Docket No. 90229-Agenda 8-November 2001.
EUGENE HILL, Appellee, v. ROGER COWAN, Warden, Menard
Correctional Center, Appellant.
Opinion filed April 18, 2002.-Modified Upon Denial of Rehearing
December 2, 2002.
JUSTICE FREEMAN delivered the opinion of the court:
This is an appeal from a judgment of the circuit court of St.Clair County granting a petition for habeas corpus filed by EugeneHill, an inmate at the Menard Correctional Center. In grantingHill's petition, the circuit court held that the extended-termsentencing provisions pursuant to which Hill was sentenced wereunconstitutional under the United States Supreme Court's decisionin Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 147 L. Ed. 2d 435, 120S. Ct. 2348 (2000). Because the circuit court's judgment declaredthe sentencing statute invalid, the appeal was taken directly to ourcourt. 134 Ill. 2d R. 302(a). We now reverse.
BACKGROUND
In May 1982, petitioner Eugene Hill pleaded guilty to theoffenses of attempted murder, rape, and armed robbery. The trialcourt accepted his guilty pleas, convicted him of the offenses, andsubsequently imposed concurrent 50-year extended-term sentenceson each conviction. The court based the extended-term sentenceson its finding that the offenses were accompanied by"exceptionally brutal or heinous behavior indicative of wantoncruelty." See Ill. Rev. Stat. 1981, ch. 38, par. 1005-5-3.2(b)(2).
Following imposition of sentence, petitioner moved towithdraw his pleas of guilty and to vacate the judgments, whichmotions were denied. The appellate court affirmed his convictionsand sentences (People v. Hill, No. 5-83-0573 (1985) (unpublishedorder under Supreme Court Rule 23)), and this court denied hispetition for leave to appeal. People v. Hill, 101 Ill. 2d 591 (1985).His subsequent petition pursuant to the Post-Conviction HearingAct (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 38, par. 122-1 et seq.) was denied,and that denial was affirmed on appeal. People v. Hill, No.5-91-0392 (1991) (unpublished order under Supreme Court Rule23).
Subsequently, in August 2000, petitioner initiated the instantaction under the Habeas Corpus Act (735 ILCS 5/10-101 et seq.(West 2000)). He contended that he is entitled to immediaterelease, because the extended-term portions of his sentences wereunconstitutional, in light of the United States Supreme Court'sdecision in Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 147 L. Ed. 2d435, 120 S. Ct. 2348 (2000).
The circuit court granted the petition. The court declared thepertinent extended-term sentencing provisions to beunconstitutional under Apprendi. Because petitioner had alreadyserved three years more than the maximum nonextended termsentences to which he could have been subjected, the court orderedthat he be discharged immediately. This appeal by the Statefollowed.
ANALYSIS
In People v. Jackson, No. 91359 (April 18, 2002), this courtheld that Apprendi-based sentencing challenges could not beraised on direct appeal from a guilty plea. Jackson, slip op. at 7.Although the instant case presents a different procedural posture,we believe that the result we reach today is dictated by thereasoning in Jackson. We need not repeat the entire analysis setout in Jackson, but will briefly summarize the salient points thatsupported our conclusion that a guilty plea waives Apprendiconcerns.
In Jackson, we noted that the Supreme Court did not fashionwholly new rights in Apprendi, but merely clarified theapplicability of the long-standing, well-established rights to a trialby jury and to proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson,slip op. at 11. The Court held that these rights extended to all factsnecessary to establish the range of penalties potentially applicableto the defendant. Jackson, slip op. at 7-8. In other words, adefendant can only receive a sentence within the range of penaltiesstatutorily prescribed for the crime, all the elements of which hehas been proven guilty. The defendant has the right to demand thathe receive a trial by jury and that he be proven guilty beyond areasonable doubt of all elements of his crime.
But as we observed in Jackson, by pleading guilty, adefendant waives his rights to a jury trial and to proof beyond areasonable doubt. Jackson, slip op. at 8. A guilty plea isintrinsically a relinquishment of the right to a trial, at which theState would be put to its burden of proof beyond a reasonabledoubt. There is no validity to the complaint that a defendant didnot "know" that he was waiving the right to have the State proveenhancing factors beyond a reasonable doubt, because by pleadingguilty the defendant releases the State from proving anythingbeyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson, slip op. at 8-9. We do notrequire the trial court to advise a defendant of all the elements ofthe crime of which he stands accused before accepting a guiltyplea. See People v. Barker, 83 Ill. 2d 319, 329-30 (1980). It issufficient that the court advise him of the nature of the crime; therange of penalties to which he might subject himself by his plea;his right to plead not guilty, if he so chooses; and that a guilty pleawould operate to waive his rights to a jury trial and to beconfronted with the witnesses against him. 177 Ill. 2d Rs.402(a)(1) through (a)(4).
In the instant case, as in Jackson, the underlying convictionsand sentences were based on a guilty plea. Unlike Jackson, in thiscase petitioner has exhausted not only his direct appeal, but alsohis post-conviction remedies. We find no reason to deviate in thiscase from the holding of Jackson, and we hold that petitioner'sguilty plea forecloses him from raising an Apprendi challenge tohis sentences.
Petitioner objects that such a holding would conflict with twoestablished principles of law. First, he notes that this court haspreviously held that a defendant may challenge his sentence onappeal from a guilty plea where the challenge goes to the court'sstatutory authority to impose the sentence in question. Second, henotes the rules that the constitutionality of a statute may bechallenged at any time and that unconstitutional statutes are saidto be void ab initio. He contends that notwithstanding his guiltyplea, his Apprendi-based arguments may be considered undereither of these two rules. We shall address these arguments in turn.
It is true that a guilty plea does not waive an argument that thecourt imposed a sentence beyond its statutory authority. SeePeople v. Wilson, 181 Ill. 2d 409, 413 (1998); People v. Williams,179 Ill. 2d 331, 333 (1997); People v. Singleton, 103 Ill. 2d 339,346 (1984). But a lack of statutory authority is not trulydefendant's argument in this case. If it were, it would be swiftlybrushed aside because the statutory scheme clearly did permit thetrial court to impose the sentences in question. See Ill. Rev. Stat.1981, ch. 38, par. 1005-5-3.2(b)(2) (permitting court to imposeextended term upon finding that the offense was accompanied byexceptionally brutal or heinous behavior indicative of wantoncruelty); par. 1005-8-2(2) (extended term for Class X felony is 30to 60 years' imprisonment). It simply cannot be said that the trialcourt imposed sentences for which it lacked statutory authority.
Petitioner also argues that, although the statute did exist, itwas unconstitutional. This is the same, he contends, as having nosuch statute at all, as unconstitutional statutes are void ab initio.But this line of reasoning also falls short, not because ofprocedural default (see People v. Wagener, 196 Ill. 2d 269, 279(2001) (constitutionality of a criminal statute may be assailed atany time)); People v. Wright, 194 Ill. 2d 1, 23-24 (2000) (same),but on its merits.
The void ab initio doctrine only applies to statutesunconstitutional on their face. As we explained in Jackson, thestatutes involved in this case-sections 5-5-3.2 and 5-8-2 of theUnified Code of Corrections (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1981, ch. 38, pars.1005-5-3.2, 1005-8-2, now codified at 730 ILCS 5/5-5-3.2,5-8-2 (West 2000))-are not unconstitutional on their face.
In our initial disposition of this case, we disposed of the voidab initio argument by noting that we had upheld application of thestatutes in question in People v. Ford, 198 Ill. 2d 68 (2001).However, on rehearing, petitioner protests that this reasoning doesnot justify our result, because Ford involved section 5-8-2(a)(1)of the Unified Code of Corrections, while the instant case involvessubsection (a)(2) of that statute. The point is valid. A