. Jackson, 299 Ill. App. 3d at 116. The Jackson court also determined that section 5-5-4 was not applicable because the trialcourt, rather than a higher court, allowed Jackson to withdraw his guilty plea and becauseJackson's conviction and sentence were not set aside on direct review or collateral attack. Jackson, 299 Ill. App. 3d at 117. The Jackson court also stated that it found the reasoningof Adams and Miller more persuasive than Pierce, and the court declined to follow Pierce. Jackson, 299 Ill. App. 3d at 117.

This court, too, finds that the reasoning of Jackson, Miller, and Adams is morepersuasive than the reasoning of Pierce. Defendant's withdrawal of his guilty pleas wasallowed by the trial court, and no direct review or collateral attack occurred on his originalconvictions and sentences. Defendant was even admonished at the hearing whereindefendant pleaded guilty for the second time that the trial court was not bound or obligatedby the sentence that was previously imposed. We note that the supreme court recentlyaddressed this issue in People v. Diaz, No. 85444, slip op. at 11 (Ill. August 10, 2000),finding that when a trial court grants a motion to withdraw a guilty plea, as in the case at bar,"both parties are then returned to the status quo as it existed prior to the acceptance of theplea." Clearly, returning defendant to the status quo-prior to the acceptance of defendant'sfirst guilty plea-permitted the trial court to sentence defendant to any term allowed bystatute, including the sentence that defendant received after his second guilty plea. Therefore, we determine that defendant's increased sentence following the withdrawal of hisoriginal guilty pleas and his entering of new guilty pleas to the same offenses does notviolate section 5-5-4, as section 5-5-4 is not applicable.

Defendant also contends on appeal that his extended-term sentence of eight years'incarceration for the offense of possession of cannabis, a class 3 felony, must be vacated,as the sentence is improper under Jordan. The State concedes this issue but asks this courtto reduce defendant's sentence to five years' imprisonment rather than remand this case forresentencing. Unlawful possession of cocaine in a penal institution is a class 1 felony (see720 ILCS 5/31A-1.1(g) (West 1996)), while unlawful possession of cannabis in a penalinstitution is a class 3 felony (see 720 ILCS 5/31A-1.1(e) (West 1996)). The range ofsentencing for a class 3 felony is two to five years' imprisonment. See 730 ILCS 5/5-8-1(a)(6) (West 1996). The extended-term for a class 3 felony is a prison term of not less thanfive years and not more than 10 years (see 730 ILCS 5/5-8-2(a)(5) (West 1996)).

In this case, defendant received an extended-term sentence of eight years'imprisonment for his conviction of unlawful possession of cannabis, a class 3 felony. Anextended-term sentence may be imposed only for the most serious class of offenses forwhich a defendant is convicted. See Jordan, 103 Ill. 2d at 206. In the case at bar,defendant's conviction for unlawful possession of crack cocaine in a penal institution is aclass 1 felony, the more serious class of offense for which defendant was convicted. Accordingly, defendant's extended-term sentence of eight years for his conviction of theclass 3 felony, unlawful possession of cannabis in a penal institution, was improper. Wherea court having jurisdiction over both the person and the offense imposes a sentence in excessof what the statute permits, the legal and authorized portion of the sentence is not void, butthe excess portion is void. See People v. Jennings, 204 Ill. App. 3d 1075 (1990). Therefore,we reduce defendant's sentence on his conviction on count two for unlawful possession ofcontraband in a penal institution (cannabis) to the maximum allowable term of five years'imprisonment, which is to run concurrently with his prison term of 14 years for count one,unlawful possession of contraband in a penal institution (crack cocaine).

For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the circuit court of Johnson County isaffirmed as to the sentence imposed on defendant's conviction for unlawful possession ofcontraband in a penal institution (crack cocaine) and affirmed as modified to a sentence offive years' imprisonment as to the sentence imposed on defendant's conviction for unlawfulpossession of contraband in a penal institution (cannabis). The sentences are to runconcurrently with each other but consecutively to the sentences that defendant is alreadyserving.

Affirmed as modified.

WELCH and CHAPMAN, JJ., concur.