This case presents a rather remarkable effort to prosecute David Turner twice for thesame criminal conduct. It appears that the State fully intends to derive harsher punishmentin the event of another successful prosecution.

The current prosecution originated on March 2, 2000, when the State's Attorney ofMassac County filed a two-count information that charged Turner with aggravated criminalsexual assault. It alleged that Turner molested his stepdaughter. A superceding indictment,with similar allegations, was filed on March 23, 2000.

Turner has already been successfully prosecuted for what he did to his stepdaughter. The same State's Attorney launched a prosecution back in March 1996 to make Turneranswer for it. On November 12, 1996, Turner capitulated to the allegations brought againsthim. He accepted responsibility for what he had done, pleaded guilty to two counts ofpredatory criminal sexual assault of a child, and went to prison. Two additional charges ofaggravated criminal sexual assault were dropped.

Thus, Turner went to prison, years ago, for the conduct alleged in the pendingcharges. Turner has done nothing to undo the two convictions that warranted hisimprisonment. No court of law has ever overturned them.

By March of 2000, Turner was about to realize every prisoner's fancy-that day whenhe would stand before a gate and watch it open, free to pass into the world he left behindyears earlier. Turner was about to pay his debt to society. As he stood on the verge offulfilling the punishment that his criminality wrought, authorities from Massac County paidhim a visit. On March 17, 2000, he was greeted with newly issued arrest warrants, backedby criminal charges that alleged the same criminal conduct that sent him to prison, conductthat resulted in punishment that he was about to complete.

This rather incredible circumstance stems from the Massac County prosecutor'sperspective of what happens when the supreme court finds that a statute is unconstitutional. He believes that Turner's convictions were instantly rendered void, as in nonexistent, whenour supreme court struck down the statute that created the crime of predatory criminal sexualassault of a child. See Johnson v. Edgar, 176 Ill. 2d 499, 680 N.E.2d 1372 (1997). He usedthis belief to convince the trial court that Turner's convictions should be treated as if theynever existed. He successfully argued that Turner's void convictions could not be raised asa bar to a second prosecution.

In effect, the Massac County prosecutor decided to overturn Turner's two convictionsand award him a new trial. He commenced these proceedings aimed at that end. Turner didnot seek a new trial. He does not want one. He wants the State to leave him alone.

There is a distinct possibility that this novel approach was formulated as an opportuneway to correct a prosecutorial oversight that allowed Turner to escape mandatoryconsecutive sentencing when originally prosecuted.⁽¹⁾ During oral argument, appellatecounsel for the State could not disavow the possibility that the ultimate goal of thisprosecution is to increase Turner's actual punishment and keep him in prison for another fouryears. If Turner is convicted again, his convictions would occur under a charging instrumentthat now alleges the commission of two sexual acts as part of a single course of conduct. This new allegation calls for mandatory consecutive sentences. While Turner might invokeconstitutional protection against the imposition of more punishment after a successiveprosecution (People v. Baze, 43 Ill. 2d 298, 302-03, 253 N.E.2d 392, 395 (1969)), theMassac County prosecutor is resourceful enough to think that so long as Turner's sentencesare not increased, and only the manner in which they must be served is involved, there is noconstitutional impediment to such punishment, even though it would double the actual lossof freedom that the State could inflict.

This grand prosecutorial scheme drew credence during oral argument. Appellatecounsel for the State voiced concern about the permanency of Turner's two convictions,since grounds may well exist to have them undone. See Johnson, 176 Ill. 2d 499, 680N.E.2d 1372; People v. Tellez-Valencia, 188 Ill. 2d 523, 723 N.E.2d 223 (1999); but seePeople ex rel. Bassin v. Isreal, 31 Ill. App. 3d 744, 335 N.E.2d 53 (1975). Turner's lawyersuggested that a desire to maintain the sanctity of Turner's convictions was not the State'sreal objective. He believes that Turner is being prosecuted in order to impose consecutivesentences which would send Turner back to prison. According to Turner's lawyer, Turnerhas always been willing to resolve this prosecution with the convictions and punishmentpermanently intact. An offer to do so was spurned by the Massac County prosecutor, whoapparently has something else in mind.

If additional imprisonment is not what the State has in mind, it is difficult to imaginewhy resources would be expended in an effort to prosecute Turner again. After all, Turnerembraces the two convictions that he already has. Turner wants to remain a convictedsexual predator and wrap himself in the protection from greater punishment that such statusaffords. The Illinois Constitution, like the United States Constitution before it, placesa well- known limitation on the State's power to punish people. It provides a simple promisethat no person shall be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense. U.S. Const., amend. V;Ill. Const. 1970, art. I,