JUSTICE KUEHN delivered the opinion of the court:

We are presented a case where three lawyers who work for the State's AttorneysAppellate Prosecutor's office teamed up to successfully prosecute and convict RobertWoodall of multiple crimes, including the execution-style murder of a young woman namedHeather Lynch. Either the trio conducted an error-free prosecution or the defendant hassimply bypassed other potential issues, confident in his challenge of their power to do whatthey did.

The defendant raises but one question for our review. It rests upon the contentionthat the people who prosecuted him were all illegitimate interlopers, masquerading asrepresentatives of the State. We are asked to decide whether the defendant's multipleconvictions stand for naught, rendered null and void by virtue of a prosecution championedby attorneys who lacked the legal authority to act on the State's behalf.

The defendant's argument is based upon a recently amended statutory provision thatcreates the State's Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor's office. Pub. Act 92-683, eff. July 16,2002 (amending 725 ILCS 210/4.01 (West 2000)). The earlier version of the statute, andthe powers that it conveyed at the time of the defendant's trial, fuels the argument. It isessentially as follows. Attorneys employed by the State's Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor'soffice (the Agency) are prohibited by statute from participation in criminal trials other thanthose expressly authorized by the Agency's enabling legislation. That legislation does notpermit the Agency employees to assist local prosecutors in the trial of cases involving thetype of charge leveled here. Therefore, the Agency employees lacked the legal authority toconduct a trial on the State's behalf. It follows that the trial itself was structurally flawedfrom the beginning. Everything that happened, including the jury's decision, is a virtualnullity, voided by the absence of a valid commission to prosecute.

The facts pertinent to this argument are undisputed. The State's Attorney for ShelbyCounty, through an assistant State's Attorney, filed a nine-count information on July 2, 1999,charging the defendant with five different theories of murder in the death of Heather Lynch. Heather died from a close-range gunshot wound to the head, inflicted on May 4, 1999. Theinformation also charged the defendant with home invasion and residential burglary inconnection with the murder. The last two counts of the information charged the defendantwith a residential burglary and an arson committed on February 23, 1999. The gun that fireda .380-caliber projectile, removed from Heather's brain during the autopsy, was one of theitems taken in this earlier residential burglary.

On August 13, 1999, Robert Broverman, the State's Attorney for Shelby County,executed two documents, each of which was entitled "Appointment of Special AssistantState's Attorney" and "Oath of Office." The documents purported to pass on theprosecutorial powers that Broverman enjoyed by virtue of his office. He wanted twoAgency attorneys, Tim Huyett and Allan Lolie, to be his assistants. Each of the documentsincluded a notarized oath of office. Huyett and Lolie took an oath to faithfully discharge theState's Attorney's duties.

On August 31, 1999, a Shelby County grand jury returned a two-count indictmentthat supplanted the last two counts of the information. The grand jury inquiry was notconducted by the Shelby County State's Attorney. The grand jury proceedings that led tothe indictment were conducted by Huyett. Huyett had been administered the oath includedon the document that Broverman drafted and executed in an effort to authorize Huyett'sactions. However, he was not authorized by the Shelby County board to conduct the State'sbusiness as an assistant State's Attorney and was not appointed by the circuit court to serveas a special prosecutor.

The defendant went to trial for the criminal offenses charged in the information andthe two crimes charged by way of indictment. A Shelby County jury found him guilty ofmurder and home invasion for the acts that he committed on May 4, 1999, and guilty ofresidential burglary and arson for the conduct that he engaged in on February 23, 1999. Thedefendant currently serves a 10-year term of imprisonment for residential burglary and a 55-year prison term for murder. No judgment was entered on the other verdicts.

The Shelby County State's Attorney did not participate in any part of the trial. AllanLolie and Ed Parkinson shared the task of trying the defendant. Each is an attorney whoworks for the Agency. Lolie had taken the oath that accompanied Broverman's effort toauthorize his prosecutorial acts, just like Huyett. However, Broverman had not tried tocreate a position for Parkinson to fill. Parkinson was administered no oath. Lolie andParkinson were not court-appointed to serve as special prosecutors. Neither was authorizedby the Shelby County board to serve as an assistant State's Attorney.

The defendant's two trial attorneys did not challenge the validity of the indictment,even though Huyett had not been court-appointed to conduct the grand jury inquiry. Moreover, they did not question whether Huyett, Lolie, or Parkinson had any businessprosecuting their client. They allowed the trio to represent the State's interests before,during, and after the trial, without objection or complaint. On several occasions during thecourse of the proceedings, the trial judge referred to Lolie and Parkinson as "special assistantState's Attorneys," a designation consistent with Broverman's effort to make Lolie hisassistant.

There is no dispute over the fact that the circuit court did not exercise its statutoryauthority under section 3-9008 of the Counties Code (55 ILCS 5/3-9008 (West 1998)). None of the three Agency attorneys were appointed by court order to perform as specialprosecutors. However, the State maintains that the trial judge's recognition of Lolie andParkinson as "special assistant State's Attorneys," coupled with the State's Attorney's effortto unilaterally appoint Lolie and Huyett, was sufficient to provide them with the authorityto prosecute the case.

Initially, we need to examine the Agency's enabling legislation as it existed at the timeof this prosecution. We need to consider the statutory grant of prosecutorial authority thatour legislature had in place at that time, in order to decide whether Huyett, Lolie, andParkinson were empowered to conduct the State's business in their capacity as employeesof the Agency.

Attorneys hired by the Agency are not constitutional officers. Their powers arederived from the statute that created them, and those powers are strictly limited by theauthority conferred upon the Agency by our state legislators. See Siddens v. IndustrialComm'n, 304 Ill. App. 3d 506, 510-11, 711 N.E.2d 18, 21 (1999).

The State's Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor's Act (the Act) (725 ILCS 210/1 et seq.(West 1998)) expressly provides for those legal matters in which attorneys employed by theAgency are entitled to represent the State's interests. The most obvious matters, consistentwith the Agency's primary purpose, are criminal appeals. The statutory grant of authorityto appear on the State's behalf includes the power to assist county prosecutors in the trial ofcertain limited matters. Section 4.01 of the Act (725 ILCS 210/4.01 (West 1998)) providesthe scope of authority by listing those things that the Agency may be relied upon to do forlocal prosecutors in order to assist them in the discharge of their constitutionally basedduties. That provision used to read like this:

"The Office may also assist [c]ounty State's Attorneys in the discharge of their dutiesunder the Illinois Controlled Substances Act [(720 ILCS 570/100 et seq. (West1998))], the Narcotics Profit Forfeiture Act [(725 ILCS 175/1 et seq. (West 1998))],and the Illinois Public Labor Relations Act [(5 ILCS 315/1 et seq. (West 1998))],including negotiations conducted on behalf of a county or pursuant to anintergovernmental agreement[,] as well as in the trial and appeal of said cases and oftax objections ***." 725 ILCS 210/4.01 (West 1998).

In People v. Ward, 326 Ill. App. 3d 897, 902-03, 762 N.E.2d 685, 690 (2002), weinterpreted this exact statutory provision and decided that the legislative enumeration of thespecific trial matters upon which Agency attorneys could appear meant that those sameattorneys were not authorized to assist local prosecutors with any trial matter not listed. Weheld that Agency lawyers could not roam the state as special assistant State's Attorneys, ableto assist on any kind of trial matter, unless the legislature provided for it.⁽¹⁾

In Ward, an Agency attorney took over the prosecution of a criminal case where thecharges originated under the Cannabis Control Act (720 ILCS 550/1 et seq. (West 1996)),rather than the Illinois Controlled Substances Act (720 ILCS 570/100 et seq. (West 1996)). Ward, 326 Ill. App. 3d at 900, 762 N.E.2d at 688. There was no court-ordered appointment,and the county board had not authorized anyone to act as an assistant State's Attorney. Ward, 326 Ill. App. 3d at 902, 762 N.E.2d at 690. The Agency attorney was notcompensated by the county, receiving only his Agency pay for the work that he put into theprosecution. There was no question over the capacity in which he prosecuted the case. Heprosecuted it as an Agency employee assisting a local prosecutor. Thus, we had no need todetermine whether a lawyer hired to work for the Agency could have his or her statutoryauthority judicially expanded by an appointment as a special assistant State's Attorney. Wedid not have to decide whether a court's statutory power to appoint a special prosecutorcould be used to appoint an Agency attorney as a special assistant, who, in that capacity,could work on a criminal case beyond the Agency's statutory charge.

Here, the State argues that the Shelby County State's Attorney's effort to appoint theAgency attorneys as assistants, coupled with the trial court's recognition of those attorneysas representatives of the State, served as an appointment that granted the authority toprosecute the case. The State argues that the attorneys were effectively made court-appointed "special assistant State's Attorneys."

The defendant counters the State's argument in two ways. First, he contests theappointment process relied upon, arguing that attorneys cannot be appointed specialprosecutors by the method employed. Second, he maintains that attorneys who work for theAgency are disqualified from criminal trial work on any matter not authorized by statute. Therefore, he argues that Lolie and Huyett could not lawfully accept their appointments asspecial assistants even if those appointments were legitimate.

We note that the State's Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor's Act provides: "The Directormay, with the concurrence of the board, hire such employees, including part-time employees,as are necessary to carry out Office duties ***. All Attorneys hired as part-time employeeswho devote 50% or more of their time to Office duties are prohibited from the privatepractice of law." 725 ILCS 210/7.02 (West 1998). We assume that most part-time Agencyattorneys maintain a private practice, servicing clients other than the Agency. Thoseattorneys could take on an appointment to specially prosecute a case and charge the countya handsome fee for doing so. Or, if they chose to, they could provide the service for free. Many of the Agency's part-time attorneys bring with them a depth of experience in the artof prosecution and are therefore prime candidates for an appointment as a special prosecutor.As part-time Agency lawyers, they could be appointed pursuant to the statutory authorityestablished by section 3-9008 of the Counties Code (55 ILCS 5/3-9008 (West 1998)), justlike any other licensed attorney engaged in private practice.

Conceivably, Huyett, Lolie, and Parkinson are part-time Agency attorneys who donot devote the bulk of their work to Agency duties and therefore maintain private practices. But nothing has been offered by either party on the nature of their Agency hire. Regardless,we think that the appointment process relied upon by the State was flawed.

In order to examine that appointment process, we have to recognize two documentsthat were not a part of the record on appeal. They were submitted by the State with a requestthat we take judicial notice of them. The defendant raises legitimate concerns over whetherthe two documents were ever made a part of any public record, but nonetheless he asks usto consider them as a part of the record because they prove beneficial to his argument.

The two documents represent the Shelby County State's Attorney's effort to appointHuyett and Lolie "Special Assistant State's Attorneys." The documents are identical in form. Lolie's purported appointment reads as follows:

"APPOINTMENT OF SPECIAL ASSISTANT STATE'S ATTORNEY

STATE OF ILLINOIS )

) ss.

COUNTY OF SHELBY )

To All to Whom These Presents Shall Come, GREETING:

Know ye, that I, Bob Broverman, State's Attorney in and for the said Countyof Shelby, in the State of Illinois, have and do hereby appoint Allan F. Lolie, Jr.[,]of the State's Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor, as Special Assistant State's Attorney,and as such full faith and credit are due to all his official acts.

Witness my hand [the words "and testimonial" have been redacted], atShelbyville, in said County, this 13th day of August, A.D. 1999.

/s/ Bob Broverman

State's Attorney

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STATE OF ILLINOIS )

)ss.

COUNTY OF SHELBY )

I, Allan F. Lolie, Jr.[,] having been appointed Special Assistant State'sAttorney of Shelby County, Illinois, do solemnly swear that I will support theConstitution of the United States[] and the Constitution of the State of Illinois, andthat I will faithfully discharge the duties of the office of State's Attorney of saidCounty, according to the best of my ability.

/s/ Allan Lolie

Subscribed and Sworn to before me this 12th day of August A.D. 1999.

/s/ Karen Carmody

Notary Public"

Huyett's purported appointment was identical, save one thing. Karen Carmodynotarized his oath a day earlier, on August 11, 1999.

Thus, it appears that Lolie accepted his charge from the Shelby County State'sAttorney on August 12, 1999, the date that the notary attests that a sworn oath was taken. Huyett appears to have taken the oath on August 11, 1999. We note that even if Brovermancould unilaterally create an office of Special Assistant State's Attorney, his effort to do sodid not occur until August 13, 1999. Hence, the oaths administered and taken werepointless. Huyett and Lolie took oaths to serve in an office that was not yet in existence. Parkinson, by way of contrast, was never appointed and took no oath at all.

The purported appointments were not limited to the prosecution of this defendant. The office that Broverman was trying to create was not "special" in the sense of time, case,or authority. A "special" prosecutor is a prosecutor limited in role to a "particular cause orproceeding." Aiken v. County of Will, 321 Ill. App. 171, 179, 52 N.E.2d 607, 611 (1943). The narrowly defined role is important. Without it, court-appointed special prosecutorscould usurp constitutionally established power intended for exercise by an elected official. See Tearney v. Harding, 335 Ill. 123, 125, 166 N.E. 526, 527 (1929).

The position of "special assistant State's Attorney" is a position unknown to our laws. The State asks us to recognize an appointment process that would create a new hybrid office,an assistant State's Attorney who is special in several ways, but not in the way that theadjective "special" normally defines the office of special prosecutor. First, the assistantwould hold a special position never authorized by the county board. Conceivably, thecounty treasury could be obligated to pay for the assistant's work despite a lack of oversightby county board members. See 55 ILCS 5/4-2003 (West 1998). The assistant would be atruly "special" special prosecutor by virtue of a commission to prosecute anything, anytime,anywhere-unconstrained by the bounds that universally accompany a court-appointedspecial prosecutor.

If such an office could be created by the method employed in this case, a State'sAttorney who, for whatever reason, did not want to perform the duties of office could simplycommandeer anyone with a law license to take over. Moreover, the number of specialassistant State's Attorneys appointed under this process would be ungoverned by countyboards. Pub. Act 92-683, eff. July 16, 2002 (amending 725 ILCS 210/4.01 (West 2000)). To be sure, the ability on the part of State's Attorneys to unilaterally appoint specialassistants to handle their chores could provide Illinois with a limitless fleet of statewideprosecutors, armed with plenary powers reserved to our Attorney General and to our State'sAttorneys under the constitution. However, the law does not contemplate such an easydelegation of official duties or prosecutorial powers.

The use of special prosecutors is limited by statute. They can be appointed by circuitcourt order only after a judicial determination that the elected State's Attorney "is sick or absent, or [is] unable to attend, or is interested in any cause or proceeding."⁽²⁾ 55 ILCS 5/3-9008 (West 1998). While this provision could arguably allow the appointment of a specialprosecutor to conduct the State's business anytime the State's Attorney wanted to go fishing,county budgetary constraints and the repository of common sense that circuit judges possessshould militate against cavalier uses of a special prosecutor. In any event, here, the circuitcourt was never asked to determine whether Broverman was sick, absent, or unable to attendor had any conflict of interest that prevented him, or his duly authorized assistant, fromprosecuting the case. Nothing in the record even suggests that any of the statutory criteriafor the appointment of a special prosecutor existed.

Furthermore, State's Attorneys are not at liberty, as a matter of course, to createassistant State's Attorney positions. The Counties Code provides as follows: "Whereassistant State's [A]ttorneys are required in any county, the number of such assistants shallbe determined by the county board, and the salaries of such assistants shall be fixed by theState's Attorney subject to budgetary limitations established by the county board and paidout of the county treasury ***." 55 ILCS 5/4-2003 (West 1998).

While the record does not reflect how Huyett, Lolie, and Parkinson were paid fortheir prosecutorial work, we suspect that they offered their assistance free of any personalfee or additional Agency charge to Shelby County.⁽³⁾ We have seen a number of cases insouthern Illinois similar to this one. There is a simple pattern to the cases. State's Attorneysin smaller counties, where the State's Attorneys typically possess less expertise in theprosecution of serious cases than Agency attorneys possess, have either solicited help orhave gratefully accepted an offer from the Agency to assist in the trial cases. Agencyattorneys eager to try cases rather than defend the appeal of cases prosecuted by others werepaid only their Agency salaries, content to assist in trials as a part of their office duties forthe Agency. We have yet to see a case where any State's Attorney or Agency attorney soughta judicial determination that a special prosecutor was warranted. The truth of the matter isthis: Agency attorneys wanted to help try cases, the State's Attorneys wanted their help andaccepted it, Agency attorneys provided professional assistance, and no one anticipated anyproblem with their role in providing that assistance. The notion that they were somehowappointed to assist as special prosecutors arose when their authority to engage in trial work,other than the trial work authorized by statute, received challenge on numerous appeals.

We conclude that there was no legitimate basis of record for any of the Agencyattorneys to conduct this prosecution on the State's behalf.

While none of the prosecution team had actual authority to advocate the State'sinterests, each was a licensed attorney who, while clothed with apparent authority, advancedthose interests fairly, professionally, and effectively. They did so after the Shelby CountyState's Attorney, through a duly appointed assistant, initiated all of the criminal charges. Their role in the prosecution also occurred after the issues in the case were joined by thedefendant's plea. The State's Attorney who wanted them to act in his stead, and who wascontent for them to perform his duties, never withdrew as an attorney of record-nor did hesuffer any reason for disqualification.

The defendant's two defense attorneys found nothing wrong with the supercedingindictment procured by Huyett, and they were perfectly comfortable with the trial judge'srecognition of Lolie and Parkinson as representatives of the State. As far as we know,counsel may have deliberately bypassed any challenge to their status. They may have seena tactical advantage in being prosecuted by people foreign to Shelby County and theprospective jurors who would decide the defendant's fate. After all, most State's Attorneysin small southern counties know most of their constituents personally and work ratherdiligently to maintain a good relationship with them. Whatever the reason behind counsels'lack of challenge to the prosecution team's authority, their inaction forfeited the defendant'sright to relief, and the defendant's convictions will stand.

There are only two things that render a judgment null and void. A judgment is void,and hence, subject to attack at any time, only when a court either exceeds its jurisdiction orhas simply not acquired jurisdiction. People v. Johnson, 327 Ill. App. 3d 252, 256, 762N.E.2d 1180, 1183 (2002). Such is not the case here.

Subject matter jurisdiction over criminal charges is conferred upon the circuit courtsby our Illinois Constitution. "Circuit Courts shall have original jurisdiction of all justiciablematters ***." Ill. Const. 1970, art. VI,