People v. Spurlock

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People v. Spurlock

State: Illinois

Court: 5th District Appellate

Docket No: 5-07-0161 Rel

Case Date: 02/26/2009

Preview:N O T IC E Decision filed 02/26/09. The text of this dec ision m ay b e changed or corrected prior to the P e t i ti o n for filing of a or the

NO. 5-07-0161 IN THE APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS

Re hea ring

FIFTH DISTRICT _________________________________________________________________________ THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS,) Appeal from the ) Circuit Court of Plaintiff-Appellant, ) Pulaski County. ) v. ) No. 06-CF-39 ) CHAD SPURLOCK, ) Honorable ) William J. Thurston, Defendant-Appellee. ) Judge, presiding. ________________________________________________________________________ JUSTICE STEWART delivered the opinion of the court: The State of Illinois appeals from an order of the circuit court of Pulaski County, Illinois, dismissing criminal charges and dismissing a petition filed under the Sexually Dangerous Persons Act (the Act) (725 ILCS 205/0.01 et seq. (West 2006)). The circuit court's dismissal of the proceedings was based on a violation of the speedy trial statute (725 ILCS 5/103-5 (West 2006)). This appeal presents an issue of first impression: whether the filing of a petition under the Act stays the underlying criminal proceeding, including the time allowed to commence the defendant's trial under the speedy trial statute. Considering the language and history of the statutes involved, we hold that the filing of a petition under the Act stays the criminal proceeding, including the statutory speedy trial period, during the pendency of the proceedings under the Act. Accordingly, we reverse the circuit court's dismissal order and remand for further proceedings. BACKGROUND On March 30, 2006, the State charged the defendant, Chad Spurlock, with two counts of criminal sexual assault and one count of intimidation. The defendant was arrested and 1

disposition of the same.

taken into custody the same day, and he remained in custody throughout the proceedings in the circuit court. On May 11, 2006, the defendant made an oral motion for a fitness examination, and the circuit court entered an order on May 17, 2006, granting the fitness examination. On July 10, 2006, the circuit court conducted a fitness hearing pursuant to section 104-16 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 (725 ILCS 5/104-16 (West 2006)), and the court found the defendant unfit to stand trial. The circuit court remanded the defendant to the Department of Human Services for treatment. At a hearing held on October 16, 2006, the circuit court found that the defendant had been rehabilitated by his treatment and that he was fit to stand trial. The trial court scheduled the defendant's jury trial to begin on November 27, 2006. At that point, 34 days had passed for speedy trial purposes, and the State and the defendant agreed that the November 27, 2006, trial setting was timely under the defendant's statutory speedy trial rights. On November 6, 2006, however, the State filed a petition pursuant to the Act to have the defendant declared a sexually dangerous person. Under the Act, if a jury finds the defendant to be a sexually dangerous person, he is committed to the custody of the Director of Corrections for care and treatment and does not face criminal punishment for the charged criminal offenses. 725 ILCS 205/8, 9 (West 2006). At a pretrial hearing held on November 6, 2006, the circuit court stated, "I believe under the statute [the sexually dangerous persons petition] immediately puts a stop to the proceedings that are occurring in the criminal case which is [No.] 06-CF-39." The trial court stated that it was removing the criminal case from the November jury docket, and the defendant's attorney stated: "[S]ince the petition has been filed, we cannot object as far as tolling. But I would bring to the Court's attention the fact that my client is in custody, and he does have a right to a speedy trial." On January 8, 2007, the State filed a request for the sexually dangerous persons 2

petition to be docketed for a jury trial. The State's motion alleged that the speedy trial statute (725 ILCS 5/103-5 (West 2006)) required a trial on the criminal charges before March 7, 2007. The State, therefore, requested a February 2007 trial setting on the sexually dangerous persons petition to avoid any conflict with the speedy trial statute. On January 12, 2007, the defendant filed a motion to dismiss the sexually dangerous persons petition pursuant to section 2-619 of the Code of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS 5/2-619 (West 2006)). The issues the defendant raised in his motion to dismiss were unrelated to the speedy trial statute. At a January 29, 2007, status hearing, the court scheduled the jury trial on the sexually dangerous persons petition for February 26, 2007. The court scheduled a hearing on the defendant's motion to dismiss the petition for February 15, 2007. The defendant's attorney told the trial court that he would also like the criminal case to "be called up" at the February 15 hearing. The State told the court that, under the Act, if the defendant was found to be a sexually dangerous person, the State would be precluded from proceeding with the underlying criminal charges. The State maintained, therefore, that the sexually dangerous persons petition "tabled" the criminal case. The defendant, however, argued that the case involved two separate proceedings and that the criminal case was still ongoing. The court did not make any determination on that issue at the January 29, 2007, hearing and directed the defendant to file a motion if he believed he was entitled to any relief. On February 15, 2007, the parties appeared in court on the defendant's motion to dismiss the sexually dangerous persons petition, and the circuit court denied the motion. The State requested the court to set a deadline for any further motions in the sexually dangerous persons proceeding, but the defendant's attorney stated that he intended to utilize "each and every" discovery option available for civil cases, including interrogatories, requests to admit facts, and depositions. The defendant, therefore, requested a continuance in the sexually dangerous persons proceeding, but he wanted to "stand firm" on the trial date 3

for the criminal matter and not waive his right to a speedy trial. The State again argued that the filing of the sexually dangerous persons petition "tabled" the criminal case. The defendant countered that the State could enter a nolle prosequi in the criminal case if it could not proceed with the sexually dangerous persons petition before the expiration of the 120day speedy trial period. The State disagreed, noting that the Act required pending criminal charges and that the criminal charges would no longer be pending if it entered a nolle prosequi. The trial court stated that it had not found any authority which indicated that the filing of the sexually dangerous persons petition tolled the defendant's statutory speedy trial rights on the underlying criminal charges. The trial court concluded that, in the absence of case law, it was going to err "on the side of protecting the speedy trial demand." Therefore, the court found that the filing of the sexually dangerous persons petition did not toll the running of the defendant's statutory speedy trial period. The State told the court that it would be ready to proceed with a trial on the sexually dangerous persons petition on the scheduled February 26, 2007, trial date. The defendant argued that since the trial court had just denied his motion to dismiss, he needed time to answer the sexually dangerous persons petition and conduct discovery before a trial on the sexually dangerous persons petition. At the conclusion of the February 15, 2007, hearing, the circuit court set the criminal case for a jury trial on March 26, 2007, which the court determined to be timely under the defendant's statutory speedy trial rights. The court also stated that the State had the right to a trial on the sexually dangerous persons petition prior to a trial on the criminal charges. Therefore, the trial court stated that it would accommodate a trial on the sexually dangerous persons petition prior to a trial on the criminal charges. The court granted the defendant's motion to continue the February 26, 2007, trial setting on the sexually dangerous persons petition, and the court reset the matter for a scheduling conference on February 20, 2007. 4

On February 20, 2007, the State filed a motion to reconsider the setting of the criminal matter for trial. The State argued in its motion that whether to prosecute the defendant or seek treatment for him under the Act is a matter of the prosecution's discretion and that once filed, the sexually dangerous persons proceeding was in lieu of a prosecution. The State's motion noted that a key witness in the sexually dangerous persons proceeding would be out of the country the week of March 15, 2007. The State requested that the circuit court place the trial on the sexually dangerous persons petition back on the February 26, 2007, docket or continue the trial on the defendant's motion to a time fair to both parties. On February 20, 2007, the defendant filed a motion to dismiss the criminal complaint for a violation of the speedy trial statute. On February 20, 2007, the circuit court conducted a scheduling conference. The court again held that the filing of the sexually dangerous persons petition did not toll the running of the 120-day speedy trial period on the underlying criminal offense. The circuit court scheduled the trial on the sexually dangerous persons petition for March 26, 2007, the same day on which the criminal trial was set to begin. The court set the matter for a final pretrial conference for March 20, 2007, at which time the court would give the defendant the option of going to trial on the sexually dangerous persons petition or on the criminal charges. At a pretrial hearing held on February 26, 2007, the court addressed the defendant's motion to dismiss the criminal charges based on the speedy trial statute. The circuit court calculated that 101 days had expired for speedy trial purposes up to that point in the proceedings. The court, therefore, denied the defendant's motion to dismiss the criminal case based on the speedy trial statute, but the court noted that the speedy trial period would expire by the March 26, 2007, trial date. The court, therefore, stated that it was prepared to make a special trial setting the following day, February 27, 2007, and offered the State the 5

opportunity to proceed to trial on the criminal case the following day. The court stated that the sexually dangerous persons petition would remain on the March docket, and the court concluded that it was not possible to try the sexually dangerous persons petition prior to the criminal case because of the approaching speedy trial deadline in the criminal case. The defendant announced that he was ready to go to trial on the criminal charges, but the State said it wanted to go to trial on the sexually dangerous persons petition, not the criminal charges. The court stated that the sexually dangerous persons petition would remain on the March docket. The State told the court that it was not going to proceed with the criminal matter on February 27, 2007, because it was inappropriate to force a trial on the criminal complaint prior to hearing the sexually dangerous persons petition. Accordingly, the State said it would not present any evidence if the criminal case was called to trial on February 27, 2007. The State requested a continuance of the criminal matter, and the trial court granted the State's request for a continuance over the defendant's objection. The court continued the criminal matter to the March 26, 2007, jury docket. On March 5, 2007, the State made a final attempt to have the sexually dangerous persons petition docketed. The State filed a request to docket the petition for trial prior to the expiration of the speedy trial term on March 17, 2007, but the defendant objected, maintaining that he had inadequate time to prepare for trial on the sexually dangerous persons petition. On March 7, 2007, the circuit court denied the State's request to docket the petition. On March 19, 2007, the defendant filed an amended motion to dismiss the criminal complaint based on an alleged violation of the defendant's statutory speedy trial rights. The circuit court granted the motion. The court dismissed the criminal complaint, and the court dismissed the sexually dangerous persons petition since there was no longer an underlying criminal complaint. The State filed a timely notice of appeal.

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DISCUSSION The State contends that the trial court improperly dismissed the proceedings under the speedy trial statute. The circuit court's erroneous dismissal, the State argues, stems from the trial court improperly moving forward with the criminal proceeding and the sexually dangerous persons proceeding simultaneously. The State asserts that by separating the case into two different proceedings, the court allowed the defendant to delay the sexually dangerous persons proceeding with civil discovery requests while, at the same time, asserting his statutory speedy trial rights in the criminal case. The State argues that, to give effect to the legislature's intent, the statutes must be construed to provide for a suspension of the running of the criminal proceeding's speedy trial term upon the filing of a sexually dangerous persons petition. The defendant, however, argues that there is no language in the Act or in the speedy trial statute which provides for a stay of the 120-day speedy trial period when the State files a sexually dangerous persons petition. The defendant concludes that the circuit court correctly dismissed the proceedings because he was not brought to trial on the criminal charges within the speedy trial time provided by statute. We agree with the State's argument and hold that the legislature intended for a tolling of the statutory speedy trial period upon the filing of a sexually dangerous persons petition. To resolve this issue on appeal, we must construe the speedy trial statute and the Act in a way that puts into effect the legislature's intent. Our review of issues involving statutory construction is de novo and is guided by well-established rules. In re Detention of Lieberman, 201 Ill. 2d 300, 307, 776 N.E.2d 218, 223 (2002). The principal objective of statutory construction is to determine and give effect to the legislature's intent. In re Detention of Powell, 217 Ill. 2d 123, 135, 839 N.E.2d 1008, 1015 (2005). "All other rules of statutory construction are subordinate to this cardinal principle." In re Detention of Powell, 217 Ill. 2d at 135, 839 N.E.2d at 1015. 7

The best evidence of the legislative intent is the language of the statute itself, and the language should be "given its plain, ordinary[,] and popularly understood meaning." In re Detention of Powell , 217 Ill. 2d at 135, 839 N.E.2d at 1015. The words and phrases contained within the language of a statute should not be considered in isolation but must be interpreted in light of other relevant provisions and the statute as a whole. Williams v. Staples, 208 Ill. 2d 480, 487, 804 N.E.2d 489, 493 (2004). If possible, we must give effect to every word, clause, and sentence and must not construe a statute in a way that renders any part inoperative, superfluous, or insignificant. Bauer v. H.H. Hall Construction Co., 140 Ill. App. 3d 1025, 1028, 489 N.E.2d 31, 33 (1986). We presume that the legislative intent did not include absurdity, inconvenience, or injustice. In re Detention of Powell , 217 Ill. 2d at 135, 839 N.E.2d at 1015. In addition to the statutory language, the courts may consider the purpose behind the law and the evils sought to be remedied, as well as the consequences that would result from construing the law one way or the other. Williams, 208 Ill. 2d at 487, 804 N.E.2d at 493. When more than one statute is at issue, we must construe the statutes in harmony with each other when reasonably possible, even when they are in apparent conflict. People v. Maya, 105 Ill. 2d 281, 287, 473 N.E.2d 1287, 1290 (1985). "It is a canon of statutory construction that where the passage of a series of legislative acts results in confusion and consequences which the legislature may not have contemplated, courts must construe the acts in such a way as to reflect the obvious intent of the legislature and to permit practical application of the statutes." People ex rel. Community High School District No. 231 v. Hupe, 2 Ill. 2d 434, 448, 118 N.E.2d 328, 335 (1954). The courts may "alter, supply[,] or modify words and correct obvious mistakes" in order to "effectuate the intent of the legislature." People v. Garrison, 82 Ill. 2d 444, 455, 412 N.E.2d 483, 489 (1980). When a statute is capable of more than one reasonable interpretation, the statute will be deemed ambiguous, and the court 8

may consider extrinsic aids to construction, such as legislative history. People v. Collins, 214 Ill. 2d 206, 214, 824 N.E.2d 262, 266 (2005). With these principles in mind, we first look to the relevant language of the statutory provisions at issue to determine the legislative intent with respect to sexually dangerous persons proceedings in relation to the statutory speedy trial time limit. The speedy trial statute provides that a defendant in custody must be tried "within 120 days from the date he was taken into custody." 725 ILCS 5/103-5(a) (West 2006). The sixth amendment and the due process clause of the United States Constitution and section 8 of article I of the Illinois Constitution guarantee a defendant the right to a speedy trial. U.S. Const., amends. VI, XIV,

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