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JUSTICE CHAPMAN delivered the opinion of the court:

In September 2001, a jury convicted the defendant, David E. "Chip" Wilson, of twocounts of aggravated criminal sexual abuse (720 ILCS 5/12-16(f) (West 2000)). The chargesstemmed from allegations that he had touched two female high school students in a sexualmanner. At the trial, two additional young women testified about similar conduct by thedefendant, for which he was not charged. On appeal, the defendant contends that the trialcourt erred in denying his motion to exclude this testimony. We affirm.

I. BACKGROUND

From September 1999 to March 2001, the defendant was employed at Central HighSchool in Breese, Illinois. His primary duties were to supervise students who had been givenin-school suspensions and to act as an assistant coach of the football team. When he had nostudents to supervise in the in-school suspension room, he often offered assistance to otherteachers or visited the art classroom. The art classroom and the in-school suspension roomwere actually one room, separated only by cabinets and room dividers. James Falconio, theart teacher, was the head coach of the football team. Often, football players sat in the backof Falconio's classroom watching videos of football plays during their study hall periods. When the defendant visited the art room, he generally talked to these players. However,occasionally he walked around the room and chatted with the art students as well.

In January 2001, the school administration received a complaint from a female studentalleging that, in December 2000, the defendant had initiated physical contact with her thatwas sexual in nature. The superintendent and the principal met with the defendant to discussthe student's allegations. In March 2001, the defendant was fired from his position after theadministration received two additional complaints.

On March 25, 2001, the State charged the defendant by information with two countsof aggravated criminal sexual abuse (720 ILCS 5/12-16(f) (West 2000)). Count I alleged thathe had knowingly touched Carol Z.'s breasts for the purpose of sexual gratification. CountII alleged that he had knowingly touched Crystal H.'s breasts for the purpose of sexualgratification. No other charges were filed.

On April 3, 2001, Sergeant Mike Kreke interviewed the defendant in his home. According to Sergeant Kreke's trial testimony, the defendant told him that he was a "touchy-feely" person who often greeted students by slapping them on the shoulder or putting his armon their back, although Sergeant Kreke could not recall the defendant's exact words. Thedefendant also gave Sergeant Kreke a written statement, in which he stated: "It is notuncommon for me to put my hand on somebody's shoulder while talking to them. I willsometimes put my hand on their waist or back also. There is no sexual connotation. To mewhat I have done is not inappropriate conduct."

On September 11, 2001, the defendant filed a motion in limine to exclude thetestimony of Lisa V.-who also had alleged sexual contact by the defendant-on the basis thather testimony would relate to uncharged conduct. On September 17, the State filed itswritten response to the defendant's motion. The State noted that the defendant was expectedto contend that any physical contact was "of a non[]sexual and harmless nature," and theState argued that the testimony was relevant because it showed the defendant's intent andmodus operandi. On September 17, the defendant filed a motion in limine to exclude thetestimony of both Lisa V. and Ashley A. (another student who had alleged sexual contact bythe defendant). He objected to Ashley A.'s testimony both because it involved unchargedconduct and because the State had not disclosed her identity to the defendant until September14, three days before the trial. On September 17, 2001, the trial court denied both motions,stating, "[In] cases such as this[,] *** the State is entitled to present this type of evidence inits case-in-chief."

The trial took place over two days, on September 17 and 18, 2001. Crystal H.testified that in March 2001, when she was a first-year high school student, she received anin-school suspension. The in-school suspension room was furnished with desks separatedby room dividers to form cubicles. When Crystal H. sat at one of these desks, the defendantapproached her from behind and put his hands around her waist. He then moved his handsup from her stomach to touch her breasts from underneath. She further testified that at othertimes, he approached her in art class and put his hands around her waist in a similar mannerand touched her stomach; however, she stated that he only touched her breasts the one time.

Carol Z. testified that the defendant made physical contact with her approximately 15times throughout the 2000-2001 school year. These incidents took place both in the art roomand in the hallways. She stated that the defendant made contact with her in a variety ofways. On some occasions, he hugged her; on others, he held her hand or touched her lowerback; sometimes he touched her eyes or her lips or brushed her hair out of her face. Shetestified that some of these times he approached her from behind but that at other times heapproached her from the front. She alleged that he had touched both her breasts and herbuttocks. She stated that the defendant was always "subtle," touching her in such a way thatothers would not be able to see that he was doing anything more than hugging her. Carol Z.further testified that the defendant often chatted with the students in Falconio's art class. Shestated that on one occasion, he asked her about her sex life, which made her feeluncomfortable. She further testified that she witnessed the defendant hugging other femalestudents but could not see whether he was doing anything more than hugging them.

Lisa V. testified to three incidents of sexual contact with the defendant. All threeincidents took place in November and December 2000. The first time, Lisa V. was seatedat a desk in her study hall. According to her testimony, the defendant approached her frombehind, grabbed her sides, and then put his fingers under her breasts so that the sides of hisindex fingers touched her breasts. The second time was also in study hall. Lisa V. testifiedthat the defendant did the same thing he had done the first time. He then sat across from herat a table to talk to her and two other girls who were sitting at the same table. She testifiedthat he winked at her and took her daily planner and drew a picture of a little devil in it andwrote next to the picture, "Lisa is a horny devil."

The third incident occurred when Lisa V. was taking a make-up test for her chemistryteacher. She testified that she went into the driver's education classroom, which wasapparently not being used at the time, to wait for her chemistry teacher to bring her the test. The defendant followed her into the room. The chemistry teacher came in after thedefendant and asked the defendant if he was going to act as a proctor and watch to make sureLisa V. did not cheat on her test. She testified that, as she took the test, the defendant twiceapproached her from behind, squeezed her shoulders, and rubbed her breasts and hershoulders. He then approached her from the left side, put his right hand on her back, andrubbed his crotch against her arm. She stated that "there was an obvious bulge in his pants"when he did this.

Ashley A. testified to two incidents that had occurred toward the end of the 1999-2000 school year. She had obtained permission to go to the art room when no art class wasin session, because she "didn't have anything to do" and she "just wanted to draw." Shetestified that she was sitting on a stool, drawing, when the defendant came up behind her,brushed his hand against her back, which she "didn't think was a big deal," and then stoodvery close to her and "rubbed his genital area on [her] leg." The second incident took placein the hall. Ashley A. was showing a group of friends a tattoo she had just gotten on hershoulder. She wore a shirt over a tank top and had pulled the shirt back so as to expose thetattoo. The defendant approached the group, and she showed him the tattoo also. She statedthat he then rubbed against her breast. At the time, she thought he did it accidentally, but inretrospect, she believed that it was intentional.

The defendant took the stand in his own defense. When asked if he had any physicalcontact with Crystal H. in the in-school suspension room, he stated, "I walked over andmaybe put my hand on her arm and asked her if she had anything to do." He testified thathe could not have touched her in the way she described because the type of chair in whichshe was sitting would have made it impossible. When he was asked to demonstrate, thefollowing exchange took place:

"Q. [Defense counsel:] Okay. And could you[-]can you try to put your handshigher up?

A. If I was[-]only if I was standing above."

A photograph of the desks and chairs in the in-school suspension room was admitted intoevidence. The photograph reveals that the chair had a solid back, the height of which wasapproximately level with the height of the desk. The chair did not have arms and was notattached to the desk. When asked if he had any additional physical contact with Crystal H.in the art room, the defendant responded, "The only[-]what we discussed before [the incidentin the in-school suspension room] is the only time that I really had any contact with her."

The defendant testified that it would not have been possible for him to approach LisaV. from behind while she was taking a make-up test in the driver's education classroom. Hetestified that she was seated in the first row of seats. The desks had chairs attached to themand were arranged so that the front of each desk was nearly touching the chair of the deskin front of it. Because of this, he stated, he would have had to move the desk behind herentirely out of the way in order to stand behind her. Although the defendant denied anyphysical contact with Lisa V. during her make-up exam, when he was asked on cross-examination if he had ever had contact with her during her study hall, he stated, "If I ever didanything to her was [sic] just put my hand around her shoulder."

When asked if he had any physical contact with Carol Z., the defendant stated, "Nonethat I can recall." He testified that on one occasion she began talking to him about her datingrelationship and that he quickly changed the subject. When asked if he had any physicalcontact with Ashley A., he replied, "None that I am aware of." He further testified that hedid not recall ever being alone with Ashley A.

On October 16, 2001, the defendant filed a motion for a judgment notwithstandingthe verdict or, alternatively, for a new trial. He raised the same objections to Lisa V.'stestimony and Ashley A.'s testimony that he had raised in his motions in limine. The trialcourt denied the motion and, on November 28, 2001, sentenced the defendant to concurrentsentences of 180 days in the Clinton County jail and 30 months of probation. This appealfollowed.

Ordinarily, evidence of prior criminal conduct or prior bad acts is inadmissible if itis only relevant to show a defendant's propensity to commit the crime charged. People v.McKibbins, 96 Ill. 2d 176, 182, 449 N.E.2d 821, 823 (1983). However, if it is relevant forany other purpose, such as to show a defendant's modus operandi or to show intent, it isadmissible. McKibbins, 96 Ill. 2d at 182, 449 N.E.2d at 824. We will not reverse the trialcourt's ruling on the admissibility of such evidence absent a clear showing that the trial courtabused its discretion. People v. Thingvold, 145 Ill. 2d 441, 452-53, 584 N.E.2d 89, 93-94(1991). The defendant contends that the trial court abused its discretion by admitting the testimony of Lisa V. and Ashley A. He argues that their testimony served only to prove thathe had the propensity to sexually molest female students. He contends that his intent wasnot at issue in the trial and that the testimony did not show a modus operandi. As a result,he concludes, it did not fit within either exception the State contends was applicable. Wedisagree.

Modus operandi literally means "method of working." The term refers to "a patternof criminal behavior so distinct that separate crimes or wrongful conduct are recognized asthe work of the same person." People v. Kimbrough, 138 Ill. App. 3d 481, 486, 485 N.E.2d1292, 1297 (1985). The connection between the uncharged conduct and the crime chargedmust be clear enough to create "a logical inference that if defendant committed one of theacts, he may have committed the other act." Kimbrough, 138 Ill. App. 3d at 486, 485 N.E.2dat 1297.

First, the defendant argues that, because his identity was not at issue, modus operandievidence was improper. We disagree. Often, evidence of uncharged conduct is used to helpestablish the fact that the defendant was indeed the perpetrator. However, modus operandievidence can be relevant even where the defendant's identity is not an issue. For example,modus operandi evidence is admissible to prove that a crime occurred at all. Kimbrough,138 Ill. App. 3d at 487, 485 N.E.2d at 1298. Illinois courts have also found such evidenceto be relevant where a defendant charged with sexual abuse presents "an innocentconstruction" to his conduct. People v. Novak, 163 Ill. 2d 93, 116-17, 643 N.E.2d 762, 774(1994); see People v. Soler, 228 Ill. App. 3d 183, 203, 592 N.E.2d 517, 531 (1992) (modusoperandi evidence was admissible where a stepfather contended that he was merely beingphysically affectionate with his stepdaughter in a nonsexual way); Kimbrough, 138 Ill. App.3d at 486, 485 N.E.2d at 1297 (evidence of modus operandi was admissible where thedefendant claimed that the encounter was consensual).

In the instant case, the defendant presented an innocent construction to his conduct. Although he denied engaging in all the precise conduct the girls alleged, he did not deny thathe engaged in physical contact with students. Rather, he stated that such contact wasnonsexual in nature. The defendant contends that he merely argued at the trial that the girlswere lying and that his assertions that any "incidental touching" was nonsexual did notamount to an assertion that any incidental touching of the girls' breasts was accidental. Hestates in his brief, "[I]t is at best an overbroad interpretation of the record to assert that thedefense was that Mr. Wilson had no prurient motive in accidentally touching breasts." Wefind this contention unpersuasive.

First, we note that the defendant's intent was at issue at the trial. The defendanttestified that he believed that Lisa V. "misunderstood" his actions toward her. Defensecounsel argued in closing that even if the jury found the evidence that the defendant hadengaged in any physical contact with the girls credible, the State was also required to provethat he did so with sexual intent. The statute does not require the State to prove that thedefendant touched the students' breasts. It merely requires the State to prove that thedefendant engaged in "an act of sexual conduct with a victim" between the ages of 13 and17, where the defendant "held a position of trust, authority[,] or supervision in relation to thevictim." 720 ILCS 5/12-16(f) (West 2000). Thus, although it is certainly harder to refutethe undeniably sexual nature of touching their breasts, it was possible for the jury to findsexual conduct in the other types of touching that he admitted occurred, even if it believedthat he did not intentionally touch any of the students' breasts or recall doing so accidentally. Moreover, the defendant's testimony shows that he did refer to the touching of the girls'breasts when he used the phrase "incidental touching." On cross-examination, the prosecutorasked the defendant about his January 2001 meeting with the principal and thesuperintendent regarding the initial student complaint against him. The following exchangetook place:

"Q. Did he tell you the specifics of the complaints?

A. No, he didn't.

Q. He didn't tell you that girls were saying that you were touching theirbreasts, for example?

A. He didn't say [']touching their breasts['].

Q. What did he say, anything close to that?

A. Said that there might have been some incidental contact of some sort.

Q. Mr. Groff stated that there might be [sic] some incidental contact?

A. Said[:] ['][Y]ou may have touched somebody[']s breasts[.] [D]id you?[']is what he asked me[,] and I said that I hadn't."

The defendant's intent in touching the girls at all was at issue; therefore, the testimony ofAshley A. and Lisa V. was very relevant to showing that he did have a sexual intent in hisconduct.

The defendant contends, correctly, that modus operandi evidence is not admissibleif it is relevant only to bolster the credibility of the State's witnesses. Kimbrough, 138 Ill.App. 3d at 488, 485 N.E.2d at 1298. He points out that in its response to his motion inlimine, the State argued that the evidence was admissible even if the defendant's intent wasnot at issue (see People v. Pitts, 299 Ill. App. 3d 469, 475-76, 701 N.E.2d 198, 203 (1998))and that, in closing arguments, the State argued that four witnesses could not tell the samelie. First, we reiterate that although the State did contend that it could use the modusoperandi evidence even if intent was not at issue, it also argued, correctly so, that thedefendant's intent was at issue. Evidence of modus operandi that is otherwise properlyadmissible is not rendered inadmissible merely because it also bolsters the credibility of theState's witnesses. Kimbrough, 138 Ill. App. 3d at 488, 485 N.E.2d at 1298.

Finally, the defendant contends that the testimony of the four girls does not establisha pattern of behavior so distinctive that it forms a modus operandi. To demonstrate such apattern, the crimes must share some distinctive features that are not common to most offensesof the same type. These similarities need not be unique, however. People v. Barbour, 106Ill. App. 3d 993, 1000, 436 N.E.2d 667, 672 (1982). The crimes need not be identical. Kimbrough, 138 Ill. App. 3d at 487, 485 N.E.2d at 1297. We find that the conduct describedby the four witnesses is sufficiently similar to constitute a modus operandi.

In contending otherwise, the defendant cites to our prior decision in People v. Bobo,278 Ill. App. 3d 130, 662 N.E.2d 623 (1996), which he contends is precisely analogous tothe case at bar. We find Bobo distinguishable.

There, a high school student alleged that a health education teacher hugged her in hisoffice and that, while doing so, he touched her on the buttocks and breast and tried to kissher. Bobo, 278 Ill. App. 3d at 131, 662 N.E.2d at 624. When she told him to stop, he toldher that she knew where to find him if she changed her mind. Bobo, 278 Ill. App. 3d at 131,662 N.E.2d at 624-25. The Illinois Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS)conducted an investigation into the matter, during which several other students madeallegations that the teacher had sexually abused them. The DCFS investigator testified tothese allegations at the trial. Bobo, 278 Ill. App. 3d at 132, 662 N.E.2d at 625. The opiniondid not describe the nature of the allegations of uncharged conduct but noted that much ofit "lacked any similarity to the incident" that formed the basis of the charges against Bobo. Bobo, 278 Ill. App. 3d at 133, 662 N.E.2d at 625. "Particularly noteworthy were allegedinstances of defendant grabbing a student's breast while walking down a hall or defendantallegedly rubbing a student's thigh while taping her ankle." Bobo, 278 Ill. App. 3d at 133,662 N.E.2d at 625. We found that these instances shared no common features other than thatthey involved the defendant fondling students. Bobo, 278 Ill. App. 3d at 133, 662 N.E.2dat 625.

The differences among the three incidents mentioned in the opinion are readilyapparent. The incident alleged by the complaining witness took place in the privacy of thedefendant's office, where he not only made physical contact with her but also propositionedher. Another incident involved initially innocuous physical contact-taping a student'sankle-that escalated into inappropriate conduct. Yet another incident involved the teachergrabbing a young woman's breast as he passed her in the hallway. Still other allegationsinvolved the defendant speaking inappropriately to students. Bobo, 278 Ill. App. 3d at 132,662 N.E.2d at 625. In the instant case, by contrast, all the allegations of physical contactinvolved inherently sexual contact hidden within seemingly innocuous contact, such ashugging a student or putting a hand on a student's shoulder.

Although the instant case is factually similar to Bobo in that it involves allegations ofthe sexual abuse of female high school students by a teacher, we believe that the similaritiesend there. We find the facts with which we are presented far more analogous to those beforethe First District Appellate Court in Soler than to those this court faced in Bobo.

There, the defendant was the stepfather of the 14-year-old victim, K.M. Soler, 228Ill. App. 3d at 185, 592 N.E.2d at 519. Before the defendant came into their lives, K.M. andher family had a practice of massaging each other's arms, legs, torsos, backs, faces, andshoulders, which they referred to as "nicing." Soler, 228 Ill. App. 3d at 185-86, 592 N.E.2dat 520. The first incident of abuse occurred when K.M. and the defendant were alone in thefamily room. The defendant told K.M. that he was going to "nice" her and began justrubbing her arm and stomach through her shirt, but then he moved his hands under her shirtand rubbed her bare chest. Soler, 228 Ill. App. 3d at 186, 592 N.E.2d at 520. K.M. testifiedthat the defendant engaged in substantially similar conduct on other occasions, often whenher sister and brother were asleep in the same bedroom with her. On one such occasion, healso rubbed her genital area underneath her pajamas. Soler, 228 Ill. App. 3d at 186, 592N.E.2d at 520. On another occasion, he put his mouth on her breasts during a familyvacation. Soler, 228 Ill. App. 3d at 187, 592 N.E.2d at 520.

Although the defendant was charged only for his sexual abuse of K.M., her eight-year-old sister, M.M., testified at the trial that she, too, had been abused. Specifically, M.M.testified that she had asked the defendant to "nice" her. He complied, initially rubbing herarms through her sleeves, but then he put his hands through the armholes of her shirt to rubher bare chest. Soler, 228 Ill. App. 3d at 191, 592 N.E.2d at 523. She also testified that he"niced" her stomach and moved his hand to touch the bare skin just above her genital area. Soler, 228 Ill. App. 3d at 191, 592 N.E.2d at 523.

In concluding that the trial court had properly admitted M.M.'s testimony, theappellate court stated: "M.M. described conduct by defendant which was virtually identicalto the incidents of abuse described by complainant. This testimony established that defendant had a common scheme or design to use 'nicing' as a pretext to sexually abuse hisstepdaughters." Soler, 228 Ill. App. 3d at 203, 592 N.E.2d at 531. Although the court didnot analyze the similarities and differences in the incidents of abuse to which both girls hadtestified, we note that there were differences in the incidents just as there are in the case atbar. M.M. asked to be "niced," while K.M. did not; some incidents occurred while thedefendant was alone with one of the girls, while others occurred in the presence of othersiblings. The defendant placed his mouth on K.M.'s breasts but did not do this to M.M. Wefind it significant, however, that the court specifically found that the modus operandidemonstrated by the evidence was the defendant's pattern of using seemingly innocuousaffection as a pretext for inappropriate sexual contact.

We think the testimony of the four young women who testified against the defendantin the instant case establishes a similar modus operandi. All four girls alleged that thedefendant touched their breasts, but only Carol Z. alleged that he also touched her buttocks,and only Lisa V. and Ashley A. alleged that he also rubbed his genital area against theirbodies. Some of the incidents to which the girls testified took place when they were in aroom alone with the defendant, while other incidents took place in view of other students,with the defendant hiding his illicit touching within seemingly innocuous contact. Ondifferent occasions, the defendant approached the girls from the front, from behind, or fromthe side. However, all the alleged incidents share the common thread that the defendantengaged in seemingly innocuous conduct and stealthily proceeded to engage in sexualcontact.

As in Soler, this common thread was directly relevant to overcoming a defense thatthe defendant had no sexual intent in his actions. There, as here, the defendant contendedthat any contact he had with the witnesses was nonsexual in nature. Soler, 228 Ill. App. 3dat 195, 592 N.E.2d at 526. Although the defendant in the case at bar draws a distinctionbetween such a contention and his contention that he did not touch the girls' breasts, we thinkimplicit in Soler's defense that he only innocently touched his stepdaughters is the argumentthat he did not touch their breasts or genital areas but only innocuously massaged the girls. In other words, the defendant in Soler argued that he did not touch his stepdaughters in themanner they alleged. That is what the defendant contends in this case.

Because the pattern of behavior established through the modus operandi testimonyhelps to explain the defendant's method of seeking sexual gratification through outwardlyinnocuous contact, it logically creates the inference that he intended his conduct to be sexual. We find, therefore, that these similarities far outweigh the rather superficial differences citedby the defendant.

In sum, we conclude that the defendant's intent was at issue in the instant case andthat the incidents of abuse to which all four girls testified were substantially similar enoughto establish a modus operandi that helped to prove the requisite sexual intent. Thus, we holdthat the trial court properly admitted the testimony of Ashley A. and Lisa V.

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the defendant's convictions.

Affirmed.

DONOVAN, J., concurs.

JUSTICE KUEHN, dissenting:

Today's decision marks a significant departure from our traditionally guarded view of other-crimes evidence,a view which requires that it be admitted only where it is relevant to some issue other than a person's penchant forcommitting crimes. Here, evidence of uncharged misconduct was admitted under the guise that it proved somethingother than the defendant's propensity for wrongdoing, when, in fact, it did not. People v. Bobo, 278 Ill. App. 3d 130,662 N.E.2d 623 (1996), should control the outcome of this case.

In People v. Bobo, we confronted circumstances identical to those we deal with here. We awarded a new trialto a teacher charged with aggravated criminal sexual abuse, because evidence of uncharged fondling of students wasadmitted under a pretext of proving intent rather than criminal propensity. Bobo denied touching his accusers. Ergo,either he fondled young breasts and buttocks for lustful reasons or he did not. There was no evidence to raise aquestion about a nonsexual purpose in touching erogenous areas of the young school girls' bodies. Therefore, we heldthat the State was prohibited from presenting evidence of uncharged student touching to address the question of intent. Now we refuse a plea that asks us to follow our precedent-a plea for equal treatment under the law. We notonly turn our back to the defendant, but we shun our own decision-making as well. Moreover, we do so without anyreason to support such a dramatic shift in position.

There was no justification, whatsoever, for the admission of testimony about sexual contact with Lisa V. orAshley A. Such testimony was admitted solely for the purpose of demonstrating the defendant's penchant for fondlingteenage girls. There was nothing distinctive or peculiar about the methods that he employed. The evidence simplyshows the defendant to be a common, run-of-the-mill pervert, who mistakenly thought that rubbing genitals againstyoung legs or placing a hand on a young breast would be either accepted or forgiven without complaint.

The majority talks about the use of other-crimes evidence to establish a modus operandi. Indeed, we are toldthat the superior quality of the modus operandi evidence admitted here allows us to distinguish our case from Peoplev. Bobo and to maintain allegiance to that precedent. Here is the reasoning that led to that decision:

"[T]he State introduced evidence of other wrongful acts, allegedly committed by defendant against severalother female students, to show intent and/or motive and/or knowledge. The State, however, did not establishhow such evidence showed motive, intent, or knowledge. Defendant denied that the entire incident with L.G.ever occurred; he did not claim he accidentally touched her, nor did he give some other type of excuse. Theevidence offered by the State *** served only to demonstrate defendant's alleged propensity to sexually assaultor harass female students." Bobo, 278 Ill. App. 3d at 132-33, 662 N.E.2d at 625.

The use of other-crimes evidence to establish a distinctive and peculiar modus operandi was not even underconsideration in People v. Bobo. The holding had nothing to do with it. How strange it seems to distinguish a casefor reasons that do not pertain to it.

My colleagues say: "[M]odus operandi evidence can be relevant even where the defendant's identity is not anissue. For example, modus operandi evidence is admissible to prove that a crime occurred at all. Kimbrough, 138 Ill.App. 3d at 487, 485 N.E.2d at 1298." Slip op. at 7. This passage demonstrates how far off base the majority hasstrayed in seeking to uphold these convictions. It is simply not true. No case stands for such a proposition.

Modus operandi is not evidence; it is not used to prove anything. It is a criminal's unique methodology thatthe State is permitted to prove, with evidence of other crimes, when the question of who committed a crime is at issue.

People v. Kimbrough does not hold that "modus operandi evidence is admissible to prove that a crimeoccurred at all." Here is the passage of that opinion that the majority thinks stands for such a proposition:

"[W]e believe that the crime charged and the subsequent [wrongful] act share peculiar and distinctivecommon features so as to earmark both acts as the handiwork of the same person. The two acts taken togetherdemonstrate a 'method of working.' It follows that the subsequent act was admissible to prove modus operandiand that the crime charged was actually committed. Evidence of other crimes [not modus operandi evidence]may be relevant not only to the issue of who committed a crime[] but also to the issue of whether a crime wascommitted at all. [Citation.] This principle is applicable to a case like the present one, where defendantcontends that as between himself and the victim, 'the question was did they meet by mutual consent or onlyby threat of force.' " (Emphasis added.) Kimbrough, 138 Ill. App. 3d at 487, 485 N.E.2d at 1297-98.

The modus operandi exception to the general rule that prohibits the admission of other uncharged wrongdoingaddresses those situations where multiple crimes are so unique that they could only have been committed by one person. The exception makes sense only in the context of cases where the offender's identity is at issue. That is not what wehave here.

The identity of who fondled the alleged victims was not at issue in this case. There was simply no questionabout who the victims claimed fondled them.

Justice Stamos, in another case that the majority misuses, put it well:

"Modus operandi *** refers to a pattern of criminal behavior so distinctive that separate crimes arerecognizable as the handiwork of the same wrongdoer. [Citation.]

*** While a showing of modus operandi does not require that the similarities be unique to theoffenses being compared, there must be 'some distinctive features that are not common to most offenses ofthat type.' [Citation.]" (Emphasis added.) People v. Barbour, 106 Ill. App. 3d 993, 999-1000, 436 N.E.2d667, 672 (1982).

The majority does not appear to understand this, particularly in light of its reliance on People v. Soler, a casethat deals with the common-scheme-and-design exception to the general prohibition against other-crimes evidence,not the modus operandi exception. See People v. Soler, 228 Ill. App. 3d 183, 202-03, 592 N.E.2d 517, 530-31 (1992).

Here is an example of what the above passage means. Most gas station armed robberies involve the use ofa pistol to relieve an attendant of all the money in the cash register. Evidence of a series of gas station robberiescommitted by a masked man who, while armed with a pistol, forces attendants to empty their cash registers would notqualify for admission in order to show modus operandi, even though every armed robbery was committed in identicalfashion. There would be no distinctive features to the methodology uncommon to most gas station holdups. However,if this same armed robber repeatedly demanded all of the Fritos that the station had on hand, instead of its cash, therobberies would take on a distinctive feature to suggest that they were the work of the same individual. Authoritieswould know that they were dealing with the Frito Bandito, and upon his arrest, the prosecution would be armed withall the robberies to prove his identity in the crime charged.

The other-crimes evidence in this case did not even share common characteristics, much less distinctivefeatures uncommon to most fondling cases. Lisa V. and Ashley A. testified to misconduct that was different from thealleged criminal conduct being prosecuted. Both charges alleged the fondling of breasts. Crystal H., a first-yearstudent, testified that the defendant approached her from behind, put his hands on her waist, and moved them towardher chest until he touched her breasts. Carol Z., the other alleged victim, testified to a host of incidents that took placein the art room and in the hallways of the school. She told the jury that on occasion the defendant hugged her. Onother occasions, he held her hand and touched her back. He approached her from behind and from the front. At times,he touched her breasts, and at times, he touched her buttocks. He even asked her about her sex life. Neither of the twovictims testified that the defendant rubbed his genitals on her arm or leg.

Lisa V. and Ashley A. both testified to purposeful contact between the defendant's clothed penis and theirarm and leg. In addition, the two schoolgirls testified about other kinds of inappropriate dalliance. The jury learnedhow the defendant was on hand to gape at Ashley A.'s provocative tattoo. It was also told how the defendant drew apicture of the devil on Lisa V.'s daily planner and labeled it "Lisa is a horny devil."

Jurors could not take kindly to an adult teacher who toyed around with his clothed penis and looked uponyoungsters as horny devils. This unseemly flirtation and misuse of a housed penis was uncharged conduct that shouldnever have been heard by jurors.

The only commonality between the charged conduct and the uncharged conduct was the touching of breasts,something that garden-variety child abusers do. This was not a case where proof of other uncharged misconduct couldestablish an uncommon modus operandi that set the defendant's fondling of teenagers apart from fondling engagedin by other child abusers. The testimony should never have been admitted on that basis.

This decision completely changes how we approach the admission of other-crimes evidence. In People v.Bobo, we addressed the same crime of aggravated criminal sexual abuse. Bobo was alleged to have fondled youngstudents in order to sexually arouse either the students or himself or both. He flatly denied touching anyone. SinceBobo never claimed an innocent reason for touching a student, we held that the State could not introduce the otheruncharged misconduct to prove the specific-intent element of the aggravated-criminal-sexual-abuse charge. Our rulingwas consistent with precedent.

Until today, we have constrained the use of other-crimes evidence to those situations where defendants pursuea defense that challenges the intent element of the State's proof. We have never recognized the State's right to useother-crimes evidence to establish the element of intent in the absence of affirmative action on the part of a defendantthat attempts to negate a prurient purpose. A flat denial of any physical contact has rendered other-crimes evidenceimmaterial and inadmissible to establish the specific-intent element of the State's proof on an aggravated-criminal-sexual-abuse charge.

In response to the defendant's claim that he never touched a student's breast, accidently or otherwise, themajority offers this stunning sentence:

"The defendant's intent in touching the girls at all was at issue; therefore, the testimony of AshleyA. and Lisa V. was very relevant to showing that he did have a sexual intent in his conduct." (Emphasis inoriginal.) Slip op. at 9.

I think the majority is saying that since the defendant denied any inappropriate touching at all, the unchargedevents became relevant to prove his sexual intent. If so, the majority is wrong.

When the defendant denied touching the girls at all, the testimony about other touching became relevant towhether he touched schoolgirls on their breasts, by showing his penchant for fondling. While it may have also beenrelevant to show why he touched breasts, it was totally unnecessary to prove a sexual purpose. Sexual intent was stilla part of the charge that needed to be proven, but it became inherent in the denial. If the defendant did not touchschoolgirls on their private parts, he did not touch them and, therefore, did nothing that could be driven by a sexualintent. It seems somewhat inane to think it important to prove other uncharged touching to establish sexual intent,when a sexual motivation was an obvious, foregone conclusion if the jurors disbelieved the defendant. The defendant'sunwillingness to concede even the possibility that he may have accidently touched a schoolgirl on a sexually taboo areatook the question of intent out of play.

The testimony of Ashley A. and Lisa V. helped resolve the question of whether the defendant touched thevictims' breasts. It made the charged allegations more likely because it showed that the defendant had a propensityfor fondling teenage schoolgirls. Of course, this is precisely what the law forbids.

This case is a green light to admit other-crimes evidence in every case where some specific intent is anelement of the offense charged. Any prosecutor worth salt will have the above sentence scribbled across his or her casefile and present it as his or her license to introduce other-crimes evidence, even though a defendant denies the allegedacts without a challenge to the intent element of the offense. Prosecutors will say what the majority is unwilling to say,because it has no reason to say it-People v. Wilson overrules People v. Bobo.

Despite the elimination of any need for an affirmative defense challenge as a prelude to the admission of other-crimes evidence on the question of intent, the majority discusses the defendant's purported effort to interject incidentaltouching as an innocent explanation for the accusations leveled against him. Again, the majority is wrong.

This defendant did not claim that he had accidentally touched anyone's breast. He merely claimed to haveput his hand on Crystal H.'s arm. He unconditionally denied touching her breasts and protested that it could not haveoccurred as she claimed. The defendant testified that he did not recall any physical contact with Carol Z.

The majority thinks that the defendant conceded a breast-touching when, on cross-examination, he used thephrase "incidental touching." To the contrary, the defendant did not lay claim to an incidental touching of anyone. All that he testified to was his superior's suggestion that he might have had some incidental contact with a student'sbreasts. The prosecutor asked, "Mr. Groff stated that there might be [sic] some incidental contact?" The defendantanswered, "Said[:] ['][Y]ou may have touched somebody[']s breasts[.] [D]id you?['] is what he asked me[,] and I saidthat I hadn't."

The majority is wrong in implying that the defendant tried to put an innocent spin on touching students. Thedefendant denied breast-touching and claimed that he had not succumbed to the suggestion that he may have innocentlytouched one. Thus, the testimony from Ashley A. and Lisa V. was not needed to refute a claim that the touching ofa breast was accidental and without sexual intent.

We can cast aside our prior decisions if we choose, but not without a good reason. Before we overruleourselves, the consistency that the law deserves, and upon which people rely, calls for an explanation. People v. Bobois virtually indistinguishable from this case. Since the majority's effort to distinguish it examines a distinction withoutreason and since nothing is offered that would warrant overruling our precedent, I would allow this defendant the samerelief granted to Mr. Bobo. I would grant the defendant a new trial where he is tried for charged misconduct, ratherthan having labeled a young schoolgirl a horny devil.

For the reasons stated, I respectfully dissent.