JUSTICE WELCH delivered the opinion of the court:

The defendant, GMAC Financial Services, also known as General Motors AcceptanceCorp., appeals from an order of the circuit court of Madison County denying its motion totransfer venue to Macoupin County. For the reasons that follow, we affirm.

The facts relevant to our resolution of this appeal are as follows. On December 18,2002, the circuit court of Madison County granted David L. Reynolds a Madison Countyresident, leave to file a third amended class action complaint against the defendant. Thecomplaint sounded in three counts for breach of contract, statutory fraud, and consumerfraud. Essentially, the suit alleges that the defendant, a finance company, conspired withautomobile dealers in overcharging customers for certain "add-ons" purchased by customerswhen financing their vehicles. These "add-ons" include credit life insurance, credit disabilityinsurance, and extended service warranties. When Reynolds purchased a vehicle, he optedto purchase some "add-ons." The form contract he signed set forth an amount charged forthe "add-ons" under the category of "Other Charges Including Amounts Paid to Others onYour Behalf." According to Reynolds, however, the amount listed in the contract was notthe amount actually paid to "others" on his behalf. Reynolds claims that a portion of thatamount was kept by the defendant and split with the dealers. Reynolds filed a class actionsuit on behalf of all persons (hereinafter, the plaintiffs) who, on or after April 4, 1991,purchased an "add-on" at the time they purchased a vehicle, signed a form contract similarto the one signed by Reynolds, and had the contract assigned to the defendant.

On June 4, 2001, after the plaintiffs had filed their initial complaint but prior to anysubsequent amendments, the defendant filed a motion to transfer venue. The defendantclaimed that venue was not proper in Madison County because Reynolds had not purchasedhis vehicle there and Reynolds had not entered into a contract there. The defendant claimedthat the vehicle was purchased in Macoupin County and that the defendant accepted theassignment of the contract in St. Louis County, Missouri. The defendant further claimed thatit does not enter into any contracts in Madison County, that it does not have a registeredoffice or other office in Madison County, and that it does not do business in Madison Countyfor purposes of satisfying the venue statute. The defendant requested that venue betransferred to Macoupin County, where the defendant has a place of business and where thevehicle was purchased.

In support of its motion, the defendant attached a one-page affidavit from MichaelBoyle, an operations manager. The affidavit claimed that the defendant does not have anyoffices, sales agents, or employees located in Madison County, that the defendant does notenter into any contracts in Madison County, that dealers who request financing for theircustomers must submit any contracts to offices in St. Louis County, Missouri, that if thecontracts are accepted, they are accepted in St. Louis County, that the defendant does notreceive any money or commission from the sale of any credit life or disability insurancepolicies, that the defendant merely finances the purchases of such insurance by thosecustomers who request the defendant to provide financing for the purchase of such policies,and that neither the defendant nor any of its affiliates have any involvement in the sale orunderwriting of such insurance.

The plaintiffs filed a brief opposing the defendant's motion to transfer. The plaintiffsclaimed that a part of the transaction occurred in Madison County and that the defendant is"doing business" in Madison County for purposes of the venue statute. The plaintiffsattached an affidavit from David Reynolds, wherein he stated that he received a paymentbook or statement at his Madison County residence from the defendant and that he made apayment to the defendant from his Madison County residence on a draft from a bank locatedin Madison County with money that he earned in Madison County. Reynolds also claimedthat the vehicle he purchased and financed through the defendant was housed in MadisonCounty.

In addition to this affidavit, the plaintiffs attached two separate depositions fromrepresentatives of the defendant. The first was from Kevin Bosch, who is responsible forapproving credit and supervising the discounting of contracts. Bosch testified that thedefendant enters into contracts with automotive dealers in Madison County. Bosch alsotestified that the defendant and the dealers in Madison County exchange funds monthlydepending on the amount of finance income generated during that month. Bosch stated thatthe amount generated is the difference between the defendant's discounted interest rate andthe rate the dealer contracted with the retail customers. In addition, Bosch testified that thedefendant notifies customers in Madison County when they are delinquent in payments andthat, in some cases, it may hire somebody to repossess the vehicle. Bosch also indicated thatthe defendant may sue the delinquent party in Madison County circuit court.

Bosch testified that since 1991, a total of 21,797 Madison County residents havefinanced their vehicles through the defendant. Bosch's testimony does not reveal how muchrevenue was generated from these contracts. The plaintiffs speculate that it was roughly$217 million (a number derived from the plaintiffs' assumption that each loan averaged 36months and $10,000).

Susan Klyasheff, a wholesale administrative analyst, was also deposed. She testifiedthat during the previous 10 years, the defendant had been involved in wholesale securityagreements with dealers in Madison County that included financing a dealer's inventory, realestate, equipment, working capital, and revolving lines of credit. Klyasheff offered nomonetary figures revealing the financial extent of their involvement.

On July 25, 2002, the defendant's motion to transfer venue was argued before thecircuit court of Madison County. On September 6, 2002, the circuit court denied thedefendant's motion. In so doing, the circuit court found, inter alia, as follows: "[A]sevidenced by the deposition testimony of [the defendant's] employees, [the defendant] is,inter alia, in the business of making loans and collecting the principal and interest on theseloans, from Madison County residents [and] on financial instruments written from MadisonCounty banks." (Emphasis in original.) The circuit court concluded that this is sufficientto satisfy the "doing business" requirement of the venue statute. The circuit court also ruledthat at least some part of the transaction occurred in Madison County. The defendant nowappeals.

On appeal, the defendant contends that the circuit court erred in denying its motionto transfer venue from Madison County to Macoupin County. We believe that the circuitcourt's denial of the defendant's motion to transfer was appropriate. We affirm on the basisthat the defendant has failed to show that it was not "doing business" in Madison County forpurposes of venue. Accordingly, as will be explained below, venue is proper in thechallenged county if a defendant corporation is "doing business" in that challenged county. Because we affirm on the ground that the record does not establish that the defendant wasnot "doing business" in Madison County, our analysis shall primarily concentrate on thiselement of the venue statute.

We must begin by setting forth the appropriate standard of review. As both partiespoint out, there is currently a conflict in this court regarding the proper standard of reviewto apply for the review of a lower court's decision to deny a motion to transfer venue. SeeBoxdorfer v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 339 Ill. App. 3d 335, 339 (2003) (applying a de novostandard of review); Southern & Central Illinois Laborers' District Council v. Illinois HealthFacilities Planning Board, 331 Ill. App. 3d 1112, 1115 (2002) (applying an abuse-of-discretion standard of review). Based upon our understanding of the venue statute, webelieve that the proper standard of review is de novo. See Boxdorfer, 339 Ill. App. 3d at 339;Reichert v. Court of Claims, 327 Ill. App. 3d 390, 393 (2002), vacated on other grounds, 203Ill. 2d 257 (2003).

The venue statute, sections 2-101 through 2-114 of the Code of Civil Procedure, specificallyprovides in part as follows:

"[E]very action must be commenced (1) in the county of residence of anydefendant who is joined in good faith *** or (2) in the county in which the transactionor some part thereof occurred out of which the cause of action arose." (Emphasisadded.) 735 ILCS 5/2-101 (West 2002).

The residency requirement of a corporation is set forth in section 2-102(a) and provides:

"Any private corporation *** is a resident of any county in which it has itsregistered office or other office or is doing business." 735 ILCS 5/2-102(a) (West2002).

"Doing business" in a county has been defined as a defendant "conducting its usual andcustomary business" in a county such that the defendant's activities are of " 'such a nature soas to localize the business and make it an operation within the district.' [Citation.]" Baltimore & Ohio R.R. Co. v. Mosele, 67 Ill. 2d 321, 329-30 (1977).

When filing a motion to transfer venue, the defendant has the burden of proving thatvenue is improper. Weaver v. Midwest Towing, Inc., 116 Ill. 2d 279, 285 (1987). Thedefendant must set forth specific facts that show that venue is not proper in the requestedforum. Weaver, 116 Ill. 2d at 285. Any inconsistencies and doubts in the record will beresolved against the defendant. Weaver, 116 Ill. 2d at 285.

In the instant case, we believe that the defendant has failed to establish that it is notdoing business in Madison County. As stated above, "doing business," for purposes ofvenue, is satisfied where the defendant is " 'conducting its usual and customary businesswithin the county in which venue is sought' " and the defendant's activities are of "such anature as to localize the business and make it an operation within the county." Long v. Gray,306 Ill. App. 3d 445, 451 (1999) (quoting and citing Mosele, 67 Ill. 2d 321, 329-30). Accordingly, for the defendant in the instant case to prevail, it must show that it is notconducting its usual and customary business within Madison County and that its activitiesare not of such a nature as to localize the business and make it an operation within MadisonCounty.

Decisions by the Illinois Supreme Court have revealed that many activities performedby a defendant corporation within a certain county will not automatically constitute "doingbusiness" within that county for purposes of venue. These activities include the following:soliciting business within a challenged county, selling goods and services to customers in achallenged county (Bucklew v. G.D. Searle & Co., 138 Ill. 2d 282, 292 (1990)), purchasinggoods from suppliers in a challenged county, allowing independent dealers to sell adefendant's products in a challenged county, requiring independent dealers to performwarranty work in a challenged county, or sending rebate payments to residents of achallenged county. Gardner v. International Harvester Co., 113 Ill. 2d 535, 541 (1986).

The major factors in the determination of whether a company is "conducting its usualand customary business within the county in which venue is sought," thereby "localiz[ing]the business and mak[ing] it an operation within the county," seem to be the nature of acompany's business and the amount of business that the company generates in comparisonto the amount of business generated by a company as a whole. For example, in Gardner andStambaugh v. International Harvester Co., 102 Ill. 2d 250 (1984), the defendant,International Harvester Company (Harvester), challenged venue in St. Clair County afterbeing sued there for damages arising from a defective fuel cap on a tractor. Harvester wasin the business of manufacturing tractors and the fuel caps, had a registered office inChicago, and had a number of manufacturing plants in Illinois but none in St. Clair County. Stambaugh, 102 Ill. 2d at 256; Gardner, 113 Ill. 2d at 537-38. The plaintiff in each caseclaimed that venue was appropriate because Harvester was doing business in St. ClairCounty.

The record revealed that Harvester had sales of over $2 million to St. Clair Countydealers. However, this was "an insignificant fraction of its total sales." Stambaugh, 102 Ill.2d at 259 (finding that $2.6 million in sales of its products to St. Clair County dealersconstituted approximately five-hundredths of 1% of its annual sales volume). Furthermore,only a small portion of its total sales occurred in St. Clair County. Accordingly, becauseHarvester is in the business of manufacturing and selling certain items and none of themanufacturing plants were in St. Clair County and only a small portion of the sales occurredin St. Clair County, the Illinois Supreme Court held that the evidence had not established thatHarvester was "doing business" in St. Clair County for purposes of the venue statute.

In Bucklew, the defendants, G.D. Searle & Company and Searle Pharmaceuticals, Inc.,challenged venue in St. Clair County after being sued there for damages arising from anintrauterine device that had been designed, manufactured, and sold by Searle. Bucklew, 138Ill. 2d at 285. The record did not demonstrate that the intrauterine device had been designedor manufactured in St. Clair County. Furthermore, the parties agreed that the defendants didnot maintain an office in St. Clair County but employed two representatives to call on healthcare providers in St. Clair County. The representatives constituted less than 0.4% of Searle'snational sales force. Bucklew, 138 Ill. 2d at 291. Furthermore, the defendants sold $289,760worth of products to customers in St. Clair County, which represented a mere 2.5% ofSearle's sales in Illinois and 0.12% of Searle's national sales in 1986. These numbers wereslightly higher in 1987. Bucklew, 138 Ill. 2d at 292. Because the defendants were in thebusiness of manufacturing and selling the intrauterine device and the device had not beendesigned or manufactured in St. Clair County and only a small portion of the company's salesof that device occurred in St. Clair County, the defendants were held not to be doing businessin St. Clair County. Bucklew, 138 Ill. 2d at 294.

In Baltimore & Ohio R.R. Co. v. Mosele, 67 Ill. 2d 321 (1977), the defendant, theBaltimore and Ohio Railroad Company, a company that operates railroad facilities, was suedin Madison County for personal injuries that had arisen in 32 cases. Mosele, 67 Ill. 2d at325. It operated railroad facilities and maintained 19 offices in Illinois, but none in MadisonCounty. The defendant solicited business from Madison County, generating "substantialrevenue" from Madison County. Mosele, 67 Ill. 2d at 326. However, the supreme court didnot reveal how much of its total business was derived from Madison County. The supremecourt looked only at the activities of the defendant's district sales manager and noted thatthey were merely incidental to the solicitation of business. Mosele, 67 Ill. 2d at 334. Therecord reveals that the freight which resulted from the solicitation was delivered to thedefendant at points outside Madison County, and little evidence demonstrated that thedefendant engaged in substantial activities within Madison County.

The facts set forth in the instant case pale in comparison to those supreme court casescited in support of the defendant's argument on appeal. In the instant case, the defendantsupports its claim that venue is improper under the "doing business" element with a one-pageaffidavit. The affidavit sets forth very few facts or data and provides general conclusionssuch as, "[The defendant] does not enter into any contracts in Madison County," "[Thedefendant] does not receive any money or commissions from the sale of any credit ordisability insurance policies," and "[The defendant] merely finances the purchases of suchinsurance by those customers who request [the defendant] to provide financing for thepurchase of such policies." On the other hand, the plaintiffs submit two affidavits from thedefendant's employees revealing that the defendant is engaged in a substantial amount ofbusiness in Madison County. The depositions reveal that the defendant had purchasedfinance contracts from 21,797 Madison County residents since 1991 and that the defendantcontracts with dealers in Madison County for financing purposes. In addition, thedepositions reveal that each month the defendant and dealers in Madison County exchangemoney generated from income derived from these financing contracts, that the defendant hasbeen involved in wholesale security agreements with dealers in Madison County to financedealer inventory, loans for real estate, loans for equipment, and loans for working capital. Because the record is unclear on exactly how much of the defendant's total business isconducted in Madison County, any doubts in the record must be resolved against thedefendant. Weaver, 116 Ill. 2d at 285.

Accordingly, because the undisputed record fails to support the defendant's claim thatit is not "doing business" in Madison County for purposes of the venue statute, the circuitcourt acted properly in denying the defendant's motion to transfer venue. For the foregoingreasons, we affirm.

Affirmed.

HOPKINS, P.J., and KUEHN, J., concur.

Rule 23 Order Filed: November 3, 2003

Motion to Publish Granted: November 20, 2003

Opinion Filed: November 20, 2003

Justices: Honorable Thomas M. Welch, J.

Honorable Terrence J. Hopkins, P.J., and

Honorable Clyde L. Kuehn, J.,

Concur

Attorneys Scott W. Fowkes, Bevin M. Brennan, Kirkland & Ellis, 200 East Randolph Drive,

for Chicago, IL 60601; Nelson L. Mitten, Riezman Berger, P.C., 7700 Bonhomme Ave.,

Appellant 7th Floor, St. Louis, MO 63105; Stephen C. Mudge, Martin K. Morrissey, Reed,

Armstrong, Gorman, Mudge & Morrissey, 115 North Buchanan Street, P.O. Box

368, Edwardsville, IL 62025

Attorneys Paul M. Weiss, Tod A. Lewis, Freed & Weiss, LLC, 111 West Washington Street,

for Suite 1331, Chicago, IL 60602; Timothy F. Campbell, Campbell & Brinkley Law

Appellee Offices, 3017 Godfrey Road, P.O. Box 505, Godfrey, IL 62035; L. Thomas Lakin,

Bradley M. Lakin, Daniel J. Cohen, Jeffrey A.J. Miller, The Lakin Law Firm, P.C.,

301 Evans Avenue, P.O. Box 27, Wood River, IL 62095-1127; Charles W. Chapman,

Charles W. Chapman, Chartered, 301 Evans Avenue, Suite 300, P.O. Box 559,

Wood River, IL 62095