People v. Naylor

SUPREME COURT CASES

Laws-info.com » Cases » Illinois » Supreme Court » 2008 » People v. Naylor

People v. Naylor

State: Illinois

Docket No: 104414 Rel

Case Date: 07/24/2008

Preview:Docket No. 104414.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellant, v. JOHN NAYLOR, Appellee. Opinion filed July 24, 2008.

JUSTICE FREEMAN delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion. Justices Fitzgerald, Kilbride and Burke concurred in the judgment and opinion. Chief Justice Thomas dissented, with opinion, joined by Justices Garman and Karmeier. OPINION Following a bench trial in the circuit court of Cook County, defendant, John Naylor, was convicted of several offenses relating to the sale of heroin. Finding a violation of People v. Montgomery, 47 Ill. 2d 510 (1971), the appellate court reversed defendant's convictions and remanded the cause for a new trial. 372 Ill. App. 3d 1. We allowed the State's petition for leave to appeal (210 Ill. 2d R. 315(a)) and now affirm the appellate court. I. BACKGROUND In April 2000, defendant was indicted on six counts relating to possession of heroin with intent to deliver and delivery of heroin. On

August 11, 2004, the State entered a nolle prosequi as to two counts, and defendant was tried on the remaining four: possession of heroin with intent to deliver, delivery of heroin, possession of heroin with intent to deliver while on Chicago Housing Authority (CHA) property, and delivery of heroin on CHA property. 720 ILCS 570/401(d), 407(b)(2) (West 2000). Defendant waived a jury and the court conducted a bench trial. The State's case in chief consisted of the testimony of two Chicago police officers and an evidence stipulation. Chicago Police Officer John Lewis testified as follows. On March 9, 2000, Officer Lewis was assigned to the narcotics and gang investigation section of the Chicago police department. He was working at 4429 South Federal Street, which is part of the Robert Taylor Homes, a CHA property. Officer Lewis and other police officers were conducting "Operation Corridor," which was an operation to suppress narcotics activity in the Robert Taylor Homes. Officer Lewis' role was to make a controlled narcotics purchase. At approximately 10:20 a.m., Officer Lewis, in civilian dress, entered 4429 South Federal Street and proceeded to the fourth floor of the north stairwell with three other police officers in civilian dress: Officers Boggan, Boyd, and Espinosa. The officers met three individuals standing in the stairwell, one of whom asked Officer Lewis if he wanted "white." Based on his undercover experience, Officer Lewis understood "white" to refer to heroin. Officer Lewis identified defendant in court as the individual with whom he spoke. In response to defendant's solicitation, Officer Lewis said, "Yeah, one." He tendered to defendant a $10 bill from the department's "1505 fund." This refers to a fund of United States currency with prerecorded serial numbers, which the department uses to purchase illegal narcotics in a controlled environment. In return for the $10, defendant gave to Officer Lewis one tinfoil packet. Officer Boyd stood behind Officer Lewis in line for a purchase. All four officers made purchases. Officer Lewis did not know from whom the other officers made their purchases. After the officers made their purchases, they retraced their steps down the stairwell and immediately exited the building together. They returned to their vehicles and radioed the descriptions of defendant and the other two individuals who were standing in the stairwell. -2-

Police officers subsequently brought them out of the building. Officer Lewis saw defendant 10 to 15 minutes later, when Chicago Police Officer William McKenna led defendant out of the building. Officer McKenna gave to Officer Lewis the prerecorded $10 bill. Officer Lewis did not see Officer McKenna recover the prerecorded $10 bill from defendant. At some point Officer Lewis opened the packet and saw a white powder he suspected was heroin. He inventoried the packet with the prerecorded $10 bill. Chicago Police Detective Deon Boyd testified as follows. At the beginning of every month, officers using the prerecorded fund personally record the serial numbers of the currency they use to make undercover drug purchases. On March 9, 2000, Detective Boyd was working as an undercover police officer with Officer Espinosa at 4429 South Federal Street, and he saw Officers Lewis and Boggan at that location. At least 20 Chicago police officers were involved in the operation. When Detective Boyd entered the building, several persons directed him to take the north stairwell to the fourth floor. When Detective Boyd reached the fourth floor, he saw a line of individuals purchasing narcotics. Officer Lewis was leaving when Detective Boyd got in line. When Detective Boyd reached the front of the line, he came into contact with a man whom Boyd identified in court as defendant. Detective Boyd said to defendant, "Let me get two." Defendant reached into a clear plastic bag, retrieved two tinfoil packets, and handed them to Detective Boyd. In exchange, Detective Boyd gave to defendant a prerecorded $20 bill. Detective Boyd did not see from whom Officers Lewis and Boggan bought drugs. Detective Boyd and Officer Espinosa retraced their steps, exited the building, and returned to their undercover vehicle. They radioed the enforcement team that they completed the transactions and they described defendant. The enforcement team entered the building, converged on the fourth-floor stairwell, and arrested defendant "and several other individuals." Detective Boyd knew specifically that one of the individuals arrested was Kohler Parks, from whom he saw Officer Espinosa buy drugs. The enforcement team brought them all down. Detective Boyd saw Officer McKenna bring defendant out of the building. Officer McKenna gave to Detective Boyd the prerecorded $20 bill. Detective Boyd never saw Officer McKenna recover the prerecorded $20 bill from defendant. At some point -3-

Detective Boyd opened the packet and saw a white powder he suspected was heroin. He inventoried the packet with the prerecorded $20 bill. After Detective Boyd testified, the State offered a stipulation. If called as a witness, Timothy Tripp would testify as follows. He is a forensic chemist with the Illinois State Police Crime Laboratory. Tripp tested the powder from each of the tinfoil packets that Officer Lewis and Detective Boyd inventoried and submitted for analysis. The substance in the packet inventoried by Officer Lewis tested positive for the presence of 0.1 gram of heroin, and the substance in one of the packets inventoried by Detective Boyd tested positive for the presence of 0.1 gram of heroin. Defendant affirmatively agreed to the stipulation. Defendant testified on his own behalf. On March 9, 2000, defendant was living in a ninth-floor apartment at 4429 South Federal Street. Sometime after 10 a.m., defendant left his apartment to pick up his son from kindergarten, which ended at 10:45 a.m. Defendant was walking down the stairs from his apartment when police officers attacked him, announced their office, and sprayed mace in his face. He denied selling drugs that day, and he denied possessing money from drug sales. Defendant did not remember on which floor he encountered the officers. Defendant could remember only being arrested with "a lot of people" and placed in a police wagon with five or six others. Defendant knew of Kohler Parks only as a neighbor in the building. Defendant testified: "I don't know him [Parks] personally." At the close of defendant's testimony, the defense rested its case. In rebuttal, the State offered as evidence a certified copy of defendant's December 1990 conviction for aggravated battery. Defendant's trial counsel objected to its admission because the prior conviction was more than 10 years old. The trial court overruled defendant's objection, finding that defendant's prior conviction was less than 10 years old from when defendant allegedly committed the charged offenses. The court admitted into evidence the certified copy of defendant's prior conviction. The State rested its case. At the close of arguments, the trial court found defendant guilty on all counts. The court subsequently sentenced defendant to six -4-

years' imprisonment and imposed $2,720 in fines, fees, assessments, and costs. Before the appellate court, defendant contended, inter alia, that the State violated People v. Montgomery, 47 Ill. 2d 510 (1971), by admitting into evidence a prior conviction that was over 10 years old at the time of trial to impeach his credibility. The appellate court observed that defendant's trial counsel failed to preserve the issue for appellate review by including it in a posttrial motion. However, the court concluded that the evidence was closely balanced and reviewed the issue. See 134 Ill. 2d R. 615(a). The court originally found no error. It held that defendant's prior conviction was admissible for impeachment because it was less than 10 years old at the time defendant allegedly committed the charged offenses. Defendant filed a petition for rehearing, and the appellate court withdrew its opinion. The appellate court filed a new opinion, holding that defendant was erroneously impeached with his prior conviction. 372 Ill. App. 3d 1. Again observing that defendant procedurally forfeited the issue, the court reviewed the issue pursuant to the plain-error doctrine of Supreme Court Rule 615(a) (134 Ill. 2d R. 615(a)). The court agreed "with the case law that applies the 10-year time period in Montgomery as running from the date of conviction or release from confinement, whichever is later, to the date of trial." 372 Ill. App. 3d at 7. Consequently, the court concluded that defendant was improperly impeached with a prior conviction that was nearly 14 years old at the time of trial. Accordingly, the appellate court reversed defendant's convictions and remanded the cause for a new trial. 372 Ill. App. 3d at 6-9. We allowed the State's petition for leave to appeal. 210 Ill. 2d R. 315(a). II. ANALYSIS The State assigns error to the appellate court's reversal of defendant's convictions on two grounds. First, the State observes that defendant procedurally forfeited the issue of whether he was impeached in violation of Montgomery. The State contends that the appellate court incorrectly applied the plain-error rule to excuse defendant's procedural default. Second, the State contends that the endpoint of Montgomery's 10-year time period should not be the date -5-

of trial, but rather the earlier date of when defendant allegedly committed the charged offense. Although defendant's trial counsel objected to the admission of the prior conviction at trial, defendant concedes that counsel failed to include this issue in his posttrial motion. "Both a trial objection and a written post-trial motion raising the issue are required for alleged errors that could have been raised during trial." (Emphases in original.) People v. Enoch, 122 Ill. 2d 176, 186 (1988). Therefore, this issue is procedurally forfeited. See, e.g., People v. Moss, 205 Ill. 2d 139, 168 (2001); People v. Young, 128 Ill. 2d 1, 38-40 (1989). The appellate court excused defendant's procedural default under the plain-error doctrine of Supreme Court Rule 615(a) (134 Ill. 2d R. 615(a)). This doctrine serves as " `a narrow and limited exception to the general [rule of procedural default].' " People v. Szabo, 113 Ill. 2d 83, 94 (1986), quoting People v. Pastorino, 91 Ill. 2d 178, 188 (1982). We recently described the doctrine as follows: "We now reiterate that the plain-error doctrine allows a reviewing court to consider unpreserved error when (1) a clear or obvious error occurs and the evidence is so closely balanced that the error alone threatened to tip the scales of justice against the defendant, regardless of the seriousness of the error, or (2) a clear or obvious error occurs and that error is so serious that it affected the fairness of the defendant's trial and challenged the integrity of the judicial process, regardless of the closeness of the evidence." People v. Piatkowski, 225 Ill. 2d 551, 565 (2007), explaining People v. Herron, 215 Ill. 2d 167, 186-87 (2005). Accord People v. Hall, 194 Ill. 2d 305, 335 (2000). Under both prongs of the plain-error doctrine, " `the burden of persuasion remains with the defendant.' " Piatkowski, 225 Ill. 2d at 565, quoting Herron, 215 Ill. 2d at 187. When a defendant fails to establish plain error, the result is that the "procedural default must be honored." People v. Keene, 169 Ill. 2d 1, 17 (1995). In addressing the State's plain-error contention, it is appropriate to determine whether error occurred at all. People v. Hudson, 228 Ill. 2d 181, 191 (2008); People v. Sims, 192 Ill. 2d 592, 621 (2000). This requires " `a

-6-

substantive look' " at the issue. People v. Johnson, 208 Ill. 2d 53, 64 (2003), quoting Keene, 169 Ill. 2d at 17. A. Did the Trial Court Commit Error? Before the appellate court, defendant contended that the trial court violated Montgomery in admitting defendant's prior conviction for impeachment. This case requires consideration of Montgomery's 10year time limit for impeaching a witness by evidence of a prior conviction. The State contends that in a criminal trial where the defendant testifies, the endpoint of the time limit should not be the date of trial, as the appellate court held, but rather the date when defendant allegedly committed the charged offense. At common law, any person convicted of an infamous crime was deemed incompetent to be a witness and was not permitted to testify in any civil or criminal trial. This disqualification was based on the belief that conviction of such a crime rendered the prospective witness inherently unworthy of trust. People v. Spates, 77 Ill. 2d 193, 201-02 (1979); see generally 2 J. Wigmore, Evidence

Download People v. Naylor.pdf