PRESIDING JUSTICE SPOMER delivered the opinion of the court:

The defendant appeals his August 6, 2003, conviction for armed robbery (720 ILCS5/18-2(a) (West 2000)) and aggravated robbery (720 ILCS 5/18-5(a) (West 2000)). Theproceedings took place in the circuit court of Madison County. Following a trial and afinding of guilty by a jury on both counts, the judge merged the convictions into oneconviction for armed robbery (720 ILCS 5/18-2(a) (West 2000)). At the sentencing hearingon October 30, 2003, the defendant was sentenced to 10 years in the Illinois Department ofCorrections. The defendant raises the following claims of error on appeal: (1) the convictionwas in violation of the defendant's right to a speedy trial as codified by section 103-5(a) ofthe Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 (725 ILCS 5/103-5(a) (West 2000)), and trialcounsel was ineffective for failing to raise the issue, (2) the defendant's motion to suppresshis confession should have been granted, (3) the defendant was denied a fair trial by themisconduct of the prosecutor, and trial counsel was ineffective for his failure to object, and(4) trial counsel was ineffective for his failure to prepare for the trial, causing trial counselto rely on an unsupportable assertion in his opening statement and closing argument. For thereasons set forth below, we affirm the defendant's conviction.

The facts necessary for our analysis of the speedy trial issue are as follows. On June20, 2001, a warrant of arrest was issued for the defendant in Madison County for the offenseof armed robbery (720 ILCS 5/18-2(a) (West 2000)). On June 27, 2001, the defendant wasarrested by United States marshals in St. Clair County on the Madison County warrant. Forreasons that are unclear from the record, the United States marshals delivered the defendantto the St. Clair County jail. While at the St. Clair County jail, the defendant was questionedby St. Clair County officials in connection with a separate armed robbery that had occurredin St. Clair County. On June 28, 2001, the defendant confessed to the St. Clair Countyarmed robbery, and on June 29, 2001, St. Clair County filed a criminal complaint and issueda warrant of arrest for the defendant, setting bail in the amount of $150,000. The defendantwas brought before a St. Clair County judge and arraigned on the St. Clair County armedrobbery charge on July 2, 2001. The defendant was unable to make bail and remained in theSt. Clair County jail until the disposition of the St. Clair County charge. The record of theSt. Clair County proceedings is a part of the record for this appeal.

The defendant filed a motion to suppress his confession to the St. Clair County chargeon October 8, 2001. After a hearing held on November 15, 2001, the defendant's motion tosuppress his confession to the St. Clair County charge was granted. At a December 10,2001, pretrial conference, the St. Clair County prosecutor announced that the prosecutionplanned to file an interlocutory appeal on the suppression issue. The order of the St. ClairCounty judge entered that date states: "On motion of the defendant, the defendant's bond isreduced to a $50,000 recognizance bond. Defendant remanded to the custody of MadisonCounty pursuant to hold."⁽¹⁾ On December 11, 2001, the day after the defendant wasremanded to the custody of Madison County pursuant to the St. Clair County order, thedefendant was first transported to Madison County for his arraignment.

The defendant argues that he was denied his right to a speedy trial because he wasarrested on the Madison County warrant on June 27, 2001, and was not arraigned on thecharge until December 11, 2001, a period of 167 days. The defendant contends that pursuantto the speedy trial statute (725 ILCS 5/103-5(a) (West 2000)), he was entitled to a trial onthe Madison County charge within 120 days of his arrest. Section 103-5(a) of the Code ofCriminal Procedure of 1963 provides, in relevant part, "Every person in custody in this Statefor an alleged offense shall be tried by the court having jurisdiction within 120 days from thedate he was taken into custody unless delay is occasioned by the defendant ***." 725 ILCS5/103-5(a) (West 2000).

The defendant argues that, according to People v. Clark, 188 Ill. App. 3d 130 (1989),because the defendant was originally arrested on the Madison County warrant, MadisonCounty is the only authority that held him and his 120 days ran the entire time St. ClairCounty was holding him on St. Clair County charges. The State argues that the defendantwas in the custody of St. Clair County from the time that St. Clair County filed chargesagainst the defendant. The State points to People v. Davis, 97 Ill. 2d 1 (1983), as authorityfor its position that the defendant was not in Madison County custody for speedy trialpurposes during the time that St. Clair County was prosecuting its charges against thedefendant.

In Davis, the defendant was in custody in the St. Clair County jail awaiting a trial andsentencing on pending St. Clair County charges. Davis, 97 Ill. 2d at 10-11. During thattime, pursuant to a writ of habeas corpus ad prosequendum, the sheriff of St. Clair Countybrought the defendant to Madison County, where he was served with a warrant and arraignedon a different offense. Davis, 97 Ill. 2d at 11. Following the arraignment, a preliminaryhearing, and the appointment of counsel, the defendant was returned to St. Clair County forthe disposition of the St. Clair County charges. Davis, 97 Ill. 2d at 11. After the defendantwas sentenced and imprisoned on the St. Clair County charges, Madison County issued asecond writ of habeas corpus ad prosequendum, commanding the correctional institution tobring the defendant to Madison County for his trial. Davis, 97 Ill. 2d at 11. The defendantchallenged the Madison County conviction on speedy trial grounds.

The Illinois Supreme Court in Davis held that although "[t]here is no question that the120-day period prescribed in section 103-5(a) commences to run on the date defendant istaken 'in custody' for the offense for which discharge is sought," where a defendant is incustody awaiting trial in one county and there is a charge pending against him in anothercounty, he cannot be deemed to be in custody for purposes of the latter offense until suchtime as the proceedings against him in the first county are terminated and he is then returnedto, or held in custody for, the second county. Davis, 97 Ill. 2d at 11, 13. The IllinoisSupreme Court recognized that this is the rule even where the defendant has appeared beforethe court in the second county but is subsequently returned to the first county for furtherproceedings. Davis, 97 Ill. 2d at 13.

The defendant attempts to distinguish Davis by focusing on the fact that the defendantin the instant case was originally arrested and held on the Madison County warrant andshould therefore be deemed in Madison County custody for the entire period he was in St.Clair County custody. We find this distinction unpersuasive. Once St. Clair County filedcharges and arraigned the defendant, St. Clair County exercised its right to hold thedefendant until he posted bail or until a disposition of the St. Clair County charges. Unlikethe situation in Clark, where the federal government was holding the defendant on a federalcharge, the defendant in this case was being held by the State of Illinois on charges in twodifferent venues. We hold that the speedy trial period was tolled from the time St. ClairCounty filed its charges and arraigned the defendant until the St. Clair County charges weredisposed of and the defendant was released to Madison County pursuant to its hold. Ourholding comports with the reasoning of the Illinois Supreme Court in Davis, wherein thecourt explained:

" 'Any other construction would embarrass and harass the effectiveadministration of criminal justice and would tend to favor an accused who is incustody of one county for a crime[] but has formal charges pending against him, forwhich hold or detainer orders have been placed in several counties. Such an absurdresult could not have been intended by the legislature when section 103-5(a) wasenacted. Further, it would seem that if one county is to be allowed 120 days toprosecute an accused who is in custody for an alleged offense, another county shouldhave an equal amount of time, notwithstanding that its charge against the sameaccused has been concurrently pending while the case in the first county was beingdisposed of.' " Davis, 97 Ill. 2d at 13 (quoting People v. Clark, 104 Ill. App. 2d 12,20 (1968)).

Applying our holding to the facts, the defendant is deemed to be in the custody ofMadison County from June 27, 2001, when he was arrested on the Madison County warrant,until June 29, 2001, when St. Clair County filed its charges against the defendant, a periodof two days. The speedy trial period for Madison County was then tolled from June 29,2001, until December 10, 2001, the date when St. Clair County reduced the defendant's bondto a recognizance bond and released the defendant to Madison County pursuant to its holdon the defendant. From December 11, 2001, until the first trial setting in Madison Countyon February 4, 2002, a period of 57 days, the defendant was in Madison County custody forpurposes of the speedy trial period. The record shows that any delay caused by the severalcontinuances following the original trial setting of February 4, 2002, was attributed to thedefendant, and the defendant does not argue otherwise on appeal. Accordingly, for speedytrial purposes, the defendant was brought to trial 59 days after he was in the custody ofMadison County, and there was no violation of the defendant's rights to a speedy trial. The defendant also argues that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to raise thespeedy trial issue during the original proceedings. In order to obtain a reversal on the basisof ineffective assistance of counsel, a convicted defendant must show that counsel'sperformance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness and that counsel's errorswere so serious that they deprived the defendant of a fair trial. Strickland v. Washington,466 U.S. 668, 687, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674, 693, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 2064 (1984). Because there wasno speedy trial violation, the defendant's claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel fortrial counsel's failure to object on speedy trial grounds must fail on both prongs of theStrickland test. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674, 693, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 2064 (1984).

We now turn to the issue of the defendant's confession. The following evidence wasadduced at the suppression hearing. Madison County officials first interviewed thedefendant in reference to the Madison County armed robbery on June 19, 2001. At that time,the officials confronted the defendant with the fact that an eyewitness had taken down thelicense plate number of the vehicle used in the robbery and that the vehicle had been tracedas a rental car rented by the defendant. At that time, the defendant told officials that he hadlet a friend borrow the car and that his children had found a wig and a BB gun on the backfloorboard when the car was returned. Following the June 19 interview, the defendantcontacted Madison County officials on June 20, 2001, and indicated he no longer wished tospeak to detectives on the advice of counsel he had retained in connection with a personalinjury lawsuit. However, the defendant called one of the Madison County detectives asecond time on June 20, 2001, and indicated that he wanted to continue to cooperate.

Following the defendant's arrest in St. Clair County on the Madison County warrant,St. Clair County officials contacted Madison County officials and informed them that thedefendant had confessed to the St. Clair County robbery. The defendant was againinterrogated concerning the Madison County charge by a Madison County detective on July6, 2001, while the defendant was incarcerated at the St. Clair County jail. We note that atthe time of the interrogation by Madison County, the defendant was in the custody of St.Clair County on the charges filed in that county on June 29, 2001. The detective produceda Miranda waiver form (Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 16 L. Ed. 2d 694, 86 S. Ct. 1602(1966)) and began explaining the form to the defendant. The defendant said he would notsign the form, indicating he had attempted suicide a few days earlier and did not thinkanything he would write down would mean much. The detective read the Miranda rights tothe defendant out loud, and the defendant verbally indicated he understood his rights. Thedefendant then verbally consented to questioning.

During questioning, the defendant denied any responsibility for the Madison Countyarmed robbery. The detective then indicated he was going to leave because he had come toget the truth and did not believe the defendant was telling the truth. The detective stood upand knocked on the window of the interrogation room to get a guard's attention to be let outof the room and terminate the interview. The defendant began pleading with the detectiveto stay and announced to the detective, "I did it." The defendant indicated he had arguedwith his wife earlier that day and committed the robbery thereafter. The defendant indicatedthat he had used a BB gun and did not intend to hurt anyone.

The defendant makes two arguments on appeal in support of his contention that themotion to suppress should have been granted. First, the defendant argues that the State violated his rights by delaying his probable cause hearing in order to interrogate him for thepurpose of gathering additional evidence. The defendant argues that under United StatesSupreme Court precedent, it is per se illegitimate to delay a probable cause hearing for thispurpose. County of Riverside v. McLaughlin, 500 U.S. 44, 114 L. Ed. 2d 49, 111 S. Ct. 1661(1991). McLaughlin concerned defendants arrested without a warrant and the unreasonabledelay of a probable cause determination. McLaughlin, 500 U.S. at 52, 114 L. Ed. 2d at 60,111 S. Ct. at 1667-68. The defendant in this case was arrested pursuant to a warrant. Thedefendant's argument and citation to McLaughlin are misplaced under the facts of this caseand provide no authority for the suppression of the defendant's confession.

By statute, a defendant arrested in a county in Illinois other than the one in which awarrant for his arrest was issued "shall be taken without unnecessary delay before the nearestand most accessible judge in the county where the arrest was made or, if no additional delayis created, before the nearest and most accessible judge in the county from which the warrantwas issued." 725 ILCS 5/109-2(a) (West 2000). We note that there does not seem to beunreasonable delay in this case because, as outlined below, approximately 48 hours after thedefendant's arrest on the Madison County warrant, St. Clair County filed charges andarraigned the defendant. At that point, the defendant was deemed to be in the physicalcustody of St. Clair County. This determination aside, the Illinois Supreme Court has heldthat even if a delay between a warrantless arrest and a probable cause determination isunreasonable, a statement or confession obtained during that period is not necessarilysuppressed. People v. Willis, 215 Ill. 2d 517, 532 (2005). Such statements will only besuppressed if they are involuntary. Willis, 215 Ill. 2d at 535.

To determine whether the defendant's confession was voluntary, we consider thetotality of the circumstances surrounding it, including the defendant's age, intelligence,education, experience, and physical condition at the time of the detention and interrogation;the duration of the interrogation; the presence of Miranda warnings; the presence of anyphysical or mental abuse; and the legality and duration of the detention. Willis, 215 Ill. 2dat 536. We will not disturb the circuit court's decision on this issue unless it was against themanifest weight of the evidence. Willis, 215 Ill. 2d at 536. However, when neither the trialcourt's findings of fact nor its determination of witness credibility is questioned, a ruling ona motion to suppress is reviewed de novo. People v. Mendez, 322 Ill. App. 3d 103, 109(2001).

The record contains ample evidence that the defendant was an articulate andintelligent adult, including having a college-level education and prior dealings with lawenforcement that evidenced an understanding of the Miranda warnings. The defendantindicated to the officers on the day of the confession sought to be suppressed that heunderstood his Miranda rights. Although the defendant refused to sign the Miranda waiverform, the defendant indicated to the officer that he would talk to him. The interrogationlasted no more than several minutes. There is no evidence of physical or mental abuse in therecord. The record shows that the officer was trying to end the interrogation when thedefendant gave his confession. Applying these facts, the trial court's determination that thedefendant's confession was voluntary cannot be said to be against the manifest weight of theevidence.

The defendant's second argument in support of his contention that the motion tosuppress should have been granted is that the defendant had invoked his right to silenceand/or his right to counsel prior to his arrest and that the officers later improperly renewedtheir interrogation of the defendant while he was in custody at the St. Clair County jail. Thedefendant's basis for this argument is that he indicated to the officers on June 20 that hispersonal injury counsel had advised him not to talk to the officers about the offense. Thedefendant argues that the officers' subsequent interrogation of him on July 6 was improperand should have resulted in a suppression.

The circuit court found that the events on June 20 indicated an intent on the part ofthe defendant to invoke his right to silence, rather than his right to counsel. This finding issupported by the record because there is no evidence that the defendant ever requested anattorney prior to the questioning. Following the Illinois Supreme Court's analysis in Peoplev. Nielson, 187 Ill. 2d 271 (1999), the circuit court determined that the defendant's initialdesire to cut off the questioning was "scrupulously honored" and that the standards forresumed questioning had been met. The factors for determining whether the defendant'sdesire to cut off questioning was "scrupulously honored" are whether (1) the policeimmediately halted the initial interrogation after the defendant invoked his right to remainsilent, (2) a significant amount of time elapsed between the interrogations, (3) a fresh set ofMiranda warnings was given prior to the second interrogation, and (4) the secondinterrogation addressed a crime that was not the subject of the first interrogation. Nielson,187 Ill. 2d at 287 (citing Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96, 104-05, 46 L. Ed. 2d 313, 321-22,96 S. Ct. 321, 327 (1975)).

Applying these factors to the subsequent interrogation of the defendant at the St. ClairCounty jail on July 6, 2001, 16 days had passed since the defendant had indicated he nolonger wished to talk to police, and the investigators made no attempt to resume thequestioning of the defendant until 16 days had passed. We conclude that this was asignificant amount of time between the interrogations. See People v. Mendez, 322 Ill. App.3d 103, 114 (2001) (two hours was a sufficient amount of time between interrogations). Theinvestigator read a fresh set of Miranda warnings prior to the second interrogation. Althoughthe second interrogation addressed the same crime as the first interrogation, this factor alonedoes not preclude a finding that the defendant's right to remain silent was "scrupulouslyhonored" when all the other factors are met. Nielson, 187 Ill. 2d at 290. Accordingly, wecannot conclude that the trial court's determination on this issue was against the manifestweight of the evidence, and we make the same determination from the record applying thede novo standard of review.

The defendant's third claim of error is that the defendant was denied a fair trial by thecumulative effect of misconduct on the part of the prosecutor and that trial counsel wasineffective for his failure to object to the alleged prosecutorial misconduct. Specifically, thedefendant cites the following comments by the prosecutor during his opening statementand/or closing argument: (1) that the defendant "used his own inclinations" to rob theRaceway because he was "having a bad day," (2) that the defendant "plea bargained" for abetter deal by confessing, (3) that if the evidence against the defendant was not consideredsufficient to warrant a guilty verdict, "I don't know what kind of case we could ever bring infront of a jury," and (4) that "the shoe does fit and so you cannot acquit."

Because there was no objection to any of the allegedly improper comments during thetrial, we address each of the defendant's allegations using the plain error standard set forthin Illinois Supreme Court Rule 615(a) (134 Ill. 2d R. 615(a)). In a criminal case, the plainerror doctrine may be invoked in two instances: first, where the evidence in the case isclosely balanced and, second, where to leave the error or errors uncorrected raises asubstantial risk that an accused was denied a fair trial and remedying the error or errors isnecessary to preserve the integrity of the judicial process. People v. Shaw, 186 Ill. 2d 301,326-27 (1998). The error or errors must be so fundamental to the integrity of the judicialprocess that the trial court could not cure the error or errors by sustaining an objection orinstructing the jury to disregard the errors. Shaw, 186 Ill. 2d at 327.

In this case, we cannot say that the evidence was closely balanced. A witness to therobbery made an in-court identification of the defendant. The same witness also identifiedthe license plate and vehicle used in the robbery, and evidence adduced at the trial showedthat the vehicle had been rented to the defendant during the time period the robbery tookplace. The victim also made an in-court identification of the defendant and the weaponfound in the defendant's vehicle. The detectives testified that the defendant confessed to therobbery, and as discussed above, the confession was properly admitted into evidence. Therefore, the defendant's conviction will not be overturned based on the allegedprosecutorial misconduct unless the alleged misconduct is of such a magnitude that thedefendant was denied a fair trial. We address the alleged errors in turn.

First, the defendant argues that it was improper for the prosecutor, during his openingstatement, to state to the jury that the defendant "used his own inclinations" to rob theRaceway because he was "having a bad day." Opening statements are intended to advise thejury of what each party expects the evidence to prove, including a discussion of reasonableinferences to be drawn from the evidence. People v. Kliner, 185 Ill. 2d 81 (1998). Theremark of the prosecutor that the defendant "used his own inclinations" to commit therobbery because he was "having a bad day" was made in the context of explaining that thedefendant confessed that he committed the robbery because he had been fighting with hiswife that day. The defendant argues that this was improper argument regarding thedefendant's propensity to commit the crime. But after considering the argument in context,we cannot say that the trial court could not have corrected any error by sustaining anobjection or instructing the jury to disregard the comment.

Second, the defendant argues that the prosecutor's statement that the defendant "pleabargained" with detectives by confessing in hopes for a better deal was reversible error. Evidence adduced at the trial by the defense established that the defendant asked thedetectives whether he would get a better deal in Madison County following his confession. The defendant contends the prosecutor's statement characterizing this statement by thedefendant as "plea bargaining" was a direct violation of Illinois Supreme Court Rule 402(f)(177 Ill. 2d R. 402(f)), because this discussion between the defendant and the detectives wasinadmissible as a "plea discussion." However, as recognized by the Illinois Supreme Court,before a discussion can be characterized as an inadmissible plea-related discussion, it mustcontain the rudiments of the negotiation process. People v. Hart, 214 Ill. 2d 490, 503 (2005). As in Hart, the defendant did not ask the detective to contact the State's Attorney's office inMadison County or convey any proposed terms of a plea agreement. He never intimated thathe was willing to plead guilty and never discussed pleading guilty with the detective. Hart,214 Ill. 2d at 511. The defendant simply asked the detective if he would get a better deal inMadison County. Therefore, under Hart, the evidence regarding the defendant's discussionwith the detective was not inadmissible under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 402(f). Having established that the evidence adduced at the trial was not inadmissible underIllinois Supreme Court Rule 402(f), the question then becomes whether the prosecutor'scharacterization of this discussion as a "plea bargain" rises to the level of plain error. As wepreviously stated, we do not find the evidence in this case to be closely balanced. Accordingly, we examine the prosecutor's characterization only to determine whether it wasof such a magnitude that it deprived the defendant of a fair trial. Toward this end, we findthat the prosecutor only made this remark once and that the jury was instructed to disregardstatements made in closing argument not based on the evidence. See People v. Moore, 171Ill. 2d 74, 100 (1996). Furthermore, had the comment been objected to at the trial, aninstruction to the jury to disregard the comment would have cured the error. Accordingly,although we find that the prosecutor made a mischaracterization of the evidence as a "pleabargain," this mischaracterization does not rise to the level of plain error.

Third, the defendant contends that the prosecutor's statement, "If we can't convict thedefendant on this type of evidence, I don't know what kind of case we could ever bring infront of a jury," was contrary to established precedent and constituted reversible error.Specifically, the defendant argues that this comment amounted to an urging that the jurors'oaths required a conviction, that future cases would be hampered by an acquittal, and thata conviction was required to show support for the authorities. See People v. Castaneda, 299Ill. App. 3d 779, 783 (1998); People v. Threadgill, 166 Ill. App. 3d 643, 648-49 (1988); People v. Slaughter, 84 Ill. App. 3d 88, 94 (1980). We decline to attach the meaning to thesestatements that the defendant suggests. The jury was instructed that opening statements andclosing arguments were not evidence, and this comment on the overwhelming nature of theevidence against the defendant does not amount to plain error that could not have beencorrected by the sustaining of an objection or by a jury instruction.

Fourth, the defendant urges the court to consider the prosecutor's statement that "ifthe shoe fits you cannot acquit" as a statement to the jury that the burden of proof was reversed and/or a statement to remind the jury of the O.J. Simpson case calculated to arousethe passions of the jury regarding an acquittal that caused widespread anger. We decline toattach the meaning to this statement that the defendant suggests. In context, the prosecutorwas rebutting defense counsel's claim in argument that the man who the defendant claimedborrowed the rental car had shoes that matched the shoes worn by the suspect in thesurveillance video. We find that this statement did not amount to plain error. We alsodecline to consider the cases cited by the defendant regarding prior cases involving thisprosecutor, because they have no relevancy to the case at bar. We find it sufficient to saythat, even when the statements are taken together, the alleged misconduct of the prosecutorin this case does not rise to the level of plain error. In addition, because we find that evenif trial counsel had objected to these statements by the prosecutor, there is no reasonableprobability that the outcome of the trial would have been different, we decline to find thattrial counsel was ineffective in this regard. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 694,80 L. Ed. 2d 674, 698, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 2068 (1984); People v. Albanese, 104 Ill. 2d 504,525 (1984).

Finally, the defendant argues that trial counsel made assertions in his openingstatement and closing argument that were not supported by the evidence presented and thatthis shows ineffective assistance of trial counsel by his failure to prepare for the trial. In hisopening statement and closing argument, defense counsel pointed to the fact that the initialpolice report contained a description that the suspect was in his twenties, while the defendantwas in his forties. We find that evidence of this discrepancy was presented at the trial.During trial counsel's cross-examination of the lead detective, the detective admitted that theoriginal description of the suspect was a man in his twenties. The defendant makes muchof the fact that trial counsel was unable to elicit an admission of this description from thewitness or the victim. However, we find that trial counsel attempted to elicit this informationfrom the witnesses, and even if trial counsel had conducted a pretrial interview of thesewitnesses and discovered prior to the trial that they would not admit to having given thatdescription, it would still be objectively reasonable for trial counsel to present the evidencethrough the lead detective and make mention of the discrepancy during arguments. Thedefendant's claim of ineffective assistance of counsel in this regard also fails both prongs ofthe Strickland test. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 694, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674, 698, 104S. Ct. 2052, 2068 (1984); People v. Albanese, 104 Ill. 2d 504, 525 (1984).

For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the circuit court is affirmed.

Affirmed.

DONOVAN and WELCH, JJ., concur.

___________________________________________________________________________________

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, ) Appeal from the

) Circuit Court of

Plaintiff-Appellee, ) Madison County.

)

v. ) No. 01-CF-1552

)

REGINALD WELCH, a/k/a REGINAL WELCH, ) Honorable

) Daniel J. Stack,

Defendant-Appellant. ) Judge, presiding.

___________________________________________________________________________________

Opinion Filed:

___________________________________________________________________________________

Justices: Honorable Stephen L. Spomer, P.J.

Honorable James K. Donovan, J., and

Honorable Thomas M. Welch, J.,

Concur

___________________________________________________________________________________

Attorneys Daniel M. Kirwan, Deputy Defender, Larry R. Wells, Assistant Defender, Office

for of the State Appellate Defender, Fifth Judicial District, 730 E. Illinois Highway 15,

Appellant Suite #1, Mt. Vernon, IL 62864

___________________________________________________________________________________

Attorneys Hon. William A. Mudge, State's Attorney, Madison County Courthouse, 157 N. Main

for Street, Edwardsville, IL 62025; Norbert J. Goetten, Director, Stephen E. Norris,

Appellee Deputy Director, Patrick D. Daly, Staff Attorney, Office of the State's Attorneys

Appellate Prosecutor, 730 E. Illinois Highway 15, Suite 2, P.O. Box 2249, Mt.

Vernon, IL 62864

___________________________________________________________________________________

1. On September 3, 2003, this court affirmed the ruling of the St. Clair County judgeon the suppression issue. People v. Welch, No. 5-01-0994 (2003) (unpublished order underSupreme Court Rule 23 (166 Ill. 2d R. 23)). Following the issuance of this court's order, theprosecutor moved for a dismissal of the St. Clair County charge. The order of the dismissalof the St. Clair County charge was entered on November 21, 2003.