People v. Santiago

SUPREME COURT CASES

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People v. Santiago

State: Illinois

Docket No: 107391 Rel

Case Date: 03/18/2010

Preview:Docket No. 107391.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellee, v. EVELYN SANTIAGO, Appellant. Opinion filed March 18, 2010.

JUSTICE THOMAS delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion. Chief Justice Fitzgerald and Justices Freeman, Kilbride, Garman, Karmeier, and Burke concurred in the judgment and opinion.

OPINION At issue in this case is Rule 4.2 of the Illinois Rules of Professional Conduct (134 Ill. 2d R. 4.2). Rule 4.2, known as the "no contact" rule, has been amended effective January 1, 2010, but at the relevant time provided that, "[d]uring the course of representing a client a lawyer shall not communicate or cause another to communicate on the subject of the representation with a party the lawyer knows to be represented by another lawyer in that matter," unless certain exceptions are present. 134 Ill. 2d R. 4.2. Defendant was the respondent in a juvenile court child protection case seeking to declare defendant's two children wards of the court, based upon injuries to defendant's daughter. An attorney was appointed to represent defendant in the child protection case.

Defendant later was arrested for child endangerment, based upon the same facts giving rise to the child protection case. Detectives and assistant State's Attorneys questioned defendant in the criminal case without contacting defendant's appointed attorney in the child protection case. The trial court held that the assistant State's Attorneys violated Rule 4.2, and therefore suppressed defendant's oral and written statements to the assistant State's Attorneys. The appellate court, with one justice dissenting, reversed the trial court. 384 Ill. App. 3d 784. We now affirm the appellate court. BACKGROUND On June 21, 2002, defendant's 13-month-old daughter, S.H., was taken to Norwegian American Hospital in Chicago with injuries to her genitals. On June 23, 2002, Detectives Auguste and Antol of the Special Victims Unit were assigned to investigate the injury, based on a child abuse hotline report. Detective Auguste spoke with defendant concerning the injury. Defendant told Auguste that she had been giving her two children a bath, and that S.H. was injured when she fell on a plastic sipping cup. S.H. was initially examined by Dr. Bogolub. Dr. Bogolub said it was possible that S.H. sustained her injury in the manner claimed by defendant, but he also said that he could not rule out child abuse. On June 25, 2002, Detective Auguste received a telephone call from Dr. Fujara, a child abuse expert at Cook County Hospital in Chicago. Dr. Fujara indicated that the injury was highly suspicious because the victim's labia minora were pulled, and had been removed with a sharp object, such as a knife or a scapel. Dr. Fujara said that the cut was very clean, and that there was no bruising indicative of a "straddle injury." Dr. Fujara's opinion was that S.H. had been abused. On June 25, 2002, petitions for adjudication of wardship and motions for temporary custody of S.H. and her brother E.H. were filed in the child protection division of the circuit court of Cook County, by the juvenile division of the Cook County State's Attorney's office. That same day, attorney Melinda MacGregor was appointed attorney of record for defendant in the child protection cases. On July 13, 2002, defendant took a polygraph examination and -2-

failed. Detective Auguste interviewed defendant at the police station and confronted her with her polygraph results. Defendant then said that she gave her kids a bath, and when she walked away from the tub, she heard S.H. scream. When she returned to the tub, she noticed blood, as well as a sipping cup or a laundry detergent cap. Detective Auguste interviewed Kevin H., the victim's biological father, on July 29, 2002. Kevin H. told Auguste that defendant had a history with DCFS as a victim of sexual abuse, and that defendant had been indicated as a sexual offender against a younger cousin. Auguste confirmed the accuracy of this information. On August 27, 2002, Detective Auguste asked defendant to come to the police station. Around 11:25 a.m., Detectives Auguste and Antol read defendant her Miranda warnings and then questioned her. When Auguste asked defendant what happened, she repeated her previous account of the accident. Auguste then placed defendant under arrest for child endangerment. He also contacted the felony review division of the Cook County State's Attorney's office and requested that an assistant State's Attorney come to the station. Assistant State's Attorney Barbara Plitz arrived at the police station around 2:45 p.m. Auguste, Plitz and Lieutenant Deloughery then interviewed defendant. Plitz introduced herself, explained that she was an assistant State's Attorney and not defendant's lawyer, and advised defendant of her Miranda rights. Defendant made no inculpatory statements at this interview. When the interview was concluded, Deloughery and Plitz left the room, although Plitz remained at the station to do paperwork. Defendant, who remained in the room with Auguste, told Auguste that she thought he and Plitz were trying to get her to admit something that she did not do. Defendant told Auguste that she wanted an attorney. When Auguste relayed this information to Plitz, Plitz told Auguste that they could no longer talk to defendant, and that Plitz would make a note of defendant's request for the next assistant State's Attorney who handled the case. Around 4 p.m., defendant called for Auguste and told him that she wanted to speak with assistant State's Attorney Plitz again. Auguste told defendant that Plitz had left, and that defendant would have to wait until another assistant State's Attorney could arrive. -3-

Approximately an hour later, assistant State's Attorney Megan Meenan and Auguste met with defendant. Meenan explained to defendant that she was a prosecutor and not defendant's lawyer, and explained that she worked with Plitz. Meenan questioned defendant concerning defendant's request for a lawyer. Defendant told Meenan that she wanted to speak with her, so Meenan gave defendant her Miranda rights. Defendant stated that she understood her rights, and that she wanted to talk with Meenan and Auguste, and not to an attorney. Meenan testified at defendant's motion to suppress that she was aware there was a child protection case pending and that defendant's children had been removed from her custody. During this interview, defendant said that Aristede Brewer said he had "done it." Meenan terminated the interview, and Auguste attempted to verify defendant's claim. Around 8 p.m., Meenan and Auguste reinterviewed defendant and told her that her story did not check out. Defendant then said that she was taking a bath with her children, and when she stepped out of the tub, her daughter tried to climb out, panicked, and fell back onto a floating detergent cap. This conversation ended around 9 p.m. Defendant was taken to lock up around 10 p.m. Around 10 a.m. the next day, Detectives Gomez and Hattula interviewed defendant. Defendant was again advised of her Miranda rights. Defendant told these detectives that when she left the room while her son and S.H. were in the bathtub, she heard the sound of glass breaking. When she went back into the room, she saw S.H. bleeding from her vagina and saw her son holding the broken handle of a coffee mug or cup. The detectives chastised defendant for blaming her son and confronted her about changing her story. The detectives also confronted defendant with the medical evidence. The detectives again asked defendant if she had cut S.H. Defendant admitted that she had. Assistant State's Attorney Plitz returned to the police station around 1 p.m. Plitz, along with Detectives Gomez and Hattula, spoke with defendant and again advised her of her Miranda rights. Defendant agreed to talk and eventually made an inculpatory statement. Thereafter, defendant filed a motion to suppress her statements, and an amended motion to suppress. In the amended motion, -4-

defendant argued that she was represented by attorney MacGregor in the child protection proceedings, and that attorney MacGregor was never contacted by the Chicago police department or the office of the Cook County State's Attorney during defendant's interviews, in violation of Rule 4.2. The State responded that Rule 4.2 did not prohibit a prosecutor from speaking to a criminal defendant in a preindictment setting just because there was a pending child protection court proceeding. The State noted that the child protection court case was never discussed, the prosecutors were generally unaware of the proceeding, and defendant's confession was not sought in connection with, or for admission in, the child protection court proceedings. The State also argued that suppression of defendant's confession was not an appropriate remedy for a violation of Rule 4.2. With regard to defendant's claims concerning Rule 4.2, the trial court partially granted defendant's motion to suppress. Relying on People v. White, 209 Ill. App. 3d 844 (1991), the trial court held that Rule 4.2 applied to criminal cases as well as civil cases. Because defendant was represented by counsel in the child protection proceedings, the trial court held that Rule 4.2 was violated in this case, although the trial court found that the violation was not "willful." The trial court stated that, although the case numbers and purposes of the child protection court case and the criminal case were different, both cases involved the same facts. Therefore, the fact that defendant had an attorney in the child protection case was imputed to the prosecutors. Consequently, the prosecutors violated Rule 4.2 by talking with defendant without her child protection attorney present. However, the trial court denied defendant's motion to suppress the statements taken by the detectives because the detectives were not acting as "alter egos of the State's Attorney's office." The State subsequently filed a certificate of substantial impairment and notice of interlocutory appeal. 210 Ill. 2d R. 604(a)(1). The appellate court, with one justice dissenting, reversed. 384 Ill. App. 3d 784 (2008). On appeal, the State argued that: (1) Rule 4.2 did not apply in criminal cases; (2) if Rule 4.2 did apply in criminal cases, the rule did not apply before the filing of formal charges; (3) if Rule 4.2 applied prior to the filing of formal charges, Rule 4.2 was not violated in this case because the criminal and child protection cases -5-

were different "matters," or because the questioning at issue was authorized by law; and (4) if Rule 4.2 applied and was violated, the suppression of defendant's written statement was not the proper remedy for that violation. The appellate court majority rejected the State's claim that Rule 4.2 did not apply in criminal cases. 384 Ill. App. 3d at 788. The appellate majority found the law unsettled concerning whether Rule 4.2 applied only after formal charges were filed, but held that there was no need to address this issue because it found that Rule 4.2 did not apply in this case. 384 Ill. App. 3d at 788-89. The majority held that Rule 4.2 did not apply because the child protection case and the criminal case were different "matters" for purposes of Rule 4.2. 384 Ill. App. 3d at 789. The majority found the decision in People v. Moreno, 319 Ill. App. 3d 445 (2001), persuasive. In Moreno, the appellate court rejected the defendant's claim that the criminal charges against her should be dismissed based upon collateral estoppel, because the same factual issues giving rise to the criminal case were resolved in the defendant's favor in a juvenile case filed against defendant. Moreno, 319 Ill. App. 3d 445. Moreno held that the differences of purpose and goal in a juvenile proceeding and a criminal proceeding were "very real," and that important public policy reasons existed to prevent the application of collateral estoppel. Moreno, 319 Ill. App. 3d at 452. The appellate court majority acknowledged that Moreno arose under different facts and addressed different issues than the instant case, but agreed with Moreno's conclusion that juvenile and criminal proceedings are entirely different proceedings, serving different purposes and having different goals. 384 Ill. App. 3d at 790. Further, juvenile and criminal cases have different case numbers, are heard by different judges, and involve different employees of the State's Attorney's office. 384 Ill. App. 3d at 790. Moreover, proceedings under the Juvenile Court Act of 1987 (705 ILCS 405/1

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