Docket No. 89665-Agenda 20-May 2001.

JOHN G. PHILLIPS & ASSOCIATES, Appellant, v. JEFFREY 
M. BROWN, Appellee.

Opinion filed September 20, 2001.

JUSTICE FREEMAN delivered the opinion of the court:

Plaintiff, the law firm of John G. Phillips & Associates(Phillips), filed suit against defendant Jeffrey Brown forintentional interference with prospective economic advantage. Thecircuit court of Cook County dismissed the complaint withprejudice as a sanction for discovery violations. Phillips appealed;the appellate court dismissed the appeal because the notice ofappeal was untimely (No. 1-99-4078 (unpublished order)). Wegranted Phillips' petition for leave to appeal (177 Ill. 2d R.315(a)), and now affirm the judgment of the appellate court.

BACKGROUND

Because of the posture of this case and the question we arecalled upon to decide, the allegations in the complaint are of onlypassing importance. In short, defendant Brown was once anassociate at Phillips. He left to go to another firm, and when he didso, two clients with whom he had been working transferred theircases to the new firm, allegedly at Brown's behest.

The complaint was originally filed in 1995. On November 2,1999, the court dismissed the entire complaint, with prejudice, asa discovery sanction. The dismissal did not contain Rule 304(a)(155 Ill. 2d R. 304(a)) language. On November 19, 1999, Phillipsfiled a notice of appeal from the dismissal. On December 1, 1999,Brown filed a motion for sanctions under Rule 137 (155 Ill. 2d R.137). The trial court denied Brown's motion for sanctions onDecember 13, 1999, in an order which did contain Rule 304(a)language. Brown did not appeal from the denial of sanctions, andPhillips never filed a new notice of appeal.

In the appellate court Brown moved to dismiss Phillips'sappeal for lack of jurisdiction. He argued that the November 19notice of appeal was premature because of the subsequent motionfor sanctions. The appellate court granted the motion, dismissingthe appeal.

ANALYSIS

Before this court, the sole issue is whether the appellate courtacted correctly in dismissing the appeal. The resolution of thisquestion turns on interpretation of the rules promulgated by thiscourt. Accordingly, our standard of review is de novo. People v.Drum, 194 Ill. 2d 485, 488 (2000) ("[t]he interpretation of asupreme court rule, like a statute, is a question of law that wereview de novo"); In re Estate of Rennick, 181 Ill. 2d 395, 401(1998).

The appellate court was correct in dismissing the appeal.

First, there can be no dispute that according to the rules of thiscourt (155 Ill. 2d Rs. 301, 304(a)), appeals may ordinarily only betaken from final orders which dispose of every "claim"-i.e., "anyright, liability or matter raised in an action." Marsh v. EvangelicalCovenant Church, 138 Ill. 2d 458, 465 (1990). Unless an orderresolves all claims, "it must contain an express finding that thereis no just reason for delaying an appeal. Otherwise, the order is notappealable." Marsh, 138 Ill. 2d at 465. See also 155 Ill. 2d R.304(a) ("an appeal may be taken from a final judgment as to oneor more but fewer than all of the parties or claims only if the trialcourt has made an express written finding that there is no justreason for delaying either enforcement or appeal or both").

Further, it is clear that motions for sanctions under our Rule137 are "claims" in the cause of action with which they areconnected. Rule 137, which permits parties to request sanctionsfor improper filings, explicitly provides that "[a]ll proceedingsunder this rule shall be brought within the civil action in which thepleading, motion or other paper referred to has been filed, and noviolation or alleged violation of this rule shall give rise to aseparate civil suit, but shall be considered a claim within the samecivil action." (Emphases added.) 155 Ill. 2d R. 137. In this regard,filing a Rule 137 motion is the functional equivalent of adding anadditional count to a complaint, or counter-claim, depending onwhich party files the motion.

Thus, since a motion for sanctions under Rule 137 is a"claim," and a notice of appeal cannot be filed before the trialcourt has disposed of all claims, a notice of appeal cannot be filedbefore the trial court has ruled on all Rule 137 motions. This courthas already so held, in Marsh. There, we stated that "no appealmay be taken from an otherwise final judgment entered on a claimwhen a section 2-611 claim remains to be resolved, absent afinding pursuant to Rule 304(a) that there is no just reason to delayenforcement or appeal." Marsh, 138 Ill. 2d at 468. Section 2-611of the Code of Civil Procedure (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 110, par.2-611), which was at issue in Marsh, was preempted by andincorporated into Rule 137. See Marsh, 138 Ill. 2d at 467.

Had Marsh not been clear enough, we were subsequentlyfaced with a situation nearly identical to the case at hand inNiccum v. Botti, Marinaccio, DeSalvo & Tameling, Ltd., 182 Ill.2d 6 (1998). There, as here, the trial court dismissed a complaintwith prejudice, the plaintiff filed a notice of appeal, and thedefendant subsequently filed a Rule 137 motion for sanctions. Werecognized that as a general rule "[a] final order is appealable asof right, and filing a notice of appeal is the jurisdictional stepwhich initiates appellate review." But we immediately noted that"[t]he filing of a timely motion for sanctions in the trial court,however, renders a notice of appeal from such an order prematureand precludes appellate jurisdiction." Niccum, 182 Ill. 2d at 7. Seealso Gaynor v. Walsh, 219 Ill. App. 3d 996, 1002 (1991)(dismissing appeal for want of jurisdiction where defendant fileda Rule 137 motion after plaintiff had filed notice of appealfollowing denial of motion for reconsideration of summaryjudgment); P. Esposito, Timing the Notice of Appeal in Light ofRequests for Attorneys' Fees and Costs: The Illinois Approach, 4App. L. Rev. 55, 61-62 (1992) ("a notice of appeal filed eitherbefore or during the pendency of a timely filed Rule 137 motionis worthless in the absence of a Rule 304(a) finding"). Althoughin Niccum we ultimately held that the appellate court hadjurisdiction over the appeal, this was only because the trial courthad included Rule 304(a) language in the final order, whichrendered it appealable despite the subsequently filed sanctionsclaim. Niccum, 182 Ill. 2d at 9.

Phillips recognizes that Marsh and Niccum are lethal to itsposition and requests that this court overrule those decisions.Plaintiff contends that the decisions are confusing and inherentlycontradictory; conflict with the rule that appellate jurisdiction"attaches instanter upon the filing of a timely notice of appeal";and permit abuse of the judicial process to deprive a litigant of hisright to appeal. Plaintiff requests that we change the law of thisstate so that a timely notice of appeal confers jurisdiction upon theappellate court regardless of any subsequent motion for sanctionsin the trial court. We are unpersuaded by plaintiff's arguments.

First, the reasoning of Marsh and Niccum is straightforward.We have set it out above, but we shall reiterate: (1) absent a Rule304(a) finding, a notice of appeal may not be filed before the trialcourt has disposed of all claims; (2) requests for sanctions underRule 137 are claims within the underlying action; therefore (3)absent a Rule 304(a) finding, a notice of appeal may not be fileduntil the trial court has disposed of all requests for sanctions underRule 137. We see no ambiguity or basis for confusion here.

The reason that our rules are so crafted is our often-statedpolicy against piecemeal appeals. Rule 137 motions deal with thepropriety of filings in the underlying action. Appellate review ofrulings on such motions will require the reviewing court toexamine not only the particular filing or filings which were thesubject of the motion, but often the entire context of thesurrounding litigation as well. Accordingly, such appeals shouldbe considered in tandem with any appeal from the litigation fromwhich it was spawned. This is why Rule 137 provides that motionsthereunder are claims in the underlying litigation-review of sucha motion will almost inevitably require familiarity with thesurrounding case.

Plaintiff also contends that Marsh is inherently contradictory.Plaintiff notes that Marsh held that a motion for sanctions is nota post-trial motion. See Marsh, 138 Ill. 2d at 461-64. Plaintiffcontends that since only timely post-trial motions toll the time inwhich a notice of appeal must be filed, an appellant must file anotice of appeal within 30 days after the final order, in directcontrast to the ultimate holding in Marsh that a notice of appealcannot be filed until all sanctions motions have been resolved.

This argument is a red herring. Plaintiff is correct-this courtheld in Marsh that a motion for sanctions is not a post-trialmotion. However, as we noted in Marsh, this does not end theinquiry of when a notice of appeal must be filed. Marsh, 138 Ill.2d at 464. The reason that a notice of appeal need not be filed untilafter the disposition of a motion for sanctions is not because amotion for sanctions is a post-trial motion, but because, again, itis a claim, and a notice of appeal may not be filed until after thetrial court has finally disposed of all claims. See J. Eaton, W.Quinlan & R. Stern, The Notice of Appeal, in Illinois CivilAppellate Practice