Rule 23 order filed
July 2, 2004;
Motion to publish granted
August 6, 2004.

JUSTICE HOPKINS delivered the opinion of the court:

The plaintiff, Waddill Platt, brought this personal injury action in the circuit court ofMadison County, charging the defendants, Gateway International Motorsports Corp., Fred A.Grueber, Miller Industries, Miller Industries Towing Equipment, Inc., and Championship AutoRacing Teams, Inc., with negligence and willful and wanton conduct. With regard to theplaintiff's allegations of negligence, the circuit court granted a summary judgment for thedefendants because the plaintiff had signed an agreement exculpating the defendants fromliability. Pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 308 (155 Ill. 2d R. 308), this court allowed theplaintiff's interlocutory appeal.

On appeal, the plaintiff contends that the exculpatory agreement does not bar hisnegligence allegations against the defendants because the term "event" in the exculpatoryagreement was ambiguous and because the parties did not contemplate the risk involved.

We affirm.

As a Marlboro Team Penski public relations employee of Philip Morris, the plaintiff attended various stock and Indy car races, including Championship Auto Racing Teams, Inc.(CART), events. At the CART racing event held at Gateway International Race Track (Gateway)in May 1998, the plaintiff was responsible for hospitality services, i.e., managing hotel roomsfor VIP guests, monitoring track signs, feeding the media, and administering cigarette salesincentives. The plaintiff's base of operations was a Marlboro media trailer located on theinfield, where the plaintiff was required to cross the racetrack to enter or exit.

On May 22, 1998, prior to qualifying rounds, multiple tow trucks traveling from 55 to70 miles per hour circled the Gateway racetrack to dry it, a standard postrain practice in theauto racing industry. After being signaled to cross by a Gateway employee, the plaintiff exitedthe infield by driving across the racetrack and collided with a tow truck driven by the defendantFred Grueber.

Prior to the collision, on January 13, 1998, the plaintiff executed a "1998Championship Auto Racing Teams, Inc.[,] ANNUAL RELEASE AND WAIVER OF LIABILITY,ASSUMPTION OF RISK[,] AND INDEMNITY AGREEMENT," which provided:

"IN CONSIDERATION of my being granted a membership, license[,] and/orcompetition privileges in Championship Auto Racing Teams, Inc. (hereinafter knownas CART)[,] sanctioned EVENT(S)[] as a[] CART and/or American Racing Series, Inc.,participant or being permitted to compete, practice, officiate, observe, work for, or forany purpose participate in any capacity in the EVENT(S) for and during the calendaryear of 1998[] or being permitted to enter for any purpose or in any capacity anyRESTRICTED AREAS (defined as any area requiring special authorization, credentials,or permission to enter any area to which admission by the general public is restrictedor prohibited), I ***

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2. HEREBY RELEASE, WAIVE, DISCHARGE, AND COVENANT NOT TO SUEChampionship Auto Racing Teams, Inc., American Racing Series, Inc., the promoters,organizers, participants, racing associations, sanctioning organizations or anysubdivision thereof, track operators, track owners, *** any persons in anyRESTRICTED AREAS, promoters, sponsors, advertisers, [and] owners, lessees,designers[,] and constructors of premises used to conduct the EVENT(S), *** all forthe purpose herein referred to as the RELEASEES, FROM ALL LIABILITY TO ME ***FOR ANY AND ALL LOSS OR DAMAGE[] AND ANY CLAIM OR DEMANDSTHEREFOR ON ACCOUNT OF INJURY TO ME OR MY PROPERTY ORRESULTING IN MY DEATH ARISING OUT OF OR RELATED TO THE EVENT(S)from any cause whatsoever, including, without limitation, the failure of anyone toenforce rules and regulations, the failure to make inspections, the condition of anyportion of the track or premises, defective products, and any act or omission of theRELEASEES or any of them or any other act WHETHER CAUSED BY THENEGLIGENCE OF THE RELEASEES OR OTHERWISE AND WHETHER OR NOTOCCURRING IN RESTRICTED AREAS.

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6. HEREBY AGREE that this ANNUAL RELEASE AND WAIVER OF LIABILITY,ASSUMPTION OF RISK[,] AND INDEMNITY AGREEMENT extends to all acts ofnegligence by the RELEASEES *** and is intended to be as broad and inclusive as ispermitted by the laws of the Municipality, Province, State[,] and/or Country in whichthe EVENT(S) is/are conducted ***."

On October 15, 1999, the plaintiff filed a second amended complaint, alleging that thedefendant Gateway International Motorsports Corp. negligently constructed and maintainedits premises; that the defendant Fred Grueber and his employer, Miller Industries and MillerIndustries Towing Equipment, Inc., negligently operated the tow truck that collided with theplaintiff's automobile; and that the defendant Championship Auto Racing Teams, Inc.,negligently operated, controlled, and maintained the racetrack. On June 16, 2000, the plaintiffamended his second amended complaint, adding allegations of willful and wanton conduct.

On July 14, 2000, the circuit court granted a summary judgment in favor of thedefendants with regard to the plaintiff's allegations of negligence. On July 18, 2003, thecircuit court entered an order finding that the July 14, 2000, ruling involved a question of lawregarding which there was substantial ground for difference of opinion and that an immediateappeal may materially advance the ultimate termination of the litigation. The circuit courtcertified the following question of law to this court:

"Whether the exculpatory agreement signed by Plaintiff was properly interpreted andconstrued by the trial court to bar Plaintiff's negligence claims under the facts involvedin this case."

On August 21, 2003, this court granted the plaintiff's petition for leave to appealpursuant to Rule 308 (155 Ill. 2d R. 308).

The plaintiff argues that the exculpatory agreement fails to bar his negligence actionagainst the defendants because a race was not in progress at the time of his injury and his injuryresulted from an occurrence unrelated to an "event," a term which is undefined, ambiguous, andthereby construed in his favor. We disagree.

A summary judgment is appropriate when the pleadings, depositions, and admissionson file, together with the affidavits, show that there is no genuine issue on any material fact andthat the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. 735 ILCS 5/2-1005(c) (West1998). The circuit court's decision to grant a summary judgment presents a question of lawand is subject to de novo review. Outboard Marine Corp. v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co.,154 Ill. 2d 90, 102 (1992).

The primary objective in construing a contract is to give effect to the intention of theparties involved. Schek v. Chicago Transit Authority, 42 Ill. 2d 362, 364 (1969). Theintention of the parties must be ascertained from the language employed in the instrument.Joseph v. Lake Michigan Mortgage Co., 106 Ill. App. 3d 988, 991 (1982). A contract is tobe construed as a whole, giving meaning and effect to every provision thereof, if possible,because it is presumed that every clause in the contract was inserted deliberately and for apurpose. Martindell v. Lake Shore National Bank, 15 Ill. 2d 272, 283 (1958). Where thecontract is clear, its interpretation is a question of law to be determined only from the termsof the contract. Quake Construction, Inc. v. American Airlines, Inc., 141 Ill. 2d 281, 288(1990).

A contract is ambiguous where the language employed is susceptible to more than onereasonable meaning or obscure in meaning through indefiniteness of expression. Meyer v.Marilyn Miglin, Inc., 273 Ill. App. 3d 882, 888 (1995). A contract is not rendered ambiguousmerely because the parties do not agree on its meaning. Joseph, 106 Ill. App. 3d at 991. Whether a contract is ambiguous is also a question of law. Quake Construction, Inc., 141 Ill.2d at 288.

An exculpatory agreement constitutes an express assumption of risk wherein one partyconsents to relieve another party of a particular obligation. Simpson v. Byron Dragway, Inc.,210 Ill. App. 3d 639, 647 (1991). Although exculpatory agreements are not favored and willbe strictly construed against the benefiting party (Scott & Fetzer Co. v. Montgomery Ward& Co., 112 Ill. 2d 378, 395 (1986)), parties may allocate the risk of negligence as they see fit,and exculpatory clauses do not violate public policy as a matter of law. Reuben H. DonnelleyCorp. v. Krasny Supply Co., 227 Ill. App. 3d 414, 419 (1991).

An exculpatory clause, to be valid and enforceable, must contain clear, explicit, andunequivocal language referencing the type of activity, circumstance, or situation that itencompasses and for which the plaintiff agrees to relieve the defendant from a duty of care. Garrison v. Combined Fitness Centre, Ltd., 201 Ill. App. 3d 581, 585 (1990). Exculpatoryagreements have been upheld in the auto racing context where an injured driver or participanthas brought suit against an owner or operator of a raceway. Schlessman v. Henson, 83 Ill. 2d82, 86 (1980); Maness v. Santa Fe Park Enterprises, Inc., 298 Ill. App. 3d 1014, 1019-20(1998); Morrow v. Auto Championship Racing Ass'n, 8 Ill. App. 3d 682, 685-86 (1972). In the present case, we accept the plaintiff's definition of "event" as "any one of thecontests in a program of sports" (see Webster's Third New International Dictionary 788(2002)) and conclude that the term "event" is not ambiguous but clear and explicit. Thecontract as a whole was broad and inclusive and barred liability for negligence claims "arisingout of or related to the event(s)," caused not only by "participants, racing associations, *** carowners, drivers, [and] pit crews" but also by "promoters, organizers, [and] any persons in anyrestricted areas." The time trials qualified as an event as provided for in the exculpatoryagreement. The tow trucks were preparing for the event by driving around the racetrack, andtherefore, the plaintiff's resulting negligence claim arose out of or was related to an event. Theplaintiff's argument, that the exculpatory agreement does not apply because no race was inprogress, is untenable. See Maness, 298 Ill. App. 3d at 1021 (the court rejected the plaintiff'sargument that the releases did not apply because the decedent was no longer participating inthe event at the time of the defendants' alleged delay in sending medical assistance). Thelanguage of the exculpatory agreement is clear and explicit and bars the plaintiff's negligenceclaim for injuries he sustained while the tow trucks prepared the racetrack for the qualifyingrounds.

The plaintiff also contends that the exculpatory agreement fails to bar his negligenceaction because the parties did not contemplate the risk involved. The plaintiff cites Simpson,210 Ill. App. 3d 639, where the appellate court held that a summary judgment based upon theexculpatory agreement was improper because the decedent's death, during a race when thedecedent collided with a deer, was not the type of risk that ordinarily accompanied the sportof racing.

The foreseeability of a danger is an important element of the risk a party assumes andwill often define the scope of an exculpatory agreement. Simpson, 210 Ill. App. 3d at 647. The plaintiff must be put on notice of the range of dangers for which he assumes the risk ofinjury, enabling him to minimize the risks by exercising a greater degree of caution. Garrison,201 Ill. App. 3d at 585. The precise occurrence that results in injury need not have beencontemplated by the parties at the time they entered into the contract. Schlessman, 83 Ill. 2dat 86. It should only appear that the injury falls within the scope of possible dangers ordinarilyaccompanying the activity and, thus, reasonably contemplated by the plaintiff. Garrison, 201Ill. App. 3d at 585.

In Schlessman, the plaintiff signed a broad agreement releasing the defendant from "'all liability' " to him " 'whether caused by the negligence of Releasees or otherwise' " while hewas in the restricted area. Schlessman, 83 Ill. 2d at 85. While the plaintiff raced on thedefendant's racetrack, a portion of the upper track embankment collapsed, causing theplaintiff's car to crash. Schlessman, 83 Ill. 2d at 84. The plaintiff argued that the collapse ofthe track embankment culminating in his crash was outside the scope of his expectations andthe sweeping language in the release. Schlessman, 83 Ill. 2d at 85. In holding the plaintiff'snegligence claim against the track owner barred by the release, the court stated:

"The racing of automobiles at a high speed in limited areas gives rise to varioussituations which have resulted in the death or injury to drivers, mechanics[,] andspectators at these events. These accidents may occur because of factors involvingmechanical failures, defective design of guardrails, driver error[,] or weather conditionsaffecting driving surfaces. In sum, a myriad of factors, which are either obvious orunknown, may singly or in combination result in unexpected and freakish racingaccidents. *** The parties may not have contemplated the precise occurrence whichresulted in plaintiff's accident, but this does not render the exculpatory clauseinoperable. In adopting the broad language employed in the agreement, it seemsreasonable to conclude that the parties contemplated the similarly broad range ofaccidents which occur in auto racing." Schlessman, 83 Ill. 2d at 86.

In Maness, the plaintiff's decedent suffered a fatal heart attack while participating in astock car race at the defendants' racetrack. Maness, 298 Ill. App. 3d at 1016. On appeal, theplaintiff argued that the defendants' delay in providing medical treatment was not the type ofrisk that ordinarily accompanied auto racing and therefore was not covered by the signedexculpatory agreements releasing the defendants from " 'any and all loss or damage[] and anyclaim or demands therefore [sic] on account of the "releasees" or otherwise' " and from " 'allliability for personal injury or property damage whether arising from claims of negligence,gross negligence, or any other cause.' " Maness, 298 Ill. App. 3d at 1020. The court held thatthe risk of requiring medical attention during a race was one that ordinarily accompanied thedangerous sport of auto racing and the fact that the decedent did not foresee the exactcircumstances necessitating prompt medical assistance was irrelevant. Maness, 298 Ill. App.3d at 1020.

We find that the risk involved in this case was within the contemplation of the partieswhen they executed the exculpatory agreement. The record reveals that the plaintiff had beeninvolved in automobile racing for years and that he had signed similar agreements prior toentering restricted areas of the racetracks. See Koch v. Spalding, 174 Ill. App. 3d 692, 697(1988). The parties were aware that the common practice to dry a track for auto racingconsisted of tow trucks driving at high speeds around the racetrack, and the parties were awarethat the plaintiff must cross the racetrack to reach his base of operations. By adopting thebroad language employed in the exculpatory agreement, the parties contemplated the similarlybroad range of accidents that occur in auto racing. See Schlessman, 83 Ill. 2d at 86. Theplaintiff's injury fell within the scope of possible dangers ordinarily accompanying auto racingactivities and, thus, was reasonably contemplated by the plaintiff. See Garrison, 201 Ill. App.3d at 585. Although the parties may not have contemplated the precise occurrence thatresulted in the plaintiff's accident, we do not render the exculpatory agreement inoperable. SeeSchlessman, 83 Ill. 2d at 86. We therefore affirm the circuit court's decision granting asummary judgment in favor of the defendants on the plaintiff's negligence claims.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the decision of the circuit court of Madison County grantinga summary judgment in favor of the defendants on the plaintiff's negligence claims is affirmed.

Certified question answered; judgment affirmed.

WELCH and GOLDENHERSH, JJ., concur.