Ross v. Illinois Municipal Retirement Fund

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State: Illinois

Court: 5th District Appellate

Docket No: 5-07-0172 Rel

Case Date: 12/01/2009

Preview:Rule 23 order filed

NO. 5-07-0172 IN THE APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS

July 22, 2009;
Motion to publish granted December 1, 2009.

FIFTH DISTRICT ________________________________________________________________________ ROBIN ROSS, ) Appeal from the ) Circuit Court of Plaintiff-Appellee, ) St. Clair County. ) v. ) No. 06-MR-76 ) ILLINOIS MUNICIPAL RETIREMENT FUND, ) ILLINOIS MUNICIPAL RETIREMENT FUND ) BOARD OF TRUSTEES, and THE ST. CLAIR ) COUNTY HOUSING AUTHORITY, ) Honorable ) Andrew J. Gleeson, Defendants-Appellants. ) Judge, presiding. ________________________________________________________________________ JUSTICE CHAPMAN delivered the opinion of the court: In July 2003, the Illinois Municipal Retirement Fund Board of Trustees (Board of Trustees) issued a final administrative decision terminating temporary total disability benefits to the plaintiff, Robin Ross. She filed an action seeking administrative review of that decision, naming as defendants the Illinois Municipal Retirement Fund (IMRF) "and its Board of Trustees." However, she served only one summons, which was addressed to the IMRF. The defendants filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that the plaintiff had failed to properly name or serve the Board of Trustees. Eventually, the plaintiff filed a motion for a voluntary dismissal without prejudice. Nearly one year later, she filed a new complaint for administrative review, this time serving separate summonses on the IMRF and the Board of Trustees. The defendants moved to dismiss for a lack of jurisdiction. The circuit court denied their motion to dismiss, found the Board of Trustees' decision to be against the manifest weight of the evidence, and reversed the administrative decision. The defendants appeal, arguing that (1) the court lacked jurisdiction and (2) the administrative decision was 1

supported by the evidence. We reverse. The plaintiff, Robin Ross, began working for the St. Clair County Housing Authority in January 1983. As an employee of a municipal agency, she participated in the IMRF. She last worked as a public housing manager in May 2001, after which time she stopped working due to various health problems, including back problems and anxiety. The plaintiff received total temporary disability benefits from June 15, 2001, to August 31, 2002. In December 2002, the plaintiff appealed the decision to terminate her benefits. On July 24, 2003, the benefit review committee of the Board of Trustees recommended to the Board of Trustees that the decision to terminate the plaintiff's benefits should be upheld. The full Board of Trustees met the following day and adopted this recommendation. In a letter dated July 29, the Board of Trustees informed the plaintiff of this decision. On August 15, 2003, the plaintiff filed a complaint pursuant to the Administrative Review Law (735 ILCS 5/3-101 et seq. (West 2002)). She named as defendants the "Illinois Municipal Retirement Fund and its Board of Trustees and the St. Clair County Housing Authority." She contended that the Board of Trustees' decision was contrary to section 7-147 of the Illinois Pension Code (40 ILCS 5/7-147 (West 2002)) because she was unable to perform the duties of any position the housing authority might reasonably assign to her. On August 18, she mailed one summons to the St. Clair County Housing Authority and another to the IMRF. On August 21, the summons addressed to the IMRF was delivered to the legal department that serves both the IMRF and the Board of Trustees. On September 15, the St. Clair County Housing Authority filed its answer. On September 22, the IMRF and the Board of Trustees (collectively, defendants) filed a motion to dismiss pursuant to section 2-619(a) of the Code of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS 5/2-619(a) (West 2002)). In it, they alleged that the summons was addressed solely to the IMRF but that the Board of Trustees was the party who had made the decision. They further alleged

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that the plaintiff "failed to properly name the Board of Trustees" in her complaint. They argued that the failure to properly name and serve the Board of Trustees is a basis to dismiss the complaint. As an alternative basis, the defendants asserted that the plaintiff failed to serve the complaint within 35 days of the final administrative decision, as required by statute (735 ILCS 5/3-103 (West 2002)). Eventually, on March 28, 2005, the plaintiff filed a motion for the voluntary dismissal of her complaint without prejudice, pursuant to section 2-1009 of the Code of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS 5/2-1009 (West 2004)). The court granted that motion the following day and ruled that the defendants' pending motion to dismiss "is hereby held in abeyance and may be refiled, and ruled upon by the Court, should [the] plaintiff choose to refile her Complaint for Administrative Review." The plaintiff contends, and the defendants

acknowledge, that the understanding of both parties at the time was that the plaintiff intended to refile the complaint so she could properly name and serve the Board of Trustees as a defendant. On March 27, 2006, the plaintiff filed her second complaint for administrative review. This time, she named as defendants the IMRF, the "[IMRF] Board of Trustees," and the St. Clair County Housing Authority. On March 28, she mailed three separate summonses, one to each defendant. The summonses sent to the IMRF and the Board of Trustees were sent to the same address. On April 28, 2006, the IMRF and the Board of Trustees filed a motion to dismiss pursuant to section 2-619, along with a supporting memorandum. They argued that the Administrative Review Law does not allow a plaintiff to refile a complaint for administrative review after a voluntary dismissal. They also alleged that the bases for dismissal set forth in their motion to dismiss the plaintiff's first complaint remained valid bases to dismiss the second petition.

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On July 18, 2006, the plaintiff filed a response to the defendants' motion to dismiss. She alleged that she had filed her motion for voluntary dismissal pursuant to an agreement of the parties. She explained that the understanding of both parties was that she would refile the action. On July 25, the defendants filed a reply in support of their motion to dismiss. They argued that it does not matter whether there was an agreement concerning the refiling of the case, that the Administrative Review Law is a departure from common law, and that its requirements must therefore be strictly complied with in order to vest the trial court with jurisdiction. On August 2, 2006, the court held a hearing on the matter. The court took the matter under advisement and ordered each party to prepare a proposed order. On September 6, the court entered an order denying the defendants' motion to dismiss. The court then reviewed the administrative record. The parties agreed to allow the court to make its decision based solely on review of the record itself. On March 2, 2007, the court entered an order finding that the Board of Trustees' decision was against the manifest weight of the evidence and reversing the decision accordingly. The defendants then filed this appeal. The defendants argue first that the circuit court erred in denying their motion to dismiss because it lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the plaintiff's complaint. The court lacked jurisdiction, they argue, because the Administrative Review Law does not permit a complaint for administrative review to be refiled after it has been dismissed voluntarily. See 735 ILCS 5/3-102 (West 2004). As an alternative to this argument, they contend that the second petition should have been dismissed for the reasons asserted in their renewed motion to dismiss. They further contend that the court erred in finding the administrative decision to be against the manifest weight of the evidence. We conclude that the court lacked jurisdiction to consider the petition because the Administrative Review Law specifically provides that a voluntarily dismissed petition may not be refiled. Because we reverse on this

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basis, we will not address the other issues raised in this appeal. The Administrative Review Law provides statutory authority for courts to review the decisions of administrative agencies. Unlike most other types of cases, the courts'

jurisdiction to hear administrative review cases flows from the Administrative Review Law, not the Illinois state constitution. Fredman Brothers Furniture Co. v. Department of Revenue , 109 Ill. 2d 202, 210, 486 N.E.2d 893, 895 (1985) (relying on Ill. Const. 1970, art. VI,

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