Robert Ben Rhoades (defendant), pursuant to negotiations with the State, onSeptember 11, 1992, pled guilty to first-degree murder and was sentenced to imprisonmentfor natural life. The sentence of death had been a possibility because on May 6, 1992, theState had filed a notice that it intended to seek the death penalty. This is defendant's thirdappeal to this court. Due to the procedural history of this case, this is a direct appeal fromdefendant's conviction. On this appeal, defendant initially contended that the circuit courterred in refusing to allow him to file a motion to withdraw his guilty plea, after a remandfrom this court following defendant's second appeal. On the motion of defendant, this courtallowed defendant to file a supplemental brief that raises the issue of whether the statuteunder which defendant was sentenced is unconstitutional. He relies on the United StatesSupreme Court's decision in Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 147 L. Ed. 2d 435, 120S. Ct. 2348 (2000).

Prior to the entry of the guilty plea, a hearing was held pursuant to Supreme CourtRule 402 (134 Ill. 2d R. 402(c)). The parties agreed that to establish a factual basis, thecourt could take judicial notice of the evidence presented to the grand jury which indicteddefendant.⁽¹⁾ The grand jury heard evidence that the victim, Regina K. Walters, age 14, waslast seen alive at her mother's apartment on February 3, 1990, in Pasadena, Texas, and thatin April 1990, defendant, an over-the-road truck driver, was arrested in Casa Grande,Arizona, where he was charged with kidnapping and sexual assault. Defendant had beena suspect in a kidnapping/rape case in which the victim, F.R.T., had been taken fromCalifornia to Houston, Texas. F.R.T. had been kept chained up in the back of defendant'struck for a two-week period during which defendant had raped F.R.T. This victim was ableto escape.

The grand jury also heard evidence that defendant was arrested in Arizona when astate trooper stopped to check on defendant's tractor-trailer, which was parked along the sideof a highway, and noticed a nude woman handcuffed and chained to the sleeper ofdefendant's tractor-trailer. When the officer shined a light into the truck, the woman startedscreaming, and defendant got out of the truck. Regina K. Walters' notebook was found indefendant's truck.

The grand jury heard evidence that a search warrant was issued for defendant'sresidence in Houston, Texas. The search produced numerous items of women's clothing,numerous obscene magazines and books, and instruments that could be used in bondage-type situations. The search also produced photographs of nude women, one of whom wasRegina K. Walters. Some of the clothing that was found resembled the clothing worn byWalters in other photographs found in defendant's apartment. Other photographs showedWalters in defendant's truck and in front of the barn where her body was found.

Lastly, the grand jury heard evidence that from the trip logs of defendant'semployment, it was determined that he had been on Interstate 70 in Bond County duringFebruary or March 1990. The victim's badly decomposed body was found on September 29,1990, in a barn along Interstate 70. It appeared that she had been strangled. The method ofstrangulation was described as follows: "A small piece of board inserted through a doublewire loop of baling wire, twisted clockwise around the neck of the body."

During the Rule 402 hearing, the court informed defendant that the court couldimpose a term of natural-life imprisonment without parole if the court decided his actionswere exceptionally brutal and heinous indicative of wanton cruelty.

Within 30 days of sentencing, defendant filed a motion to reduce sentence, which wasdenied after a hearing. On defendant's first appeal, he contended that because defensecounsel did not file a certificate of compliance with Supreme Court Rule 604(d) (145 Ill. 2dR. 604(d)), the cause should be remanded for further proceedings to consider defendant'smotion at a hearing after compliance was shown. This court reversed that portion of the trialcourt's judgment denying defendant's motion to reduce sentence and remanded the cause forfurther proceedings. People v. Rhodes, 259 Ill. App. 3d 1054, 674 N.E.2d 1284 (1994)(unpublished order pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 23 (166 Ill. 2d R. 23)) (defendant'sname was misspelled in the casebooks).

On August 24, 1994, the mandate of this court issued. On September 21, 1994, thetrial court received a letter from defendant in which he wrote that he withdrew his plea ofguilty and that his three trial attorneys did not respond to letters mailed to them. OnSeptember 26, 1994, the court appointed Jon Coleman, one of defendant's previous trialattorneys, to represent him on the remand from this court. The order advised defendant todiscuss with his attorney what documents should be filed.

On October 21, 1994, Coleman filed a motion to withdraw as counsel for defendant,on the basis that defendant accused Coleman of committing error in his prior representationof defendant.

On January 23, 1995, the trial court received another letter from defendant. Defendant wrote that he had told Coleman that defendant would present evidence in courtthat he had been coerced to plead guilty by all of his attorneys and by the Bond Countysheriff's office. Defendant also wrote that he had previously fired Coleman as his counsel. Defendant further wrote, "[I]f a new attorney has been appointed, I wish the court to orderthem to contact me at once," and "[P]lease acknowledge this letter by return mail, includingany pertinent information on my new attorney."

On January 31, 1995, the trial court allowed Coleman to withdraw as counsel fordefendant. The court found that the sentence was the result of plea negotiations binding thecourt and all parties, that defendant had clearly stated that he did not wish to withdraw hisguilty plea but only wanted his sentence reduced, and that, therefore, pursuant to then-recentopinions of this court, counsel need not be appointed when a plea and sentence were fullynegotiated. The trial court denied defendant's motion to reduce sentence without appointingcounsel and without conducting a hearing. On defendant's second appeal, he asked that thecause be again remanded to the trial court because the trial court denied his Rule 604(d)motion without appointing counsel. People v. Rhoades, No. 5-95-0084 (February 7, 1996)(unpublished order pursuant to Rule 23) (Rhoades II).

This court reversed and remanded pursuant to People v. Maltimore, 161 Ill. 2d 535,647 N.E.2d 586 (1995) (supervisory order), in which our supreme court vacated our earlierdecision in that matter (see People v. Maltimore, 268 Ill. App. 3d 532, 644 N.E.2d 478(1994)) and remanded the case to the circuit court of Madison County for the filing of a newmotion to reduce sentence. Rhoades II, order at 4. We reasoned, "Under Rule 604(d) a trialcourt has an obligation to appoint counsel except in situations where a defendant'affirmatively, knowingly, and intelligently waives appointment of counsel.' " Rhoades II,order at 4-5 (quoting People v. Ledbetter, 174 Ill. App. 3d 234, 238, 528 N.E.2d 375, 378(1988)). This court could not find, as the State had argued, that defendant's actions weretantamount to a waiver of counsel. This court reversed the order of the circuit court of BondCounty denying the motion to reduce sentence, and we remanded the cause to the circuitcourt in order to determine if defendant desired counsel and, if so and if defendant wasfound to be indigent, for the appointment of counsel and further proceedings in strictcompliance with Rule 604(d). Rhoades II, order at 5.

On remand, on December 26, 1996, defense counsel filed a motion to withdraw theguilty plea. Defense counsel also filed a certificate of compliance with Supreme Court Rule604(d) (145 Ill. 2d R. 604(d)). The State filed a motion to dismiss alleging that the motionto withdraw the guilty plea was not timely filed and that this court's decision applied onlyto the previously filed motion to reduce sentence.

On April 24, 1997, defense counsel filed an amended motion to withdraw the guiltyplea and/or to reduce sentence. Defense counsel filed another Rule 604(d) certificate onApril 24, 1997. The court allowed the State's motion to dismiss as it related to the motionto withdraw the guilty plea, on the basis that the motion was not filed within 30 days ofsentencing as required by Rule 604(d). The court stated, however, that the parties would beallowed to present an offer of proof on the motion to withdraw the guilty plea.

On December 4, 1998, a hearing was held on the motion to reduce sentence, and anoffer of proof was presented on the motion to withdraw the guilty plea. The court reiteratedits ruling denying the motion to withdraw the guilty plea because the motion was not timelyfiled. The court found that the sentence was negotiated in all respects within the rangeallowed by law, and the court denied the motion to reduce sentence.

On this appeal, defendant contends that the circuit court's interpretation of this court'smandate was incorrect. Defendant states that the only reasonable reading of this court'smandate is that the trial court must appoint counsel, who then would be allowed to presentand address all claims consistent with Rule 604(d), including a motion to withdraw theguilty plea.

We find that the circuit court's actions on the remand from defendant's second appealwere entirely consistent with this court's mandate. The circuit court appointed counsel. Counsel received the court file and the report of proceedings of the guilty plea, and heconferred with defendant concerning his contentions of error. Counsel performed his dutiesby raising all the issues counsel found appropriate and by filing an amended motion towithdraw the guilty plea and/or to reduce sentence. The court ruled on the motion byapplying the law applicable at the time the amended motion was presented. In People v.Janes, 158 Ill. 2d 27, 630 N.E.2d 790 (1994), our supreme court held that a timely filedmotion to withdraw guilty plea is a condition precedent to taking an appeal. Here, defendanttimely filed a motion to reduce sentence. Therefore, the circuit court properly refused toconsider the motion to withdraw the guilty plea, which was not filed within 30 days ofsentencing. See People v. Feltes, 258 Ill. App. 3d 314, 316, 629 N.E.2d 1172, 1174 (1994). As the guilty plea and sentence were fully negotiated, defendant could not attack hissentence without attempting to withdraw his guilty plea in a timely manner. See People v.Evans, 174 Ill. 2d 320, 673 N.E.2d 244 (1996). The circuit court correctly read this court'smandate.

Alternately, defendant suggests that the circuit court should have considered hisSeptember 19, 1994, letter, indicating that he wanted to withdraw his guilty plea, as aninartfully drawn postconviction petition. As this contention could have been raised on thesecond appeal and was not, the issue is waived. See People v. Taylor, 199 Ill. App. 3d 788,790, 557 N.E.2d 575, 576-77 (1990). Further, this suggestion has no merit.

The constitutionality of a statute is a question of law that is reviewed de novo. Peoplev. Fisher, 184 Ill. 2d 441, 448, 705 N.E.2d 67, 71-72 (1998). Statutes carry a strongpresumption of constitutionality. Arangold Corp. v. Zehnder, 187 Ill. 2d 341, 351, 718N.E.2d 191, 197 (1999). A party challenging the constitutionality of a statute bears theburden of rebutting the presumption and clearly establishing a constitutional violation. Arangold Corp., 187 Ill. 2d at 351, 718 N.E.2d at 197.

Count VIII of the criminal information to which defendant pled guilty alleges thatdefendant committed first-degree murder "on or about February 3, 1990[,] to March 17,1990." At the time of the offense, section 5-8-1(a)(1) of the Unified Code of Correctionsprovided:

"Except as otherwise provided in the statute defining the offense, a sentenceof imprisonment for a felony shall be a determinate sentence set by the court underthis Section, according to the following limitations:

(1) for first[-]degree murder, (a) a term shall be not less than 20 years and notmore than 60 years, or (b) if the court finds that the murder was accompanied byexceptionally brutal or heinous behavior indicative of wanton cruelty or that any ofthe aggravating factors listed in subsection (b) of Section 9-1 of the Criminal Codeof 1961 [Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 38, par. 9-1] are present, the court may sentence thedefendant to a term of natural[-]life imprisonment ***." Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 38,par. 1005-8-1(a)(1)(a), (b).

Defendant states that the trial court imposed a natural-life sentence on the basis thatthe offense was exceptionally brutal or heinous indicative of wanton cruelty or wascommitted in the course of a forcible felony. Defendant argues that since the count of thecriminal information to which he pled guilty did not allege felony murder, the only possiblejustification for imposing a natural-life sentence would be the exceptionally brutal orheinous nature of the offense. Defendant concludes that the court did not make the findingthat the first-degree murder was accompanied by exceptionally brutal or heinous behaviorindicative of wanton cruelty and that under Apprendi the court did not have the authority tomake that finding, because section 5-8-1(a) of the Unified Code of Corrections (Ill. Rev.Stat. 1989, ch. 38, par. 1005-8-1(a)) does not require that this factor be proved beyond areasonable doubt. In Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 147 L. Ed. 2d 435, 120 S. Ct.2348 (2000), the United States Supreme Court held a New Jersey hate-crime statuteunconstitutional because it allowed judges to make a factual finding that enhanced theirpower to punish beyond the maximum penalties prescribed for a given criminal offense.

In 1994, Charles Apprendi, Jr., took his handgun and fired a spray of .22-caliberbullets into the home of his new neighbors. Apparently, the newly arrived family did notfit Apprendi's color criteria for living in a Vineland, New Jersey, neighborhood. Apprendiwas indicted on numerous criminal offenses because of his misconduct, but none of themalleged that his actions were racially motivated. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 469, 147 L. Ed. 2dat 442, 120 S. Ct. at 2351.

Apprendi pled guilty to possession of a firearm for an unlawful purpose, an offensefor which the New Jersey legislature had provided a 10-year maximum prison sentence. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 469-70, 147 L. Ed. 2d at 442-43, 120 S. Ct. at 2352. However, aseparate New Jersey hate-crime statute authorized the imposition of greater punishment forany crimes motivated by racial hatred. The trial judge found that Apprendi's crime was somotivated and, because of that fact, sentenced Apprendi to a prison sentence greater than the10-year maximum that could otherwise have been imposed. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 470, 147L. Ed. 2d at 443, 120 S. Ct. at 2352.

The Supreme Court, relying upon constitutional protections of due process, notice,and the right to a trial by jury, struck down the New Jersey hate-crime statute. Apprendi,530 U.S. at 470, 147 L. Ed. 2d at 442, 120 S. Ct. at 2351. The Court took an exhaustivelook at what our founding fathers promised when they bestowed the right to a trial by juryin all criminal cases. It found that a part of that promise was the right to have a jurydetermine all facts necessary to a determination of the maximum punishment the law allows. The Supreme Court handed down a constitutional-based rule when it stated, "Other than thefact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond theprescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury[] and proved beyond a reasonabledoubt." Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 490, 147 L. Ed. 2d at 455, 120 S. Ct. at 2362-63.

In the instant case, by enforcing the guidelines for accepting a guilty plea, the trialcourt provided the protections that Apprendi now ensures. Before defendant entered hisguilty plea, the court informed him of the possibility of a sentence of natural life for thecrime to which he pled guilty. Indeed, the State had previously filed a notice that it intendedto seek the death penalty, and the guilty plea avoided that possibility. The court also madesure there was an adequate factual basis for the plea and that evidence was presented in opencourt. See People v. Calva, 256 Ill. App. 3d 865, 873, 628 N.E.2d 856, 862 (1993).

The guilty plea is sufficient proof that defendant was guilty beyond a reasonabledoubt. See North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 33, 27 L. Ed. 2d 162, 91 S. Ct. 160, 165,(1970). Defendant's guilty plea was a knowing admission of guilt of the criminal actscharged and all the material facts alleged in the charging instrument. See Davis v. City ofEvanston, 257 Ill. App. 3d 549, 553, 629 N.E.2d 125, 129 (1993). A guilty plea ends thecontroversy and removes the prosecution's burden of proof, as it supplies both the evidenceand the verdict. Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 242 n.4, 23 L. Ed. 2d 274, 279 n.4, 89S. Ct. 1709, 1712 n.4 (1969) (quoting Woodard v. State, 42 Ala. App. 552, 558, 171 So. 2d462, 469 (1965)). The reliability of guilty pleas is strengthened by the fact that by pleadingguilty a defendant knowingly waives several constitutional rights, including the privilegeagainst self-incrimination and the right to a trial by jury. People v. Williams, 188 Ill. 2d 365,370, 721 N.E.2d 539, 543 (1999).

As defendant was sentenced according to the statute for the offense to which heknowingly pled guilty, he cannot now claim that his rights were violated per Apprendi.Although Apprendi itself was an appeal following a guilty plea, the defendant thereexpressly reserved the right to challenge on appeal the constitutionality of the sentence-enhancement statute. Apprendi pled guilty to one offense and was then given a sentenceexceeding the statutory maximum for that offense. In this case, defendant was admonishedregarding the possible sentence he eventually received. The possibility of a natural-lifesentence for the charge to which defendant pled guilty was clear at the time of the plea, anddefendant did not object or raise this issue until his third appeal.

By pleading guilty, the defendant gives up the right to challenge a sentence withinthe statutory range for the offense to which he pled guilty. People v. Jackson, 319 Ill. App.3d 110, 113, 744 N.E.2d 1275, 1278 (2001). In addressing how Apprendi affects guiltypleas, the Second District has stated:

"A defendant who pleads guilty does not have the same appeal rights as oneconvicted following a trial. [Citation.] Generally, after pleading guilty, a defendantmay not raise claims of the deprivation of constitutional rights that occurred beforethe entry of the plea. [Citation.] Before defendant entered his plea, the courtinformed him of the sentencing ranges for the offenses and specifically admonishedhim of the possibility of consecutive sentences. Having waived a jury trial on allissues, defendant cannot now claim that he was deprived of the right to have a jurydetermine the issue of his future dangerousness. Similarly, he cannot claim that hewas unfairly deprived of the right to have the State prove that point beyond areasonable doubt." People v. Chandler, 321 Ill. App. 3d 292, 297, 748 N.E.2d 685,690 (2001).

In this case, after receiving a sentence within the range for the offense to which he pledguilty, defendant cannot now claim that his Apprendi rights were violated. See UnitedStates v. Johnstone, 251 F.3d 281 (1st Cir. 2001) (a guilty plea gives the court the discretionto impose the statutory maximum sentence because the defendant is informed of thatpossible sentence).

Finding that an Apprendi violation did not occur in this case is consistent with ourprior interpretation of Apprendi. In People v. Nitz, this court called into question the validityof section 5-8-1(a). People v. Nitz, 319 Ill. App. 3d 949, 968, 747 N.E.2d 38, 55 (2001). This court reduced the defendant's sentence from natural life to 60 years' imprisonment. However, we made clear that our difficulty with the application of the statute was that itviolated the defendant's right to a trial by a jury. Nitz, 319 Ill. App. 3d at 968, 747 N.E.2dat 55. In this case, defendant's right to a trial by a jury was not violated. Defendant waivedthis right. Defendant should not be able to waive a right, receive a sentence he subjectedhimself to, and then contend that the right was violated.

For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the circuit court of Bond County isaffirmed.

Affirmed.

CHAPMAN, P.J., and HOPKINS, J., concur.

1. A grand jury returned a seven-count indictment charging defendant with murder. On July 2, 1992, criminal informations were filed that were virtually identical to theindictments with the exception that first-degree murder was charged.