PRESIDING JUSTICE HOPKINS delivered the opinion of the court:

Tedd and Amanda Romine (plaintiffs) appeal the trial court's decision entering asummary judgment in favor of the Village of Irving (defendant). On appeal, plaintiffs, whowere involved in a car accident with Dixie Osborne, contend that the trial court erredbecause a genuine issue of material fact, i.e., whether the police officers' actions of directingDixie to leave the premises while intoxicated, constituted willful and wanton conduct andprecluded a summary judgment. We affirm the decision of the circuit court.

On June 6, 1999, John Osborne drove his wife, Dixie, and their five sons to ahomecoming festival in Irving, Illinois. After escorting their children to the festival, Johnand Dixie parked their van in front of a tavern, where each consumed approximately 12bottles of beer. After a few hours, John and Dixie exited the tavern and walked severalblocks to return to the festival. Once she left the tavern, Dixie did not consume additionalalcoholic beverages.

At the festival, while exiting a beer tent, John encountered one of his sons, and while"horsing around," John struck his son. Officer Brent Keele, an Irving police officer, anddeputy Bruce Sanford, of the Montgomery County sheriff's department, witnessed theoccurrence. Officer Keele confronted John, John became belligerent, and Officer Keeleultimately handcuffed John and, accompanied by Deputy Sanford, walked John 30 yardsfrom the beer tent.

Concerned that her husband was being handcuffed, Dixie approached John and theofficers. Once John's son indicated that he did not want to press charges, the officersreleased John and told John and Dixie to leave. Neither officer told John or Dixie to get intoa vehicle to leave the area, and neither officer saw them approach a vehicle. Both officersobserved John and Dixie walking from the beer tent area. Officer Sanford testified in hisdeposition that he knew that John and Dixie were not from Irving, knew that they wereintoxicated, and suggested, as John and Dixie were walking from the beer tent, that they notdrive a vehicle.

John and Dixie walked from the festival to their van at the tavern. Dixie, drivingaway in the van, collided with plaintiffs' vehicle, thereby injuring plaintiffs.

On June 6, 2001, the trial court found that the focus of the police action was John andthat no evidence supported the allegations that defendant permitted Dixie to operate hervehicle while intoxicated, instructed her to drive while she was intoxicated, or failed toprevent her from operating her vehicle when it knew or should have known of herintoxication. Accordingly, the trial court entered a summary judgment in favor of defendant. On June 28, 2001, plaintiffs filed a motion to reconsider the court's ruling on the motion fora summary judgment, which the trial court denied on July 31, 2001. Plaintiffs filed theirtimely appeal.

Plaintiffs contend that the police officers' actions of instructing Dixie to leave thepremises, when they should have known that Dixie was intoxicated, rise to willful andwanton conduct and that, therefore, defendant is liable because those actions are notprotected under the Local Governmental and Governmental Employees Tort Immunity Act(see 745 ILCS 10/2-202 (West 2000)).

There can be no recovery in tort for negligence unless the defendant has breached aduty owed to the plaintiff. Boyd v. Racine Currency Exchange, Inc., 56 Ill. 2d 95, 97(1973). The existence of a legal duty and the existence of immunity are separate issues, and"the [Local Governmental and Governmental Employees] Tort Immunity Act does notimpose on a municipality any new duties." Barnett v. Zion Park District, 171 Ill. 2d 378,386 (1996). "The distinction between an immunity and a duty is crucial, because only if aduty is found is the issue of whether an immunity or defense is available to the governmentalentity considered[.]" Zimmerman v. Village of Skokie, 183 Ill. 2d 30, 46 (1998).

Whether defendant owed plaintiffs a legal duty is a matter of law and appropriate fora summary judgment. Barnett, 171 Ill. 2d at 385. We review summary judgment rulings denovo. Outboard Marine Corp. v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co., 154 Ill. 2d 90, 102 (1992).

The existence of a legal duty is premised "on whether the harm reasonably wasforeseeable." Kirk v. Michael Reese Hospital & Medical Center, 117 Ill. 2d 507, 525(1987). To establish reasonable foreseeability, plaintiffs must show more than thatdefendant could have foreseen that the event was possible-plaintiffs must show that theoccurrence was objectively reasonable to expect. Dunaway v. Ashland Oil, Inc., 172 Ill.App. 3d 712, 715 (1988). No one can be expected to guard against harm from events thatare not reasonably to be anticipated (Cunis v. Brennan, 56 Ill. 2d 372, 376 (1974)), andpolice officers have no duty to anticipate the criminal acts of third parties. Medley v. Turner,869 F. Supp. 567, 577 (N.D. Ill. 1994) (citing Boyd, 56 Ill. 2d at 97-98). "In judgingwhether harm was legally foreseeable[,] we consider what was apparent to the defendant atthe time of his now complained of conduct, not what may appear through exercise ofhindsight." Cunis, 56 Ill. 2d at 376.

In the case sub judice, the police officers instructed John and Dixie to leave thepremises and watched them walk from the beer tent area. The officers did not witness Dixieentering a vehicle while intoxicated and certainly did not instruct her to do so. See Fatigatov. Village of Olympia Fields, 281 Ill. App. 3d 347 (1996). Considering what was apparentto the officers at the time of John's disturbance, when they instructed Dixie and John to leavethe premises, plaintiffs' injuries were not objectively reasonable to expect. Assuming theofficers' knowledge of Dixie's intoxication, the officers could not reasonably have foreseenthat Dixie would walk several blocks from the festival to her van, break the law by drivingwhile intoxicated, and ultimately cause an accident and injure plaintiffs. We hold that theremote possibility of the accident did not give rise to a legal duty on the part of the policeofficers, and by extension the municipality, to plaintiffs to provide against their injury. SeeCunis, 56 Ill. 2d at 378.

To determine the question of legal duty in a negligence action, we also consider themagnitude of the risk involved, the burden of requiring the State to guard against the risk,and the consequences of placing such a burden on the State. See Lance v. Senior, 36 Ill. 2d516, 518 (1967). We recognize that plaintiffs were wrongly injured by a drunk driver, anall-too-common occurrence, but the burden of guarding against plaintiffs' injuries would bevery cumbersome for police officers, who would be required to ascertain the whereaboutsof each intoxicated person with whom they came into contact. Holding the municipalityliable for the harmful and illegal acts of an intoxicated person who, at the time of contactwith police, was not the center of police action and was not driving or approaching a vehiclewhile intoxicated would be an unreasonable burden on the municipality. Thus, in additionto the unforeseeability of plaintiffs' harm, public policy dictates that no duty be imposed ondefendant under the facts of this case.

For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the circuit court of Montgomery Countyis affirmed.

Affirmed.

MAAG and KUEHN, JJ., concur.

Opinion Filed: January 15, 2003

Justices: Honorable Terrence J. Hopkins, P.J.

Honorable Gordon E. Maag, J., and

Honorable Clyde L. Kuehn, J.,

Concur

Attorney David A. Rolf, Sorling, Northrup, Hanna, Cullen and Cochran, Ltd.,

for Suite 800, Illinois Building, 607 East Adams Street, P.O. Box 5131,

Appellants Springfield, IL 62705

Attorney Douglas R. Heise, Schrempf, Blaine, Kelly & Darr, Ltd., 307 Henry

for Street, Suite 415, P.O. Box 725, Alton, IL 62002

Appellee