PRESIDING JUSTICE DONOVAN delivered the opinion of the court:

This is an appeal from the denial of a motion to compel arbitration and to dismiss or stay proceedings in a putative class action lawsuit brought by Sandra K. Ragan and Dennis Mangiaracino, on behalf of themselves and others similarly situated (plaintiffs), against AT&T Corp. (defendant), pursuant to the Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business Practices Act (815 ILCS 505/1 et seq. (West 2002)) and "substantially similar state consumer protection statutes enacted to protect consumers against unfair, deceptive[,] or fraudulent business practices." The fraud alleged in plaintiffs' amended complaint, filed July 31, 2002, in the circuit court of Madison County, relates to defendant's allegedly deceptive inclusion on plaintiffs' bills of a charge for the Universal Service Fund (USF), a support mechanism established by the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) that subsidizes telecommunications services for low-income and rural telephone customers, schools, and libraries. Plaintiffs allege that defendant presents this charge on its bills in a deceptive manner in that it appears to be a pass-through charge similar to taxes, from which defendant does not profit. Plaintiffs further allege that, in actuality, defendant charges the customer far more than it pays into the USF, thereby reaping a profit from this charge. The complaint alleges that plaintiffs were deceptively billed USF charges under the guise of a government-imposed subscriber or pass-through charge and that had plaintiffs known that defendant was not simply passing these charges through to the USF but was profiting from them, they might have refused to pay the charge or switched to another provider.

Defendant responded to the amended complaint by filing, on September 18, 2002, a motion to compel arbitration and to dismiss or stay the proceedings in the circuit court. Defendant's motion was based on its written "Consumer Services Agreement" (CSA), which it contends constitutes a written contract between it and its customers, including plaintiffs, and which provides for final and binding arbitration of any dispute between the parties that cannot be resolved informally, in small claims court, or before the FCC. The arbitration provision also explicitly prohibits class actions. The CSA was mailed to all of defendant's customers, some in their monthly bills and some in a separate mailing, prior to its effective date of August 1, 2001. The named plaintiffs were sent their CSAs in a separate mailing. The CSA informs the customer that by using or paying for defendant's services, the customer agrees to the terms of the CSA. It further informs the customer that it may choose not to be bound by the terms of the CSA by cancelling its service with defendant immediately by telephoning a toll-free number.

In its memorandum of law in support of its motion to compel arbitration, defendant points out that there is a strong public policy favoring the enforcement of arbitration agreements and that, by continuing to use and pay for defendant's services after receipt of the CSA, plaintiffs agreed to be bound by the arbitration provision of the contract. Defendant argues that the arbitration provision contained in the CSA is presumptively valid, mandatory, and applicable to plaintiffs' claim. Defendant further argues that there is no meritorious basis for declining to enforce the arbitration provision because any state-law basis to challenge the validity of the arbitration provision is preempted by federal law, more precisely, the Communications Act of 1934 (FCA) (47 U.S.C.