JUSTICE KUEHN delivered the opinion of the court:

Lenn and Glenn are twin brothers. Their car-hijacking escapades spelled doubletrouble for drivers in and around Alton, Illinois. They have a cousin named HeatherWeeden. She provided the bait for their unwary hijacking targets. She would lure driverswith romantic promise, board their vehicles, and direct them to a designated rendevous withthe brothers Reed. Drivers eager to sample the wares that Heather strutted were alwaysgravely disappointed when the encounter they expected materialized into a look down thebarrel of a pistol. In the case of a young man named Michael Ufert, the encounter provedgrave indeed. His car was not the only thing that was taken from him.

Lenn, Glenn, and Heather were friends with a young man named Andre Cunningham. As youths growing up in Alton, Illinois, they participated in youth programs, performingvarious song-and-dance routines in competition with other youngsters. Unfortunately, asthey grew into their teens, they engaged in less wholesome activities. On September 1,1994, at the age of 17, the four teamed up, intent on hijacking a 1993 Ford Mustang drivenby Michael Ufert. They took his car after they took his life.

The discovery of Ufert's body in a remote area, followed by the discovery of hiswrecked car miles away, made the Reeds early suspects in the investigation. However, therewas no evidence to link them to the crime. Suspicion lingered for several years due to theirknown penchant for vehicular hijacks. Then in 1996, an anonymous tip pointedinvestigators the way to Heather Weeden. Heather confessed, implicated the others, andassisted in the investigation. Self-schooled in the art of deception, she wore a wire andengaged Lenn in a 90-minute conversation designed to prompt unwitting admissions fromher trusting cousin. The police videotaped the conversation, but the tape's sound provedlargely inaudible. The only discernible comment of value was a declaration by Lenn: "Thepolice don't have anything."

Heather no doubt tasted the same feeling of dashed expectations experienced by herhijack victims. The State did not treat her assistance with the kind of favor that she hadanticipated. She had to be gravely disappointed when the treatment that she expected forher assistance materialized into a devout pursuit of first-degree murder and aggravatedvehicular-hijacking charges. Although the record is unclear as to whether she went to trialor pled guilty, we do know that she currently serves a 40-year prison term for her role in themurder and a 30-year prison term for her participation in the hijacking.

Heather did not appear at the trial of these two defendants. She did not testify. Norwas information that she had provided earlier a part of these proceedings. However, herconfession proved to be invaluable, for it provided the tool by which the prosecutionprocured the testimony of Andre Cunningham. His testimony was the centerpiece of theState's case. There was no version of events to present to the jury without his claim of whathappened. The jury could not harbor a doubt about his veracity and still convict these twodefendants.

This is what Andre told the jury about the evening of September 1, 1994.

Heather wanted money. She spotted a nice target in Michael Ufert and his red 1993Mustang GT. She pointed him out to the Reed twins, and their standard car-hijacking gamewas afoot. Andre admitted that he was a willing participant in the hijacking scheme.

Andre and the Reed brothers watched from afar as Heather solicited Ufert andboarded his car. As Heather and Ufert drove off, Heather's trio of cohorts followed. Lennand Glenn became concerned when Ufert's car did not travel a path to where Heather hadsteered their other victims. The planned encounter usually occurred at Rock Springs Parkin Alton, but Ufert's Mustang traversed the countryside, far beyond the Alton city limits. Attimes, it became difficult to maintain the car in their sight.

Andre remembered that rap music accented the ride, Lenn having dialed in the "108Magic" radio station.

The Mustang finally came to a stop on an isolated country road adjacent to a field. Lenn pulled up a short distance behind, and he, Glenn, and Andre went to claim the objectof their enterprise. Ufert exited his car, mindful of his predicament. When he did, Lennstepped up and struck him in the face with a pistol. The gun discharged. A frightened Uferttried to escape, bolting into the darkness of the nearby field. Andre explained how he andGlenn chased after Ufert and arrested his flight. As they held Ufert captive, Lenn andHeather approached them. Ufert was on his knees as Lenn drew near, gun in hand. Ufertpleaded with Lenn to spare his life, telling him and his other captors that he had a son toraise. In the midst of Ufert's supplicant pleas, Lenn shot him in the face and passed the gunto his twin brother with instruction to shoot again. Glenn readily complied, firing a shotdirectly into Ufert's chest. It proved to be the fatal wound. Glenn handed the gun to Andre. Andre claimed that he resisted firing another shot. However, Lenn, who decided that theywere all going to shoot Ufert to seal their complicity and to assure future loyalty to oneanother, told Andre that his choice was to shoot Ufert or to share in his fate. Andre fired athird bullet into Ufert's body and walked back to the car. He heard the report of another shotas he left.

Andre rode back to Alton as a back-seat passenger in Ufert's car. He was droppedoff with advice from the Reed brothers. He was told that silence was the key to avoidsanction for what they had done.

The jury heard the foregoing facts from Andre Cunningham. Several facts thatdeveloped during the course of the investigation fit his description of what happened. Theycorroborated his presence when Michael Ufert met his death.

Authorities found Ufert's car the day after the killing, wrecked and abandoned. Theradio was tuned to "Magic 108." Ufert's wife testified that he never listened to that radiostation.

The circumstances under which the State procured the testimony of AndreCunningham were a significant part of the trial. It took more than two years to break thecase. Someone contacted the police and informed them that Heather Weeden had detailedknowledge about a murder. The details fit the circumstances of the Ufert homicide. Heatherwas confronted and confessed the details of the car-hijacking operation and the Ufertmurder. The State intended to use Heather as a witness against these defendants. Apparently, she and the State could not agree on the terms under which she would providethat help. Heather must have balked at the concessions that the State was willing to makein order to have her testimony.

The State contacted an attorney who represented Andre Cunningham. At the time,Andre was incarcerated in the Madison County jail. He had already pled guilty to shootingsomeone in the back. He was awaiting trial on another aggravated-battery-with-a-firearmcharge. The pending charge alleged that he shot someone else in the stomach. Andre hada demonstrated penchant for gunplay.

Initially, Andre resisted the State's overtures, thinking that the State could not provehis involvement in the Ufert murder. After his attorney provided him with a copy ofHeather's statement, Andre decided to reconsider his position. He decided to testify againsthis bygone friends. It was a decision made easy by the carrot that the State dangled. Itpromised to forego any prosecution for murder, accept his plea to vehicular hijacking, andrecommend a prison term no greater than 20 years.

The jury was thoroughly apprized of the fact that Andre's testimony was procured byway of these concessions. Thus, the jury had the benefit of weighing his testimony's worthagainst the terms of its purchase. The jury knew that Andre's testimony allowed him to getaway with murder. However, the terms of his arrangement with the State still presented thepossibility of 20 years of imprisonment. There was a strong implication, argued by theprosecutor, that even though he signed on as the State's key witness, Andre would spend thebetter part of the next 20 years in prison.

The actual plea bargaining and sentencing were postponed until after Andre testifiedagainst his cohorts. Andre testified on June 10, 1998. On June 17, 1998, he pled guilty toarmed robbery rather than vehicular hijacking. On November 16, 1998, an order wasentered sentencing him to time served on that armed robbery. The sentencing judge orderedhis immediate release at that time, and the punishment for his role in Michael Ufert's deathwas complete.

Andre received other favorable treatment from the State. He claimed that it wasunrelated to his agreed-upon testimony, an assertion that his attorney and the State seconded. However, the defense suggested that the State's sponsorship of favorable treatment on thetwo pending charges of aggravated battery with a firearm was an added benefit in return fortestimony, value that the jury needed to weigh in assessing Andre's interest in being awitness for the State.

Andre officially signed on as a State's witness on October 24, 1996. Two days later,a pending charge of aggravated battery with a firearm was dismissed by the State. Andrehad previously received the minimum six-year prison sentence for aggravated battery witha firearm. In order to skirt truth-in-sentencing requirements, the sentencing judge found thatshooting someone in the back did not produce bodily harm. Apparently, the IllinoisDepartment of Corrections took a different view. On March 2, 1998, the sentencing judgehad to order the Department of Corrections to credit Andre with day-for-day good-timecredit on his six-year sentence.

The jury listened to Andre detail the circumstances of Ufert's murder. As the Stateelicited the events that led to his becoming a State's witness, defense counsel objected,claiming that the State was fashioning the circumstances in a way that made Andre appearto be a "good guy." The prosecutor then offered his opinion that Andre was a "good guy."

After Andre testified, the State called an attorney named Harry Anderson to the stand. Anderson represented Andre. He recalled that in October 1996, he was summoned to theMadison County State's Attorney's office by the prosecutor in charge of this murderinvestigation. He was told that Andre was a murder suspect but that in return for Andre'sassistance against the other suspects, the State was willing to forego murder charges.

He left his meeting with the assistant State's Attorney and visited Andre. He askedAndre about the State's overture, and Andre responded, "Well, I'm sure they want to talk tome about a murder that happened awhile back." Anderson testified that Andre then confidedin him. Before any deal with the State was in place, Anderson learned from Andre thatAndre, along with Lenn, Glenn, and Heather, murdered Michael Ufert.

The jury found the defendants guilty. The findings of guilt for committing first-degree murder wrought a 75-year prison term for Lenn Reed and a 70-year prison term forGlenn Reed. The findings of guilt for committing aggravated vehicular hijacking drew 30-year prison sentences for both of them. The sentences were ordered to be servedconcurrently.

The defendants raise several issues on appeal.

First, they challenge the sufficiency of the evidence. They assert that theirconvictions rest entirely upon the uncorroborated testimony of an actively involvedaccomplice who testified with substantial self-interest. They argue that his word is a legallyunacceptable basis for the convictions, particularly in light of his active role in the murder,coupled with the benefits that he obtained in return for his testimony. Hence, the defendantsconclude that the State has failed to establish their guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.

We agree that these convictions rest upon the largely uncorroborated testimony of anaccomplice witness. While there are numerous pieces of evidence that corroborate AndreCunningham's knowledge about the murder and credit his presence at the scene of the crime,there was little to corroborate his claim that the Reed brothers were also to blame. Notwithstanding, given our standard of review and our supreme court's view of how thatstandard applies to accomplice testimony, we cannot accept the conclusion that Andre'stestimony, standing alone, cannot support a conviction.

We review this issue under an oft-stated standard of review that prevents us fromreweighing the evidence from our view of its worth. That standard requires us to ask"whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, anyrational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond areasonable doubt." People v. Byron, 164 Ill. 2d 279, 299, 647 N.E.2d 946, 956 (1995).

We might question whether rational jurors using caution should ever credit testimonyfrom the likes of an Andre Cunningham. We might further question whether someone wholevels an accusation in exchange for absolution from a killing, someone who had ademonstrated penchant for shooting people, could ever be trusted to speak the truth. However, we cannot question the state of the law. Our supreme court has held that evenwhen uncorroborated, "the testimony of an accomplice is sufficient to sustain a convictionif it satisfies the jury of the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt." People v. Rivera,166 Ill. 2d 279, 287, 652 N.E.2d 307, 311 (1995) (citing People v. Collins, 106 Ill. 2d 237,261, 478 N.E.2d 267, 277 (1985)).

We cannot say as a matter of law that Andre Cunningham's testimony was unworthyof belief. The jury saw it and chose to believe it, despite Andre's admitted role in themurder. Nor can we conclude that testimony procured with freedom precludes a jury fromembracing such testimony, even though valid reasons exist to shun it.

Determinations of the credibility of witnesses, the weight to be given their testimony,and the reasonable inferences to be drawn from the evidence are responsibilities that befalljurors. Byron, 164 Ill. 2d at 299, 647 N.E.2d at 955-56. If believed, the testimony of AndreCunningham was sufficient to establish guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Aware of his manyshortcomings, his interest in testifying favorably for the State, and their duty to assess histestimony with suspicion and caution, the jurors obviously believed in what he had to say.

Accordingly, we find that the evidence was legally sufficient to establish guilt beyonda reasonable doubt.

The next issue arises out of the testimony of Harry Anderson. The defendants claimthat the introduction of Andre's prior consistent statement, implicating the defendants in themurder and made in the confidence of the attorney-client relationship, resulted in reversibleerror. There is no question that the out-of-court statement was hearsay and that it wasdamaging to these defendants. Nonetheless, it was admissible.

Defense counsel cross-examined Andre at length. He was confronted with priorinconsistent statements, with his past criminal conduct, with his admitted role in the murder,and with the personal gains in store in return for the story that he told. The pervasive themeof this examination was that Andre fabricated the blame cast to feather his own nest.

Once the defense implied a reason to testify falsely and suggested the manufactureof falsehoods to promote that reason, the State was permitted to show that Andre's claimswere made before any motive to lie ever arose. See People v. Williams, 147 Ill. 2d 173, 227-28, 588 N.E.2d 983, 1003 (1991). Here, Andre told his attorney about the defendants'complicity in the Ufert murder, while he harbored the belief that the State's threat toprosecute was a bluff. He did not offer the information about the Reeds in pursuit ofleniency. In fact, after confiding in his attorney, he told him that he was not interested in theState's invitation to deal.

Any motive to fabricate the defendants' involvement in the murder did not arise untilthe next day, when he contacted Anderson and asked him to find out what evidence the Statehad to prove his guilt. He had no reason to falsify the defendants' complicity in the murderuntil he was shown Heather's statement and realized that he might very well face a murderprosecution.

Andre's statement to Anderson, prior to the pursuit of any benefit in return for thatstatement, bore the ring of truth. Its admission was necessary and proper to rebut the notion,crafted by the defense during cross-examination, that Andre's testimony was a recentfabrication motivated by a desire to preserve his own self-interest.

A 90-minute videotape between a then-cooperating Heather Weeden and Lenn Reedwas authenticated and admitted into evidence during the trial. While there was testimonyelicited about the videotape, its contents, and how it was used during the course of theinvestigation, it was not shown to the jurors. The State explained its goal in arranging thetaped surveillance and its failure to produce an audible conversation. The jury was told thatLenn could be heard to say, "[T]he police don't have anything." During the deliberations toverdict, the jurors wanted to view the videotape. The trial judge allowed them to do so.

The defendants claim that the trial judge erred in permitting the jury to watch thevideotape. Their argument stems from the tape's inaudible condition. Due to the lack ofdiscernible conversation, they argue that the event depicted was irrelevant and allowed thejury to speculate that Lenn was discussing his complicity in the Ufert murder with Heather. Defense counsel objected to allowing the jurors' request. However, they did notobject to the admission of the videotape. Once admitted, publishing its contents to the jurywas a matter that rested within the trial judge's discretion. See People v. Gomez, 236 Ill.App. 3d 283, 293, 603 N.E.2d 702, 707 (1992). Absent an abuse of discretion, we will notoverturn a decision to allow the jury to examine admitted evidence. Gomez, 236 Ill. App.3d at 293, 603 N.E.2d at 707.

Contrary to the defendants' basic assertion, the contents of the tape were clearlyrelevant. " 'Evidence is relevant if it has "any tendency to make the existence of any materialfact more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence." ' " People v.Anderson, 237 Ill. App. 3d 621, 632, 604 N.E.2d 546, 553 (1992) (quoting People v.Mitchell, 152 Ill. 2d 274, 332, 604 N.E.2d 877, 906 (1992) (quoting People v. Free, 94 Ill.2d 378, 425, 447 N.E.2d 218, 236 (1983))). It simply cannot constitute an abuse ofdiscretion for the trial judge to allow the jurors to see and hear admitted evidence that isrelevant to their fact-finding task.

The videotape, and the circumstances under which it was produced, corroborated thetestimony of Andre Cunningham when he claimed that Heather Weeden was a participantin the Ufert murder. It was certainly relevant to the inquiry for the jury to see what Heatherlooked like. Andre claimed that her looks lured Michael Ufert to his death. It was alsorelevant for the jury to witness the kind of rapport that existed between Heather and anotherwho Andre accused, particularly when the known topic of conversation was the Ufertmurder.

Testimony established that Heather was assisting the police and that she willinglyengaged in the secretly taped conversation with her cousin. She, and the authorities,believed that she possessed the ability to generate open discussion about the Ufert murder. The jury was told that Heather's charge was to open a dialogue with Lenn about the murder. Given the stated purpose of the meeting, Lenn's comment that "the police don't haveanything" was relevant. It was reasonable to infer from it, and the circumstances underwhich the conversation was arranged, that Lenn was mindful of the ongoing probe into themurder, was aware of what evidence had been developed, and had measured their chancesof avoiding detection. Since the videotape was relevant to issues tending to establish thedefendants' guilt, the jurors were entitled to see and hear the videotape.

Next, the defendants claim that they were deprived of their right to a fair trial by the"gross misconduct" of the prosecuting attorney. First, they complain about the prosecutorgiving the opening statement on his knees. The prosecutor, in argumentative fashion, wentto his knees to assume the role of the victim, as he first described the moment of death to thejury. Second, the defendants decry the repeated questioning of two witnesses about seeingLenn with a gun. The questions were designed to establish that Lenn possessed a gun, butwithout a direct link to the murder or its immediate time frame. The first time a witness wasasked the question, the trial judge correctly sustained an objection on relevancy. Theprosecutor continued to pose the same basic question by altering the time frame of theinquiry, but not linking it to the murder. The trial judge continued to sustain repeatedobjections to the entire line of questioning. Finally, the defendants find fault with theprosecutor's bolstering of Andre Cunningham's testimony by calling him a "good guy"during direct examination and an "honest man" twice in closing argument.

While prosecutors should refrain from argument in an opening statement, abide bythe rules of evidence and a trial judge's ruling on the same, and avoid personal opinionsabout their witness's character traits, our examination of the record does not lead us tobelieve that the conduct complained of deprived either defendant of a fair trial. The trialjudge shamed the prosecutor to his feet during the opening statement, instructed the jury todisregard the prosecutor's opinion that Andre was a "good guy," and sustained objectionsto the repeated inquiries about gun possession. With regard to Lenn's possession of a gunat some other time either before or after the murder, the only response given before anobjection could be sustained was in the negative.

We note that only one issue that appellate counsel raise to challenge the fairness ofthese proceedings was properly preserved for appeal by trial counsel. We have addressedseveral of the issues without comment on that fact. If we thought that the various excessesof the prosecuting attorney amounted to "gross misconduct," we would again address themerits of this issue despite the question of waiver. However, we do not.

None of the conduct raised here was complained of in either defendant's posttrialmotion. Hence, the error was not properly preserved for review on appeal, and thedefendants have forfeited the right to complain. People v. Enoch, 122 Ill. 2d 176, 185-86,522 N.E.2d 1124, 1129-30 (1988).

Next, the defendants argue that the trial judge should not have permitted the State toadd an additional count of murder on the eve of trial and that trial counsel was incompetentby failing to seek its dismissal on speedy trial grounds. The added count of first-degreemurder involved the same facts known to the State since the inception of the prosecution. It pled felony murder, alleging that Michael Ufert's death occurred during the course of anaggravated vehicular hijacking, a circumstance known all along.

Had the jury returned a guilty verdict solely upon the added felony murder count orhad the trial judge entered a judgment upon that guilty verdict, the defendants would havereason to complain. However, a judgment was not entered against either defendant on theadded count of murder. Therefore, we have no reason to consider this argument, for thedefendants are in need of no relief from the added charge. People v. Majors, 308 Ill. App.3d 1021, 1030, 721 N.E.2d 753, 760 (1999).

The defendants raise several arguments directed at the constitutionality of theirsentences. First, they point out that fundamental fairness requires that similarly situateddefendants may not receive grossly disparate sentences. People v. Banks, 241 Ill. App. 3d966, 983, 609 N.E.2d 864, 876 (1993). Here, Lenn and Glenn Reed received a 75-year anda 70-year prison term, respectively, for the crime of first-degree murder, while HeatherWeeden was sentenced to prison for only 40 years for the same crime. They argue thatHeather, as well as Andre Cunningham, who escaped without any punishment for themurder, shared complete complicity in it yet received grossly disparate treatment incomparison to the punishment meted out to them. They point out that Heather and Andreperformed all of the same criminal acts performed by them and that the crime was Heather'sidea. They also note that when Ufert tried to flee to safety, it was Andre who chased himdown and held him captive for the others.

At first blush, the divergent treatment of the four people responsible for MichaelUfert's death seems whimsical. However, upon closer examination, the disparatepunishment is supported by valid reasons.

For the purpose of this analysis, we must accept as truth that version of the crimeupon which the verdicts rest. An analysis of the facts set forth in Andre Cunningham'stestimony reveals that the four participants in this murder are not similarly situated. Thecircumstances of the crime itself, coupled with events surrounding the prosecution,warranted different punishments.

Clearly, the decision to turn a car hijacking into a murder originated in the mind ofLenn Reed. He, and he alone, possessed the power to hear Michael Ufert's pleas and sparehis life. He made the decision to kill. He, among those responsible for the death, was themost evil. His acts were the most despicable. Lenn not only made the life-or-death decisionbut imposed that decision on the others, requiring their participation in the killing by threatto their own lives in lieu of active involvement. Glenn Reed was the second to shootMichael Ufert. He did not have to hear any threat to his own safety, and none was made,before he accepted the gun and fired a bullet at point-blank range into Ufert's chest. Heinflicted the unkindest wound, the one that ended Ufert's life. The other three wounds likelywould not have proven fatal. He may well have taken less deadly aim, had he any reticenceover committing murder. His willingness to participate in the killing and his intention whendoing so were both clear. Ufert was already shot in the head. He aimed for another vitalarea of the body and was the participant that sealed Ufert's fate.

We think that the Reed twins shared a greater role in, and a greater responsibility for,this death. Moreover, neither one has ever done anything to demonstrate a sense of remorseor acceptance of responsibility.

Neither brother can be punished for denying guilt and exercising his right to standtrial. However, others who admit guilt and negotiate guilty pleas can be treated differentlybecause of that fact.

Heather Weeden may well have pled guilty. A part of the record seems to suggestthat she pled guilty to murder and vehicular hijacking in exchange for agreed-uponconcurrent sentences. This might well serve as reason for her disparate treatment. To theextent that the record is unclear and the circumstances under which Heather was sentencedare unknown, the uncertainty falls upon the defendants, who have the burden to provide "arecord from which a rational comparison of sentences can be made." People v. Cooper, 239Ill. App. 3d 336, 363, 606 N.E.2d 705, 724 (1992); People v. Generally, 170 Ill. App. 3d668, 676, 525 N.E.2d 106, 110 (1988).

There are other reasons that support the lighter sentence that Heather received. TheReed brothers would never have been brought to justice had she not decided to inform thepolice about their complicity in the Ufert murder. Her initial assistance, while it did notmature into testimony on behalf of the State, still helped the prosecution's cause. Additionally, there is a significant difference in her role in the murder. Murder was not acrime that she bargained for when she lured Ufert and his car to the scene of the crime. Sheand the Reeds had engaged in car hijacking before and no one was killed. While we knowthat Lenn, Glenn, and Andre fired shots into the body of Ufert, it is a matter of speculationwhether she administered the fourth shot and, if so, what circumstance she was under whenshe did so. We do know that the fourth shot inflicted a nonfatal wound.

Andre Cunningham received remarkably lenient treatment for his role in the murder. The record does not reflect what the prosecution did, if anything, to promote his time-servedsentence for the armed robbery conviction that stemmed from his role in this murder. It isunclear how much punishment he actually received for that criminal conduct. But, given theconduct that he engaged in, it was not very much.

The Reed brothers' sentences, as a practical matter, condemn them to a life ofimprisonment. While there is an air of unfairness where an active accomplice finds freedombefore the defendants even file briefs on appeal from their convictions, the Reed brothersmiss the simple difference between them and Andre Cunningham. The three are clearly notsimilarly situated. The prosecution pursued the Reed brothers as defendants. To do so, itneeded evidence. It obtained that evidence from Andre Cunningham, who became aprosecution witness. As this case graphically demonstrates, the criminal justice system treatsthose who sit in a witness chair far differently than those who sit at counsel's table ascriminal defendants.

The promise of freedom offers immeasurable value in procuring testimony. Its worthis greater than any other commodity that could be offered, a circumstance that prosecutorsneed bear in mind when using it in exchange for evidence. However, we know of noconstitutional constraint that prevents its use. The only constraint is how freedom's promiseinfects the value of the purchased testimony, a constraint tested by the defense in this case. If due process required comparable treatment of cohorts in crime regardless of their decisionto turn State's evidence, due process would bring a halt to many valid prosecutions. TheState would be compelled to forego the prosecution of anyone, rather than use accomplicetestimony to convict those participants considered most culpable. Disparate treatmentbetween an accomplice witness and the accomplices against whom he testifies provides nobasis for constitutional relief.

Finally, both defendants challenge the constitutionality of their extended-term prisonsentences for the offense of first-degree murder. At sentencing, the trial judgeunderstandably determined that the murder of Michael Ufert was exceptionally brutalindicative of wanton cruelty. That determination extended the range of punishment beyondthe prescribed maximum punishment available, absent the finding. Instead of a maximum60-year prison term, the finding empowered the sentencing judge to impose up to 100 yearsof imprisonment. In the case of Lenn Reed, it enabled the judge to enhance punishment by15 years. The same finding allowed the punishment of Glenn Reed to exceed the maximumprison term otherwise available by 10 years.

We are asked to examine the statutory sentencing scheme employed in this case, inlight of Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 147 L. Ed. 2d 435, 120 S. Ct. 2348 (2000),a case in which the United States Supreme Court held a New Jersey hate-crime statuteunconstitutional because it commissioned judges to make a factual finding that enhancedtheir power to punish beyond the maximum penalties prescribed for any given criminaloffense.

We decided this precise issue in another case during the pendency of this appeal. People v. Rush, 322 Ill. App. 3d 1014, 748 N.E.2d 832 (2001). We found that the extended-term statutory sentencing scheme employed in this case was invalid under the constitutionalrule pronounced in Apprendi v. New Jersey. Writing for the majority, Justice Welch wrote,"[T]here is an immense difference between (a) allowing state officers or governmentofficials to make factual determinations, without any standard of proof, that may deprive anaccused of his liberty and (b) allowing an accused to have those crucial facts proved by theState beyond a reasonable doubt to an accused's fellow citizens." Rush, 322 Ill. App. 3d at1027-28, 748 N.E.2d at 843.

Here, the factual determination that this murder was set apart from other murders byits exceptionally brutal nature was made by a State officer rather than a jury of thedefendants' peers. The constitutional guarantee to a trial at which facts critical to themeasure of punishment are decided by fellow citizens rather than a public official cannotabide such a scheme. The constitutional promise of a trial by jury guarantees the right tohave a jury determine those facts that determine the maximum sentence the law allows.People v. Nitz, 319 Ill. App. 3d 949, 969, 747 N.E.2d 38, 54 (2001). Accordingly, theextended-term sentences imposed in this case are constitutionally infirm.

It is clear that the sentencing judge believed that Lenn Reed was the most culpableparticipant in the crime. We agree. It is also clear that this was a particularly senseless andfoul murder. After all, Michael Ufert's flight completed the hijacking objective, making allthat occurred thereafter pure sport of human hunt and kill.

Since the trial judge felt that the crime warranted more than the maximum otherwiseavailable, and since he determined that Lenn Reed was the worst of the participants, we willmodify his first-degree murder sentence to 60 years of imprisonment, the maximumpunishment the law allows us to impose upon the facts determined by a jury of his peers.

As previously stated, the Reed brothers are twins. They are alike in many ways,including their callous disregard for human life. However, their conduct was not identical,and the sentencing judge recognized that fact. Glenn Reed received a lesser sentence thanhis twin brother. While we can readily conclude that the sentencing judge would haveimposed the maximum sentence available upon Lenn Reed, we are uncertain whether, withless punishment available, he would continue to preserve some disparity in punishment andtreat Glenn Reed more leniently than his brother. Accordingly, we vacate the 70-yearsentence imposed upon Glenn Reed, and we remand for sentencing anew, consistent withthe constitutional constraints determined by this decision.

For the reasons stated, we affirm the convictions, modify Lenn Reed's sentence forfirst-degree murder to a 60-year prison term, vacate Glenn Reed's sentence for first-degreemurder, and remand to the sentencing judge for further proceedings consistent with thisopinion.

No. 5-98-0777, Affirmed in part and vacated in part; cause remanded.

No. 5-98-0778, Affirmed as modified.

MAAG, P.J., and WELCH, J., concur.