PRESIDING JUSTICE CHAPMAN delivered the opinion of the court:

The parties, who were never married, are the parents of Christopher L. Johns. Thefather appeals from an order increasing his child support obligation. He argues that the trialcourt (1) erred by deducting only a portion of his student loan payments in calculating hisnet income for child support purposes and (2) abused its discretion by not ordering childsupport in an amount below the statutory guideline amount. We affirm in part, reverse inpart, and remand with directions.

Christopher L. Johns was born on May 2, 1991. His parents, Alyson L. Johns, nowknown as Alyson L. Bennett, and Jeffrey L. Roper (Jeff), were in high school at the time. On January 18, 1996, Jeff filed a petition to establish paternity. He sought visitation withthe child but asked that the court reserve a determination of child support because he wasthen a full-time student in his junior year at the University of Illinois. Alyson, who is twoyears older than Jeff, had apparently finished her education by this time and was working asa licensed physical therapist assistant. It is not clear from the record what level of educationAlyson attained.

On July 29, 1996, the court entered a judgment declaring Jeff to be Christopher'sfather and incorporating the visitation schedule to which the parties had agreed. On April4, 1997, the court entered an agreed order providing that Jeff would pay to Alyson thefollowing: (1) child support in the amounts of $20 per week during the school year and $200per month during the summer months, (2) half of the cost of Christopher's health insurancepremiums and medical expenses not covered by insurance and 40% of the cost of daycare,and (3) $6,635 for a portion of Alyson's pregnancy and childbirth expenses and Jeff'sobligations for child support and Christopher's medical expenses from his birth until theentry of the order.

In May 1997, Jeff graduated from the University of Illinois with a bachelor's degreein business administration. That fall, he enrolled at Washington University School of Law. While attending law school, Jeff decided to enroll in a combined degree program, whichmeant that he would earn both a law degree and a master's degree in business administrationand finish in four years instead of three. In May 2001, Jeff graduated from law school. Priorto graduation, he had accepted a position with Deloitte and Touche, which was to pay him$75,000 per year.

On June 18, 2001, Alyson filed a petition for a modification in child support, seekingan increase based on the increase in Jeff's income. On August 12, 2002, the trial court helda hearing in the matter. By that time, Jeff had been laid off from his position with Deloitteand Touche, although he has since found another position. The primary issue at the hearingwas whether Jeff's student loan payments would be deducted from his income as paymentson a debt that was reasonable and necessary for the production of income. See 750 ILCS5/505(a)(3)(h) (West 2002). Jeff testified that his total student loan debt was $180,000 andhis minimum monthly payments on the loans were $2,100 per month. The record is not clearabout how much of the debt represents loans Jeff took as an undergraduate at the Universityof Illinois and how much represents law school loans. Presumably, at least a portionrepresents undergraduate loans, while the bulk of the debt was incurred attendingWashington University.

In an August 23, 2002, docket entry, the court determined Jeff's child supportobligations. The court noted that most of the benefit of Jeff's advanced degrees would berealized after Christopher had reached the age of majority and that it would therefore beunjust to deduct the entire debt from child support payments. The court ruled that Jeff wasentitled to a deduction for a portion of his student loan payments, however. For one periodof Jeff's child support obligations-December 1, 2001, until August 23, 2002-the courtdeducted $375 per month in calculating Jeff's income. Using this deduction, the court foundthat Jeff's income for that period for child support purposes was $2,014.56 biweekly, and thecourt ordered Jeff to pay child support for that period in the amount of $403 biweekly,representing the statutory guideline amount of 20% of that figure (750 ILCS 5/505(a)(1)(West 2002)). On October 25, 2002, the court entered a written order incorporating thefindings from its docket entry. This appeal followed.

The trial court enjoys broad discretion in determining the modification of childsupport, and we will not overturn its decision unless it results from an abuse of discretion. In re Marriage of Davis, 287 Ill. App. 3d 846, 852, 679 N.E.2d 110, 115 (1997). Jeff'sprimary contention on appeal is that the trial court abused its discretion in deducting only aportion of his student loan debt in calculating his net income. As an alternative to thisargument, he contends that the court abused its discretion by not ordering child support inan amount below the statutory guideline amount of 20%. We may reject this argument at theoutset. The statutory guidelines create a rebuttable presumption that child support in theguideline amount is appropriate. Stockton v. Oldenburg, 305 Ill. App. 3d 897, 902, 713N.E.2d 259, 263 (1999). The proponent of a deviation from the guidelines bears the burdenof producing evidence that compelling reasons exist to justify the deviation. Department ofPublic Aid ex rel. Nale v. Nale, 294 Ill. App. 3d 747, 752, 690 N.E.2d 1052, 1056 (1998). We need not determine whether Jeff's evidence of his debt burden was sufficient to overcomethis presumption, because he did not request that the trial court deviate from the guidelinesin setting support. A trial court does not abuse its discretion by failing to deviate sua spontefrom the presumptively appropriate guidelines. We now turn to Jeff's argument that the trialcourt erred in calculating his income.

The statutory definition of "net income" for child support purposes is the total of thenoncustodial parent's income from all sources, less certain specified deductions. 750 ILCS5/505(a)(3) (West 2002). The only such deduction relevant here is the deduction for therepayment of loans for "reasonable and necessary expenses for the production of income." 750 ILCS 5/505(a)(3)(h) (West 2002). This court has recognized that student loans fallwithin this category. In re Marriage of Davis, 287 Ill. App. 3d at 854, 679 N.E.2d at 116. Although we held that the loans at issue in In re Marriage of Davis were deductible in theirentirety (see In re Marriage of Davis, 287 Ill. App. 3d at 856, 679 N.E.2d at 117), ouropinion should not be read as holding that student loan payments will always be completelydeductible. Like other debt payments deductible under this provision, student loans must beboth reasonable and necessary for the production of income. See In re Marriage of Davis,287 Ill. App. 3d at 853, 679 N.E.2d at 115 ("simply because an expense falls into thecategory of a debt repayment does not mean that it is necessarily deductible").

Jeff does not contend otherwise. Rather, he contends that the court erred in findinghis loan payments to be only partially deductible. He argues that once the court found thatthe debt Jeff had incurred was reasonable and necessary at all, it was obliged to find that theloan payments were deductible in their entirety. We disagree. This court has previouslyfound a debt incurred for the production of income to be only partially deductible. In reMarriage of Heil, 233 Ill. App. 3d 888, 892, 599 N.E.2d 168, 171 (1992). There, we heldthat a noncustodial father's mortgage payments on a hunting lodge that he used to entertainbusiness clients were only partially deductible. We found that only half the debt incurredin buying the lodge was reasonable and necessary for the production of income, because thefather used the lodge for personal purposes approximately half the time. In re Marriage ofHeil, 233 Ill. App. 3d at 892-93, 599 N.E.2d at 171. We see no principled reason to treat astudent loan debt differently from other debt in this regard.

Moreover, our examination of the purposes to be served by allowing the deductionin the context of student loan payments convinces us that trial courts must have the flexibilityto find that a partial deduction is warranted. Because Illinois courts have not previously hadthe occasion to consider this issue in depth, we look to the decisions of other jurisdictions. In State ex rel. Elsasser v. Fox, 7 Neb. App. 667, 584 N.W.2d 832 (1998), cited by Jeff, theNebraska Court of Appeals explained that policy as follows:

"[I]t is clear that [the noncustodial father] incurred his student loan in order to obtainthe education necessary to gain employment as a teacher. By setting the initial childsupport at $50 per month, the trial court made it possible for [him] to obtain hispresent income. Most courts recognize that fostering further education of youngparents in such a fashion benefits the child throughout the child's life. It seemsundesirable to undermine that policy by ignoring the fact that such students must laterrepay the student loans they incurred in the process." (Emphasis added.) Fox, 7 Neb.App. at 672, 584 N.W.2d at 835.

In Fox, the father's student loan debt was low, only $178 per month, and it financed anundergraduate degree that enabled the father to begin his professional career as a teacher. Further, the father finished his education and began working as a teacher when his child wastwo years old. The reasonableness of the debt incurred was not at issue. In subsequentcases, however, Nebraska courts have held that deductions for student loans are notunlimited. See Noonan v. Noonan, 261 Neb. 552, 564-65, 624 N.W.2d 314, 324-25 (2001)(a trial court abused its discretion in allowing a deduction for student loan payments wherethe noncustodial parent presented no evidence of the loan terms, the total amount owed,whether he could reduce his monthly payments, or how he had spent the loan proceeds)(citing Sears v. Larson, 259 Neb. 760, 612 N.W.2d 474 (2000)).

Another court to consider the reasons for allowing parents to deduct their student loanpayments in determining net income for child support purposes was the Minnesota Court ofAppeals in In re Marriage of Svenningsen, 641 N.W.2d 614 (Minn. App. 2002). Unlike itsIllinois counterpart, the Minnesota statute there at issue contains a provision limiting to 18months a child support reduction based on debt incurred for expenses necessary for theproduction of income. In re Marriage of Svenningsen, 641 N.W.2d at 615-16 (citing Minn.Stat.